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Directorate of Intelligence

Secret

# Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned Country Statements at the CSCE Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) (CDE-VII & CDE-VIII)

## 10 September – 18 October 1985
## 5 November – 20 December 1985

## Volume II

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**Reference Aid**

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*This reference aid was prepared by the Office of Central Reference. Comments and questions may be directed to Chief, USSR-EE Division, OCR*

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07729
SUBJECT: SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT APPARENTLY REACHED ON TRANSITION TO CDE EXPLORATORY PHASE
REF: STATE 301425
1. CDE VII - 041.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE NATO CAUCUS HAS APPARENTLY REACHED A SATISFACTORY AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT WITH THE EASTERN AND NNA GROUPS ON A FRAMEWORK FOR THE TRANSITION TO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE CDE. BECAUSE THE DELEGATION AGREES THAT THE AGREEMENT PROTECTS OUR INTERESTS ON ALL IMPORTANT POINTS AND BECAUSE IT IS CONSISTENT WITH REFTEL, I HAVE SAID THAT I BELIEVE IT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO WASHINGTON. IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, I WILL GIVE OUR FORMAL AGREEMENT TO THE CAUCUS MEETING AT 10:30 LOCAL TIME OCTOBER 10.
4. THE TEXT OF THE "AGREEMENT" (TRANSMITTED SEPTEL) WOULD BE CIRCULATED TO ALL DELEGATIONS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE; ACCOMPANYING ORAL STATEMENTS (ALSO SEPTEL) WOULD PROBABLY BE READ BY THE NNA COORDINATOR. IN BRIEF, THE FOLLOWING KEY POINTS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE EAST:
- A. NATO CAUCUS FORMULATION ON VERIFICATION, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION HAS SURVIVED INTACT ("IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS").
- B. NATO CAUCUS FORMULATION ON VERIFICATION SURVIVES INTACT ("CSBMS TO BE ADOPTED WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT").
- C. AN ADEQUATE FORMULATION ON CONSTRAINTS SURVIVES FROM ORIGINAL "NON-US NON-PAPER" ("CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES").
- D. US POSITION ON DRAFTING IS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED. THERE WILL BE AN INFORMAL ORAL STATEMENT, SEPARATE FROM THE "AGREEMENT," WHICH WILL READ, "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING STAGE SHOULD START, IF POSSIBLE, DURING THE EIGHTH SESSION." IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE MUST BE CONSENSUS FOR DRAFTING TO BEGIN, THIS POSITION IS SUPPORTED BY THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT, AND WE HAVE CLEARLY SIGNALLED THAT WE WILL NOT AGREE TO DRAFT UNLESS WE ARE SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLORATORY PHASE.
- E. OUR POSITION ON "CONSULTATIONS AND RAPID MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS" IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VERIFICATION/INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION PACKAGE IS PROTECTED, I.E., THE ABOVE PHRASE WILL NOT BE PART OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE WILL BE AN ORAL STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THESE TOPICS WILL BE



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RAISED, BUT THIS WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION IN ANY CASE; WE COULD NOT PREVENT THE ROMANIANS/NNAS FROM INCLUDING THEM UNDER THE SUBJECT OF "COMMUNICATIONS".
5. THERE WAS UNANIMOUS APPROVAL OF THE AGREEMENT PACKAGE IN THIS MORNINGS NATO CAUCUS. THE UK REPRESENTATIVE, WITH WHOM I HAVE CONSULTED CLOSELY, EXPECTS A GREEN LIGHT FROM LONDON.
6. THE NNA ARE A POSSIBLE FLY-IN-THE-OINTMENT SINCE THEY HAVE NOT YET FORMALLY ACCEPTED THE PACKAGE, BUT THEY ARE NOT EXPECTED TO RAISE DIFFICULTIES GIVEN THEIR EAGERNESS TO MOVE AHEAD.
7. EVEN IF WE AGREE ON MONDAY TO MOVE INTO THE
FROM USDEL CDE
FOR USIA PM DIRECTOR HOLMES FROM BARRY
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT APPARENTLY REACHED ON EXPLORATORY PHASE AND HAVE A COUPLE OF TRIAL RUNS BEFORE THIS ROUND CLOSES, PROCEDURAL WRANGLES WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUPY MUCH OF OUR TIME. PARALLEL WITH SUBSTANCE, THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW TO STRUCTURE DRAFTING. THIS COULD TAKE THE ENTIRE EIGHTH ROUND, BUT THIS GIVES US ANOTHER "FIREBREAK" IF NEEDED.
8. NONETHELESS, THE MOVE TO A MORE INFORMAL STAGE GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE A MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY TO SUBSTANCE, WHICH IN TURN ENHANCES THE PROSPECTS FOR OUR CSBMS. THIS IS AN ACCOMPLISHMENT WE CAN POINT TO WITH SATISFACTION. MUCH OF THE CREDIT BELONGS TO JIM GOODBY, WHO STRUCTURED THE BASIC OUTLINES OF THE TRANSITIONAL FRAMEWORK.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07730
SUBJECT: TEXT OF INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AND ORAL
- STATEMENTS
1. CDE VII - 042 - C - ENTIRE TEXT
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT DESCRIBING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE TRANSITION TO AN EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE CDE, AS WELL AS TEXT OF ORAL REMARKS WHICH WOULD ACCOMPANY WRITTEN TEXT. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, THIS LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTED AD REF BY THE NATO CAUCUS OCTOBER 9.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
(1) THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS A MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCESS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE ON A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE, FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
(2) IN INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WILL BE TAKEN UP:
WORKING GROUP A
- TUESDAY NON-USE OF FORCE
- WEDNESDAY EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION,
- - - COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION, AND
- - - DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, IN
- - - THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
- - - COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY
- - - CSBM'S
- THURSDAY CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF
- - - CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
WORKING GROUP B
- TUESDAY NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
- THURSDAY OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(3) INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD START DURING THE 7TH
- SESSION () WITH A VIEW TO FACILITATING AN EARLY
- TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING STAGE.
(4) BOTH IN THE EXPLORATION OF THE TOPICS MENTIONED ABOVE
- AND IN SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF LANGUAGE FOR A
- CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ALL WORK AND ALL DRAFT TEXTS WILL
- BE CONSIDERED PROVISIONAL AND WILL NEITHER IMPLY NOR
- PREJUDICE FINAL AGREEMENT ON ANY OF THE ELEMENTS
- DISCUSSED.
(5) IT IS RECALLED THAT THE CSBM'S TO BE ADOPTED WILL BE
- PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH
- CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.
() THE EXACT DATE (OCTOBER 15) MIGHT NOW BE INDICATED.
END TEXT.
4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ORAL REMARKS:
BEGIN TEXT:
(1) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, CONSULTATIONS AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED;



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(2) INFORMAL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WILL BE CHAIRED BY ROTATING CHAIRMEN;
(3) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING STAGE SHOULD START, IF POSSIBLE, DURING THE 8TH SESSION.
OCTOBER 9, 1985
NOTE: THE NN-DELEGATIONS WISH TO LEAVE OUT THE REFERENCE - TO COORDINATORS
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07781
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING, OCTOBER 10, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7730
1. CDE VII - 044.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE CDE NATO CAUCUS OCTOBER 10, DUE TO A FRENCH RESERVE, FAILED TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT AND ORAL UNDERSTANDINGS ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE REPORTED REFTEL. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS, GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) BLOCKED CONSENSUREQUIRING A CHANGE OF THE WORD "WILL" TO "COULD" IN THE AD REF WORDING OF THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING ON CONSULTATIONS -- "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, CONSULTATIONS AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED." PARIS HAD INSTRUCTED GASCHIGNARD TO OBTAIN CAUCUS AGREEMENT THAT THE NATO SPOKESMEN WOULD TELL KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) THAT NATO WAS PREPARED TO GIVE FULL AGREEMENT TO THE TEXTS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THIS CHANGE. GASCHIGNARD EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS MEANT TO PROVIDE A POLITICAL SIGNAL OF THE DIFFICULTY WE HAVE WITH THE CONCEPT OF CONSULTATIONS. THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS IN THE CAUCUS TO ACCEPT THE FRENCH POSITION, WHICH MOST DELEGATIONS VIEWED AS DANGEROUS BOTH BECAUSE IT WOULD PROMPT OTHER CHANGES FROM THE EAST AND NNA'S, AND WOULD MAKE THE WEST APPEAR TO BE BLOCKING AN AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE, GASCHIGNARD FURTHER INDICATED THAT, IF THE CAUCUS COULD NOT AGREE TO HAVE THE SPOKESMEN MAKE THIS POINT ON BEHALF OF NATO, HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH KAHILUOTO AS SOON A POSSIBLE (I.E., TODAY) AND MAKE IT IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY.
4. THE CAUCUS SPENT SEVERAL HOURS SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION OF THIS SEEMING IMPASSE. DISCUSSION WAS PARTICULARLY CHARGED FOLLOWING GASCHIGNARD'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD GO TO KAHILUOTO DIRECTLY IF THE CAUCUS COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FRENCH POSITION. BARRY (U.S.) SUPPORTED FRANCE'S SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS ON CONSULTATIONS, AND REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT HE ALSO HAD VOICED SOME CONCERN OVER THE VERB "WILL" IN THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING. HE NOTED THAT MANY, IF NOT ALL, CAUCUS MEMBERS PROBABLY SHARED FRANCE'S SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS ON THIS ISSUE. FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION OF SEVERAL OPTIONS, THE CAUCUS AGREED TO AN APPROACH SUGGESTED BY THE U.S. WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE FRENCH TO SEND THEIR POLITICAL SIGNAL WITHOUT DEMANDING A CHANGE IN THE TEXT, THEREBY PREVENTING AN OPEN DISPLAY OF CAUCUS DISUNITY. THE CAUCUS INSTRUCTED THE NATO SPOKESMEN TO TELL KAHILUOTO (ON THE EVENING OF OCT. 10) THAT "THE CAUCUS HAS NOT ARRIVED AT A FINAL CONSENSUS; A PROBLEM REMAINS WITH RELATION TO CONSULTATIONS." IF PRESSED BY



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KAHILUOTO AS TO WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS, THE SPOKESMEN WERE INSTRUCTED TO RESPOND THAT " WE (THE CAUCUS) WILL TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM AMONG OURSELVES." ON THE BASIS OF THIS APPROACH, GASCHIGNARD AGREED NOT TO APPROACH KAHILUOTO AT THIS TIME.

5. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION, THE CAUCUS WAS INFORMED THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAD PASSED VIRTUALLY THE SAME MESSAGE TO KAHILUOTO BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN "UNABLE TO SOLVE ROMANIA'S PROBLEM" (ROMANIA APPARENTLY WANTED THE ORAL POINT ON CONSULTATIONS EITHER STRENGHTENED OR MADE PART OF THE WRITTEN TEXT). THE CAUCUS AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE AT 9:45 AM ON OCTOBER 11.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07822
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, OCTOBER 10, 1985
1. CDE VII - 045
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BECAUSE OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS' PREOCCUPATION WITH REACHING A PROCEDURAL SOLUTION ONLY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DELIVERED A PREPARED STATEMENT AT THE OCTOBER 11 PLENARY. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY REAFFIRMED GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS WHICH WOULD COVER NAVAL, AIR, GROUND ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS. IN SO DOING, HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS MORE MEANINGFUL THAN THE WEST'S LIMITED MEASURE WHICH ONLY DEALT WITH LAND ACTIVITIES. IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) SAID GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS WAS A POSITIVE STEP, BUT HIS DELEGATION WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE "SMALL PRINT" OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE ANNUAL FORECASTS OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. (FULL TEXT OF GRINEVSKY'S STATEMENT SENT SEPTEL.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07821
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD
- OF USSR DELEGATION TO CDE, OCTOBER 11, 1985
REF: TEL CDE VII - 045
1. CDE VII - 046
2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE STATEMENT DELIVERED OCTOBER 11, 1985, BY THE HEAD OF THE USSR DELEGATION TO THE CDE FOLLOWS.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,
- ADDRESSING IN PARIS MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV REAFFIRMED THE READINESS OF OUR COUNTRY TO PROMOTE THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT IS PRECISELY WITH THIS AIM IN MIND, WITH THE AIM OF SEEKING ACCORDS REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE IN THE MILITARY FIELD THAT THE SOVIET UNION, AS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV INDICATED, WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS SOVIET PROPOSAL IS AIMED AT GIVING NEW IMPETUS TO THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM FORUM. IN FACT, ANOTHER IMPORTANT TOPIC IS BEING INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE, THAT OF EXCHANGING ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND NOT IN A CURTAILED FORM PROPOSED BY SOME STATES BUT ON A BROAD PLANE COVERING ALL TYPES OF MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS OF FORCES. IT IS SUCH AN APPROACH TO AN AGREEMENT IN THIS FIELD THAT WILL HELP OVERCOME SUSPICION AND IMPEDE A COVERT PREPARATION OF WAR.
- MAKE YOUR JUDGMENT. THE NUMBER OF MILITARY MANEUVERS IN EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREAS AND AIR SPACE HAS BEEN GROWING WITH EACH YEAR. THEY REPRESENT THOROUGHLY COORDINATED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN LAND AND SEA THEATERS AND IN AIR. IN THEIR FRAMEWORK AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS AND TRANSFERS OF TROOPS HAVE BEEN ACQUIRING AN EVER-THREATENING DIMENSION. THE SCOPE AND THE SCALE OF THOSE MANEUVERS CONDUCTED ON LAND, AT SEA AND IN AIR ARE SUCH THAT THEY COULD BE UTILIZED TO DEMONSTRATE FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. ALL THIS IS ELOQUENTLY MANIFESTED BY NUMEROUS FACTS NOT ONLY OF PAST BUT OF RECENT HISTORY.
-
- IF WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT A GREAT NUMBER OF GROUND TROOPS, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES ARE PUT IN FULL COMBAT READINESS AND HAVE THE NECESSARY AMMUNITION THIS ACTIVITY RESEMBLES, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, A PRELUDE TO WAR AND THUS LEADS TO INCREASED SUSPICION AND DISTRUST. THESE SERIOUS QUESTIONS HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND MUST BE CONSIDERED AT THE CONFERENCE.



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- IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO ELABORATE SOMEWHAT ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS PROPOSAL LIKE OTHER CBM'S, WHETHER LIMITATION, NOTIFICATION OR OBSERVATION MEASURES, SHOULD, AS THE SOVIET UNION REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT, ENSURE THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO EQUAL SECURITY AND ASSURE A SITUATION WHERE NO STATE OR GROUP OF STATES COULD OBTAIN ADVANTAGES OVER THE OTHERS.
- THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS COULD NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT UNLESS THEY COVER THE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY NOT ONLY OF GROUND TROOPS BUT ALSO OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF TROOPS OF EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREAS AND AIR SPACE. THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDS HERE FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVISIBLE SECURITY, ITS COMPREHENSIVE CONSIDERATION

FROM USDEL
USIA FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD

IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES. WE ARE OPPOSED TO ANY SELECTIVE COVERAGE BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF A PARTICULAR TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. A BROAD APPROACH IS IN FULL AND COMPLETE ACCORD WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE. THE "MILITARY ACTIVITIES" CONCEPT IN THE MANDATE IS FAR BROADER THAN THE ACTIVITIES OF GROUND TROOPS OR THE SO-CALLED OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES.
- IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT INFANTRY IS NO LONGER THE QUEEN OF BATTLEFIELDS. NEW GODS OF WAR AT SEA AND IN AIR WITH THEIR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES AND FORMIDABLE WEAPONRY ROCK SECURITY IN EUROPE DURING MANEUVERS. IT IS PRECISELY THESE MAJOR MANEUVERS, THEIR AREAS AND DATES THAT ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS SHOULD BE INFORMED OF IN ADVANCE. THEY SHOULD BE NOTIFIABLE AND SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANNUAL PLANS. IN THIS WAY WE COULD REDUCE SUSPICIONS AND IMPEDE A COVERT PREPARATION OF WAR.
- INCIDENTALLY, SOME OF OUR COLLEAGUES HERE IN THIS HALL HAVE SPENT MUCH EFFORT TO TRY AND CONVINCE THE CONFERENCE THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY IS THREATENED ONLY WITH GROUND TROOPS AND THAT AS FAR AS AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES GO THEY ARE JUST A SORT OF INNOCENT TOURIST CRUISES IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, LET ME QUOTE A DIFFERENT OPINION BY A NO LESS AND, PERHAPS, EVEN MORE AUTHORITATIVE EXPERT ON THE MATTER. I HAVE IN MIND GENERAL ROGERS, SUPREME COMMANDER OF NATO ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE, WHOSE OPINION, APPARENTLY, SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED. IN HIS RECENT INTERVIEW TO THE FRENCH SCIENCE ET VIE MAGAZINE PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER UNDER THE HEADLINE "NEW



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STRATEGY FOR EUROPE" HE SAID THAT MODERN WARFARE MUST ACHIEVE BASIC OBJECTIVES BY AIR STRIKES OF OUR (U.S.) AIRCRAFT AND OUR (U.S.) MISSILES AND NOT ON LAND AND NOT BY GROUND FORCES. THE SAME GOES FOR THE NAVY.

- WHAT ARE, THEN, THE GROUNDS ON WHICH IT HAS BEEN PERSISTENTLY SUGGESTED TO US THAT AIR AND NAVAL FORCES -- THESE STRIKE FORCES OF MODERN WARFARE WHICH, ACCORDING TO GENERAL ROGERS, MUST ACHIEVE BASIC OBJECTIVES -- BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES? THE ANSWER CAN BE SIMPLE: EITHER THEY DO NOT WANT TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE OR THEY WANT TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR THEMSELVES.

- BOTH APPROACHES ARE ALIEN TO THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION.

- NOW THAT THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FIGURES IN THE PROPOSALS OF ALL THREE GROUPS OF STATES THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT AND THE NEGOTIATION OF CORRESPONDING AGREEMENTS COULD BE INTENSIFIED. WE WILL HAVE TO AGREE ON ONE QUESTION: WHAT SHOULD BE THE CONTENT OF THOSE FORECASTS, WHAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THEM AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE MAGNITUDE OF INFORMATION GIVEN ON EACH ACTIVITY. CERTAINLY, THE ISSUE AT HAND SHOULD BE THE INCLUSION NOT OF THE DAY-TO-DAY COMBAT TRAINING OF GROUND TROOPS AT TRAINING FIELDS, TEST RANGES AND FIRE RANGES WHERE TROOPS OF ANY STATE ARE ENGAGED IN ROUTINE TRAINING BUT RATHER OF MAJOR MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS AND AIR AND NAVAL FORCES WHICH INDEED POSE A THREAT TO SECURITY.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

- THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DEMONSTRATE IN PRACTICE THEIR READINESS TO INTENSIFY THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIONS OF OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. IT IS CLEAR FROM OUR STATED READINESS TO ACCEPT AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF

FROM USDEL
USIA FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE EXPECT APPROPRIATE RESPONSES FROM THE OTHER PARTICIPATNS IN THE CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO START, AT LAST, MOVING TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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# S T A T E M E N T

by Oleg A.GRINEVSKY,
Ambassador at Large,
Head of the USSR Delegation
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

Stockholm, October 11, 1985



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Mr. Chairman,

Addressing in Paris members of the French Parliament the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev reffirmed the readiness of our country to promote the solution of the problem of strengthening confidence and security in Europe. It is precisely with this aim in mind, with the aim of seeking accords regarding the problem of confidence in the military field that the Soviet Union, as Mikhail Gorbachev indicated, was prepared to accept agreement on the exchange of annual plans of notifiable military activities. This Soviet proposal is aimed at giving new impetus to the work of the Stockholm forum. In fact, another important topic is being included in the agenda of the Conference, that of exchanging annual plans of military activities, and not in a curtailed form proposed by some states but on a broad plane covering all types of manoeuvres and movements of forces. It is such an approach to an agreement in this field that will help overcome suspicion and impede a covert preparation of war.

Make your judgement. The number of military manoeuvres in Europe and in the adjoining sea (ocean) areas and air space has been growing with each year. They represent thoroughly coordinated military activities in land and sea theatres and in air. In their framework air and naval manoeuvres and transfers of troops have been acquiring an ever threatening dimension. The scope and the scale of those manoeuvres conducted on land, at sea and in air are such that they could be utilized to demonstrate force for political intimidation. All this is eloquently manifeste by numerous facts not only of past but of recent history.



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If we take into account that a great number of ground troops, air and naval forces are put in full combat readiness and have the necessary ammunition this activity resembles, for all practical purposes, a prelude to war and thus leads to encreased suspicion and distrust. These serious questions have a direct bearing on confidence and security in Europe and must be considered at the Conference.

In this connection I wish to elaborate somewhat on certain aspects of the position of the Soviet Union regarding exchanges of annual plans of notifiable military activities. This proposal like other CBMs, whether limitation, notification or observation measures, should, as the Soviet Union repeatedly pointed out, ensure the right of each state to equal security and assure a situation where no state or group of states could obtain advantages over the others.

The exchange of annual plans could not satisfy this requirement unless they cover the notifiable activity not only of ground troops but also of air and naval forces, as well as movements (transfers) of troops in Europe and in the adjoining sea (ocean) areas and air space. The Soviet Union proceeds here from the principle of indivisible security, its comprehensive consideration in the interests of all European states. We are opposed to any selective coverage by confidence-building measures of a particular type of military activity. A broad approach is in full and complete accord with the mandate of the Conference. The "military activities" concept in the mandate is far broader than the activities of ground troops or the so called out-of-garrison activities.



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It must be admitted that infantry is no longer the queen of battlefields. New gods of war at sea and in air with their advanced technologies and formidable weaponry rock security in Europe during manoeuvres. It is precisely these major manoeuvres, their areas and dates that all the participants in the all-European process should be informed of in advance. They should be notifiable and such information should be included in annual plans. In this way we could reduce suspicions and impede a covert preparation of war.

Incidentally, some of our colleagues here in this hall have spent much effort to try and convince the Conference that European security is threatened only with ground troops and that as far as air and naval activities go they are just a sort of innocent tourist cruises in Europe. However, let me quote a different opinion by a no less and, perhaps, even more authoritative expert on the matter. I have in mind General Rogers, Supreme Commander of NATO armed forces in Europe, whose opinion, apparently, should not be overlooked. In his recent interview to the French Science Et Vie magazine published in October under the headline "New strategy for Europe" he said that modern warfare must achieve basic objectives by air strikes of our (U.S.) aircraft and our (U.S.) missiles and not on land and not by ground forces. The same goes for the Navy.

What are, then, the grounds on which it has been persistently suggested to us that air and naval forces - these strike forces of modern warfare which, according to General Rogers, must achieve basic objectives - be excluded from the scope of confidence-building measures? The answer can be simple: either they do not want to strengthen confidence and security in Europe or they want to obtain unilateral advantages for themselves. 219

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Both approaches are alien to the Soviet Union's position.

Now that the exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable military activities figures in the proposals of all three groups of states the exchange of views on the subject and the negotiation of corresponding agreements could be intensified. We will have to agree on one question: what should be the content of those forecasts, what should be included in them and what should be the magnitude of information given on each activity. Certainly, the issue at hand should be the inclusion not of the day-to-day combat training of ground troops at training fields, test ranges and fire ranges where troops of any state are engaged in routine training but rather of major manoeuvres and movements of troops and air and naval forces which indeed pose a threat to security.

Mr.Chairman,

The socialist countries demonstrate in practice there readiness to intensify the work of the Conference and take into account the positions of our negotiating partners. It is clear from our stated readiness to accept agreement on mutual exchanges of annual plans of military activities. We expect appropriate responses from the other participants in the Conference in order to start, at last, moving to mutually acceptable accords.



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SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET 01 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 08022
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF OCTOBER 7-11, 1985
1. THIS IS CDE -061.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. LITTLE NEW GROUND WAS PLOWED, AS NATO AND WTO CONTINUED TO HOLD THEIR OWN. NNA REMAINED QUIET. FOR THE SECOND WEEK, THE WTO ALSO REMAINED SILENT IN THE WORKING GROUP ON VERIFICATION. AND, OF INTEREST, CZECHOSLOVAKIA INDICATED THAT THE WTO MAY BE READY TO DISCUSS THE OBSERVATION REGIME, PROVIDED IT IS CONSIDERED "HAND IN HAND" WITH THE ELABORATION OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING GROUP AB.
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF WG AB THIS WEEK.
5. WORKING GROUP B: NOTIFICATION -- OCTOBER 8, 1985.
DEMARK (HOWARD) DEFENDED SC.1'S FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AS GROUND FORCES CAN SEIZE AND OCCUPY TERRITORY. SMALL STATES BELIEVE LOWER THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, HE SAID. HOWARD NOTED THAT THE SC.1 PROPOSAL ON "ALERT" ACTIVITIES STRIKES A GOOD BALANCE BETWEEN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF MILITARY FORCES TO CONDUCT REALISTIC TRAINING.
POLAND (STANIEVSKY) ASSERTED THAT THE MEANING OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT IS STILL UNCLEAR AND ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERED ARE UNCLEAR. A CLOSE EXAMINATION REVEALS THAT SC.1 SPONSORS SPEAK ONLY OF MANEUVERS. STANIEVSKY ASKED IF SC.1 AUTHORS ENVISAGED DIFFERENT NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS FOR MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS.
NETHERLANDS (VAN DER GRAAF) SAID THAT DESPITE ASSURANCES THAT THE EXERCISE "DRUZHBA 85" WAS WELL BELOW THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, UP TO 30,000 TROOPS COULD HAVE PARTICIPATED, USING THE USSR (TATARNIKOV) MODEL FOR STRUCTURING AN EXERCISE. THE PRESENCE OF HIGH-RANKING AUTHORITIES AND THE LEVEL OF PRESS COVERAGE ALSO SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE EXERCISE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED, VAN DER GRAAF SAID.



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FRG (SCHMIDBAUER) NOTED THAT IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF DIFFERENT STRENGTHS OF DIFFERENT DIVISIONS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA MADE REFERENCE ONLY TO PERSONNEL, NOT OTHER IMPORTANT DIVISION ELEMENTS. DIVISIONS ARE STRUCTURED AS EACH COUNTRY SEES FIT, HE NOTED, JUST AS MOSCOW HAS DETERMINED WTO DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE.
FRANCE (MERIC) SAID THAT THE WEST HAS NOT REJECTED NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. HE ACCUSSED CZECHOSLOVAKIA OF BEING MORE RIGID THAN ITS EASTERN COLLEAGUES. IF YOU WON'T LISTEN TO SC.1 SPONSORS, HE SAID, AT LEAST LISTEN TO YOUR WTO COLLEAGUES.
UK (BACK), ANALYZING THE NOTIFICATION OF "KAVKAZ 85" IN TERMS OF THE HFA AND WTO WGB.1 CRITERIA, SAID THE RESULT REPRESENTED LITTLE IF ANY IMPROVEMENT OVER THE HFA.
USSR (TATARNIKOV) ROSE TO THE DEFENSE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, TELLING FRANCE (MERIC) NOT TO WORRY ABOUT NUANCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE HE AGREED THAT EVERY STATE HAS A RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN DIVISIONAL STRUCTURES, TATARNIKOV SAID THAT MANNING LEVELS MUST BE CONSIDERED. SOME DIVISIONS, HE CONCLUDED, ARE MANNED AT AS LOW AS 20 PER CENT; WHILE ONE CAN HARDLY CALL THAT A DIVISION, IT MAY PLAY AS A DIVISION IN AN EXERCISE.
FRANCE (MERIC) STATED THAT A NUANCE WAS THE USSR'S (TATARNIKOV) EXPLANATION OF THE 20,000 NUMERICAL THRESHOLD IN TERMS OF STRUCTURE.
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
SWITZERLAND (SCHARLI) SOUGHT TO HEAD OFF CRITICISM OVER THE FACT THAT SWITZERLAND DID NOT INVITE OBSERVERS TO ITS NATIONAL EXERCISE "TORNADO", NOTIFIED ON AUGUST 25, WHICH BEGAN OCTOBER 7 AND RUNS UNTIL OCTOBER 17, PROVIDING SOME DETAIL ON THE EXERCISE. THE FACT THAT THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION DID NOT CORRESPOND TO SWITZERLAND'S VIEWS ON STANDARDIZED NOTIFICATION WAS NOT A CONTRADICTION, HE ASSERTED. ALL STATES MUST FIRST DEMONSTRATE A WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN SUCH NOTIFICATIONS. SWITZERLAND WILL NOT RISK THE FIRST STEP IN SUCH SENSITIVE AREAS (ARMY MOUNTAIN CORPS 3) UNTIL OTHERS SHOW GOOD WILL.
6. WORKING GROUP A: NON USE OF FORCE -- OCTOBER 8, 1985.



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ASSERTING THAT SC.1 SPONSORS WERE ADDRESSING NUF IN MORE CONCRETE TERMS, GDR (GEORGI) ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS NOW "HIGH TIME" TO SEEK COMMON NUF LANGUAGE AND MOVE TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS. THE CRITERIA FOR A CREDIBLE NUF COMMITMENT, AS OUTLINED BY THE FRG ON OCT 1, WERE MET IN SC.6'S BASIC ELEMENTS. THE GDR SUPPORTS ENRICHING THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE "CSCE DIMENSION", TO SERVE AS THE CORNERSTONE FOR A NEW PHASE OF DETENTE IN EUROPE. GEORGI ASKED THE FRG DELEGATION, IN LIGHT OF AN EARLIER STATEMENT, FOR ITS IDEAS ON A CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONCRETE NUF FORMULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONCRETE CSBM'S, AND FOR NUF FORMULATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE POLITICALLY BINDING EFFECT.
HUNGARY (KORMENDY) NOTED APPROVINGLY THAT THE FRG HAD

SAID EARLIER THAT "NO POLITICAL AIM, NO CONCEPTION OF LAW OR RIGHTS, NO IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION CAN JUSTIFY THE USE OF FORCE." HE INTERPRETED THIS STATEMENT IN STRICT WTO TERMS: NUCLEAR ARSENALS HAVE CHANGED THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OR MANIFESTATION OF FORCE AND THUS JUSTIFY A NEW EMPHASIS ON THE NUF COMMITMENT. KORMENDY AGREED WITH AN EARLIER U.S. STATEMENT THAT THE APPROACH TO A NUF REAFFIRMATION: SHOULD BE PRECISE, "BE BASED ON" THE LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE FINAL ACT (AS OPPOSED TO U.S. REP'S STATEMENT THAT THIS LANGUAGE SHOULD BE "USED"), SHOULD DEAL WITH BOTH THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE, AND SHOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES IN THEIR MUTUAL, AS WELL AS THEIR INTERNATIONAL, RELATIONS. KORMENDY DID NOT CHALLENGE THE CREDIBILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE TEN FINAL ACT PRINCIPLES, BUT DID NOTE THAT HUNGARY INTERPRETS THEIR PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND EQUALITY DIFFERENTLY THAN DOES THE U.S. AS FOR THE U.S. (GUNDERSEN) VIEW THAT AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM WOULD BE REVIEWED PERIODICALLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE HELSINKI REVIEW PROCESS, ADVOCATED CONSULTATIONS AND EXCHANGE OF NECESSARY INFORMATION IN THE EVENT OF THE RISK OF WAR (AS OUTLINED IN PARA 8 OF SC.6) INSTEAD.
BULGARIA (RADOUKOV) CONTENDED THAT THE UN CHARTER, THE FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ADDRESSED THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY. HE CRITICIZED THE "MINIMALIST" APPROACH OF SOME (WESTERN) DELEGATIONS WHICH FAVOR THE "MERE REPETITION" OF UN CHARTER AND FINAL ACT NUF LANGUAGE, ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD NOT GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF OBLIGATION IN ALL WAYS AND FORMS, AS CALLED FOR IN THE FINAL ACT.



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SPAIN (LORENZO) DEBUNKED THE EAST'S EFFORTS AT PROMOTING A NUF TREATY, CITING ARTICLE 35 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON LAWS AND TREATIES TO THE EFFECT THAT A TREATY IS VOID WHEN IT GOES AGAINST AN IMPERATIVE NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (NORM OF THE SAME CHARACTER). NOTING THAT THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IS SUCH A NORM, THE SPANISH DELEGATE CRITICIZED THE SC.6'S
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<< SECTION 3 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
EMPHASIS ON A TREATY WHEN NUF ALREADY HAS A MAXIMUM OBLIGATORY NATURE. RECALLING THE CYPRIOT SUGGESTION THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION INCLUDE THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, LORENZO REMINDED THE CONFERENCE THAT IN 1959 THE

UN CREATED A SPECIAL COMMITTEE WHICH TOOK MORE THAN A QUARTER OF A CENTURY TO COME UP WITH A DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION AND A NON-RESTRICTIVE LIST OF ACTS WHICH CONSTITUTE AGGRESSION. HE FURTHER ARGUED THAT THE MADRID MANDATE DID NOT CALL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OR CODIFICATION OF SUCH PRINCIPLES, BUT RATHER HAD CHARGED THE CONFERENCE TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE THROUGH NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS, I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S.
RAKHMANINOV (USSR) DISAGREED WITH LORENZO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE UN CHARTER, ARGUING THAT IT DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIONAL AGREEMENTS WHICH "INCLUDE THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY." HE INSISTED THAT THE CDE DID NOT NEED PERMISSION TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE.
CYPRUS (PAPADAPOULOS) AGAIN SAID THAT WE ARE CHARGED TO GIVE THE NUF PRINCIPLE A "CDE DIMENSION"; IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT THE NUF PRINCIPLE WAS SINGLED OUT IN THE MADRID MANDATE. HE ACCEPTED THE FRG'S TERM "CSCE DIMENSION", SAYING THAT IT ALSO WOULD GIVE THE PRINCIPLE THE "CDE DIMENSION", I.E., THE "MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" AS PART OF THE DEFINITION OF THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE. HE ASKED OTHERS FOR PROPOSALS ON HOW TO DO THIS.



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7. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION -- OCTOBER 9, 1985.
ITALY (DE BERNARDIN) STRESSED THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS COUPLED WITH THEIR TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION. AN ESSENTIAL PART OF VERIFICATION/INSPECTION IS ITS PREPARATION INCLUDING THE REQUEST AND RESPONSE. DEDICATED COMMUNICATION LINKS WILL ENHANCE TIMELY PREPARATION, AND COULD ALSO BE USED TO MANAGE THE NORMAL FLOW OF INFORMATION RELATING TO CSBM'S. DE BERNARDIN SAID THAT THE SC.1 VERIFICATION PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO FIT THE NEED AND NOT BE OVERLY INTRUSIVE. THUS, THE INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD NOT PROLONG ITS ACTIVITIES OVER 48 HOURS. SC.1/MEASURE 1 PROVIDES FOR PROVISION OF STATIC INFORMATION THAT WILL ASSIST IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY AND WILL ALLOW THE AUTHORITY REQUESTING AN INSPECTION TO BE EXACT IN SPECIFYING LOCATION. PRIOR INFORMATION ASSISTS A COUNTRY IN DEVELOPING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS TO ASK AND THEREBY FACILITATES SPEEDY INSPECTION.
ROMANIA (BUHOARA) CONTINUED ITS SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, ASSERTING THAT PROPOSALS TO DATE CONFIRM "WITHOUT A DOUBT" THE IMPORTANCE COUNTRIES ATTACH TO SETTING UP MEANS AND PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION, CONSULTATION, AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN STATES. DIFFERENCES IN POSITIONS NOTWITHSTANDING, SEVERAL

CONVERGENT AND COMPLIMENTARY ELEMENTS ARE EMERGING. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION, COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION CONSTITUTE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE SAME EFFORT -- TO CONTRIBUTE TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION AND TO COMPLIMENT AND STRENGTHEN EACH OTHER. SC.1, SC.3, AND THE ROMANIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE ALL ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS. AND THOSE WITH NO CONCRETE PROPOSALS, HE ASSERTED, HAVE BEEN FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE. HE CITED THE SEPTEMBER 23 U.S. (HANSEN) STATEMENT AS ENCOURAGING, INASMUCH AS THE U.S. AGREES PARTIALLY THAT AT LEAST IN GENERAL TERMS CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION ARE IMPORTANT. HE CONTENDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S.
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 4 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF



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MISUNDERSTOOD THE ROMANIAN POSITION; THE ROMANIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE ADDRESSES THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING FACT-FINDING PROCEDURES UNDER EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES. HE ARGUED AGAINST AN EARLIER PORTUGUESE ASSERTION THAT THERE WERE ONLY TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION AT THIS CONFERENCE, RECALLING OTHER APPROACHES OUTSIDE OF THE TWO BLOCS: SWEDEN (VERIFICATION BY CHALLENGE), AUSTRIA VERIFICATION BY CHOICE), AND ROMANIA ( FACT-FINDING).

DENMARK (ROSENTHAL) NOTED THAT THE DEGREE OF CRITICISM OF THE SC.1 VERIFICATION/INSPECTION PROPOSAL VARIES. SOME HAVE ADMITTED IDEAS THAT ARE NOT DIFFERENT FROM INSPECTION, SUCH AS VERIFICATION BY CHALLENGE, OBSERVATION BY CHALLENGE, AND THE CONCEPT OF FACT-FINDING. ALL HAVE IN COMMON THE VIEW THAT THESE ACTIVITIES WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. CRITICISM OF SC.1 IS FREQUENTLY BASED, HE OBSERVED, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WILL LEAD TO A MASSIVE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS. THE WTO HAS CALCULATED THAT IF EACH OF THE 35 STATES COULD CARRY OUT TWO INSPECTIONS IN EACH OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, IT WOULD RESULT IN OVER 2,000 SUCH INSPECTIONS A YEAR. BUT SC.1 STATES THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE COULD CARRY OUT NO MORE THAN TWO INSPECTIONS PER YEAR -- A TOTAL OF ONLY 70. AND, ROSENTHAL SAID, INSPECTIONS ARE NOT NECESSARY SO-CALLED "ON-SITE INSPECTIONS" AS THE INSPECTION CAN BE BASED IN THE AIR OR ON THE GROUND. AN AERIAL INSPECTION WAS NOT AN ON-SITE INSPECTION. IN ANY EVENT, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE QUOTA FOR INSPECTIONS WILL BE FILLED, HE SAID, AS A COUNTRY WILL WANT TO HOLD AT LEAST ONE IN RESERVE SHOULD IT BE NEEDED LATER. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT THE SC.1 OBJECTIVES WERE MODEST -- TO ESTABLISH A NARROWLY LIMITED SYSTEM OF INSPECTION THAT WILL BE ABLE TO COPE EFFECTIVELY WITH A KIND OF SITUATION THAT COULD LEAD TO HOSTILITY. (COMMENT: SEVERAL NATO DELEGATIONS QUESTIONED HIS CONTENTION THAT AN AERIAL INSPECTION OVER A CERTASIN AREA WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN "ON-SITE" INSPECTION PER SE. END COMMENT.)

8. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATION -- OCTOBER 10, 1985. IRELAND (O'CONNEL) SAID WE MUST DEVELOP AN OBSERVATION REGIME THAT MEETS ITS AGREED PURPOSE. OUTLINING A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS FOR INCORPORATION IN AN OBSERVATION REGIME IN ORDER TO MEET ITS PURPOSE, HE OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NO ACCIDENT THAT HIS IDEAS PARALLELED THOSE OF OTHERS (SC.1/AMPLIFIED). WHILE THE FINAL ACT HAS A STRONG DIMENSION OF GOOD WILL, IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE PURPOSE. IN THE UN SYSTEM, HE OBSERVED, OBSERVATION IS MORE STRINGENT AND IS CONNECTED WITH A STRONG VERIFICATION DIMENSION. IN CONCLUSION, O'CARROL SUGGESTED THAT THIS MAY BE A PERTENENT EXAMPLE FOR OUR DISCUSSIONS.



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U.S. (MCPEAK) AGREED WITH TWO USSR (TATARNIKOV) REMARKS: IT IS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE PRACTICE OF OBSERVATION BE TRANSFORMED INTO VERIFICATION, AND THE SECURITY OF THE STATE HOSTING OBSERVERS SHOULD NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED. OBSERVATION WILL NOT FULFILL THE MADRID MANDATE CRITERIA THAT CSBMS BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE, HE STATED. SC.1'S OBSERVATION MEASURE IS DESIGNED TO MEASURE COMPLIANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ROUTINE, WHILE ITS VERIFICATION MEASURE IS DESIGNED TO FOCUS PRIMARILY ON ANOMALOUS SITUATIONS. AND WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT AN OBSERVER CANNOT SEE EVERY ASPECT OF EVERY PHASE OF A MANEUVER, HE POINTED OUT, IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE HOST STATE TO ENSURE THAT AS MUCH AS CAN BE SEEN WILL BE SEEN.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA REITERATED THAT AN AGREEMENT OF WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED AND SUBSEQUENTLY SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION MUST BE REACHED PRIOR TO DEVELOPMENT OF

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 5 >>>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF

AN OBSERVATION REGIME. ALTHOUGH WE HAVEN'T REACHED SUCH AN AGREEMENT, HE SAID, THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE HAVE NOT ACCOMPLISHED ANYTHING. WE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING THE PREREQUISITES FOR FURTHER AND MORE IN DEPTH CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM. FOR ITS PART, THE WTO HAVE ATTEMPTED TO FURTHER THE DIALOGUE BY PUTTING FORWARD OBSERVATION SCENARIOS. AND, HE SAID, ENOUGH PREREQUISITE GROUNDWORK HAS BEEN LAID TO BEGIN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF OBSERVATION IN ITS FULL RANGE, SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH NOTIFICATION. RECALLING THAT SC.1 PROVIDES FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, HE ASKED FOR THE VIEWS OF SC.1 SPONSORS ON HOW OBSERVATION OF THESE NAVAL AND SEA ELEMENTS WOULD PROCEED. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT: (1) WE NEED TO DETERMINE THE ACTIVITIES TO WHICH OBSERVERS ARE INVITED; AND (2) TO DETERMINE THE INTERACTION BETWEEN NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION OF THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION ACTIVITIES. THIS REQUIRES A REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY EFFECTS OF THE MEASURES ADOPTED.



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9. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS -- OCTOBER 10, 1985. THIS REMARKABLY BRIEF MEETING FEATURED A SHORT STATEMENT BY ITALY (BLAIS). BLAIS CRITICIZED THE INTERPRETATION OF HIS OCTOBER 3 SPEECH FROM ITALIAN INTO RUSSIAN, NOTING THAT IT HAD BEEN RELAYED FROM FRENCH. JUDGING FROM THE USSR'S (TATARNIKOV) REACTION TO THIS STATEMENT (BLAIS' IDEAS WERE CHARACTERIZED AS "EXTRAVAGANT" AND "NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ADEQUATE LOGICAL ARGUMENTS,"), BLAIS SURMISED THAT SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF HIS REMARKS MUST HAVE BEEN LOST IN THE TRANSLATION. HE CONCLUDED BY PRECISELY REPEATING THE MAIN POINTS OF HIS OCTOBER 3 STATEMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07820
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS OF OCTOBER 11, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7781

1. CDE VII - 48
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THREE NATO CAUCUS SESSIONS ON OCTOBER 11 ONCE AGAIN FOCUSED ON THE PENDING INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT, AND THE CONTINUING FRENCH RESERVE TO THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING ON CONSULTATIONS (REFTEL). BY THE END OF THE DAY IT APPEARED THAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS THE ONLY REMAINING OBSTACLE TO FULL CONFERENCE ACCORD ON THE AGREEMENT. DURING THE MORNING CAUCUS SESSION GASCHIGNARD INDICATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM OCTOBER 10 (WHICH APPARENTLY ALLOWED HIM NO ROOM TO MANEUVER), AND THAT FRANCE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT A STRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL NEEDED TO BE SENT ON CONSULTATIONS. GASCHIGNARD WAS UNMOVED BY THE COMMENTS OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT THE NATO SPOKESMEN HAD SENT SUCH A SIGNAL THE PREVIOUS EVENING WHEN THEY HAD TOLD KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) THAT, "ONE PROBLEM REMAINS WITH RELATION TO CONSULTATIONS". BARRY (U.S.) SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS OTHER WORDING OF THE ORAL POINT COULD RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM. CITRON (FRG) PROPOSED, "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, THERE WILL BE A POSSIBILITY TO DISCUSS CONSULTATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S". GASCHIGNARD AGREED TO THIS SUGGESTION; HOWEVER, AS THERE WAS NO CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO PRESENT IT AS A NATO POSITION, THE SPOKESMEN WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY IT TO KAHILUOTO AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE "CONSULTATIONS PROBLEM".
4. DURING THE AFTERNOON, THE CAUCUS SPOKESMEN REPORTED THE RESULTS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH KAHILUOTO. KAHILUOTO HAD INDICATED THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE TO THE NNA CAUCUS, BUT THAT THE CAUCUS DID NOT WANT TO REOPEN DISCUSSION AND HAS TAKEN THE FIRM POSITION THAT THERE SLOULD BE NO FURTHER CHANGES TO THE TEXTS. KAHILUOTO HAD FURTHER INFORMED THE SPOKESMEN THAT CETERCHI (ROMANIA) HAD TOLD HIM THAT ROMANIA WOULD NOT BLOC CONSENSUS ON THE AGREEMENT, WHICH IT WAS PREPARED TO GIVE ONCE THE WEST HAD ACCEPTED THE FULL TEXTS. FOLLOWING THIS REPORT, THE CHAIR (NORWAY) REMARKED THAT THE CAUCUS HAD NOW SENT A FORCEFUL SIGNAL ON OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH CONSULTATIONS AND ASKED IF THE CAUCUS COULD NOW ACHIEVE CONSENSUS TO ACCEPT THE PACKAGE AS DRAFTED. GASCHIGNARD, HOWEVER, MAINTAINED HIS POSITION AND THE FRENCH RESERVE ON THE AGREEMENT. DISCUSSION CLOSED ON THIS TOPIC WITH CITRON (FRG) CALLING ON FRANCE TO RECONSIDER THE APPEAL OF THE CAUCUS THAT IT JOIN IN CONSENSUS, AND MELLBIN (DENMARK)



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TESTILY AND WITH EVIDENT FRUSTRATION NOTING THAT WE HAD REACHED THE "END OF THE ROAD" IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH KAHILUOTO, AND RHETORICALLY ASKING IF FRANCE'S "ALLIES AND FRIENDS" SHOULD NOT EXPECT A POSITIVE ANSWER FROM THE FRENCH ON MONDAY.

5. COMMENT: MANY IN THE CAUCUS ARE CLEARLY FRUSTRATED WITH THE FRENCH POSITION, AND MANY DELEGATIONS NOW FEAR THAT THE EAST WILL USE THIS DELAY TO ACCUSE NATO OF BLOCKING PROGRESS. GASCHIGNARD, WHO HAS APPRECIATED U.S. SUPPORT ON THIS MATTER, TOLD AMBASSADOR BARRY FOLLOWING THE MEETING THAT HE HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO FALL-OFF HIS POSITION, BUT COULD NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE NEW INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE MONDAY BECAUSE D'ABOVILLE (QUAI DISARMAMENT CHIEF) WAS OUT OF PARIS. IN ANY EVENT, GASCHIGNARD WAS NOT POSITIVE HIS INSTRUCTIONS WOULD CHANGE UPON D'ABOVILLE'S RETURN. THIS DRAWN OUT SQUABBLE IS ALREADY CAUSING PERSONAL AND NATIONAL ANIMOSITIES TO SERVICE AMONG CAUCUS MEMBERS. CONSEQUENTLY, IF THE FRENCH STICK ON THIS POSITION CAUCUS UNITY WILL DISSIPATE AS OTHER DELEGATIONS "GO PUBLIC" TO AVOID RESPONSIBILITY FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS. END COMMENT.

BARRY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07847
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING, OCTOBER 14, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7730
1. CDE VII - 051
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE OCTOBER 14 CDE NATO CAUCUS SESSION, FRANCE WITHDREW ITS RESERVATION ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AND JOINED FULL CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THE AGREEMENT. ADOPTION OF THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE BY THE CONFERENCE WAS BRIEFLY THREATENED BY MALTA, WHICH WITHDREW ITS EARLIER CONCURRENCE. HOWEVER, UNDER NNA PRESSURE MALTA ACCEPTED THE AGREEMENT AT THE LAST MINUTE. INFORMAL DISCUSSSIONS BEGAN ON OCTOBER 15. END SUMMARY.
4. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) OPENED THE OCTOBER 14 NATO CAUCUS MEETING BY WITHDRAWING THE FRENCH RESERVATION ON THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING ON CONSULTATIONS AND JOINING IN CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT (REF A). GASCHIGNARD ADDED THAT FRANCE STILL REGARDED THE ISSUE OF CONSULTATIONS AS ONE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND BELIEVED THAT THE FRENCH POSITION HAD RESULTED IN THE CAUCUS SENDING A "USEFUL POLITICAL SIGNAL" ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE. HE ALSO FELT THAT THE FRENCH POSITION HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN SECURING ROMANIAN AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT AS DRAFTED. (BEGIN COMMENT: WHILE MANY DELEGATIONS THANKED THE FRENCH DELEGATION FOR JOINING THE CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THE ISSUE, THERE IS A LINGERING SENSE OF FRUSTRATION ABOUT FRENCH TACTICS ON THE PART OF SOME CAUCUS MEMBERS. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), FOR EXAMPLE, ARGUED THAT THE ONLY POLITICAL SIGNAL THAT THE CAUCUS HAD SENT BY DELAYING APPROVAL OF THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT WAS OF ALLIED DISSONANCE. END COMMENT.)
-
5. THE NATO SPOKESMAN IMMEDIATELY INFORMED KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) OF NATO'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT IN ANTICIPATION THAT THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE COULD BE IMPLEMENTED AT THE AFTERNOON MEETING OF WORKING GROUP AB. THE PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, WAS IN CONSIDERABLE DOUBT FOR SEVERAL HOURS, AS KAHILUOTO INFORMED THE NATO SPOKESMEN THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM VALLETTA MALTA HAD WITHDRAWN ITS CONCURRENCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. THE MALTESE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT, KALILUOTO HAD SAID, BUT RATHER WITH THE LONG-AWAITED (AND LONG-DEBATED) NNA POSITION PAPERS, AND WERE WITHHOLDING CONSENSUS TO ENSURE THAT MALTESE VIEWS WERE ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED IN THOSE PAPERS WHICH ARE NOW (PERHAPS) BEING FINALIZED. CITRON (FRG) ADVISED THE CAUCUS THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM ANOTHER SOURCE THAT WHAT MALTA WANTED WAS THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL MOVEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE NNA



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PAPERS. (COMMENT: SEVERAL NNA CONTACTS HAVE INDICATED TO US THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD BEEN PRESSING THE MALTESE ON THIS POINT, AND WERE NOT DISPLEASED WITH THE MALTESE GAMBIT. END COMMENT.) BOTH CITRON AND CIARRAPICO (ITALY) FELT THAT SOME NATO REACTION WAS WARRANTED (CITRON WONDERING IF IT MIGHT NOT SOON BE TIME FOR THE CDE TO MOVE FORWARD WITHOUT MALTA), BUT MOST AGREED THAT THE NNA COULD BEST HANDLE THIS PROBLEM. THE SUSPENSE WAS SHORT-LIVED, AS THE OTHER NNA MEMBERS, IN FACT, WERE ABLE TO PRESSURE MALTA TO JOIN IN THE CONFERENCE CONSENSUS IN TIME FOR THE AFTERNOON AB MEETING. AT THIS TIME, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER MALTA SIMPLY SUCCUMBED TO NNA PRESSURE OR A DEAL WAS STRUCK WITHIN THE NNA CAUCUS TO SECURE MALTA'S AGREEMENT. WITH THE MALTESE PROBLEM SOLVED, WORKING GROUP AB QUICKLY ADJOURNED ITS FORMAL SESSION AND ADOPTED THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE WITHOUT DISCUSSION. INFORMAL CLUSTER MEETINGS BEGIN ON OCTOBER 15.
BARRY
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25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07830
SUBJECT: CDE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY/NEW EXPLORATORY PHASE
REF: STOCKHOLM 6852
1. CDE VIII - 050.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE (CDE) ADOPTED A MORE INFORMAL STRUCTURE TODAY (OCTOBER 14) TO BEGIN A NEW EXPLORATORY PHASE OF ITS WORK. USDEL CDE HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING LINE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS:
BEGIN TALKING POINTS:
THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THE ADOPTION OF A NEW INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS LONG CALLED FOR MORE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS AS A NECESSARY PRELUDE TO ACTUAL DRAFTING OF A FINAL AGREEMENT; WE HOPE THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE NOW BEGINNING WILL SEE THE KIND OF SUBSTANTIVE GIVE AND TAKE NEEDED TO RESOLVE THE COMPLEX AND IMPORTANT ISSUES WHICH STILL REMAIN BEFORE THE CONFERENCE.
QUESTION: DOES THIS ARRANGEMNT REPRESENT A DEAL? HAS NATO MADE CONCESSIONS ON ITS MEASURE ONE (EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION) AND MEASURE FIVE (VERIFICATION) IN RETURN FOR EASTERN AGREEMENT TO DROP ITS NON-STARTERS?
ANSWER: NO. WE HAVE MADE NO CONCESSIONS, AND THIS DECISION DOES NOT COMPROMISE ANY OF OUR MEASURES. OUR DOCUMENT SC.1/AMPLIFIED REMAINS INTACT AS A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING DOCUMENT. END TALKING POINTS.
4. AS NOTED, THIS INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT SHOULD SEE INTENSIFICATION OF DISCUSSIONS ON SUBSTANCE; SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES ON KEY ISSUES REMAIN. USDEL PLENARY SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 10 (REF) OUTLINES WESTERN POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES. USDEL WILL DEVELOP MORE DETAILED BRIEFS ON THESE ISSUES WHICH, P/PFE IN USIA CONCURRING, WE WILL DISTRIBUTE THROUGH THE WIRELESS FILE.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07896
SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: THE UN-CDE RELATIONSHIP
REF: A) STATE 266848, B) USUN 2605, C) USUN 2574,
- D) STATE 299182
1. CDE VII - 052
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: U.S. DELEGATION HAS INFORMED ALLIES OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CDE OF A UN DRAFTING EXERCISE ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. WHILE MOST ALLIED DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM WERE INITIALLY UNAWARE OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT THE UN DIMENSION OF NUF, THERE SEEMS TO BE AN INCHOATE AWARENESS THAT DRAFTING ON A UN DECLARATION ON NUF WILL COMPLICATE OUR WORK IN STOCKHOLM. ACCORDINGLY, DELEGATION CONCURS WITH USUN'S REQUEST FOR DEMARCHES IN SELECTED CAPITALS ON THE SUBJECT (SEE PARA 6). END SUMMARY.
4. DRAWING ON REF A ANALYSIS, AMBASSADOR BARRY RELAYED TO THE NATO CAUCUS U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMPLICATIONS FOR THE CDE POSED BY A UN DRAFTING EXERCISE ON NUF DOMINATED BY THE NONALIGNED . MOST DELEGATIONS WERE EITHER UNAWARE OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF A UN NON-USE OF FORCE DRAFTING EXERCISE FOR THE CDE; ONLY THE UK AND THE FRG SEEMED TO HAVE FORMED COHERENT (AND DIVERGENT) VIEWS. THE UK, ON THE ONE HAND, STRONGLY SUPPORTS OUR VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SHIFT FUTURE UN WORK ON NUF TO THE CHARTER COMMITTEE. ON THE OTHER HAND, FRG AMBASSADOR CITRON, AN OLD UN HAND, SEES AN "ENDLESS" DRAFTING EXERCISE ON A UN DECLARATION ON NUF AS PREFERABLE FROM A CDE POINT OF VIEW TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD TREATY ON THE SUBJECT.
-
5. GIVEN THE DIFFERING LEVELS OF INTEREST AND DISINTEREST ON A SUBJECT THAT MAY WELL AFFECT OUR FUTURE DELIBERATIONS, U.S. DELEGATION HAS CONDUCTED A SORT OF CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING EXERCISE AMONG SELECTED CDE DELEGATIONS (PARTICULARLY ITALY, THE FRG, AND FRANCE) ON THE DANGERS OF AN NNA-CONTROLLED DRAFTING EXERCISE AT THE UN. WITHOUT EXAGGERATING THE INFLUENCE OR THE COMMITMENT OF SOME OF OUR FELLOW NATO DELEGATIONS, THERE SEEMS TO BE AN INCHOATE AWARENESS THAT DRAFTING A UN DECLARATION ON NON-USE OF FORCE MAY HAVE NEGATIVE RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THERE IS ALSO SOME CONCERN ON THE PART OF OUR ALLIES HERE IN STOCKHOLM THAT ONE NUF HAND (STOCKHOLM) DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE OTHER (NEW YORK) IS DOING. ACCORDINGLY, NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE JETTISONED THEIR WORLD NUF TREATY IDEA AND NOW ADVOCATE PREPARATION OF A UN DECLARATION ON THE SUBJECT, SOME OF THESE DELEGATIONS SEEM PREPARED TO RAISE THE SUBJECT WITH THEIR CAPITALS DURING THE COMING



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RECESS (OCTOBER 18 - NOVEMBER 5).
6. BASED ON THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, U.S. DELEGATION CDE CONCURS WITH REF B REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT TO CONSIDER DEMARCHES IN BONN, PARIS, AND ROME WHILE CDE DELEGATIONS ARE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS, I.E., OCTOBER 21 - NOVEMBER 1.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07987
SUBJECT: USDEL OBJECTIVES FOR EXPLORATORY PHASE OF CDE
1. CDE - VII 53.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE CONFERENCE NOW HAS ADOPTED AN INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE DELEGATION BELIEVES CAN BE USED PROFITABLY TO PURSUE SEVERAL BASIC OBJECTIVES: FURTHER NATO COORDINATION; RAISE THE WEST'S GENERAL LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE OF OUR PACKAGE WITHIN NATO CAUCUS; EXPLORE MORE FULLY CONVERGENCES/DIVERGENCIES WITH THE IDEA OF FORCING THE EAST TO DISCUSS OUR PACKAGE; FURTHER GAIN NNA SUPPORT. END SUMMARY
4. THE CONFERENCE NOW HAS ADOPTED AN INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE DELEGATION BELIEVES CAN BE USED PROFITABLY TO PURSUE SEVERAL BASIC OBJECTIVES. THE FOLLOWING ARE DELEGATION VIEWS ON WHAT WE WILL TRY TO ACHIEVE.
5. MAINTAINING/ENHANCING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND EDUCATION: THE MAJORITY OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING MANY NATO CAUCUS MEMBERS, DOWNPLAY THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING ANYTHING POSITIVE DURING THIS INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE AND, THEREFORE, WANT TO MOVE INTO DRAFTING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS RUSH TOWARDS DRAFTING IS, IN OUR VIEW, ILL-ADVISED FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST, WE AREN'T READY AS A CAUCUS TO DRAFT, AND SECOND, IMPORTANT GROUNDWORK REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE FOR DRAFTING. ENTERING MORE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS, THE CAUCUS NEEDS TO TIGHTEN ARGUMENTS ON DETAILS OF THE NATO PACKAGE AND ALSO DEVELOP EXPERTISE IN ARTICULATING CONVINCING ARGUMENTATION. THUS, DURING THIS INFORMAL PERIOD, WE HOPE TO RAISE THE GENERAL LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE OF SOME CAUCUS MEMBERS AND ALSO WILL TRY TO IMPROVE NATO COORDINATION TO ENSURE ALL SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE IN CONSTANTLY EVOLVING NEGOTIATING CONDITIONS.
6. TOUTING OUR PACKAGE: INFORMAL STRUCTURE SHOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER EDUCATION OF THE CONFERENCE ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE NATO PACKAGE AND COMMITMENT OF NATO TO FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS AND PRINCIPLES. FOR EXAMPLE:



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- INVIOLABILITY OF VERIFICATION: THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION AND ITS CONNECTION TO THE REST OF OUR PACKAGE ARE NOT FULLY APPRECIATED, EVEN WITHIN THE NATO CAUCUS. WE WILL STRESS THIS CONCEPT AND THE NECESSITY FOR ITS UNIVERSAL APPLICATION TO CSBMS.
- DOWNPLAY OF NUF/CONSTRAINTS: WE WILL EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION ON THESE TWO ISSUES SINCE BOTH HAVE GREAT POTENTIAL TO AFFECT OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. SOME ALLIES ARE URGING US TO ADOPT A MORE "FORTHCOMING" STANCE AT THE CDE ON THESE TWO ISSUES, ESPECIALLY NUF.

THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO LINK THE VERIFICATION OF NUF WITH A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, MOVING THEMSELVES ONE STEP CLOSER TO THEIR LONG-DESIRED OBJECTIVE OF A "DROIT DE REGARD" OVER EUROPEAN SECURITY MATTERS. NEVERTHELESS, THE INFORMAL PHASE WILL GIVE US AN OPERATIONAL "TESTING GROUND" FOR OUR ARGUMENTATION AND SHOULD ALLOW US TO POSITION OURSELVES BETTER TO PREVENT SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF THESE ISSUES.
- REJECTION OF LINKAGE: THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO LINK PROGRESS IN ONE AREA WITH PROGRESS IN OTHERS, PARTICULARLY LINKING NUF AND CSBMS, ON THE ONE HAND, AND CSBMS APPLYING TO LAND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR CSBMS INVOLVING INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ON THE OTHER. WE WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT SUCH LINKAGE IS A NON-STARTER.
- NO MINI-PACKAGE: THE EAST CAN BE EXPECTED TO WORK TOWARDS REDUCING THE OUTCOME HERE TO THE ADOPTION OF A "MINI-PACKAGE" (I.E., NUF, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION, ALL WITH INADEQUATE VERIFICATION). DEPENDING ON

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: USDEL OBJECTIVES FOR EXPLORATORY PHASE OF CDE

PERCEPTIONS OF "PROGRESS" AT THE CDE, MANY EUROPEANS MAY OPT FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME AS WE APPROACH THE END GAME, EITHER AS A "FINAL" AGREEMENT OR AS AN "INTERIM" SOLUTION PRIOR TO A CALL FOR RECONVENING THE CDE AFTER THE VIENNA REVCON. OUR EFFORTS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, BOTH IN THE WORKING STRUCTURE AND ON THE MARGINS, WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IDEA OF A "MINI-PACKAGE" IS A NON-STARTER.



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- MAINTAIN THE MANDATE: WE SEE THE EASTERN GAMBIT TO PUSH FOR NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS AN ATTEMPT TO RENEGOTIATE THE MADRID MANDATE BY CHANGING THE PRESENT CDE FOCUS FROM EUROPE AS A GEOGRAPHIC ENTITY TO A BROADER STRATEGIC ONE WHICH AIMS TO INCLUDE WHAT THE SOVIETS REGARD AS FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS. AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, WE CONTINUE TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR OUR REJECTION OF THIS, USING THE MANDATE AS OUR PRINCIPAL TOOL.

7. EXPLORING CONVERGENCES/DIVERGENCIES: THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE MAKES IT EASIER FOR US TO HOME IN UPON THE BASIC ISSUES IN ORDER TO SHAPE THE STRUCTURE OF FUTURE WORK, PARTICULARLY ON SUCH KEY SUBJECTS AS OUT-OF-GARRISON, STRUCTURAL APPROACH, VERIFICATION, INFORMATION AND CONSTRAINTS.

8. GAIN NNA SUPPORT: BECAUSE THE NNA HAVE NOT YET AGREED UPON A PACKAGE OF THEIR OWN, WE CAN USE THE EARLY PART OF THIS PHASE TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THEIR FINAL PRODUCT. ALSO, WE WILL CONTINUE COURTING AND EDUCATING THIS GROUP IN ORDER TO GAIN THEIR FURTHER SUPPORT FOR OUR POINTS OF VIEW. THE EXPLORATORY PHASE SHOULD LAST AT LEAST LONG ENOUGH TO SEE THE NNA PACKAGE EMERGE AND BE DISCUSSED, SINCE THIS SHOULD STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION ON SOME ISSUES. THIS SHOULD NOT BE AN IMMUTABLE GOAL, HOWEVER. THE NNA MAY FAIL TO COME FORWARD WITH A UNIFIED PACKAGE OR WE MAY LEARN THAT ITS SUBSTANCE IS SHIFTING IN WAYS WHICH WILL DO US MORE HARM THAN GOOD. THEN WE MAY WANT TO MOVE ON ANOTHER TACK BEFORE THE NNA TEXT ARRIVES.



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9. THESE ARE THE OBJECTIVES WE PLAN TO PURSUE IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. IF WASHINGTON WISHES US TO PURSUE OTHER GOALS, WE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ACCORDINGLY.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07942
SUBJECT: NATO CAUCUS VIEWS ON FUTURE CDE STRATEGY
1. CDE VII-054. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN TWO MEETINGS RESTRICTED TO HEADS OF DELEGATION ONLY, THE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSED OUR GOALS DURING THE CURRENT EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE CDE AND THE QUESTION OF HOW BEST TO MANAGE SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND CSBMS. ONLY THE U.S., UK, FRANCE AND PORTUGAL BELIEVE AN EXTENDED EXPLORATORY PHASE WOULD BE USEFUL; THE REST WANT TO MOVE ON TO DRAFTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS FAR AS NUF/CSBM LINKAGE IS CONCERNED, ONLY FRANCE AND THE U.S. ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD TRY HARD TO GET DRAFTING STARTED ON OUR MEASURES WHILE STONEWALLING ON NUF. TENSIONS BETWEEN THE "WETS" AND "DRYS" WILL SURFACE EARLY IN THE NEXT ROUND. END SUMMARY
-
3. AT MY SUGGESTION, THE NATO HEADS OF DELEGATION MET IN RESTRICTED SESSION TWICE ON OCTOBER 15 TO DISCUSS STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT ROUND. THE TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS CONSIDERED WERE:
-- WHAT SHOULD OUR GOALS BE DURING THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WE ARE NOW IN?
-- HOW SHOULD WE MANAGE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE LATERAL LINKAGE BETWEEN THEIR NON-USE OF FORCE PROPOSAL AND CSBMS?
4. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, MOST HEADS OF DELEGATION ARGUED FOR KEEPING IT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE AND MOVING INTO THE DRAFTING STAGE SOMETIME DURING THE NEXT ROUND. SOME, LIKE THE FRG, SUGGESTED THAT THE PHASE COULD BE USED TO ORGANIZE NATO DELEGATIONS TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS. OTHERS SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE NNA PAPERS TO EMERGE AND BE DISCUSSED. MANY, (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, DENMARK, TURKEY, GREECE, SPAIN, CANADA AND ITALY) POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AND THAT IT WOULD THEREFORE BE UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DO SO. EVEN THE USUALLY HARDLINE UK SUGGESTED IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT A REAL NARROWING OF SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES DURING THIS PERIOD; HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT A RATHER LENGTHY EXPLORATORY PERIOD WOULD BE USEFUL BECAUSE IT WOULD PERMIT NATO TO PROMOTE ITS OWN PACKAGE MORE EFFECTIVELY. HE PARTICULARLY URGED THAT WE TRY HARDER TO SELL OUR POSITION ON "STATIC INFORMATION" TO THE NNA'S DURING THIS PERIOD. FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD ARGUED FOR A LENGTHY EXPLORATORY PHASE WHICH WOULD BE USED TO "FILTER" TOPICS FOR DRAFTING. HE SAID WE SHOULD TRY TO EXTRACT SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS FROM THE SOVIETS ON THIS PHASE AND DEFINE AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. PART OF OUR PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO ACTIVATE



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THE DISCUSSION OF OUR PROPOSALS AND, IF POSSIBLE, START DRAFTING ON SOME TOPIC OF INTEREST TO US WHILE STONE-WALLING ON NUF. I SUPPORTED THE FRENCH POSITION.

5. ON TACTICS FOR HANDLING SOVIET LINKAGE, THE FRG SUGGESTED "LURING" THE SOVIETS INTO DRAFTING ON ISSUES OF INTEREST TO US, SUCH AS NOTIFICATION, BEFORE WRITING DOWN ANYTHING ON NUF. AT AN EARLY STAGE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE SOME OF OUR NUF LANGUAGE - SAY THE UN CHARTER PROVISION. FROM THAT POINT ON, DRAFTING WOULD CONTINUE ON NUF AND CSBMS AT A PACE WE CONTROLLED - SAY FIVE TIMES AS MUCH TEXT ON CSBMS AS ON NUF. THE UK SUGGESTED THAT THE PROPER TACTIC WAS A "DEAL" (PREFERABLY STRUCK BEHIND THE SCENES) TRADING OFF SOMETHING ON NUF FOR SOMETHING ON CSBMS. OTHERWISE THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE DRAFTING BECAUSE, UNDER THE PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED THEY CAN ALWAYS VETO DRAFTED LANGUAGE ON CSBMS IF THEY DO NOT GET WHAT THEY WANT ON NUF. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS (ITALY, DENMARK AND SPAIN) ADVOCATED DEVELOPING A NUF TEXT WITHIN NATO. FRANCE WAS THE ONLY ADVOCATE OF "SEQUENTIALISM" - INSISTING ON STONEWALLING ON NUF WHILE PRESSING AHEAD ON CSBMS. NUF SHOULD NOT EVEN BE DISCUSSED WITHIN NATO UNTIL THE NNA PAPERS EMERGE; WE MAY FIND THE NNA POSITION A BETTER STARTING POINT THAN A TEXT WE DRAFTED. FRANCE SAID THE BASIC TRADEOFF IN CDE WAS
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PAR, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: NATO CAUCUS VIEWS ON FUTURE CDE STRATEGY
BETWEEN CSBMS AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE CDE PROCESS, NOT BETWEEN NUF AND CSBMS. I OPPOSED DISCUSSION OF NUF IN NATO SINCE IT INEVITABLY WOULD LEAK. FROM WHAT I KNEW OF THE SOVIET POSITION I DOUBTED THAT SEQUENTIALISM WOULD WORK, BUT I SUPPORTED TRYING IT.



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6. COMMENT: IN OUR DISCUSSIONS BOTH OF PROCEDURE AND OF STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE IT APPEARED THAT TENSIONS BETWEEN THE "WETS" AND "DRYS" ARE RUNNING HIGH, WITH THE "WETS" INCREASINGLY ACCUSING THE "DRYS" OF TRYING TO PREVENT ANY OUTCOME AT ALL IN THE CONFERENCE. SOME OF THIS IS DUE TO PENT UP FRUSTRATIONS CREATED BY ARGUING OVER TEXTS FOR THE PAST SIX WEEKS, BUT I SUSPECT THAT THE BREAK WILL NOT HEAL ALL WOUNDS. THE DISPUTES WILL PROBABLY REEMERGE EARLY IN THE NEXT SESSION.
END COMMENT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07969
SUBJECT: KAMPLEMAN-BRUNNER DISCUSSION ON STOCKHOLM
- CONFERENCE
REF: GENEVA 9731
1. CDE VII-056. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USDEL POSITION ON RELATIONSHIP OF STOCKHOLM TO MADRID IS IDENTICAL TO THAT DESCRIBED IN PARA 4 OF REFTEL. ON THE QUESTION OF A TERMINATION DATE, WE HAVE EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR A FIRM DATE IN JULY. THERE WILL NOT BE CONSENSUS ON THIS, HOWEVER. WE WILL PROBABLY END UP WITH A JULY 18 TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION PLUS AN "OPTIONAL" ADDITIONAL SESSION BEGINNING IN LATE AUGUST AND ENDING WHEN THE VIENNA PREPCOM BEGINS IN SEPTEMBER. THE CATCH IS THAT IT WILL TAKE CONSENSUS NOT TO MOVE ON TO OPTIONAL SESSION, WHICH MEANS WE WILL HAVE IT.
3. AS FOR THE NNA, WE ARE NOT PRESSING THEM AT ALL TO TABLE THEIR PAPERS; IN FACT WE HOPE THEY WILL NOT EMERGE IN THEIR CURRENT STATE BECAUSE WE STILL HOPE TO INFLUENCE THEIR CONTENT. THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT BE TABLED UNTIL WELL INTO THE NEXT ROUND, IF THEN. WE AGREE WITH BRUNNER ABOUT THE RELATION OF CDE TO THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV GENEVA MEETINGS; THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS HERE IN ADVANCE OF GENEVA SINCE WE RECESS FROM OCT. 18 - NOV. 5 IN ANY CASE.
-



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4. WE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE SWISS DELEGATION HERE AND APPRECIATE THE SUPPORT THEY HAVE PROVIDED FOR U.S. POSITION WITHIN THE NNA. THEY ARE AMONG THE MOST ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS HERE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET 01 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 08026
SUBJECT: EASTERN VIEWS ON CDE AND VERIFICATION
1. CDE VII -062.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. SELF-PROCLAIMED "HONEST BROKER" ISTVAN KORMENDY, DEPUTY HEAD OF HUNGARIAN DELEGATION, TREATED US CDE DEPUTY TO LUNCH ON 17 OCTOBER 85 WHICH, IN ADDITION TO DELIGHTS FROM THE SWEDISH KITCHEN, INCLUDED A MENU OF VIEWS ON CDE ISSUES THAT KORMENDY DESCRIBED AS RECIPES FROM MOSCOW. THE SOVIET UNION WANTS A CDE AGREEMENT AS PART OF ITS NEW EMPHASIS ON EUROPE AND WILL THEREFORE REQUIRE LITTLE MORE FROM THE WEST THAN A REAFFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLE TWO OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN THE REALM OF POLITICAL MEASURES. SOVIETS ARE ALLEGEDLY WILLING TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN HELSINKI FINAL ACT CBMS BUT WANT SOME FACE-SAVING WESTERN MOVE ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN RETURN FOR COVERAGE OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. KORMENDY'S PAPER ON VERIFICATION OF CSBMS PRESENTED IN A RECENT SWEDISH VERIFICATION SYMPOSIUM WAS TOUTED AS CONTAINING SOVIET VIEWS ON HOW ON-SITE INSPECTION COULD BE PART OF AN OUTCOME OF THE CDE PROCESS. SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM THE PAPER ARE FORWARDED IN PARA 7. END SUMMARY.
4. HUNGARIAN CDE DEPUTY KORMENDY REFERRED TO THE HUNGARIAN ROLE IN STOCKHOLM AS BEING THAT OF "HONEST BROKER" BETWEEN SOVIET AND US DELEGATIONS. (COMMENT: KORMENDY HAS ALSO BEEN REGARDED BOTH AS AN INFLUENCE PEDDLER FOR THE SOVIETS AND AN AGENT OF DISINFORMATION. END COMMENT) IN THIS SELF-PROCLAIMED CAPACITY KORMENDY SAID HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE RECENTLY ADOPTED INFORMAL WORKING SCHEME SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS AN INDICATION OF SOVIET IMPATIENCE AND DESIRE TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER 1986 PREPARATION FOR THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE. THE SEPTEMBER DATE FOR ENDING THIS PHASE OF THE MEETING HAS MORE OR LESS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS, KORMENDY OPINED. BUT, HE ADDED, THE SOVIETS WANT A SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO END THE FIRST STAGE AND CLAIM THE CONFERENCE TO BE A SUCCESS. THIS, KORMENDY EMPHASIZED, WAS IN HARMONY WITH THE NEW EMPHASIS ON EUROPE WHICH HAS EMERGED IN THE FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT OF GORBACHEV/SHEVARDNADZE -- AN ELEMENT OF WHICH IS TO CONVINCE THE EUROPEANS THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY.
5. THE WEST, KORMENDY CLAIMED, WILL ONLY HAVE TO AGREE TO A REPACKAGING OF THE NUF LANGUAGE ALREADY CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT TO MEET SOVIET DEMANDS IN THAT AREA. IT WILL BE THE VOLUME OF VERBIAGE RATHER



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THAN THE SUBSTANCE WHICH MUST SATISFY SOVIET PRESTIGE IN A FINAL OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM. TURNING TO CONCRETE CSBMS, KORMENDY INSISTED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HELSINKI CSBMS BUT THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO GIVE THE SOVIETS SOME SATISFACTION ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. HE HINTED BROADLY THAT THE CAPTURING OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES WOULD ASSUAGE SOVIET HUNGER FOR OBTAINING REVENGE FOR THE COVERAGE OF THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN PART OF SOVIET UNION IN THE MADRID MANDATE. KORMENDY'S OWN CONVERSATIONS WITH SEVERAL ALLIED DELEGATIONS, HE SAID, HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT WESTERN EUROPEANS WILL INSIST ON AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM IN ORDER TO OPERATIONALIZE THE CONCEPT OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. (COMMENT: KORMENDY IS PROBABLY THE EASTERN DELEGATE WHO MOST ACTIVELY PURSUES INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN DELEGATIONS. END COMMENT)
6. KORMENDY'S MAIN MESSAGE FOR THE DAY, HOWEVER, CONCERNED VERIFICATION. HANDING OVER A REVISED VERSION OF THE PAPER HE PRESENTED AT THE SWEDISH SYMPOSIUM ON VERIFICATION OF DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, KORMENDY COMMENTED THAT THE PAPER HAD THE BLESSINGS OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES. (COMMENT: AT THE SYMPOSIUM ITSELF, DANIEL ROTFELD -- A MEMBER OF THE POLISH DELEGATION AT
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, MBFR, PARM
SUBJECT: EASTERN VIEWS ON CDE AND VERIFICATION
MADRID AND A HABITUAL ATTENDEE AT CSBM CONFERENCES -- STATED THAT KORMENDY WAS WAY OUT IN FRONT OF THE SOVIET POSITION. END COMMENT). THE PAPER ENTITLED ALTERNATIVE VERIFICATION MODELS FOR CSBMS IN EUROPE", FIRST ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT THE WESTERN MODEL AS PRESENTED IN MEASURE 5 OF SC.1 THEN DESCRIBES TWO ADDITIONAL MODELS. KORMENDY SAID THE SOVIETS HAD PROVIDED THE WORDS DEALING WITH ON-SITE INSPECTION IN THE SECOND MODEL AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE SUBSTANCE OF THE THIRD MODEL.
7. SINCE KORMENDY INSISTS HIS VIEWS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE OF THE SOVIETS (GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING HAS ALSO INDICATED THEY ARE) THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS FROM THE KORMENDY PAPER ARE FORWARDED.
-- HOW MUCH ON-SITE INSPECTION IS ENOUGH? THE SELF-EVIDENT ANSWER IS THAT THE NUMBER OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, PROVIDED REASONABLE AND SHARED VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF AGREED CSBMS WOULD MAKE THIS METHOD NECESSARY, SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE NUMBER



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OF SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS OR AMBIGUOUS EVENTS THAT CANNOT BE PROVED OR IDENTIFIED OTHERWISE. IT MUST NOT BE LESS AND SHOULD NOT BE MORE.
-- A SECOND VERIFICATION MODEL THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED FOR THE PURPOSES OF A CSBM REGIME PROVIDES FOR MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATIVE VERIFICATION BASED ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. DEPENDING ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES IT MAY INCLUDE ON-SITE INSPECTION AS WELL.
-- AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF THIS SECOND VERIFICATION MODEL IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSULTATIVE FORUM COMPOSED OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. ITS FUNCTION WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH ANY ISSUES OR QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE THAT MAY EMERGE IN THE DAY-TO-DAY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSBM AGREEMENT. IF THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF CSBMS AGREED AT THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CDE DO NOT NECESSITATE THE FUNCTIONING OF A PERMANENT BODY, CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES COULD BE CONVENED AT A SHORT NOTICE ON AN AD HOC BASIS.
-- SHOULD IT CORRESPOND TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF CSBMS AGREED AT THE CDE, THERE MAY BE A NEED FOR CONSIDERING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MEANS AND METHODS OF VERIFICATION WITH SOME OPTIONS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION, DESPITE THE GROWING AWARENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS MOST INTRUSIVE METHOD OF VERIFICATION.
  O IT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, INCLUDING THOSE OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE OF APPLICATION SINCE TROOP OR FORCE MOVEMENTS FROM THEIR TERRITORIES INTO THE ZONE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE NOTIFIED.
  O ON-SITE INSPECTION, LIKE ANY OTHER METHOD OF VERIFICATION, SHOULD HAVE A CLEARLY DEFINED OBJECTIVE I.E. TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THOSE CONCRETE CSBMS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF WHICH IT WAS AGREED UPON.
-- NO REALISTIC VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT OF CSBMS COULD SUPPORT THE USE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A ROUTINE METHOD OF MONITORING COMPLIANCE. IT SHOULD BE APPLIED AS A LAST RESORT AFTER THE POTENTIALS OF OTHER AGREED MEANS AND METHODS OF VERIFICATION HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED, IN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS OF CRISES OF CLEAR VIOLATIONS THAT COULD BE FELT THREATENING BY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES.
-- IT MAY BE EXPLORED WHETHER THE SWEDISH IDEA OF "VERIFICATION BY CHALLENGE" COULD HAVE A USEFUL ROLE IN VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH CSBMS. THIS CONCEPT, AS DESCRIBED BY ALVA MYRDAL, "RELIES ON THE INTEREST OF A PARTY UNDER SUSPICION TO FREE ITSELF THROUGH THE SUPPLY OF RELEVANT INFORMATION NOT EXCLUDING AN INVITATION TO
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***<<<<< SECTION 3 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, MBFR, PARM
SUBJECT: EASTERN VIEWS ON CDE AND VERIFICATION

INSPECTION BY AN OUTSIDE PARTY OR ORGAN. IT IS EASIER TO PROVE YOUR OWN INNOCENCE THAN SOMEBODY ELSE'S GUILT.
-- ON-SITE INSPECTION MUST NOT BE CONCEIVED AS THE CONSUMMATION OF SUSPICION BETWEEN A AND X THROUGH A BILATERAL ACT. INSPECTORS FROM ONE OR PREFERABLY MORE PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD CARRY OUT THEIR TASK ON BEHALF OF THIRTY-FOUR. THIS PERCEPTION SHOULD ALSO BE REFLECTED IN THE PATTERN OF DESIGNATION OF INSPECTORS IN THE CONSULTATIVE BODY.
-- THE VERIFICATION PROCESS MAY HAVE TO DEAL WITH TIME-URGENT CASES AS WELL. IN THIS CONTEXT, CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN AT THE CDE TO THE IDEA OF SHORT EMERGENCY MEETINGS WHICH COULD BE CONVENED AT THE DEMAND OF ANY ONE OF THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES WITHIN A NUMBER OF HOURS.
-- THE CDE MAY ALSO WANT TO BUILD UPON THE IMPORTANT EXPERIENCE WITH THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, THE SEA-BED TREATY OR THE OUTER SPACE TREATY WHICH CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS.
-- IN A CERTAIN STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS THE CDE MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A THIRD MODEL BASED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT MONITORING CAPABILITIES WHICH CAN BE CALLED INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.
-- THE VERIFICATION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY CARRIED OUT BY IAEA IS A POWERFUL EXAMPLE OF THE FEASIBILITY OF THIS IDEA.
-- REMOTE SENSING DEVICES OPTIMALIZED FOR MONITORING CSBM OR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS THAT MAY EMERGE FROM SUBSEQUENT STAGES OF CDE MAY BE RENTED FROM GOVERNMENTS, DONATED BY THEM OR PURCHASED ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEND AN AGREED NUMBER OF EXPERTS TO OPERATE THE DEVICES. OBVIOUS CANDIDATES FOR HOSTING THE HEADQUARTERS AND THE EQUIPMENT ARE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES.
-- THE MAIN FUNCTION OF THE JOINT ORGANIZATION WOULD BE THE CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF THE COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CDE.
-- THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING MAY BE SOMEWHAT REDUCED BY THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF THE DETECTION CAPABILITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. (COMMENT: WE ASSUME THIS REFERS TO AWARENESS OF LIMITATIONS OF CAPABILITIES. END COMMENT)
-- BEYOND MONITORING, THE VERIFICATION PROCESS COULD BE SUPPORTED, MUTATIS MUTANDIS BY THE SAME MEANS AND METHODS AS DESCRIBED AT THE SECOND MODEL.



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BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
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UNCLAS COMPLET 01 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 07956
SUBJECT: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT SC.1 REFERENCES TO
- NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM'S)
1. CDE VII - 059
2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. SUMMARY: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT PROVISIONS IN SC.1 MEASURE 5 FOR THE USE OF NTM'S FOR VERIFICATION CENTER ON THE PROBLEMS THEY POSE FOR OUR NEGOTIATING TACTICS AS WELL AS ON THE QUESTION OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO SHARE NTM-COLLECTED EVIDENCE. USDEL HAS LEARNED THAT THE HAGUE HAS ASKED THE NETHERLANDS NATO MISSION TO EXPLORE WAYS TO DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THE ROLE GIVEN NTM'S IN SC.1, WHICH THEY VIEW AS DETRACTING FROM OUR POSITION ON ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE DUTCH ARE ALSO PERSISTING IN THEIR QUEST FOR A DEFINITIVE U.S. STATEMENT ON THE ROLE OF NTM'S IN A CSCE CONTEXT. THE NETHERLANDS MISSION MAY SOON BRING UP ONCE AGAIN THE QUESTION OF NTM'S IN SC.1 IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.
4. MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE [redacted] 25X1
[redacted], INVITED USDEL MEMBER HUCK TO LUNCH FOR 25X1
PURPOSE OF EXPLORING WAYS TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR EXPLOITATION BY THE SOVIETS AND NEUTRALS OF REFERENCES IN SC.1 TO A ROLE FOR NTM'S IN THE VERIFICATION OF A CDE AGREEMENT. THE FOLLOWING DAY DEPUTY HEAD OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION SIZOO INFORMED U.S. DEPUTY HEAD OF DEL HANSEN THAT THE NETHERLANDS STILL BELIEVES THE U.S. HAS NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH AN INCONSISTENCY IN ITS POLICY ON THE QUESTION OF SHARING EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY NTM'S. AS EVIDENCE OF THIS INCONSISTENCY, SIZOO CITED OUR WILLINGNESS TO PUBLICIZE NTM-COLLECTED DATA ON THE SS-20 BUILDUP AND OUR STATED POLICY IN STOCKHOLM OF NOT SHARING NTM DATA IN A CSCE CONTEXT.
-
5. [redacted] THE DUTCH VIEW SC.1 25X1
REFERENCES TO NTM'S MAINLY AS A FACTOR COMPLICATING OUR ABILITY TO MAKE A MORE EFFECTIVE CASE FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE SOVIETS, FOR INSTANCE, SOMETIMES CITE THE PROVISIONS IN SC.1 FOR NTM'S IN SUPPORT OF THEIR POSITION THAT NTM'S ALONE ARE ADEQUATE FOR VERIFICATION. THE DUTCH ALSO CONSIDER THE OCCASIONAL REQUESTS BY SUCH NEUTRALS AS AUSTRIA FOR A DEFINITION OF WHAT NTM'S COMPRISE AS TROUBLESOME. THE DUTCH DELEGATION APPARENTLY HAS RECEIVED RECENT INSTRUCTIONS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST TO ENGAGE IN AN EXERCISE THAT WOULD INVOLVE DEFINING NTM'S. THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR INDICATED RECENTLY THAT THE DELEGATION HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT THE NETHERLANDS ITSELF HAS SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT WISH TO BE IDENTIFIED.
6. DURING THE DISCUSSION [redacted] QUOTED FROM A 25X1



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CABLE WHICH HE HAD AT HAND AND WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN SENT TO THE NETHERLANDS MISSION TO NATO. ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE CABLE, ABOUT FOUR PAGES IN LENGTH, 25X1
PRIMARILY ADDRESSES THE KINDS OF PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ARISEN, OR COULD ARISE, BECAUSE OF THE REFERENCES IN SC.1 TO NTM'S AND NON-INTERFERENCE.
7. SOME SPECIFIC DUTCH CONCERNS, AS REFLECTED IN THE CABLE OR ELABORATED ON BY [redacted] ARE AS FOLLOWS: 25X1
- A) THE REFERENCES TO NTM'S AHEAD OF THE PROVISION FOR INSPECTIONS IN MEASURE 5 OF SC.1 COULD BE CONSTRUED AS SUGGESTING A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE FOR NTM'S AND MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TACTICALLY TO SELL ON-SITE INSPECTION AS THE CENTERPIECE OF OUR VERIFICATION PROPOSAL.
- B) THE PROVISION FOR NON-INTERFERENCE INVITES LEGITIMATE REQUESTS FOR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTE NTM'S, HOW THEY OPERATE, AND WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE. DUTCH DELEGATION HAS RECENTLY COME TO APPRECIATE THAT IT SHARES U.S. INTEREST
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

***<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>***
FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT SC.1 REFERENCES TO
IN AVOIDING DEFINITIONS OF NTM'S.
-
- C) NEUTRALS MAY SEIZE UPON THE INTERFERENCE QUESTION IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH PRECEDENTS WHICH WOULD PROTECT WHATEVER SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS THEY MAY EVENTUALLY DEVELOP AND OPERATE. THIS COULD LEAD TO DISCUSSION OF COMPLEX TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES, MILITARY OPERATIONAL MATTERS AND BEHAVIOR WHICH MAY IMPEDE COLLECTION BY NTM'S.
8. SIZOO IN HIS MEETING WITH HANSEN MADE CLEAR THAT THE DUTCH REGARD THE U.S. POSITION ON NTM'S AS INCONSISTENT. HOW CAN WE MAINTAIN A POLICY THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT SHARE EVIDENCE RELATING TO FUTURE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF A CDE AGREEMENT AND AT THE SAME TIME RELEASE NTM-COLLECTED DATA ON SUCH SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS THE SS-20 PROGRAM FOR PURPOSES OF MOBILIZING ALLIED SUPPORT FOR U.S. INF DEPLOYMENTS?
9. COMMENT: WE WELCOME DUTCH INTEREST IN REDUCING THE ROLE OF NTM'S IN THE VERIFICATION PORTION OF OUR NEGOTIATING PACKAGE. WE STILL FACE THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, OF PERSUADING THE DUTCH TO BACK OFF THE QUESTION OF SHARING THE RESULTS OF NTM'S. THE DUTCH MAY FEEL THEY HAVE SOME LEVERAGE TO PUSH THE SHARING ISSUE IN VIEW OF A PROBABLE POSITIVE DECISION ON NOVEMBER 1 TO ACCEPT U.S. CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS. IN THE ABSENCE OF DEFINITIVE



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WASHINGTON GUIDANCE, U.S. REPS HAVE CONSISTENTLY VOICED THE VIEW THAT WE WILL NOT SHARE INFORMATION FROM NTM'S IN THE CDE. WHILE THIS ISSUE IS PROBABLY MANAGEABLE HERE, IT MAY BE USEFUL IF USNATO AND USDEL COULD BE PROVIDED WITH ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR OUR POSITION.
END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

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25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET 01 OF 06 STOCKHOLM 08083
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING PAPERS
REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 7415 (B) STOCKHOLM 6957
1. CDE VII - 060.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. THE NNA HAVE BEEN WORKING DOWN TO THE WIRE THIS ROUND TO DEVELOP A SERIES OF POSITION PAPERS TO SUPPLEMENT SC.3. A "CORE" GROUP OF THREE DELEGATIONS (SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA) REACHED AD REF AGREEMENT ON SUCH A PACKAGE, BUT HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA, CYPRUS AND FINLAND FULLY ON BOARD. IT MAY BE THAT THESE PROBLEMS WILL BE RESOLVED DURING THE BREAK AND A PAPER WILL BE TABLED EARLY IN ROUND VIII. U .S. DEL, THROUGH A VARIETY OF CONTACTS, HAS BEEN ABLE TO PIECE TOGETHER THE ANTICIPATED PACKAGE. IN PARTICULAR, THE NNA SEEM TO HAVE COME A LONG WAY TOWARDS OUR STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AND OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. THERE WILL BE A SEPARATE VERIFICATION SECTION ("OBSERVATION BY REQUEST") WHICH BASICALLY PROVIDES FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION, BUT ALSO FOR THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL. THE SECTION ADDRESSING NON-USE OF FORCE CONTAINS LARGELY UNEXCEPTIONAL LANGUAGE FROM THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, BUT ITS LENGTH AND DETAIL MAY CAUSE US TACTICAL DIFFICULTIES. END SUMMARY.

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GENERAL

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4. THE NNA HAVE CONTINUED TO WORK FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES -- DAY, NIGHT AND WEEKENDS -- TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF PAPERS FOR TABLING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH A "CORE" GROUP OF THREE DELEGATIONS (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND SWEDEN) FINALLY REACHED AN ACCOMMODATION LATE IN THE SESSION, THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO BRING FINLAND, MALTA, CYPRUS AND YUGOSLAVIA ON BOARD. THE "CORE" GROUP HAD HOPED TO SECURE AD REF AGREEMENT ON THE PACKAGE HERE IN STOCKHOLM, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT CAPITALS WOULD REVIEW THE PACKAGE DURING THE BREAK, FOR TABLING EARLY ON DURING THE NEXT ROUND. AT LEAST FIVE STICKING POINTS, HOWEVER, HAVE PREVENTED SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE PRODUCT WILL NONETHELESS BE REVIEWED IN CAPITALS DURING THE BREAK. THE MORE OPTIMISTIC AMONG THE NNA HOPE THAT THE PAPER WILL BE READY TO TABLE BY THE SECOND WEEK OF THE NEXT ROUND. A MORE PESSIMISTIC NNA VIEW IS THAT THE "CORE" GROUP, AND POSSIBLY FINLAND, MIGHT BE FORCED TO TABLE A PARCEL OF PAPERS WHICH WOULD NOT REPRESENT THE ENTIRE NNA.
THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING THE PAPER IS REVEALING. THAT YUGOSLAVIA POSED PROBLEMS CAME AS NO SURPRISE; HOWEVER MEMBERS OF



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25X1

THE "CORE" GROUP EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND FRUSTRATION THAT FINLAND PROVED SO DIFFICULT (THE FINNS HAVE USUALLY PLAYED A CONCILATORY ROLE AMONG THE NNA). THE FINNS, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, PROFESS RELUCTANCE TO GO TOO FAR AFIELD FROM THE REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, HAVING A PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE PROCESS; THEY THUS SHY AWAY FROM EMBARKING UPON SOMETHING TOO NEW AND DIFFERENT AND HENCE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS.

25X1

THIS LONG, DIFFICULT ROAD TO CONSENSUS AMONG THE NNA HAS THUS EXACTED ITS TOLL ON THE GROUP IN TERMS OF
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING PERSONAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS. ALTHOUGH THE NNA FUNCTION AS WELL AS CAN BE EXPECTED -- GIVEN THEIR DIVERSE SECURITY INTERESTS AND PERSONALITIES -- THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS OF TENSION IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY DRAW CLOSER TO AN AGREEMENT.
ONE WELL-TIMED PLOY WAS INFORMATION ON THE NNA POSITION WHICH WAS LEAKED TO THE BONN NEWSPAPER, "GENERAL ANZEIGER" AND HIT THE NEWS STANDS ON OCTOBER 10TH. (WE HAVE HEARD AUSTRIA IS RESPONSIBLE.) THIS ARTICLE OUTLINED THE AREAS WHICH PROBABLY WILL BE COVERED IN THE NNA PACKAGE, WITH A SHORT PARAGRAPH OF WHAT IS CONTAINED IN EACH. WHILE THE "BLUE" NNA -- SWISS, AUSTRIANS -- NO DOUBT WERE PLEASED WITH THEIR COUP, IT DREW THE IRE OF THE HOLDOUTS (FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA) AS A HEAVY HANDED ATTEMPT TO FORCE CONSENSUS AMONG THEM.
ANOTHER "ACTIVE MEASURE" EMPLOYED TO PRESSURE OTHERS EMBARRASSED THE MALTESE ON SWEDISH TELEVISION FOLLOWING THE AGREEMENT TO MOVE TO INFORMAL WORKING DISCUSSIONS. THE MALTESE, WHO HAD BLOCKED CONSENSUS FOR A DAY, WERE FEATURED ON SWEDISH TELEVISION THAT NIGHT. AS THE CAMERA ZOOMED IN ON THE MALTESE DELEGATE, THE SOUND OF LAUGHTER FROM OTHER DELEGATES COULD BE HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND. THE MALTESE DELEGATE IS CONVINCED THE SWEDES WERE BEHIND THIS.
THERE ALSO ARE INDICATIONS OF SOME SNIPING AMONG THE SWEDES, FINNS, AUSTRIANS AND SWISS. THE FINNS



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REPORTEDLY ARE UNHAPPY WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE NNA NOTIFICATION PROPOSAL. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, AT LEAST, THIS HAS INCREASED THE FRICTION BETWEEN THEM AND THE SWEDES, WHILE THE SWISS HAVE JOINED THE SWEDES IN A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE. NORMALLY, THE SWISS DEPRECATE THE SWEDES, WHO TRY TO HAVE AN ANSWER FOR EVERYTHING. THE YUGOSLAVS REMAIN THE MOST UNPLACABLE IN THE GROUP, AND AS A RESULT, HAVE BEEN UNDER HEAVY NNA PRESSURE. IT IS INTERESTING THAT IN ARGUING AMONG THEMSELVES THE NNA HAVE BEEN SURPRISINGLY INFORMATIVE IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WEST. THIS MAY WELL BE DUE TO A NEED TO CLARIFY WHAT THE PROBLEMS ARE, AND TO DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THEM. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS EASY FOR THE SWISS OR AUSTRIANS TO DISCUSS THE PACKAGE AND THE NNA PROBLEMS, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT THE REASON FOR THE NNA DELAY.

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THE PACKAGE

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5. SERIOUS WORK HAS GONE INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "CORE" GROUP'S PACKAGE AND THE "CORE" GROUP IS, BY AND LARGE, BOTH PLEASED WITH, AND PROUD OF, ITS PRODUCT. THERE IS SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE -- ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT ENOUGH FOR SOME. ONE "CORE" GROUP DELEGATE CHARACTERIZED THE PAPER AS "65 PER CENT NATO." AND YUGOSLAVIA IS RUMORED, AT FIRST BLUSH, TO HAVE DUBBED IT OUTRIGHT AS A "NATO PAPER." THE PROOF, HOWEVER, IS IN THE PUDDING. U.S. DEL, THROUGH A VARIETY OF CONTACTS, HAS TRIED TO GET A HANDLE ON WHAT WE MIGHT EXPECT TO SEE FROM THE NNA'S EARLY NEXT ROUND -- AN "SC.3/AMPLIFIED". IT IS POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, THAT THE PRICE OF SECURING YUGOSLAV AND FINNISH SUPPORT OR EVEN THE REVIW BY CAPITALS WILL RESULT IN CHANGES. NONETHELESS, PIECING TOGETHER VARIOUS BITS OF INFORMATION, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS A FAIRLY ACCURATE, ALBEIT GENERAL, PICTURE OF WHAT THE PACKAGE LOOKED LIKE AT THE END OF THIS ROUND.

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PRIOR NOTIFICATION

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END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 3 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING
6. GENERAL. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE PRESENTED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY, THE NNA APPEAR TO HAVE MOVED TOWARDS OUR



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STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AND OUR OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ACTIVITIES TO BE PRE-NOTIFIED ARE MANEUVERS COVERED BY THE MANDATE. HOWEVER, MANEUVERS WILL BE DEFINED BASICALLY AS FORMATIONS OR UNITS OUT-OF-GARRISON, ALTHOUGH GARRISON WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A "PEACETIME LOCATION." AND PEACETIME LOCATION WILL BE DEFINED IN SUCH A WAY SO AS TO EXCLUDE WHAT WE HAVE TERMED THE MOBILIZATION PHASE (I.E., FOR A COUNTRY THAT MOBILIZES OUT OF VILLAGES, THE PEACETIME LOCATION WILL BE WHERE THEY GATHER AND PICK UP EQUIPMENT.). NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS WILL BE SPECIFIED. THE THRESHOLD IS A STRUCTURAL ONE, THE DIVISION, ALTHOUGH DIVISION IS FURTHER DEFINED IN TERMS OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS (NUMBERS OF TROOPS) WITH ACCOMPANYING EQUIPMENT (TANKS, HELICOPTERS, ETC.), OR AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE, OR AIR-MOBILE UNITS ON THE LEVEL OF A BATTALION ACCOMPANIED BY AN AS YET UNDESIGNATED NUMERICAL THRESHOLD, AND SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SQUARE METERS.

7. RELEVANT DEFINITIONS WILL BE, WE UNDERSTAND, ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- MILITARY MANEUVERS: ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL IN COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES OUTSIDE THEIR PEACETIME LOCATIONS, INCUDING THE RELOCATION OF SUCH FORMATIONS AT A NOTIFIABLE LEVEL BETWEEN PEACETIME LOCATIONS AND THE EXERCISE AREA AS WELL AS BETWEEN DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE EXERCISE. (BEGIN COMMENT: THE NNA WILL BELIEVE THIS IS AS FAR AS THEY CAN GO, AND YUGOSLAVIA, AND PERHAPS FINLAND, THINK IT IS TOO FAR. END COMMENT.)

-- MOVEMENTS: THE RELOCATION OF FORMATIONS, IN NON-COMBAT RELATED ACTIVITIES, AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO AND FROM PEACETIME LOCATIONS/STAGING AREAS. (BEGIN COMMENT: ACCORDING TO THE SWISS, THE NNA DESIGNED THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO POSE PROBLEMS TO NATO MOVEMENTS/TRANSITS. END COMMENT.)

-- DIVISION: MOBILE MILITARY UNITS TEMPORARILY OR PERMANENTLY UNDER ONE COMMAND IN HEADQUARTERS, COMBAT AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND TWO-FIVE UNITS AT BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL WITH X TANKS, ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES, HELICOPTERS OR X TROOPS AND Y TANKS, ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES, HELICOPTERS. BEGIN COMMENT: USING THIS APPROACH, "DIVISION", PER SE, IS NOT A THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION, BUT IS NOTIFIED UNDER A NUMERICAL EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD. END COMMENT.)

8. TIMING AND CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT NOTIFICATION IS TO BE GIVEN 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE (PRECISELY TWICE THE NUMBER OF DAYS CALLED FOR UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.) THE NNA PACKAGE WILL NOT HAVE AN INDEPENDENT STATIC INFORMATION MEASURE, BUT



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RATHER WILL CALL FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION, IN FAR GREATER DETAIL THAN THAT PROVIDED FOR IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED, IN THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED WILL FALL INTO FOUR CATEGORIES: GENERAL (THIS WILL INCLUDE CERTAIN "STATIC" INFORMATION, WHICH IS A KEY ELEMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA'S CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO THE TOTAL PACKAGE), PARTICIPATING UNITS, INFORMATION ON DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION, AND OTHER INFORMATION (TO INCLUDE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EXERCISE TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.)

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END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 4 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING NOTIFICATION

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9. THE PACKAGE WILL ALSO INCLUDE A SECTION ON ACTIVITIES NOT NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE -- BASICALLY SHORT NOTICE MANEUVERS ("ALERT" ACTIVITIES) AND MOVEMENTS. THE TRIGGERING MECHANISM FOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE THE SAME AS THAT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS.

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CONSTRAINTS

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10. WE UNDERSTAND THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE BASICALLY ALONG THE LINES OF THOSE OUTLINED IN REF (B). IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO COMPLETELY BAN CONCURRENT LARGER-SCALE MANEUVERS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT A NEW ELEMENT -- A RESTRICTION ON THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY TO NO MORE THAN 17 DAYS -- WILL BE ADDED.

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OBSERVATION

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11. THE NNAS HAVE DEVELOPED A COMPREHENSIVE OBSERVER REGIME THAT WILL REQUIRE MANDATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO ALL PRE-NOTIFIED MILITARY MANEUVERS AND TO NOTIFIED MILITARY MANEUVERS (ALERTS) WHEN THE DURATION OF A MANEUVER EXCEEDS AN AS YET UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF HOURS. THE REGIME WILL REQUIRE THAT CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACTIVITY BE PROVIDED IN THE OBSERVER INVITATION, AND ALSO WILL ADDRESS IN



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CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE MODALITIES AND GUIDELINES FOR OBSERVATION, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF MAPS. INVITATIONS WILL BE EXTENDED AT THE TIME OF THE NOTIFICATION. THE MOMENT AT WHICH THE OBSERVATION STARTS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WHAT WE WOULD HAVE HOPED FOR -- AN OBSERVATION WILL START NOT LATER THAN AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF HOURS AFTER/AFTER THE ACTIVITY HAS STARTED. WHILE OBSERVERS WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW ALL THE MAIN PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A SPECIFIC PROVISION ALLOWING THE OBSERVER TO OBSERVE THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY FROM START TO FINISH AND RETURN TO GARRISON (PEACETIME LOCATIONS). (BEGIN COMMENT: THIS IS EVIDENCE THAT THE NNA DO NOT FULLY EMBRACE THE OOG CONCEPT. THEY DEFINE "MANEUVER" CLOSE TO OOG, BUT DO NOT APPLY IT TO THE PERIOD OF OBSERVATION. THIS WILL BE A PROBLEM AREA FOR US. END COMMENT.)

VERIFICATION

12. THIS ISSUE WILL APPARENTLY BE ADDRESSED UNDER THE TERMS OF "OBSERVATION BY REQUEST AND NTM'S." WHILE IT APPEARS TO BE MUCH MORE THAN INITIALLY WAS INDICATED BY THE NNA, IT NONETHELESS LOOKS AS IF IT WILL FALL SHORT OF WHAT WE WANT. WHILE CHARACTERIZED BY SOME OF THE NNA AS A "NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL ON-SITE INSPECTION", IT DOES NOT REALLY SEEM TO BE THAT AT ALL, AS WE BELIEVE THERE MAY BE TWO CATCHES. AN "OBSERVATION" READ INSPECTION) MAY ONLY BE REQUESTED IF A STATE DEEMS ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS TO BE IN JEOPARDY OR IF A STATE BELIEVES THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSBM REGIME (AS A WHOLE) IS CALLED INTO QUESTION. THUS, THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH SUCH AN "OBSERVATION" COULD BE REQUESTED ARE EXCEPTIONAL. IN ADDITION, A STATE MAY REFUSE SUCH A REQUEST ON GROUNDS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS. THE ELEMENT OF TIMELINESS WILL, HOWEVER, BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, PROBABLY REQUIRING A STATE TO

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***<<<<< SECTION 5 >>>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING
INVITE "OBSERVERS", OR AT LEAST RESPOND TO THE
REQUEST, WITHIN TWELVE HOURS. AND AN NNA OBSERVER WILL
ALWAYS BE PART OF THE "OBSERVATION" TEAM. FINALLY, IT
APPEARS THAT THE REQUESTS FOR "OBSERVATION", AND
INVITATIONS/RESPONSES WILL HAVE TO BE IN ACCORDANCE

WITH SOME PROVISIONS FOR AGREED PROCEDURES FOR RAPID
COMMUNICATIONS.

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COMMUNICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS

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13. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH
MODALITIES FOR "RAPID COMMUNICATION" (TELECOMMUNICATION
LINES), IT APPEARS THAT THE PROVISIONS TO BE INCLUDED
IN THIS SECTON WILL BE, BY-AND-LARGE, VOLUNTARY IN
NATURE. WHILE COMMUNICATIONS MUST BE TRANSMITTED TO
ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, THE RAPID MODALITY
COMMUNICATIONS "CAN" RATHER THAN "MUST" BE USED. AND,
SHOULD CLARIFICATION AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BE NECESSARY, AGAIN, THIS
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM "CAN" BE USED. CONSULTATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE ENVISAGED EITHER ON AN AD HOC
BASIS, OR AT REGULAR INTERVALS AS DECIDED BY THE
STATES, BUT NOT, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, REQUIRED. THE
SWISS CONCEPT OF SALON DES AMBASSADEURS HAS NOT
DISAPPEARED ENTIRELY. THERE MAY BE A PROVISION FOR A
CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM LINKED TO "OBSERVATION ON
REQUEST."

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ANNUAL CALENDERS

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14. WE UNDERSTAND THEIR ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL WILL
BE SIMILAR TO SC.1/AMPLFIED. THERE MAY BE A FEW
DIFFERENCES, AS THE NNA PAPER IS LIKELY TO CALL FOR
MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE TYPES OF FORCES
PARTICIPATING, TO WIT: LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING
AND COMMANDING THE ACTIVITY; NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE



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PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES; AND NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE PARTICIPATING AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIR-MOBILE BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT INFORMATION FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTICIPATING UNITS, BY ORGANIZATIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, WILL BE CALLED FOR.

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NON-USE OF FORCE

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15. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WILL CONTAIN FIFTEEN ELEMENTS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY DRAWN FROM THE UN CHARTER AND HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE POINTS, IN AND OF THEMSELVES, ARE LARGELY UNEXCEPTIONABLE INCLUDING SECTIONS ON THE PRIMACY OF THE CHARTER, BALANCE IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (TO MOLLIFY THE SWISS). THERE IS ALSO A YUGOSLAV-INSPIRED SECTION ON TERRORISM. WHILE THE NNA DRAFT IS A LOT LONGER THAN WE WOULD HAVE WISHED, AT LEAST IT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE DETAILED DEFINITIONS OF FORCE ("THE CDE

DIMENSION") ADVOCATED BY THE CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVE.

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PROBLEMS .

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16. AS INDICATED EARLIER, BOTH YUGOSLAVIA AND FINLAND HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE PACKAGE AS IT HAS NOW EVOLVED, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST FIVE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES. FINLAND DOES NOT LIKE THE
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 6 >>>>***
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING DEFINITIONS OF MOVEMENTS AND DIVISIONS, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE THEY STRAY TOO FAR FROM ACCEPTED HELSINKI FINAL ACT CONCEPTS, BUT MOST LIKELY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TROUBLE ACCEPTING THEM. SPECIFICALLY, THE FINNS WOULD LIKE TO SET THE TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION OF A MANEUVER AT THREE, VICE TWO UNITS OF A DIVISION. FINLAND ALSO HAS A PROBLEM WITH THE TREATMENT OF WHAT WE CALL "ALERT" ACTIVITIES. YUGOSLAVIA, IN TURN, HAS DIFFICULTY ACCEPTING THE NOTION OF SPECIFYING PEACETIME LOCATIONS (ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THAT, IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING THE YUGOSLAVS ON BOARD, ONE OF THE NNA DELEGATES PULLED OUT A MAP AND POINTED OUT YUGOSLAV PEACETIME LOCATIONS IN ORDER TO PROVE TO YUGOSLAVIA



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THAT THESE LOCATIONS WERE HARDLY A SECRET), AND WITH OBSERVATION BY REQUEST; HERE, YUGOSLAVIA WOULD LIKE TO LIMIT THE RATIONALE FOR MAKING SUCH A REQUEST STRICTLY TO SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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SC.7

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF
AUSTRIA, CYPRUS, FINLAND, LIECHTENSTEIN, MALTA, SAN MARINO,
SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, YUGOSLAVIA

SC.7

The above-mentioned States,

Renewing their commitment to document CSCE/SC.3,

Expressing their wish to contribute to the further progress of the Conference,

Submit the following:



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PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

The participating States will give prior notification to all other participating States of military manoeuvres, covered by the mandate, i.e.

- the engagement of military formations at or above the notifiable level as defined below outside their normal locations in combat-related exercises and
- movements of such formations at or above the notifiable level between their normal locations and the exercise areas as well as between the areas of the different phases of the exercises.

Such manoeuvres will be subject to prior notification, whenever they involve at least

- numerical total(s) - to be defined - of forces participating in the activity as a whole, emphasizing mobility and firepower or
- one division or equivalent formation* or
- three amphibious, airborne, air-mobile units on battalion level or combinations thereof and a total number of xx troops or a total number of xx troops and a total of yy square metres of shipborne loading capacity.

---

*For the purpose of the agreement a division or equivalent formation is defined as

- a mobile military unit structured, permanently or temporarily, under one command in headquarters, combat and support elements or
- any other group of forces of equivalent capability

containing 2-5 units on brigade/regiment level with a total number of at least x troops and y tanks/armoured fighting vehicles/helicopters or a total number of at least z tanks/armoured fighting vehicles/helicopters.



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Prior notification will be given by the participating States on whose territory these manoeuvres take place as well as by those States carrying them out. Prior notification will also be given by States participating in these manoeuvres whenever their participation reaches notifiable level.

Prior notification will be given 42 days or more in advance of the start of these military manoeuvres in a standardized format containing the following information:

1. General information

1.1. Type and designation of the activity

1.2. Main purposes

1.3. Timeframe of the activity

1.4. Area of the activity

1.5. Level of command, organizing and commanding the activity

1.6. Participating States

1.7. Number and types of participating divisions or equivalent formations of ground, naval and air forces

1.8. Number and types of participating amphibious, airborne and air-mobile brigades or regiments

1.9. Numerical strength of the activity and the number of troops of each participating State

2. Information on participating units

2.1. Number, types, and, whenever possible, names of units of each participating State involved in the activity, down to and including

- brigade and/or regiment level; equivalent level of ground, naval and air forces

- battalion level in case of amphibious, airborne and air-mobile units



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2.2. Numerical strength (manpower) of

- directing staff, including umpires
- each major unit, at
  - divisional level or above
  - battalion level in case of amphibious, airborne and air-mobile units

2.3. Number and/or type of the following*:

- tanks
- other armoured fighting vehicles
- river crossing and other types of heavy assault engineering equipment
- logistic assault support equipment
- selfpropelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers (more than 100 mm)
- other artillery and multiple rocket launchers (more than 100 mm), as well as mobile surface to air missile launchers
- heavy live ammunition
- combat aircraft
- combat helicopters
- transport aircraft
- transport helicopters
- naval combatants
- landing crafts
- amphibious vessels, including shipborne loading capacity
- auxiliary amphibious ships, including shipborne loading capacity

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*level of detail to be defined



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3. Information on different phases of the military activity and their geographical definition

3.1. The starting and finishing dates of the movements of forces involved, whenever they reach notifiable level, as well as the period of absence from their normal locations

3.2. Duration of each phase, tactical purpose and corresponding geographical areas, including staging areas, and final positions before returning to their normal locations

4. Other information

4.1. Additional relevant information to be defined on the units participating in notifiable activities.

4.2. Substantial changes and additions to the annual calendar* as well as reasons for such changes

4.3. Relation to other notifiable activities

4.4. State responsible for the observation programme

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*See page 6



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ANNUAL CALENDAR OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

The participating States will transmit to all other participating States the calendar of their military activities subject to prior notification and planned for the calendar year beginning on the subsequent January 1st. This annual calendar will be transmitted every year, not later than October 1st, in a standardized format containing the following information:

1. Type of activity

2. Main purposes

3. Timeframe of the activity with envisaged starting and finishing dates

4. Area of the activity

5. Level of command, organizing and commanding the activity

6. States participating in the activity

7. Number and types of the participating divisions or equivalent formations of ground, naval and air forces

8. Number and types of the participating amphibious, airborne and air-mobile units

9. Additional relevant information to be defined on the units participating in notifiable activities

10. Numerical strength of the activity in terms of manpower as well as the number of troops of each participating State



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## INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION

The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to military manoeuvres subject to prior notification in accordance with the provisions set out below.

1. The invitation of observers will be extended simultaneously with the prior notification of the military activity.

2. In addition to the basic information on the military activity, given in the prior notification, the invitation will specify

- State responsible for the observation programme
- the period of observation
- the number of observers invited per participating State
- the languages used in interpretation and translation during the observation.

The deadline for accepting the invitation will be 21 days before the start of the observation. If no reply is given in time, it will be assumed that no observers will be sent.

3. Additional information will be sent not later than 14 days before the start of the observation to those States which have accepted the invitation or which request such additional information. The information will include

- basic situation and main phases of the activity
- maps of the area of activity with a scale to be specified
- general practical arrangements for the observers
- authorized equipment for the observers
- general observation programme



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4. At latest when the observation begins information will be given to the observers on the

- detailed observation programme
- directing staff responsible for the observation
- details of practical arrangements.

5. The observation will cover the duration of the activity, as notified, whenever it reaches the notifiable level, during phases to be defined.

6. The invitation will be valid for at least one observer from each participating State; in case of larger scale activities at least two observers will be invited. In the case of particularly large activities an even higher number of observers could be envisaged.

7. While the observers are on the territory of the State where the activity takes place, their persons and property, as well as their living quarters, will be granted the same privileges and immunities as those accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

8. The invited State decides whether to send military and/or civilian observers.

9. Observers from all participating States will be treated without discrimination and offered equal opportunities to carry out their functions.

10. Observers will be given the possibility to use high capability optical equipment to be defined.

11. The use of photographic equipment is generally prohibited, unless the inviting State grants exceptions.

12. Irrespective of the language(s) used in briefings and information, it/they will be interpreted or, respectively, translated into at least one working language of the CSCE. Languages to be used will be indicated in the invitations given.



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13. The observers will be given extensive and authoritative information on the purpose, the basic situation and the progress of the activity through detailed daily briefings with the help of maps and drawings describing the current situation.

14. In particular the observers, in order to evaluate whether the activities are carried out in conformity with the prior notification and whether they are non-threatening in nature, will be given opportunity

- to observe ground, naval and air units carrying out the main activities as well as areas that are essential for the above purposes of observation
- to visit, within the framework of alternatives offered, field units on levels to be defined and to follow their activities and to communicate with commanders and troops
- to be briefed on unit levels, to be defined, by commanders or members of their staff
- to be provided with information concerning their approximate position, geographically and in relation to units referred to in earlier briefings.

They will be provided with appropriate means of transportation.

15. The inviting State will also consider requests made by other participating States before the start of the observation programme with regard to possibilities to supplement the observation programme in order to meet particular concerns expressed.

16. The inviting State will guide the observers in the area of activities. Observers will follow the relevant instructions issued by the inviting State in accordance with the provisions set out in this document. The inviting State will not be required to permit observation of restricted installations such as fortifications or similar defence sites.



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17. Observers will be given the opportunity to communicate with their embassies and/or with their home authorities.

18. The inviting State will cover the costs of board and lodging during the observation programme.



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## NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE

1. The participating States will give notification to all other participating States of military manoeuvres as defined on page 2, covered by the mandate, which are carried out at short notice, whenever they reach notifiable level as defined on page 2.

2. The participating States will give notification to all other participating States of such military movements which are not in conjunction with combat-related exercises, of military formations at or above notifiable level to and from normal locations/staging areas, covered by the mandate, whenever they reach notifiable level as defined on page 2.

3. Notification will be given by the participating States on whose territory these manoeuvres and movements take place as well as by those States carrying them out. Notification will also be given by States participating in these manoeuvres and movements whenever their participation reaches notifiable level.

4. Notification will be given at the earliest possible opportunity prior to the start of these manoeuvres and movements in a standardized format containing information as outlined under the section on prior notification with exceptions to be defined.

5. The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to military manoeuvres carried out at short notice, when the duration of the activity at or above notifiable level exceeds ... hours, in accordance with provisions to be elaborated.



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## CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

1. The participating States will abide by the following constraints on the notifiable military activities referred to in this section:

2. No individual military manoeuvre will exceed five times the notifiable level and its duration at or above notifiable level will not exceed 17 days.

3. The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate in more than a total of five notifiable military manoeuvres per calendar year which are of a size less than two times the notifiable level; moreover, the States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate* in a total of more than one such manoeuvre at the same time.

However, if such manoeuvres are notified in the annual calendar by the States on whose territory they take place as well as by those States carrying them out, the total number per calendar year and the number of such manoeuvres taking place at the same time will not be restricted.

4. The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate* in more than a total of five military manoeuvres per calendar year, which are of a size of two times the notifiable level or above. Such manoeuvres will be notified already in the annual calendar by the States on whose territory they take place as well as by those States carrying them out.

The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate* in a total of more than two such manoeuvres at the same time. However, once a year two such manoeuvres may be combined but not exceed a total of seven times the notifiable level.

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*to be defined



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OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

A participating State which considers that its national security interests are at stake or that the continued effectiveness of the agreement is seriously jeopardized because of specific circumstances in the context of the implementation of measures contained in the preceding sections, will be entitled to request to send observers to another participating State on very short notice.

The request will be addressed to the State on whose territory the activities or presumed activities are carried out. It will define the requested observation area and cite the relevant measures on which the request is based as well as state the reasons for the request.

The State which has received such a request will, within twelve hours after receiving the request, invite the requesting State to carry out the observation. The modalities and guidelines for such observation, including exceptions which apply to restricted areas, will be defined.

If, for reasons of supreme national security interests, a State which has been requested to receive observers would find itself compelled not to grant the request, it will state the reasons which in the particular situation have caused the refusal in an answer addressed to the requesting State within twelve hours after receiving the request.

In view of the fact that the CSCE process takes place outside military alliances, the requested State will in addition invite observers from a third participating State with which it does not maintain relations of military alliance.

If observers from a third State take part, they will participate in the whole observation together with the observers from the requesting State, and be provided with the same facilities.

After a requested observation has been carried out, the requesting State, the inviting State as well as the invited third State, will each submit a report to the other participating States within ... hours upon completion of the observation.



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**The request and the answer thereto as well as the reports on the observation will be transmitted in accordance with the provisions contained in the following section.**



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## ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THE MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED

### 1. General provisions for communication

Each participating State will transmit all communications foreseen in the preceding sections to all other participating States.

Such communications can be transmitted in conformity with the modalities for rapid communications set out below.

The participating States can also make use of the rapid communication system in order to provide and request clarification and additional information as well as in order to exchange views concerning the implementation of the measures in the preceding sections.

### 2. Modalities for rapid communications

In order to ensure that the communications can be transmitted without delay and at all times, the participating States will keep telecommunication lines accessible between the designated representatives of the participating States for transmitting and receiving printed text, charts and maps.

Access to all such communications will be restricted in accordance with CSCE practice.



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CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Arrangements for short meetings of representatives of all the participating States, in relation to the implementation of the measures in the preceding sections, should also be envisaged.

Such meetings could be convened

- on an ad hoc basis, at the request of any participating State, to deal with exceptional situations
- at intervals and dates to be decided by the participating States, to proceed to an exchange of views on the routine implementation of the measures



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NON-USE OF FORCE

The participating States stress their commitment to the Final Act of the CSCE and the need for improved and consistent implementation of all its provisions, and thus to further the process of increasing security and developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole. They are also conscious of the interrelation between security in Europe as a whole, and security in the Mediterranean area.

All the principles set forth in the Final Act are of primary significance and, accordingly, will all be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others. Respect for these principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among the participating States in all fields.

The participating States are conscious of the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security within the CSCE.

They stress that the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force is a universally recognized obligation in international law, binding all States, and that non-compliance with it consequently constitutes a violation of international law.

They reaffirm their determination to respect this principle, contained in the Final Act, so as to ensure that, as a norm of international life, it is strictly and effectively observed. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

They recall the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.

The participating States will refrain, in their mutual as well as in their international relations in general,

- from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Final Act, and, accordingly,



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- from any manifestation of force, direct or indirect, for the purpose of inducing any State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights,

regardless of this State's political, social, economic, or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with this State relations of alliance.

No territorial occupation or acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force will be recognized as legal.

The participating States stress their firm commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in the Final Act, convinced that it is an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force. They reaffirm their resolve to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute existing or arising between them. They also express their determination to reinforce, improve and develop the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The participating States confirm the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the respect for which is an essential factor for the CSCE process and for international peace and security as well as for the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.

The participating States confirm that they will refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State. They express their determination to take effective measures for the prevention and supression of acts of terrorism and will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective territories from being used for the preparation, organization or commission of terrorist activities, including measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism.



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The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law. They declare that their existing international commitments, rights and obligations do not conflict with the present document.

They confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail.

The participating States are convinced that the situation in Europe and the equal respect for the legitimate security interests of every participating State require determined efforts by all of them to build mutual confidence, lessen military confrontation, strengthen security for all and promote disarmament.

By their very nature concrete CSBMs serve to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force.



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08027
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, OCTOBER 18, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7956, B) STOCKHOLM 7994
1. CDE VII - 064
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE U.S. AND USSR WEIGHED IN ON THE ISSUES WHICH MUST BE RECONCILED IF THERE IS TO BE AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. (TEXTS OF BOTH SPEECHES SENT REFS A AND B.) CANADA ENUMERATED PROBLEM AREAS REVEALED DURING INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. LUXEMBOURG SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE EC-10 END SUMMARY.
-
4. AMBASSADOR BARRY OUTLINED DIFFERENCES WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IN ORDER FOR THE CONFERENCE TO MOVE INTO INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. HE CALLED ON THE EAST TO CEASE ITS EFFORTS TO CHALLENGE THE CDE ZONE OF APPLICATION. (TEXT OF SPEECH SENT REF A.)
5. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S COUNTERPOINT GENERALLY PLAYED UP TO THE EUROPEANS, PLACING THE CONFERENCE IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN DETENTE. HOWEVER, HE ALSO CRITICIZED THE ALLEGED ATTEMPT OF THE U.S. TO "EXPOSE" THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF FORCES; TO CONSIDER ONLY GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY; AND TO "DELAY" DEVELOPMENT OF NUF. (TEXT SPEECH SENT REF B.)
6. AMBASSADOR DELWORTH (CANADA) URGED THE CONFERENCE TO MOVE QUICKLY INTO DRAFTING VIA CONCRETE CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANCE IN THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALREADY REVEALED PROBLEMS, E.G.,



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(1) ON VERIFICATION/INFORMATION, WHICH IS REJECTED BY THE EAST; (2) ON THE EAST'S ATTEMPT TO EXTEND THE CDE ZONE; AND (3) ON THE EAST'S DESIRE TO DRAFT NUF LANGUAGE BEFORE MOVING TO DRAFTING IN OTHER GROUPS.

7. IN A BRIEF STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE EC-10, DEPUTY HEAD OF DELEGATION KAYSER (LUXEMBOURG) CHARACTERIZED THE AGREEMENT ON INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS AS A "TURNING POINT" IN DISCUSSIONS.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

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SUBJECT: U.S. <><>CDE<><> PLENARY SPEECH, 10/18/85
1. [redacted]
2. U-ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE ADDRESS AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF USDEL <><>CDE<><>, GAVE IN PLENARY TODAY, OCTOBER L8. BEGIN TEXT:
THIS CONFERENCE HAS JUST CROSSED A THRESHOLD. WE HAVE, I HOPE, DECIDED TO LEAVE PROCEDURE BEHIND AND CONCENTRATE ON SUBSTANCE. MY DELEGATION, WITH OTHERS, WORKED HARD TO BRING ABOUT THE TRANSITION, AND WE WELCOME IT AS LONG OVERDUE. IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, PRESIDENT REAGAN

EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WOULD SOON SEE "THE BEGINNING OF PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A FINAL AGREEMENT." IN MAY, THE PRESIDENT SAID: "THE CONFERENCE IS NOW AT A POINT WHERE IT COULD MOVE INTO A 1ORE INTENSE NEGOTIATING PHASE..." WE HAVE FINALLY TAKEN THAT STEP. MY PREDECESSOR, AMBASSADOR GOODBY, PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN GETTING THE SOMETIMES CUMBERSOME CONSENSUS PROCESS UNDER WHICH WE OPERATE TO WORK. SO DID MANY OTHER DELEGATES.
BUT LET US NOT BE TOO FREE WITH SELF-CONGRATULATIONS. LET US REFLECT ON NEARLY TWO YEARS OF DISCUSSION WHICH HAVE DONE LITTLE TO MAKE EUROPE MORE SECURE OR CONFIDENT. THE TIME REMAINING TO US IS SEVERELY LIMITED. THE TIME SPENT ON PROCEDURE DURING THIS PAST ROUND, HOWEVER NECESSARY, HAS NOT LED TO SIGNIFICANT CONVERGENCE ON THE ISSUES; IF ANYTHING, IT HAS SERVED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR SUBSTANCE. AS WE LOOK AHEAD TO THE NEXT ROUND, WE SHOULD HAVE A CLEAR VIEW IN MIND OF THE COMPLEXITY AND URGENCY OF THE TASK BEFORE US.
DURILG THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WE ARE NOW IN, OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO FIND OUT IF THERE IS INDEED SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND AMONG US ON WHICH A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME CAN BE BUILT AND TO DETERMINE WHEN AND HOW WE CAN BEST MOVE TO ACTUAL DRAFTING. LET'S NOT DELUDE OURSELVES; ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SIGNS OF EMERGING CONSENSUS ON SOME ISSUES, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON MOST. FINDING SOLUTIONS TO THEM WILL BE DEMANDING.
THE UNITED STATES IS READY FOR SUJSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION. IN A STATEMENT ON SEPTEMBER LO, AMBASSADOR GOODBY IDENTIFIED THE MAIN ISSUES BEFORE THE CONFERENCE AND OUTLINED THE POSITIONS OF THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.L ON THEM. AMONG OTHER THINGS, HE EXPRESSED OUR FUNDAMENTAL BELIEF THAT THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION MUST BE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWERED; HE ARGUED FOR THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO NOTIFICATION; HE EXPLAINED OUR VIEWS ON OBSERVATION AND ON-SITE INSPECTION. AND HE EXPLAINED THE NEED FOR AN ANNUAL



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EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURES AND LOCATIONS. THESE POSITIONS ON THE CONTENT OF CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES LIE AT THE HEART OF DEGATE HERE AND WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS OF OUR CONTRIBUTION TO DRAFTING. IF WE CAN NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT ON SUCH MEASURES, WE WILL HAVE MADE THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN EUROPE LESS LIKELY; THEN, A REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE COMMITMENT, AS PART OF THAT AGREEMENT, WOULD HAVE REAL MEANING.

OTHER QUESTIONS WE WILL ADDRESS HERE NOT BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THEY ARE PART OF OUR MANDATE, BUT BECAUSE OTHERS HAVE RAISED THEM. I HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY ATTEMPTS TO ALTER THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. THE MANDATE IS CLEAR IN REFERRING TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE; IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR IN AFFIRMING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. STATED MOST PLAINLY, ACTIVITIES IN THOSE AREAS ARE COVERED ONLY WHEN THEY MEET BOTH OF TWO CRITERIA:

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***<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>***
FRO1 USDEL <><>CDE<><>
USIA FOR P/PFE
E.O. L2356: N/A
TAGS: CSCE, <><>CDE<><>, PARM, PREL
WHEN THEY AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AND WHEN THEY ALSO CONSTITUTE A PART OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE FOR WHICH NOTIFICATION IS REQUIRED. WE ARE PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT THE MANDATE IN THIS REGARD AS IN ALL OTHERS; THE ZONE OF APPLICATION IS NOT OPEN TO RENEGOTIATION OR REINTERPRETATION.
MR. CHAIRMAN, MY GOVERNMENT AND, I BELIEVE, MOST OTHERS HERE WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT EMPTY FORMULATIONS WHICH PROMISE SECURITY TO OUR PUBLICS BUT DO NOTHING TO FULFILL THE PROMISE. AS THE MADRID MANDATE SAYS, THE PRODUCT OF OUR WORK HERE MUST HAVE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. BY MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, I MEAN A SUBSTANTIVE, QUALITATIVE ADVANCE OVER THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, MEASURES WHICH CAN IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE TO UNDERSTAND THE INTENTIONS AND PURPOSES BEHIND THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS REQUIRES A MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY SET OF MEASURES ADDRESSING THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF 1ILITARY ACTIVITY, NOT ISOLATED MEASURES DIRECTED AT SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN WE ESTABLISH A RELIABLE PROFILE OF THE ACTIVITIES WHICH ROUTINELY OCCUR OVER A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME SO AS, FINALLY, TO DEVELOP NORMS FOR MILITARY BEHAVIOR. TO OUR MINDS, BUILDING SUCH A PROFILE REQUIRES A SYSTEM OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND NOTIFICATIONS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE EVALUATED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INFORMATION ABOUT FORCES NORMALLY STATIONED IN THE AREA. ONLY SUCH AN INTERRELATED SYSTEM WOULD ALLOW REALLY INFORMED ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE MEANILG OF ACTIVITIES IN THE OVERALL MILITARY CONTEXT.
IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THE STATEMENT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV MADE IN PARIS ON OCTOBER 3 THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT "MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION." THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF DOCUMENT SC.L, INCLUDING MY COUNTRY, PROPOSED SUCH AN EXCHANGE AS ONE OF THE SIX MEASURES WE TABLED AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THIS CONFERENCE,

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IN JANUARY, L984. DOCUMELT SC.3, TABLED BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES IN MARCH OF THAT YEAR, ALSO CONTAINS SUCH A PROPOSAL. SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THIS CONCEPT SERVES AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS NECESSARY FOR A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. I MUST ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE RECENT REMARKS ON THIS SUBJECT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, EQUATING INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, QUALIFIES GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT IN A WAY WHICH UNDERCUTS THE EMERGING AGREEMENT ON THIS MEASURE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, AS OUR MANDATE STATES AND AS WE HAVE BEEN STRESSING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS CONFERENCE, THE REQUIREMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE ALSO MEANS THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED HERE MUST BE VERIFIABLE AND PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE MEANS OF VERIFICATION. IN RELATION TO NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THIS REQUIRES THAT EVERY STATE HAVE THE ABILITY TO ASSURE ITSELF THAT ALL OTHER STATES ARE PROVIDING NOTIFICATION FOR EVERY ACTIVITY WHICH MEETS THE AGREED PARAMETERS. WITHOUT THE MEANS OF VERIFYING THAT ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IS ACCURATE AND COIPLETE, NO STATE CAN GAIN REAL CONFIDENCE FROM A SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, AND NO SUCH SET CAN BE OF TRUE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. I KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES, ITS GOVERNMENT, CONGRESS AND PEOPLE, COULD NEVER ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT HERE WHICH WAS NOT VERIFIABLE IN ALL ITS OPERATIVE PARTS.

END OF MESSAGE

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***<<<<< SECTION 3 >>>>***

FRO1 USDEL <><>CDE<><>

USIA FOR P/PFE

MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SPOKEN GENERALLY TODAY TO REMIND THE CONFERENCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS OF MY DELEGATION AS WE ENTER INTO A NEW PHASE OF OUR WORK. I HAVE NOT ADDRESSED ALL ISSUES BEFORE US; I HAVE NOT TRIED TO ARGUE THE DETAILS OF OUR POSITIONS. I HAVE SIMPLY TRIED TO DESCRIGE--IN OUTLINE--OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS REQUIRED BY OUR MANDATE AND BY THE EXPECTATIONS OF OUR STATES AND PEOPLES. I LOOK FORWARD TO A PRODUCTIVE NEXT ROUND, ONE IN WHICH ACTUAL DRAFTING COULD BEGIN. BUT AS AN EXPERIENCED OPTIMIST I AM ALWAYS LOOKING FOR THE RAIN CLOUDS OVER THE HORIZON. THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS DURING THIS SESSION THAT SOME DELEGATIONS WOULD LIKE TO IMPOSE A KIND OF DUAL LINKAGE ON THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS, INSISTING THAT PROGRESS ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, AS DEFINED BY OUR



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MANDATE, BE HELD HOSTAGE BOTH TO PROGRESS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE ISSUE AND ALSO TO WORK ON PROPOSALS WHICH, IN FACT, LIE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF OUR MANDATE. THIS IS A FORMULA FOR COMPLETE STALEMATE, WHATEVER WE CALL THE STAGE WE ARE IN.

FINALLY, LET ME NOTE THE BROADER CONTEXT IN WHICH WE WORK. IN ABOUT ONE YEAR, OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL GATHER IN VIENNA TO EVALUATE PROGRESS IN THE WHOLE CSCE PROCESS, INCLUDING THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. OUR IMMEDIATE JOB HERE IS MORE NARROW; IT IS TO ENACT A SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. BUT IT IS WELL TO KEEP IN MIND, AS MY DELEGATION AND OTHERS HAVE SAID BEFORE, THAT OUR SPECIFIC WORK CAN ACHIEVE ITS FULLEST SIGNIFICANCE ONLY IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF SECURITY WHICH TRANSCENDS MILITARY AFFAIRS AND ENCOMPASSES POLITICAL, CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AS WELL. PART OF THAT BROADER CONTEXT WAS THE OTTAWA MEETING ON HUMAN RIGHTS HELD LAST JUNE; ANOTHER IS THE CULTURAL FORUM WHICH OPENED IN BUDAPEST ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER L5. AND THE BERN MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS, COMING IN THE SPRING OF NEXT YEAR, CAN CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE BALANCE OF THE OVERALL CSCE PROCESS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I BEGAN WITH A CALL FOR HASTE. LET ME END BY SUGGESTING PATIENCE AS WELL. ONE OF OUR MOST BELOVED WRITERS, E. B. WHITE, DIED A SHORT TIME AGO; ONE OF THE 10ST FAMOUS PASSAGES HE WROTE GOES AS FOLLOWS: "AS LONG AS THERE IS ONE UPRIGHT MAN, AS LONG AS THERE IS ONE COMPASSIONATE WOMAN, THE CONTAGION MAY SPREAD AND THE SCENE IS NOT DESOLATE. HOPE IS THE THING THAT IS LEFT TO US, IN A BAD TIME. I SHALL GET UP SUNDAY MORNING AND WIND THE CLOCK AS A CONTRIBUTION TO ORDER AND STEADFASTNESS." NEARLY TWO YEARS OF WINDING THE CLOCK HAS BROUGHT US TO THIS NEW THRESHOLD. MY DELEGATION, LIKE OTHERS, HAS HELD THE HOPE OVER THOSE MONTHS THAT PATIENCE, STEADFASTNESS, AND DETERMINATION CAN FINALLY LEAD TO SOLID RESULTS. THE CONFERENCE HAS NOW, I BELIEVE, TAKEN A STEP TOWARD THAT END. MY DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO WORK STEADILY AND CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO HELP MAINTAIN BOTH THE MOVEMENT AND THE PATIENCE NECESSARY FOR FINAL SUCCESS.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLAS COMPLET 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07994
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY,
- HEAD OF USSR DELEGATION TO THE CDE,
- OCTOBER 18, 1985
1. CDE VII - 058
2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE HEAD OF THE USSR CDE DELEGATION FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
-

DISTINGUISHED MR. CHAIRMAN,
- IT WILL NOT BE AN OVERSTATEMENT TO SAY THAT THIS SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS BEEN UNUSUAL. ITS WORK CAN BE DESCRIBED THIS TIME AS POSITIVE. WHILE IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO MAKE A FINAL JUDGMENT WE BELIEVE THAT IT HAS MARKED A CERTAIN TURN AT THE CONFERENCE TOWARDS MOVING OVER TO MORE PRODUCTIVE WORK.
- THE CONFERENCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN AFFECTED BY MAJOR INTERNATIONAL EVENTS. IN THIS RESPECT IT CAN BE CALLED, TO USE A FIGURE OF SPEECH, THE BAROMETER OF POLITICAL MOODS IN THE CAPITALS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, THE INDICATOR OF, FIRST AND FOREMOST, THE REALIZATION BY THE EUROPEANS OF THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS.
- THE STOCKHOLM FORUM WAS POSITIVELY AFFECTED BY THE RECENT SOVIET-FRENCH SUMMIT MEETING WHICH HAD AN IMPORTANT SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN SECURITY, BROADENING THE ALL-EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE VISIT TO FRANCE BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV LAID A GOOD BASIS BOTH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET-FRENCH COOPERATION WHICH IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR OF STABILITY IN EUROPE AND FOR A TURN TO A RADICAL IMPROVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TO ENHANCED SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES.
- ADVANCE ALONG THE TRAIL BLAZED IN HELSINKI HAS ALWAYS DEPENDED ON THE CLIMATE PREVAILING IN EUROPE, THE POLITICAL WILL AND INITIATIVE TO PURSUE DETENTE AND SECURITY AND ON THE STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. THE HIGHER THE LEVEL OF THOSE RELATIONS AND THE FIRMER THE WILL TO COOPERATE, THE DEEPER IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS. EUROPE, WHERE DETENTE WAS BORN, CAN AND MUST PLAY AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE IN THE ACTIVE SEARCH FOR WAYS LEADING TO A DRASTIC IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY FACILITATED BY A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
-





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- INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT A TENDENCY IS GAINING MOMENTUM IN EUROPE TO OVERCOME THE LOGIC OF CONFRONTATION. THIS REQUIRES RESOLUTE AND BOLD ACTIONS, A FRESH VIEW OF AND APPROACH TO NUMEROUS INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING

IN EUROPE. SPEAKING IN PARIS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV STATED THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO TURN MORE RESOLUTELY THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TO THE NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENTS AS "THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES HERE TO INTENSIFY THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS."

- ONE OF THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THOSE OPPORTUNITIES WAS THE DECISION TO MOVE AT THE CONFERENCE OVER TO EXPLORATION AND SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF ISSUES WHICH WOULD SHAPE THE FRAMEWORK OF POSSIBLE ACCORDS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE COMPLETING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE THREE GROUPS OF STATES, NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED, WARSAW TREATY, AND NATO, DEMONSTRATED THEIR FLEXIBILITY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN PREPARING THAT DECISION. I WOULD LIKE TO PAY SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO, DISTINGUISHED HEAD OF THE REPUBLIC
END OF MESSAGE
UNCLASSIFIED

***<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>***
FROM USDEL
USIA FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, OF FINLAND, FOR THE IMPORTANT ROLE WHICH HE PLAYED IN REACHING THIS AGREEMENT, WHOSE DIPLOMATIC MASTERSHIP MADE IT POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME MANY OBSTACLES.

- WE SHARE THE OPINION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE STEP TAKEN BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE ESTABLISHES THE FRAMEWORK AND GUIDELINES FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF OUR WORK, MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS AND SETS THE CONFERENCE AT A BUSINESSLIKE TEMPO.



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- UNFORTUNATELY, THE UNITED STATES AND SOME OTHER NATO COUNTRIES CONTINUE THE LINE AT NARROWING DOWN THE SCOPE AND CAPACITY OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THEY TRY TO REDUCE EVERYTHING TO MEASURES WHICH CONCERN ONLY LAND FORCE ACTIVITIES WHILE LEAVING ASIDE THE MOST DANGEROUS TYPES OF FORCES, I.E., AIR AND NAVAL FORCES. HOWEVER, IT IS WITH THEIR STRIKES THAT BIG AND SMALL WERE STARTED MORE THAN ONCE DURING THE LAST 50 YEARS OR SO. INSTEAD OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THEY PALM OFF ITS ANTIPODE -- MEASURES DESIGNED TO EXPOSE THE LOCATIONS AND STRUCTURES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE EUROPEAN STATES AND TO SECURE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.
- MANY WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY IN FAVOR OF NON-USE OF FORCE BECOMING THE INDISPUTABLE LAW OF THE CONDUCT OF STATES, OF THE CONFERENCE MAKING ITS WEIGHTY CONTRIBUTION TO THIS CAUSE. HOWEVER, A LINE IS CLEARLY VISIBLE HERE, TOO, TO DELAY THIS DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.
- THE CURRENT SITUATION REQUIRES AS NEVER BEFORE THE NEED TO GIVE MORE EFFECT TO THE RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF NO USE OR THREAT OF FORCE, AND IN ITS MOST IMPORTANT DIRECTION AT THAT, THAT OF PROHIBITING THE USE OF ANY KINDS OF WEAPONS, NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ALIKE. IT IS ON THIS PREMISE THAT IS BASED THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO CONCLUDE A TREATY ON THE RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

- THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM REQUIRES ENERGETIC SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD COMBINE MUTUALLY SUPPLEMENTARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY BOTH IN THE POLITICAL AND THE MILITARY FIELDS. ADVANCEMENT SHOULD BE ALONG BOTH DIRECTIONS. ATTEMPTS AT PUSHING THE CONFERENCE ONTO A ONE-WAY ROAD WILL LEAD TO NOTHING.
- WE FACE CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS: A CAREFUL EXPLORATION OF THE ISSUES TO ELABORATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS.





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- A WEEK OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS HAS SHOWN THAT THE CONFERENCE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. NO MATTER HOW COMPLEX THE ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION IN STOCKHOLM ARE, THEY CAN PRODUCE RESULTS, PROVIDED THERE IS THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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Unofficial translation

# S T A T E M E N T

by Oleg A. GRINEVSKY,
Ambassador at Large,
Head of the USSR Delegation
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

Stockholm, October 18, 1985





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Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

It will not be an overstatement to say that this session of the Stockholm Conference has been unusual. Its work can be described this time as positive. While it is still too early to make a final judgement we believe that it has marked a certain turn at the Conference towards moving over to more productive work.

The Conference has always been affected by major international events. In this respect it can be called, to use a fugure of speech, the barometer of political moods in the capitals of the participating states, the indicator of, first and foremost, the realization by the Europeens of their security interests.

The Stockholm forum was positively affected by the recent Soviet-French summit meeting which had an important significance for strengthening European security, broadening the all-Europeen cooperation and improving the international situation. The visit to France by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev laid a good basis both for the development of the Soviet-French cooperation which is a significant factor of stability in Europe and for a turn to a radical improvement in international relations and to enhanced security of all countries.

Advance along the trail blazed in Helsinki has always depended on the climate prevailing in Europe, the political will and initiative to pursue detente and security and on the state of bilateral relations between states. The higher the level of those relations and the firmer the will to cooperate, the deeper is the development of the all-Europeen process. Europe, where detente was born, can and must play an indispensable role in the



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active search for ways leading to a drastic improvement in the situation which would be significantly facilitated by a substantive outcome of the Stockholm Conference.

International developments have demonstrated that a tendency is gaining momentum in Europe to overcome the logic of confrontation. This requires resolute and bold actions, a fresh view of and approach to numerous international problems, particularly with respect to accomplishing the tasks of confidence-and security-building in Europe. Speaking in Paris Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the time has come to turn more resolutely the Stockholm Conference to the negotiation of agreements as "there are opportunities here to intensify the search for mutually acceptable solutions".

One of the manifestations of those opportunities was the decision to move at the Conference over to exploration and subsequent drafting of issues which would shape the framework of possible accords on confidence-and security-building measures in Europe completing the first stage of the Stockholm Conference. Representatives of all the three groups of states, neutral and non-aligned, Warsaw Treaty and NATO, demonstrated their flexibility and mutual understanding in preparing that decision. I would like to pay special tribute to Ambassador Kahiluoto, distinguished head of the Republic of Finland, for the important role which he played in reaching this agreement, whose diplomatic mastership made it possible to overcome many obstacles.

We share the opinion to the effect that the step taken by the participants in the Conference establishes the framework



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Mr.Chairman,

The achievement of success in Stockholm requires energetic search for solutions which would combine mutually supplementary aspects of security both in the political and the military fields. Advancement should be along both directions. Attempts at pushing the Conference onto a one-way road will lead to nothing.

We face concrete negotiations: a careful exploration of the issues to elaborate mutually acceptable accords.

A week of informal discussions has shown that the Conference has the potential for positive development. No matter how complex the issues under discussion in Stockholm are, they can produce results, provided there is the necessary political will.



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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF OCTOBER 14-18, 1985.
1. CDE VII -063.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. THIS WEEK MARKED THE TRANSITION OF CDE WORK INTO A MORE INFORMAL SETTING, AS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON MONDAY TO HOLD INFORMAL MEETINGS IN EACH OF THE FIVE CLUSTERS. THESE INFORMALS, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WENT WELL AS NATO WAS EFFECTIVE IN BOTH FOCUSING AND DIRECTING DISCUSSIONS IN MOST OF THE MEETINGS. IN THE POLITICAL GROUP (NUF) THE WARSAW PACT PUSHED FOR EARLY DRAFTING AND PRESENTED AN OUTLINE OF A POSSIBLE NUF AGREEMENT. WHILE LITTLE NEW SUBSTANTIVELY EMERGED, WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE "GIVE-AND-TAKE" WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE SHARPENING OF FOCUS NECESSARY BEFORE COMMON GROUND WILL EMERGE. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING GROUP AB -- OCTOBER 14, 1985.
THERE WERE NO SPEAKERS AT THIS MEETING. AT AN INFORMAL MEETING IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING, THE CDE AGREED ON AN INFORMAL STRUCTURE FOR ITS FUTURE WORK. (SEE SEPTEL.)
FRG (SCHMIDBAUER) KICKED OFF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH A PREPARED LARGELY POLITICAL, STATEMENT OF WELCOME FOR THE INFORMAL MEETINGS. HE IDENTIFIED AS AREAS OF COMMON GROUND THE DESIRE TO IMPROVE UPON THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT BY LOWERING THESHOLDS AND DEVELOPING MANDATORY PROVISIONS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT DIVERGENT VIEWS REMAINED ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES. WE MUST EXPLORE RAPPROCHEMENT POSSIBILITIES, HE CONCLUDED.
UK (BACK) FOCUSED ON THE OUT-OF-GARRISON (OOG) CONCEPT AS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE USE OF TERMS "MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS," WHICH WOULD REQUIRE DEFINITION. LIMITED DEFINITIONS WOULD BE OPEN TO CIRCUMVENTION AND BROAD DEFINITIONS WOULD LOSE THE UTILITY OF DISTINCTION. THE WTO HAS ALSO INTRODUCED A CONCEPT NOT IN THE FINAL ACT, HE SAID, -- THAT OF TRANSFERS. HE NOTED, THE TERM MOVEMENTS IS ALWAYS QUALIFIED BY THE TERM TRANSFER AN ASKED WHY; COULD THERE BE MOVEMENTS THAT ARE NOT TRANSFERS, WAS A TRANSFER A PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY RE-DEPLOYMENT, AND WOULD IT COVER STAGED TRANSFERS, SUCH AS SEMI-ANNUAL TROOP ROTATIONS? THE OOG CONCEPT IS COMPRESHENSIVE, HE SAID; IT CAN'T BE CIRCUMVENTED, AND IS EASY TO VERIFY. ONLY ONE DEFINITION -- THAT OF GARRISON -- IS REQUIRED. THAT DEFINITION WAS PROPOSED, AND HAS NOT BEEN REJECTED, HE OBSERVED.
USSR (TATARNIKOV), SAID THAT THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND MUST BE BASED ON THE MANDATE WHICH CALLS FOR COVERAGE OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT ACTIVITIES THE



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OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT INCLUDES. IT DOESN'T SEEM TO INCLUDE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING AREA, WHICH ARE COVERED UNDER THE MANDATE AND REPRESENT A THREAT. WE MUST TAKE SUCH ACTIVITIES INTO ACCOUNT. IN RESPONSE TO THE UK, HE SAID THAT THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS INCLUDES THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES USING VARIOUS FORMS OF TRANSPORTATION, INCLUDING RAILWAYS, DURING MANEUVERS OR THE ROTATION OF TROOPS. THE CONCEPT IS ALSO ADDRESSED IN MILITARY MANUALS. TATARNIKOV SAID A TRANSFER IS AKIN TO A MOVEMENT BUT INCLUDES ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT OVER A LONGER DISTANCE, SUCH AS BRINGING TROOPS FROM THE FAR EAST OR THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE.
UK (BACK) NOTED THAT THE MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTION TO THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT APPEARED TO BE BASED ON THE EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HE CHALLENGED THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO JOIN IN DEVELOPING
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
COMMON GROUND ON USING THE OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH,
WITH RESPECT TO NOTIFYING ACTIVITIES BY GROUND FORCES
WHICH DWELL IN GARRISONS.
FRANCE (FELIX-PAGANON) IDENTIFIED THREE PROBLEMS IN THE
AREA OF NOTIFICATION: (1) SCOPE OF NOTIFICATION (WHAT
DO WE WANT TO NOTIFY); (2) LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION
(THRESHOLD); AND (3) THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION (WHAT
INFORMATION TO EXCHANGE). SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE
IN THE AREA OF THRESHOLDS, HE ASSERTED. WE ARE ALL
AGREED ON THE NECESSITY OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS, THE
FRENCH DEPUTY STATED, CLAIMING THAT NO ONE QUESTIONS
THE PRINCIPLE OF A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD. BUT THE
SITUATION IS LESS CLEAR REGARDING STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLDS. HOWEVER, THOSE WHO ARGUE AGAINST THE
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN
INTRODUCING A STRUCTURAL DIMENSION TO THE NUMERICAL
PARAMETERS. WE SHOULD DETERMINE HOW TO USE THIS
APPROACH. (BEGIN COMMENT: MANY OF OUR NATO COLLEAGUES
WERE CONCERNED WITH THE FRENCH REFERENCE TO THE
ACCEPTABILITY OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS AND THE ALLUSION
TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF COMBINING NUMBERS WITH
STRUCTURE. WHEN CHALLENGED BY TURKISH AND DUTCH
DELEGATES LATER AT A NATO MINI-CAUCUS MEETING, HOWEVER,
THE FRENCH CONTENDED THAT THEY HAD SAID NO SUCH THING.
END COMMENT.)
YUGOSLAVIA (BOZOVIC) SAID THAT THE ONLY THING HE KNEW
ABOUT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT WAS THAT IT WAS
SIMPLE, NEEDS NO DEFINITION, AND WAS SO ALL-EMBRACING
IT CAN'T BE CIRCUMVENTED. "HOW CAN WE TAKE A STAND ON
AN ISSUE WHEN WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IT IS?", HE ASKED.
U.S. (HANSEN) QUICKLY RESPONDED THAT EVERY MILITARY
EXERCISE OF GROUND FORCES WAS INCLUDED IN THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT . ENCOURAGING BOZOVIC TO TAKE
HIS PENCIL IN HAND AND WRITE DOWN A TYPICAL LIST,
HANSEN NOTED THAT A LIST WOULD INCLUDE MANEUVERS,
MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS, COMMAND STAFF EXERCISES, COMMAND
POST EXERCISES, GROUND TRAINING EXERCISES, ROAD
MARCHES, AND REDEPLOYMENTS -- IF THEY MET AN AGREED
THRESHOLD. ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED UNDER
THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT MIGHT BE, FOR EXAMPLE,
TROOPS USED FOR HARVESTING OR DISASTER RELIEF, BECAUSE
THE OOG CONCEPT FOCUSES ON COMBAT ELEMENTS AND COMBAT
CAPABILITIES.
DENMARK (HOWARD) HIGHLIGHTED AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT -- IT COVERS MILITARY
ACTIVITIES FROM THE VERY START OF THOSE ACTIVITIES.
USSR (TATARNIKOV) STATED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME
HE HAD HEARD SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF OOG.
THERE IS EVEN SOME COINCIDENCE OF VIEWS, HE NOTED,



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INASMUCH AS OOG INCLUDED ACTIVITIES THAT THE WTO HAS ADDRESSED IN ITS PROPOSALS. BUT, HE ASKED, WHY SHOULD WE TRY SO HARD TO DO SOMETHING DIFFERENT, WHICH MIGHT EVEN REQUIRE A LISTING OF EXCEPTIONS, WHEN WE ARE ALREADY AGREED UPON THE SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERED. UK (BACK) RESPONDED THAT ONE TERM TO COVER MANY ACTIVITIES WAS PREFERABLE TO MANY TERMS. U.S. (HANSEN) REITERATED THAT THE REFERENCE TO EXCEPTIONS FROM THE OOG CONCEPT WAS MERELY ILLUSTRATIVE. THERE WERE ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED OUT-OF-GARRISON (OOG), ACCORDING TO PROVISIONS OF MEASURE 3, BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT INVOLVE PARTICIPATION OF MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS.

5. WORKING GROUP A: POLITICAL -- OCTOBER 15, 1985. THE EAST ATTEMPTED TO PUSH THIS WORKING GROUP IN THE DIRECTION OF DRAFTING ON NUF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
USSR PRESENTED THE MOST DETAILED DESCRIPTION TO DATE OF
THE STRUCTURE OF A NUF AGREEMENT. CYPRUS WAS
ENCOURAGED BY THE SOVIET STATEMENT AND PRESENTED ITS
OWN FRAMEWORK FOR A NUF DECLARATION. THE U.S., NOTED
THAT EVERYONE SEEMED TO AGREE THAT NUF LANGUAGE SHOULD
BE PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND WARNED THAT EFFORTS TO
MOVE BEYOND UN CHARTER LANGUAGE WOULD LEAD THE
CONFERENCE INTO TREACHEROUS WATERS. TOWARD THE END OF
THE MEETING POLAND SUGGESTED THAT THE NUF CLUSTER,
INDEPENDENT OF THE OTHER MEETINGS, MOVE TO DRAFTING AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.
USSR (RAKHMANINOV) DESCRIBED THE STRUCTURE OF A NUF
AGREEMENT, CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
-- A PREAMBLE MADE UP OF PROVISIONS FROM THE UN
CHARTER, THE FINAL ACT AND, PERHAPS, THE MADRID
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT;
-- A GENERAL AFFIRMATION FOLLOWED BY AN ELABORATION OF
THE TYPES OF FORCE TO BE BANNED, WITH PRIDE OF PLACE
GIVEN TO THE "MOST DANGEROUS FORM, MILITARY FORCE;"
-- SPECIFIC POINTS, I.E., A "CONCRETIZATION" OF THE
MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE "AS APPLIED TO THE
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND OUR MANDATE;"
-- A REFERENCE TO IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN;
-- A CONCLUDING SECTION WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE SUCH
PROVISIONS AS: CONSULTATIONS; THE POSSIBILITY OF
REQUESTING CLARIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION;
"OTHER POINTS IN SC.6;" A REAFFIRMATION OF FUNDAMENTAL
ARTICLES OF THE UN, SUCH AS ARTICLES 51 AND 103.
IN ADDITION, RAKHMANINOV OFFERED THE FOLLOWING AS
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF LANGUAGE FOR A NUF AGREEMENT:
-- THE DECLARATION ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS;
-- THE DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY;
-- THE DECLARATION ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE;
-- THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION;
-- BILATERAL SOVIET-U.S., SOVIET-FRENCH AND SOVIET-U.K.
DOCUMENTS.
CYPRUS (PAPADAPOULOS) WAS "ENCOURAGED" BY THE SOVIET
STATEMENT, AS IT REFLECTED THE TYPE OF ISSUES HE HAD
TRIED TO EXAMINE IN MARCH 1985. HE SUPPORTED
"COMPLETING" THE CONCEPT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE BY
COVERING ALL ELEMENTS OF ESCALATION, I.E., THE THREAT
OF FORCE, THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE AND, FINALLY, THE
USE OF FORCE. HE OFFERED HIS FRAMEWORK FOR A NUF
DECLARATION:
-- A DEFINITION OF THE ELEMENTS OF NUF;
-- THE ROMANIAN IDEA OF SPECIFYING THE ACTIONS FROM
WHICH STATES WOULD HAVE TO REFRAIN;
-- THE CDE (CSCE) DIMENSION: THE LINKAGE BETWEEN



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CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE; I.E., THE
CREATION OF OPERATIONAL BARRIERS AGAINST THE USE OF
FORCE;
-- OTHER ADDITIONAL OR SUPPORTIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING
CONSULTATIONS, ETC.;
-- AN EXCEPTION TO THE BAN ON THE USE OF FORCE ARTICLE
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
51 (SELF-DEFENSE).
U.S. (GUNDERSEN) AGREED WITH CYPRUS THAT THE DISCUSSION OF NUF WOULD BE COMPLEX, BUT NOTED THAT ALL AGREE THAT NUF LANGUAGE SHOULD BE PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS. HE WARNED THAT MOVING BEYOND THE AUSTERE BUT UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER, WOULD BE A MOVE INTO TREACHEROUS AND UNCHARTED WATERS. THE CDE'S GOAL IS THAT OF MAKING THE USE AND THREAT OF FORCE LESS LIKELY, NOT OF FORMULATING NEW NUF LANGUAGE. A NUF REAFFIRMATION WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CSBM'S WOULD BE WORSE THAT MEANINGLESS; IT WOULD GIVE ONLY THE ILLUSION OF SECURITY. OF THE MYRIAD OF INTERWAR NUF AGREEMENTS, WHETHER IN THE GUISE OF NON-AGGRESSION PACTS OR FRIENDSHIP TREATIES, ALMOST ALL WERE UNAMBIGUOUSLY BROKEN, HE SAID.
ROMANIA (BUHOARA) STRESSED THE NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT POSITIONS ON SUBSTANCE. HE AGREED THAT MORE IS REQUIRED TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE THAN MERE ENUNCIATION. HE RECOMMENDED IDENTIFYING BOTH THE CONCRETE FORMS OF MILITARY FORCE OR THE THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE FROM WHICH STATES WOULD HAVE TO REFRAIN, AND "POSITIVE ACTIONS". TO SAVE TIME THE ROMANIAN DELEGATE RECOMMENDED USING EXISTING AGREED TEXTS.
RAKHMANINOV INSISTED THAT CSBM'S SHOULD FLOW FROM A REAFFIRMATION OF NUF. THE FINAL ACT IS BASED ON THE MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, HE SAID, AND HE STRESSED THE NEED TO APPROACH A NUF REAFFIRMATION AND SUBSTANTIAL CSBM'S IN THE MILITARY SPHERE "HAND IN HAND."
POLAND (KONARSKI) SUGGESTED A MOVE TO DRAFTING IN THE NUF CLUSTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WOULD MAKE MORE SENSE TO MOVE TO DRAFTING, HE SAID, "IN AREAS (E.G. NUF) WHERE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT SO DEEP AND WHERE WE DON'T HAVE MUCH TO SAY IN AN EXPLORATION PHASE, AS OPPOSED TO A DRAFTING PHASE WHERE WE WILL HAVE MORE TO SAY." THE EXPLORATORY PHASE COULD BE USED PRODUCTIVELY, HE NOTED, IF DELEGATIONS TRIED TO FORMULATE A RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET OUTLINE OF A POSSIBLE DOCUMENT, MAKING CLEAR WHAT THEY DO AND DON'T WANT INCORPORATED IN SUCH A DOCUMENT.
6. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION -- OCTOBER 16, 1985.
IN A WELL-COORDINATED EFFORT, NATO COUNTRIES HOMED IN ON THE SUBJECT OF INFORMATION. THE USSR SPOKE OFTEN, AND ASSERTED THAT THE ISSUES OF INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION WERE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. WE COUNTERED THIS



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ASSERTION, BUT WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH THIS INTERPRETATTATARNIKOV) EXPRESSED SURPRISE WITH SPAIN'S STATEMENT. THE CONFERENCE, HE ASSERTED, HAD REACHED A CLEAR CUT DECISION THAT INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION, AND THE USSR IS READY TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE INFORMATION IN THAT CONTEXT. AS TO THE QUESTION ABOUT PEACETIME LOCATIONS, TATARNIKOV SAID THAT THERE MAY BE DIFFERENT KINDS -- BARRACKS, CAMPS, SOME OTHER KIND OF DISPOSITION OF FORCES, AND GARRISONS. PRECISE DEFINITIONS ARE AVAILABLE, IF NEEDED. INFORMATION SHOULD BE EXCHANGED AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION, HE SAID, AND THE INFORMATION WILL DEPEND ON THE TYPE OF MANEUVER NOTIFIED AND WHETHER IT INVOLVES GROUND, SEA OR AIR FORCES.

UK (FREEMAN) RECITED THE TITLE OF THE MEETING IN ITS ENTIRETY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE USSR. REGARDING USSR COMMENTS ON PEACETIME LOCATIONS, HE ASKED WHETHER THEY RECOGNIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF THOSE VARIOUS ELEMENTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE CSBM REGIME.

USSR (TATARNIKOV) ALSO REFERRED TO THE TITLE OF THE MEETING, CONTENDING THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED ON OCTOBER 14 THAT INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION WILL BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION. WE ARE PROCEEDING ON THAT UNDERSTANDING, HE SAID. THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON PERMANENT LOCATIONS, HE SAID, AS SUCH INFORMATION IS NOT OF ANY INTEREST. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS WHERE THE EXERCISE TAKES PLACE. IN A THINLY VEALED ALLUSION TO INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY IF SOMEONE ELSE NEEDED TO KNOW THIS INFORMATION.

FREEMAN (UK) AND HANSEN (U.S.) BOTH REAFFIRMED THAT THIS INFORMAL CLUSTER WOULD DISCUSS INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS.

FRANCE (MERIC) VEERING MORE THAN A BIT OFF COURSE, SAID EVERYONE THINKS THAT WE WILL ONE DAY MOVE TO A DISARMAMENT STAGE IN THE CDE. FOR THIS, INFORMATION WILL BE CRITICALLY ESSENTIAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE FRENCH DELEGATION WAS INSTRUCTED TO DO THE MAXIMUM TO MAKE PROGRESS AT CDE, AND NOTED THAT THE CONFERENCE HAS NOT YET HEARD THE FRENCH POSITION ON ALL OF THE ISSUES.

USSR (TATARNIKOV) SAID THAT WHEN THE DISARMAMENT STAGE IS REACHED, ALL THE CARDS WILL BE LAID ON THE TABLE, AS DURING SALT I AND SALT II. AS TO WHERE TROOPS COME FROM (I.E. PEACETIME LOCATIONS), THAT WOULD BE COVERED UNDER THE WTO PROVISIONS ADDRESSING MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS.

7. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATION -- OCTOBER 17, 1985. THE INFORMAL SESSION ON OBSERVATION WITNESSED LONG



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DISCUSSION WITH MANY PARTICIPANTS. THE USSR IMPLIED
THAT IN THE CASE OF TROOPS MOVING TO AN EXERCISE AREA,
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
THEIR PEACETIME LOCATION WOULD BE NOTIFIED UNDER THE
CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THE WTO MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS
PROPOSAL. WTO STILL WON'T ACCEPT THE MANDATORY NATURE
OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME OR THE INVITATION OF ALL
STATES TO AN EXERCISE.
POLAND (STANIEWSKI) IDENTIFIED SOME AREAS OF
CONVERGENCE REGARDING OBSERVATION MODALITIES: DETAILED
BRIEFINGS; ABILITY TO OBSERVE "TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE"
ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMAND STAFF; AND NEED TO HAVE
DIRECT CONTACTS WITH PERSONNEL "WHERE CONDITIONS PERMIT
AND ARE JUSTIFIED." THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM, HOWEVER,
SHOULD BE DEFINED BY THE HOST STATE AND IT IS IN THE
HOST
STATE'S INTEREST TO ENSURE THAT THE PROGRAM WILL MEET
ITS NEEDS. THE HOST COUNTRY MUST ALSO ENSURE THE
SECURITY OF THE OBSERVERS; THE METHODS MAY DIFFER
ACCORDING TO THE ACTIVITY BEING OBSERVED. STANIEWSKI
IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES ON WHICH HE
BELIEVED AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT, NAMELY:
CONDITIONS FOR OBSERVERS, LODGING, ATTENDANCE, MEANS OF
TRANSPORT AND MEDICAL RESOURCES. BUT ON SOME ISSUES,
HE NOTED, THEE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES AND FURTHER
IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION IS REQUIRED. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME
CONTEND THAT AN OBSERVER SHOULD BE PRESENT AT ALL
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION FROM THE START TO
THE FINISH; WHILE OTHERS BELIEVE THAT IT IS SUFFICIENT
FOR THE OBSERVER TO OBSERVE MAIN EPISQDES (HE SUPPORTED
THE LATTER POSITION). HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT
OBSERVATION FOR THE DURATION OF THE MANEUVER, WHICH
COULD L
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CDE, CSCE, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
PARTICULARLY IF IT IS CLOSE TO A BORDER. POLAND
RESPONDED THAT ACTIVITIES AREN'T NOTIFIED UNTIL THEY
REACH THE NOTIFIABLE THRESHOLD -- WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO
HAPPEN UNTIL THE TROOPS HAVE GATHERED AT THE EXERCISE
AREA. DENMARK SAID THAT IT WAS PARTICULARY IMPORTANT
THAT THE RETURN TO GARRISON BE OBSERVED, AS TROOPS
HAVING JUST COMPLETED A TRAINING EXERCISE WERE PREPARED
FOR WAR AND THUS MOST THREATENING.
FRANCE (MERIC) ASSERTED THAT WE MUST KNOW WHERE THE
TROOPS COME FROM; OBSERVERS MUST HAVE ACCESS TO
INFORMATION, AND MAPS SHOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED FOR
OBSERVERS. USSR (TATARNIKOV) RESPONDED THAT THAT THE
AREA OF THE MANEUVER WOULD BE CLEARLY INDICATED AND IN
THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, TROOPS
COMING FROM FAR AWAY WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS TO WHERE



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THEY ARE FROM.
TATARNIKOV TOLD DENMARK (HOWARD) THAT THE USSR HAD NEVER SAID THAT AFTER TRAINING THE OBSERVERS WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWN. THE TRANSFER OF FORCES, UNDER THE WTO PROPOSAL, WILL REQUIRE OBSERVATION AND, HE POINTED OUT THAT IN THE WTO SCENARIOS WE MAKE SURE OBSERVERS CAN WATCH THE RETURN OF TROOPS.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) ASKED THE U.S. WHETHER IT WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS AN OBSERVER REGIME FOR AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCES. U.S. (BLANK) TOOK THE QUESTION UNDER ADVISEMENT.
8. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS/FORECASTS -- OCTOBER 17, 1985.
IN INFORMALS, THE NETHERLANDS (VAN GORP) WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, NOTING THAT IT HAD PLACED NO PRECONDITIONS ON WHAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. BECAUSE OF THE BROAD CONSENSUS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FORECASTS, VAN GORP SAID HE DID NOT FORESEE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEING TO SPECIFIC MODALITIES. HE ASKED HOW THE SOVIET UNION ENVISAGED THE STRUCTURE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT FORECASTS HAVE A CONSTRAINING EFFECT ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES, E.G., PREPARATIONS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK OR ACTIVITIES AIMED AT INTIMIDATION.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) INSISTED THAT FORECASTS WOULD ENSURE THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO EQUAL SECURITY ONLY IF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES, I.E., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANUEVERS, AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS, ARE INCLUDED IN THEM. HE CRITICIZED NATO FOR ITS "SELECTIVE" APPROACH AND ARGUED THAT AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, EQUIPPED WITH MODERN WEAPONRY, REPRESENT A THREAT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE.
THE FRG (METSCHER) CRITIZED THE FINE PRINT -- A DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WHICH INCLUDED GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS -- GRINEVSKY HAD GRAFTED ONTO GORBACHEV'S PARIS PROPOSAL. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHAT IS NOTIFIABLE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NOTIFICATION MEETING IN WORKING GROUP B. METSCHER PRESSED FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE STRUCTURE OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST: WOULD IT BE BROKEN UP BY QUARTERS, WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION WOULD IT CONTAIN -- THE NAME AND DESIGNATION OF EXERCISES, THEIR DURATION, ETC?
THE USSR (TATARNIKOV) FOCUSED ON THE DEFINITION OF "MILITARY ACTIVITIES", AS CONTAINED IN THE MANDATE AND ASSERTED THAT IT INCLUDED A BROAD RANGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, E.G., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS. HE CRITICIZED THE FRG FOR INCLUDING ONLY GROUND ACTIVITIES. TATARNIKOV ALSO ARGUED THAT ROUTINE COMBAT TRAINING AT FIRING RANGES



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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
PARTICULARLY IF IT IS €LOSE TO A BORDER. POLAND
RESPONDED THAT ACTIVITIES AREN'T NOTIFIED UNTIL THEY
REACH THE NOTIFIABLE THRESHOLD -- WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO
HAPPEN UNTIL THE TROOPS HAVE GATHERED AT THE EXERCISE
AREA. DENMARK SAID THAT IT WAS PARTICULARY IMPORTANT
THAT THE RETURN TO GARRISON BE OBSERVED, AS TROOPS
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POINTED OUT THAT IN THE WTO SCENARIOS WE MAKE SURE
OBSERVERS CAN WATCH THE RETURN OF TROOPS.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) ASKED THE U.S. WHETHER IT WAS
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TOOK THE QUESTION UNDER ADVISEMENT.
8. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS/FORECASTS --
OCTOBER 17, 1985.
IN INFORMALS, THE NETHERLANDS (VAN GORP) WELCOMED
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E.G., PREPARATIONS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK OR ACTIVITIES
AIMED AT INTIMIDATION.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) INSISTED THAT FORECASTS WOULD
ENSURE THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO EQUAL SECURITY ONLY
IF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES, I.E., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL
MANUEVERS, AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS, ARE INCLUDED IN
THEM. HE CRITICIZED NATO FOR ITS "SELECTIVE" APPROACH
AND ARGUED THAT AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, EQUIPPED WITH
MODERN WEAPONRY, REPRESENT A THREAT TO SECURITY IN
EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE.
THE FRG (METSCHER) CRITIZED THE FINE PRINT -- A



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DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WHICH INCLUDED GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS -- GRINEVSKY HAD GRAFTED ONTO GORBACHEV'S PARIS PROPOSAL. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHAT IS NOTIFIABLE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NOTIFICATION MEETING IN WORKING GROUP B. METSCHER PRESSED FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE STRUCTURE OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST: WOULD IT BE BROKEN UP BY QUARTERS, WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION WOULD IT CONTAIN -- THE NAME AND DESIGNATION OF EXERCISES, THEIR DURATION, ETC? THE USSR (TATARNIKOV) FOCUSED ON THE DEFINITION OF "MILITARY ACTIVITIES", AS CONTAINED IN THE MANDATE AND ASSERTED THAT IT INCLUDED A BROAD RANGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, E.G., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS. HE CRITICIZED THE FRG FOR INCLUDING ONLY GROUND ACTIVITIES. TATARNIKOV ALSO ARGUED THAT ROUTINE COMBAT TRAINING AT FIRING RANGES

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 08 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT SC.1 IS NOT THE ONLY PROPOSAL
ON THE TABLE AND URGED DELEGATIONS TO FOCUS ON COMMON
GROUND, NOT CONTRADICTIONS, IN THEIR POSITIONS.
TURKEY (BOLUKBASI) REMINDED THE CONFERENCE OF THE
THREE-YEAR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH RESULTED IN THE MADRID
MANDATE AND BLUNTLY WARNED THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD
NOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE.
ROMANIA (BUHOARA) CITED SEVERAL UNATTRIBUTED, BUT
CLEARLY NATO, STATEMENTS TO ARGUE THAT CONSTRAINTS
SHOULD NOT MERELY CODIFY CURRENT MILITARY PRACTICE OR
BEHAVIOR, BUT SHOULD LIMIT THEM. HE ALSO DISAGREED
WITH WESTERN DELEGATIONS WHICH GIVE A LOW PRIORITY TO
CONSTRAINTS. THE ROMANIAN INSTEAD ECHOED HIS EASTERN
COLLEAGUES IN INSISTING THAT ALL ISSUES BE TAKEN UP IN
PARALLEL.
CANADA (NAMIESNIOWSKI) EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE CDE,
LIKE THE TOPHEAVY SWEDISH WARSHIP, THE VASA, WHICH
OVERTURNED ON ITS MAIDEN VOYAGE, WOULD FAIL TO REACH
CONCENSUS IF IT WERE OVERLOADED.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET 01 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08084
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
1. CDE VII - 066
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SEVENTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WAS DOMINATED BY PROSAIC PROCEDURAL PROPOSITIONS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE CDE BEAST, EVEN SEEMINGLY BENIGN PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS HAVE LONG-TERM SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE SESSION, THE CONFERENCE ACCEPTED A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO DRAFTING BEGINNING WITH AN INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE WHICH REFLECTED THE U.S. APPROACH. DURING THE "TEST" RUN OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, MOREOVER, NATO FARED WELL AND, ON THE WHOLE, WAS ABLE TO DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON WESTERN TERMS. WHILE THE CONFERENCE ESSENTIALLY ACCEPTED THE WESTERN APPROACH TO PROCEDURE, IT HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT A PRICE FOR WESTERN UNITY. THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS SERIES OF MEETINGS LEADING TO CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON WORKING STRUCTURE CONTRIBUTED TO A CLEAR DIVISION OF NATO INTO "WETS" AND "DRYS," WHICH DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR END GAME NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS, IN THE MEANTIME, WERE ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR AS THEY COURTED THE EUROPEANS. WHILE THEY WERE ACCOMMODATING ON PROCEDURE, ON SUBSTANCE THEY HELD THEIR GROUND. THE NNA WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR PUBLIC SILENCE. HOWEVER, THEY WORKED FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES -- DAY, NIGHT, AND WEEKENDS -- TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN ELABORATED NNA PACKAGE. THIS SO FAR UNSUCCESSFUL QUEST FOR CONSENSUS HAS LED TO MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS, WITH A CHANGING CAST OF CHARACTERS (YUGOSLAVIA, FINLAND, CYPRUS, AND, OF COURSE, MALTA) ASSUMING THE ROLE OF NNA SCAPEGOAT. THE STRAINS WITHIN THE NNA WERE AT ONCE UNEXPECTED AND INEVITABLE. UNEXPECTED IN THAT, HERETOFORE, THE NNA HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKERS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. INEVITABLE, IN THAT, PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THEY HAVE HAD TO IDENTIFY COMMON SECURITY CONCERNS. THE NNA'S LONG NIGHT'S JOURNEY TOWARD A CONSENSUS DOCUMENT HAS AFFORDED US TIME TO SEDUCE THEM -- WITH SOME SUCCESS -- TO HOP INTO THE WESTERN CONCEPTUAL BED ON SUCH TOPICS AS OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES AND THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD. FINALLY, LESS BECAUSE OF MALICIOUS INTENT THAN OF CAPRICIOUS INCOMPETENCE, PROBLEMS WITH RUSSIAN TRANSLATIONS CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.
-
NATO
4. THE NOT SO MAGNIFICENT OBSESSION. FOR MUCH OF THE SEVENTH ROUND THE NATO CAUCUS WRESTLED WITH THE PROSAIC QUESTION OF HOW AND WHEN TO MOVE INTO AN INFORMAL



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EXPLORATORY NEGOTIATING PHASE. THE PROTRACTED AND SOMETIMES HEATED DEBATE OVER PROCEDURE MOVED SUBSTANCE TO THE BACK BURNER. THE PAPER CIRCULATED BY AMBASSADOR GOODBY CONTAINING SOVIET SUGGESTIONS ON WORKING STRUCTURE, WHICH EVOLVED OUT OF GOODBY'S EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY -- AND HOW TO RESPOND TO IT -- WAS AT THE CORE OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS. WHILE MOST OF OUR ALLIES WANTED TO BEGIN DRAFTING SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, THEY EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH. DRAFTING WILL BE PRECEDED BY AN INFORMAL, EXPLORATORY PHASE. THIS APPROACH, IN OUR VIEW, PROTECTS THE U.S. AND ALLIED STANCE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE THE CONFERENCE ESSENTIALLY BOUGHT THIS WESTERN APPROACH TO INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, IT HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT COSTS.

5. CONTRETEMPS AND CONCORD. DURING THE CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS ON HOW TO BREAK THE PROCEDURAL IMPASSE, THE ALLIES DISPLAYED A MORE THAN HEALTHY DOSE OF CENTRIFUGAL

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>>***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII

PROCLIVITIES. MOST OF OUR ALLIES ARGUED FOR A QUICK AND FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET SUGGESTIONS ON WORKING STRUCTURE, WITH MINIMAL CHANGES. THESE DELEGATIONS WERE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY (IF NOT IMMEDIATE) TRANSITION TO DRAFTING, WITHOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT "FIREBREAK" BETWEEN THE EXPLORATORY AND DRAFTING PHASES. OTHERS, NOTABLY THE FRENCH, THE UK, AND THE U.S., WERE EXTREMELY CHARY ABOUT ENTERING INTO ANY INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE AND PREDETERMINE THE EVENTUAL DRAFTING STRUCTURE. WE SHOULD, ACCORDING TO THEIR VIEW, MAKE HASTE CAUTIOUSLY. IN ANY CASE, THE FINE PRINT IN EACH CLAUSE OF THE "NON-AMERICAN, NON-PAPER" WAS EXAMINED LIKE A USED CAR GUARANTEE. CAVEAT EMPTOR.

6. HALUK, FELIX, AND I. WHEN ACCORD WAS FINALLY REACHED WITHIN THE CAUCUS, THREE SPOKESMEN, TURKISH AMBASSADOR HALUK OZGUL, BELGIAN AMBASSADOR FELIX STANDAERT, AND DANISH AMBASSADOR SKJOLD MELLBIN, WERE APPOINTED TO PRESENT NATO'S POSITION TO THE EAST AND THE NNA. AFTER EACH ROUND OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, MELLBIN WOULD OPEN THE FOLLOWING CAUCUS MEETING WITH THE REFRAIN, "TODAY, HALUK, FELIX, AND I . . . ." WITH EACH



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TURN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE CAUCUS DESIGNATION FOR THE TRIO SEEMED TO CHANGE. THEY WERE FIRST DUBBED THE SPOKESMEN, THEN THE WISE MEN, THE TROIKA, THE TRINITY, AND THE MUSKETEERS. (MERCIFULLY, BECAUSE OF THEIR QUIET AND EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY, THEY ESCAPED THE THREE STOOGES APPELLATION.)

7. "WETS" AND "DRYS." IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO DRAFT EARLY, THE "WETS" DEMONSTRATED A WORRISOME WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE THE EAST BY ADVOCATING A MINIMALIST, "CONSENSUS-BUILDING" NATO OPENING POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATION OF AN INFORMAL STRUCTURE. IT TOOK ENERGETIC EFFORTS BY THE "DRYS" (UK, U.S., FRANCE, AND PORTUGAL) TO HEAD OFF "WET" EFFORTS TO CONCEDE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE NATO POSITION IN AN INTERNAL CAUCUS PRE-NEGOTIATION. IRONICALLY, IT WAS THE "WETS," LED BY CANADIAN AMBASSADOR DELWORTH (WHO HAD EARLIER REFERRED TO THE NATO POSITION AS A "TOMBSTONE PROPOSAL") WHO WERE MOST VOCAL IN CONGRATULATING THE CAUCUS WHEN THE EAST ACCEPTED MOST NATO CHANGES.

8. THE FRUSTRATION FACTOR. THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS SERIES OF MEETINGS LED TO BICKERING AND RECRIMINATIONS IN THE CAUCUS -- DUE AS MUCH TO PERSONAL PIQUE AS TO POLITICAL POSITIONS. AT VARIOUS TIMES THE UK, BELGIUM, CANADA, AND FRANCE WERE ACCUSED OF HOLDING UP CAUCUS CONSENSUS. THE U.S. DID NOT ESCAPE ITS NIGHT IN THE BARREL.

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9. THE FRENCH FACTOR. THE FRENCH, IN PARTICULAR, WON FEW FRIENDS AND INFLUENCED FEWER PEOPLE DURING THE SEVENTH SESSION. THE SO-CALLED FRENCH SOFT-TRANSITION OPTION, "LA TRANSITION EN DOUCEUR," WAS SO NUANCED THAT ITS INTRICACIES MYSTIFIED NOT ONLY FRANCE'S NATO PARTNERS, BUT THE FRENCH THEMSELVES. FRANCE'S LAST-MINUTE RESERVE ON THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT AND OPEN THREAT TO BREAK RANKS AND APPROACH THE NNA COORDINATOR, FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO, BILATERALLY ON THE CONSULTATIONS ISSUE HAD, HOWEVER, THE MOST SERIOUS RAMIFICATIONS. SEVERAL SHARP EXCHANGES OVER THIS ISSUE ERUPTED IN THE CAUCUS; THE ATMOSPHERE WAS PARTICULARLY TENSE BETWEEN BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE). SOME DELEGATIONS WONDERED ALOUD WHY THE ALLIANCE BOTHERED TO MEET IN CAUCUS AT ALL IF THE FRENCH (AND BY INFERENCE ALL OTHERS) COULD PRESENT THEIR NATIONAL VIEWS AS THEY PLEASE. ONE SPANISH DELEGATE NOTED ACIDLY, "CAN YOU IMAGINE LIVING NEXT TO
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

***<<<<< SECTION 3 >>>>***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL



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FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII

THESE PEOPLE FOR THE LAST 100,000 YEARS?" WHILE OTHERS MANAGED TO CONTAIN THEMSELVES IN CAUCUS, FRUSTRATION AND ANGER WITH FRENCH TACTICS WERE VIRTUALLY UNIVERSAL. TO AVOID ISOLATING THE FRENCH ENTIRELY, THE U.S. PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION IF NOT THEIR TACTICS. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ANTICIPATE THAT LINGERING RESENTMENT WITH THE FRENCH WILL NOT QUICKLY DISSIPATE AND COULD PRESENT ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR ALLIANCE COHESION IN STOCKHOLM IN THE FUTURE. FOR THEIR PART, THE FRENCH ACTIONS SUGGEST THAT THEY WILL INCREASINGLY KEEP THEIR OWN COUNSEL AND ASSERT THEIR NATIONAL POSITION AS THE CONFERENCE PROGRESSES. ALTHOUGH WE SHARE MANY OF THEIR BASIC POSITIONS, GALLIC PRIDE AND PREROGATIVES WILL MAKE FRANCE AN UNPREDICTABLE FACTOR IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

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10. AND THE GOOD NEWS. ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, WHILE NATO HEADS OF DELEGATION ENGAGED IN A LONG -- AND AS YET INCONCLUSIVE -- DEBATE OVER HOW TO ORGANIZE COORDINATING TEAMS FOR THE EXPLORATORY MEETINGS IN THE EIGHTH ROUND, INFORMAL WORKING LEVEL MEETINGS AND DISCUSSIONS PAID OFF IN A GOOD FIRST WEEK PERFORMANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE. A GOOD DEGREE OF COORDINATION WAS ACHIEVED IN ALL WORKING CLUSTERS, WITH A NUMBER OF WESTERN SPEAKERS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN EACH. A DIALOGUE WAS INITIATED WITH THE EAST ON A NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES WHICH PROMISES TO CLARIFY BOTH AREAS OF COMMON GROUND AND AREAS OF DIVERGENCE. AS THE SESSION CLOSED, THE ALLIANCE'S GENERAL VIEW WAS THAT WE WERE OFF TO A GOOD START IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. THE EAST.

11. THE NEW SOVIET MAN, STOCKHOLM STYLE. THE SOVIETS WERE ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR THIS ROUND. WHETHER IT BE A REFLECTION OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP OR ANTICIPATION OF THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT, EVEN THE OFTEN CHURLISH SOVIET AMBASSADOR WAS UNCHARACTERISTICALLY UPBEAT IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS "RIPE" FOR GETTING DOWN TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS, GRINEVSKY DECLARED IN HIS OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT, AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO DO ITS PART. DURING THE PROCEDURAL NEGOTIATIONS IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS INDEED WERE ANXIOUS TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS -- BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR BASIC POSITIONS. WHEN THE ALLIANCE HUNG TOUGH ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS, THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED MOST OF NATO'S SUGGESTED CHANGES ON THE COMPROMISE WHICH EVENTUALLY LED TO AGREEMENT ON AN INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. IN HIS CLOSING MESSAGE, GRINEVSKY AGAIN ADOPTED AN



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ACCOMMODATING TONE. PRIVATELY, HE IMPLIED NO GIVE ON SUBSTANCE.

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12. NOT SO BENIGN INTENT. FROM AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, HOWEVER, THE INTENT OF GRINEVSKY'S SOOTHING LANGUAGE IS FAR FROM BENIGN. HIS IS A MESSAGE WE HEARD AT THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THIS AUGUST AND ONE WE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL HEAR IN GENEVA THIS NOVEMBER. IT IS A MESSAGE INTENDED FOR EUROPEAN, RATHER THAN AMERICAN, EARS: THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHO SHARE "OUR COMMON HOME" SEE THE IMPERATIVE TO "GET DOWN TO BUSINESS" IN STOCKHOLM; THE "SOVIET-FRENCH SUMMIT HAS POSITIVELY AFFECTED" THE WORK FOR "DETENTE IN EUROPE;" "THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FAVOR ACCELERATING THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE." IF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD FAIL TO RESOLVE EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES, ACCORDING TO THIS LOGIC, IT WOULD NOT BE THE FAULT OF THE SOVIET UNION BUT THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE AND NATIONS OF EUROPE WOULD BE THE LOSERS. WE HAVE PUT FORWARD REASONABLE PROPOSALS; WE HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE AND HAVE
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***<<<<< SECTION 4 >>>>>***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
DEMONSTRATED THE POLITICAL WILL TO NEGOTIATE, MOSCOW PROFESSES. IT IS ONLY THE "UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN NATO ALLIES" WHO "HOLD STUBBORNLY" TO POSITIONS DESIGNED TO GAIN THEM "UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES." MOSCOW'S INTENT, THEREFORE, MAY BE TO PREPARE THE PROPAGANDA GROUNDS FOR FAILURE AS MUCH AS SUCCESS.

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13. DOUBLE LINKAGE. THE NON-USE OF FORCE AND INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN THE FOCAL POINTS OF EASTERN WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES. THESE SUBJECTS ARE NOT UNRELATED. THE SOVIETS ARGUE THAT PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATING A COMPLETE PACKAGE OF CSBM'S, INCLUDING GROUND ACTIVITIES, IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF THE WEST ACCEPTS NEGOTIATIONS ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. FURTHERMORE, PROGRESS IN DRAFTING CSBM'S IS CONTINGENT ON COMPARABLE PROGRESS ON DRAFTING A NUF COMMITMENT. "NOW IS THE TIME," POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI CLAIMED, "TO BEGIN DRAFTING ON NUF" (READ: WE WILL NOT BEGIN REAL DRAFTING ON CSBM'S WITHOUT AT LEAST PARALLEL PROGRESS ON NUF DRAFTING). THIS APPROACH, OF



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COURSE, IS A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE. THE EASTERN IDEA OF LINKAGE WILL LEAD TO A PARALLELISM THAT IS MORE GEOMETRIC ("TWO PLANES THAT DO NOT INTERSECT") THAN PHILOSOPHICAL ("DEVELOPING READILY RECOGNIZED SIMILARITIES"). A MAJOR TASK DURING THE NEXT ROUND WILL BE HOW BEST TO MANAGE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE LATERAL AND INTERNAL LINKAGE BETWEEN NUF AND CSBM'S AND BETWEEN GROUND AND INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, RESPECTIVELY. IT WILL NOT BE EASY.

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14. CHTO DYELAT. IDEAS ON HOW TO BREAK THE SOVIET DOUBLE LINKAGE WERE AS NUMEROUS AND NUANCED AS THE WINES OF FRANCE. SOME DELEGATIONS SUGGEST "LURING" THE SOVIETS INTO DRAFTING ON ISSUES OF INTEREST TO US, SUCH AS NOTIFICATION, BEFORE WRITING DOWN ANYTHING ON NUF. AT AN EARLY STAGE, HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE FRG, WE WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE SOME OF OUR NUF LANGUAGE -- SAY THE UN CHARTER PROVISION. FROM THAT POINT ON, DRAFTING WOULD CONTINUE ON NUF AND CSBM'S AT A PACE WE CONTROLLED -- E.G., FOUR OR FIVE TIMES AS MUCH TEXT ON CSBM'S AS ON NUF. A COUPLE OF DELEGATIONS BELIEVE THAT THE PROPER TACTIC WOULD BE TO MAKE A "DEAL" (PREFERABLY STRUCK BEHIND THE SCENES) TRADING OFF SOMETHING ON NUF FOR SOMETHING ON CSBM'S. OTHERWISE THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE DRAFTING BECAUSE, UNDER THE HALLOWED CSCE PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED, THEY CAN ALWAYS VETO DRAFTED LANGUAGE ON CSBM'S IF THEY DO NOT GET WHAT THEY WANT ON NUF. SOME OF THE "WETTER" DELEGATIONS ADVOCATE DEVELOPING A NUF TEXT WITHIN NATO. STILL OTHERS, PARTICULARLY FRANCE, INSIST ON A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH, I.E., STONEWALLING ON NUF WHILE PRESSING AHEAD ON CSBM'S. NUF SHOULD NOT EVEN BE CONSIDERED WITHIN NATO UNTIL THE NNA PAPERS EMERGE, THE FRENCH ARGUE; WE MAY FIND THE NNA POSITION A BETTER STARTING POINT THAN A TEXT WE DRAFTED. THE BASIC TRADEOFF IN CDE WAS BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE CDE PROCESS, NOT BETWEEN NUF AND CSBM'S, ACCORDING TO SOME OF THE NATO "DRYS." WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THIS APPROACH. IN ADDITION, WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT DEVELOPING A COMMON NATO NUF TEXT FOR POLITICAL (THE EAST SHOULD REMAIN THE DEMANDEURS ON NUF) AS WELL AS PRACTICAL (ANY NATO TEXT WOULD INVARIABLY LEAK) REASONS.

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THE NNA

15. THE STOCKHOLM MARATHON. THE NNA HAVE CONTINUED TO WORK FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES -- DAY, NIGHT, AND WEEKENDS -- TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF PAPERS FOR TABLING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH A "CORE"

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***<<<<< SECTION 5 >>>>>***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
GROUP OF THREE DELEGATIONS (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND SWEDEN) FINALLY REACHED AN ACCOMMODATION LATE IN THE SESSION, THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO BRING FINLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA ON BOARD. THE "CORE" GROUP HAD HOPED TO SECURE AD REF AGREEMENT ON THE PACKAGE HERE IN STOCKHOLM, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT CAPITALS WOULD REVIEW THE PACKAGE DURING THE BREAK. A NUMBER OF STICKING POINTS, HOWEVER, HAVE PREVENTED SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE MOST OPTIMISTIC OF THE NNA NOW EXPRESS "THE HOPE" THAT THE PAPER WILL BE READY TO TABLE BY THE SECOND WEEK OF THE NEXT ROUND.

16. THE COURTSHIP OF THE NNA. THE NNA'S LONG NIGHT'S JOURNEY TOWARD A CONSENSUS DOCUMENT HAS ALLOWED US TO CONTINUE COURTING THEM. IN PUBLIC PLACES AND PRIVATE CONTACTS, WE HAVE -- WITH SOME SUCCESS -- ATTEMPTED THROUGH GENTLE PERSUASION (SOME CALL IT SEDUCTION) TO GET THE NNA TO HOP INTO THE WESTERN CONCEPTUAL BED. BASED MAINLY ON WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NNA HAVE MOVED TOWARD NATO'S POSITIONS BY DEFINING MANEUVERS IN THEIR PAPER TO BE LARGELY SYNONYMOUS WITH OUR OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT OBSERVATION CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR VERIFICATION. HOWEVER, WHILE OUR NNA COLLEAGUES ASSURE US THAT THEIR PAPER WILL CONTAIN NO SURPRISES AND WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS, WE ARE NOT TOTALLY REASSURED. THE PORTIONS ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS WILL MOST LIKELY POSE PROBLEMS FOR US.

17. THE STRAINS WITHIN THE NNA WERE AT ONCE UNEXPECTED AND INEVITABLE. HERETOFORE, THE NNA HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO ELABORATE A COMMON SECURITY POSITION. HOWEVER, NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THE NNA HAVE BEEN FORCED TO IDENTIFY COMMON SECURITY CONCERNS -- AND IT AIN'T EASY. (SEPTEL DESCRIBES THE CURRENT SHAPE OF THE NNA PAPERS IN DETAIL.)

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18. THE FINNISH ENIGMA. THE LONG AND YET UNFINISHED ROAD TO CONSENSUS ALSO HAS TAKEN ITS TOLL ON THE NNA IN TERMS OF BOTH PERSONAL AND NATIONAL RELATIONS. MEMBERS OF THE "CORE" GROUP, FOR EXAMPLE, EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND FRUSTRATION THAT FINLAND HAS PROVEN TO BE SO DIFFICULT. THAT YUGOSLAVIA POSED PROBLEMS CAME AS NO SURPRISE. RELYING AS THEY DO ON A CONCEPT OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE,



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THEY HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITHOUR INFORMATION MEASURE. VARYING ACCOUNTS HAVE FINLAND HIDING BEHIND YUGOSLAVIA AND VICE VERSA. THE FINNS, DISPLAYING A CERTAIN PROPRIETARY INTEREST -- AND A DESIRE TO KEEP THE CSCE PROCESS ALIVE -- ARE RELUCTANT TO GO TOO FAR AFIELD FROM THE REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IN ADDITION, THE FINNS MAY NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS ACCEPTING CONCEPTS WHICH ARE TOO NEW AND DIFFERENT AND HENCE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS. FINALLY SOME SOURCES ARGUE THAT FINNISH RELUCTANCE TO JOIN THE "CORE" GROUP WAS DUE TO ITS DESIRE NOT TO BE SEEN AS PART OF A PRESSURE GROUP ON YUGOSLAVIA. FINLAND HAS PLAYED A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE DURING PROCEDURAL NEGOTIATIONS. FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO ACTED AS HONEST BROKER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN FASHIONING THE FINAL COMPROMISE, WHICH LED TO AGREEMENT ON ENTERING INTO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. THIS, TOO, MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO FINLAND'S ROLE IN HOLDING UP THE TABLING OF THE NNA PAPERS.

19. AND THE MALTESE GAMBIT. IF FINLAND PLAYED ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE ON THIS QUESTION, MALTA PLAYED THE ROLE OF, WELL, MALTA. AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR, THE MALTESE SAID THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM VALLETTA, IT WOULD WITHDRAW ITS CONCURRENCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT. THE MALTESE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE INFORMAL WORKING
END OF MESSAGE

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***<<<<< SECTION 6 >>>>>***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII

STRUCTURE, ACCORDING TO KAHILUOTO, BUT RATHER WITH THE LONG-AWAITED (AND LONG DEBATED) NNA POSITION PAPERS. THEREFORE IN A CLASSIC MALTESE BARGAINING STANCE, MALTA WITHHELD CONSENSUS TO ENSURE THAT MALTESE VIEWS WERE ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED IN THOSE PAPERS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT MALTA WANTED THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL MOVEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE NNA PAPERS. SEVERAL NNA CONTACTS INDICATED TO US THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD BEEN PRESSING THE MALTESE ON THIS POINT AND WERE NOT DISPLEASED WITH THE MALTESE GAMBIT. SOME OF OUR FRUSTRATED NATO COLLEAGUES OPENLY WONDERED WHETHER IT WAS NOT TIME TO PRESS MALTA THROUGH DEMARCHES OR MERELY TO IGNORE MALTA, THEREBY BREAKING THE CONSENSUS RULE. VALLETTA, NO DOUBT, WOULD HAVE LOVED THE LIMELIGHT. HAPPILY, COOLER HEADS PREVAILED AND THE NNA WERE LEFT TO DEAL WITH THEIR MALTESE ALBATROSS. THE SUSPENSE WAS



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SHORT-LIVED, AS THE NNA WERE ABLE TO PRESSURE MALTA TO JOIN IN THE CONFERENCE CONSENSUS IN TIME FOR FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INFORMAL COMPROMISE IN WORKING GROUP AB THAT AFTERNOON (OCTOBER 14). WE THINK MALTA SIMPLY WAS SENDING THE CONFERENCE A POLITICAL SIGNAL AS IF THE 34 OTHER PARTICIPANTS COULD EVER FORGET THAT MALTA INDEED HAD ITS OWN SPECIAL PLACE IN THE CSCE PROCESS.

20. WORKING GROUPS. THE FIRST FIVE WEEKS SAW BOTH NATO AND WTO DELEGATIONS POSITION THEMSELVES FOR THE ANTICIPATED TRANSITION TO THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. NATO DELEGATIONS HELD THEIR GROUND WELL AND, IN OUR VIEW, THROUGH FURTHER CLARIFICATION, ENHANCED UNDERSTANDING OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE NNA. (WE WILL BE ABLE TO MEASURE OUR EFFECTIVENESS WHEN THE NNA POSITION PAPERS FINALLY EMERGE.) THE NNA WERE VIRTUALLY SILENT AS THEY WORKED FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THESE PAPERS. THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE FLOOR REFLECTED AN INFORMAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE NNA'S NOT TO SPEAK UNLESS SPOKEN TO. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE YUGOSLAVS ON VERIFICATION AND THE CYPRIOTS ON NUF, THE NNA DISPLAYED COMMENDABLE DISCIPLINE.

21. SUBTLE SIGNALS. THE EAST HINTED AT SOME FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD AND THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. WHILE REJECTING BOTH PROPOSALS AS SUBSTITUTES FOR THE TRIED-AND-TRUE TERMS AND PRACTICE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT REGIME, THE EAST LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR THESE NEW CONCEPTS TO "SUPPLEMENT" EXISTING ONES. ON THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, THE SOVIET DELEGATION SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT IT DID NOT REJECT THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, NOTING THAT STRUCTURAL INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED IN THE NOTIFICATION TRIGGERED BY NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. THE EAST'S PROFESSED MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS ALONE IS BASED ON THE DISPARITY BETWEEN DIVISIONS FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. IMPLICIT IN THIS OBJECTION, HOWEVER, WAS AN INDICATION THAT A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER IN SOME KIND OF COMBINATION WITH A NUMERICAL PARAMETER MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. THE EASTERN "NON-STARTERS" VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED FROM THE AGENDA, AS THE EAST, REALIZING THAT THE CONFERENCE'S PATIENCE WITH THESE PROPOSALS WAS RAPIDLY RUNNING OUT, FOCUSED ON "NON-USE OF FORCE." FINALLY, CERTAIN EASTERN SOURCES HAVE MADE DISCREET, AND AS YET UNCONFIRMED, NOISES THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT SOME VERY DILUTED FORM OF ON-SITE INSPECTION IN THE END GAME.

22. ON THE DOWN SIDE, THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT THE ISSUES OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION CANNOT BE DISCUSSED INDEPENDENT OF A NOTIFICATION MEASURE. IN FACT, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN THE ONLY WARSAW PACT



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DELEGATION TO SPEAK ON THIS SUBJECT THIS ROUND,
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***<<<<< SECTION 7 >>>>***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
REFLECTING MOSCOW'S LACK OF TRUST IN ITS ALLIES' ABILITY TO HANDLE SENSITIVE SUBJECTS IN ANY GIVE-AND-TAKE WITH THE WEST. THE SOVIETS, WITH SOME ASSISTANCE FROM THEIR LOYAL GDR COLLEAGUES, ALSO HAVE CARRIED THE BALL ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, ASSERTING THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID MANDATE. THE SOVIETS HAVE, MOREOVER, REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF OBLIGATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, AND THEY CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT AN OBSERVATION REGIME CANNOT BE DEVELOPED UNTIL IT IS DETERMINED WHICH ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED, AND, THUS, CANDIDATES FOR OBSERVATION.

23. WORKING GROUP DYNAMICS CHANGED FURTHER DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE ROUND AS THE CONFERENCE ENTERED INTO THE INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE. DURING THIS "TEST" RUN OF INFORMAL MEETINGS THE WEST FARED WELL AND WAS ABLE TO DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON ITS TERMS. THE USSR, LED BY SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV, HOWEVER, AGGRESSIVELY ARGUED ITS CASE ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, WHILE AMBASSADOR RAKHMANINOV PLAYED THE DEMANDEUR ROLE IN THE GROUP DEALING WITH NON-USE OF FORCE. ALL IN ALL, HOWEVER, THE GIVE-AND-TAKE THAT CHARACTERIZED THESE MEETINGS BODES WELL FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS DURING THE NEXT ROUND.

24. PROCEDURAL PROBLEM FOR THE NEXT ROUND. JUDGING BY WHAT WE HEAR FROM THE SOVIETS AND SOME OTHER WTO'S, THEY ARE CONSIDERING A MAJOR PROCEDURAL OFFENSIVE IN THE NEXT ROUND TO ESTABLISH THE POINT THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE CAN EXTEND ITSELF. YET THERE APPEARS TO BE NO MAJOR OBSTACLE TO SUSPENDING THE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER PREPCON FOR THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE, NATO, AND MANY NNA'S WOULD BLOCK CONCENSUS ON MEETING WHILE THE VIENNA MEETING IS IN PROGRESS, INSISTING THAT ONLY THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE ITSELF CAN DEBATE ON WHEN, AND WHETHER, CDE RESUMES. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THIS IS AN ESSENTIAL LEVERAGE ON SOVIET POSITIONS ON CSBM'S. WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE ARE SUPPORTED BY NATO, AS WELL AS



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KEY NNA'S. THIS, IN OUR VIEW, SHOULD BE A CENTRAL THEME OF DISCUSSIONS WITHIN NATO AND WITH THE NNA COUNTRIES.

25. DELIVERING MOSCOW'S MESSAGE TO STOCKHOLM. PROBLEMS WITH THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE CONFERENCE. THIS ROUND THE ISSUE HAS BEEN LESS ONE OF MALICIOUS INTENT THAN OF CAPRICIOUS INCOMPETENCE. WE HAVE SEEN IN THE PAST, AND NO DOUBT WILL SEE IN THE FUTURE, COLLUSION BETWEEN THE SOVIET-SUPPLIED RUSSIAN LINGUISTS AND THE SOVIET DELEGATION. THIS ROUND, SHEER INCOMPETENCE CAUSED US MORE PROBLEMS THAN DELIBERATE MISTRANSLATIONS. AS A RULE, THE SOVIETS HAVE ROTATED DIFFERENT INTERPRETERS THROUGH STOCKHOLM VIRTUALLY EVERY ROUND, WITH THE UNFORTUNATE RESULT THAT THEY ARRIVE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE SPECIALIZED CDE VOCABULARY AND, BY THE TIME THEY LEARN IT, MOVE ON TO SOMETHING ELSE. EVEN THE SECRETARIAT, EVER ANXIOUS TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIETS, HAS COMPLAINED ABOUT THE FREQUENT CHANGES OF PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, STOCKHOLM APPEARS TO BE THE PLACE WHERE INEXPERIENCED SOVIET LINGUISTS CUT THEIR TEETH AND THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT IS NOT PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO HAVE THE SOVIET LINGUISTS RECEIVE THEIR ON THE JOB TRAINING IN STOCKHOLM. AND FINALLY, THE BEST SOVIET INTERPRETERS PRESUMABLY ARE BEING SIPHONED OFF FOR THE U.S.-SOVIET GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS.

26. AMONG OUR ALLIES, ONLY THE GERMANS AND THE BRITISH CONCUR THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE TO RECTIFY THE CURRENT HIRING PRACTICES; THE OTHERS APPEAR WILLING TO

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***<<<<< SECTION 8 >>>>***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
FOLLOW OUR LEAD, BUT SEEM TO SEE THE PROBLEM AS A
U.S.-SOVIET DISPUTE.
-
27. WE HAVE TALKED WITH THE SECRETARIAT FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS ABOUT ADOPTING THE SAME RECRUITMENT PRACTICES FOR RUSSIAN AS THOSE USED FOR THE OTHER FIVE LANGUAGES -- HIRING INDEPENDENT FREELANCERS. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM, BUT A NATURAL BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA TOGETHER WITH A FATALISTIC BELIEF THAT THERE ARE NO COMPETENT RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION MAKE THE SECRETARIAT EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO ROCK THE BOAT. THIS LATTER CONVICTION IS A LINE WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE FED

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS FOR DECADES WITH CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS -- AND TO A CERTAIN DEGREE IT HAS BECOME A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY: BECAUSE OF THE LONGSTANDING PRACTICE IN UN AND OTHER MULTILATERAL MEETINGS OF HIRING ONLY SOVIETS FOR THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTHS, GIFTED YOUNG INTERPRETERS HAVE BEEN DISCOURAGED BY THE LACK OF JOB PROSPECTS FROM DEVELOPING THE ABILITY TO INTERPRET INTO RUSSIAN. NONETHELESS, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED ONE SUCH GENEVA-BASED INTERPRETER, WHO COMES WELL RECOMMENDED, BUT HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE SECRETARIAT THAT ITS OWN ADVISERS IN GENEVA DO NOT RECOMMEND HER.
28. WHILE IRKSOME NOW, SOVIET CONTROL OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO IN THE FINAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE AGREED ENGLISH TEXT WILL NEED TO BE TRANSLATED INTO THE OTHER OFFICIAL LANGUAGES. WE CAN EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PERSONNEL TO WIN BACK POINTS IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION THAT THEY LOST DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARIAT IS NOW HIRING INTERPRETERS FOR THE FIRST SESSION OF 1986. THEREFORE, ANY ASSISTANCE DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE IN IDENTIFYING QUALIFIED INDEPENDENT RUSSIAN LINGUISTS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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25X1

UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08422
SUBJECT: START OF CDE ROUND VLLL
L. CDE VIII - 00L
2. UNCLASSIFIED-ENTIRE TEXT
3. ROUND VIII OF CDE RESUMES TOMORROW, NOVEMBER 5, IN STOCKHOLM. IT WILL CONTINUE UNTIL DECEMBER 20.
4. USDEL CDE HEAD, AMBASSADOR BARRY; HAS BEEN DELAYED IN WASHINGTON. I HAVE ASSUMED CHARGE. HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08531
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 4, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 004
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF NOVEMBER 4 DISCUSSED RECENT OVERTURES GRINEVSKY (USSR) HAS MADE TO SEVERAL ALLIED DELEGATIONS CONCERNING THE POSSIBLILITY OF THE CDE ESTABLISHING ITS OWN RESUMPTION DATE. CAUCUS CONSENSUS WAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE CDE DOES NOT HAVE THIS AUTHORITY. WITH REGARD TO THE ANTICIPATED NNA PAPER, THE CAUCUS DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO POCKET ANY POSITIVE POINTS, BUT SHOULD AVOID APPEARING OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC. DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS GENERALLY INCONCLUSIVE, BUT JANUARY 21 DID EMERGE AS THE MOST LIKELY DATE FOR CONVENING THE NINTH SESSION. NORWAY AND DENMARK ARGUED THAT NO "ARTIFICIAL" CUTOFF DATE FOR THE CDE SHOULD BE SET PRIOR TO THE START OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 4 FOR POLITICAL REASONS, WHILE THE U.S. AND FRANCE COUNTERED THAT THE CDE SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19 AT THE LATEST TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CDE IS SUBORDINATE TO THE FULL CSCE. END SUMMARY.
4. CONTACTS: THE NATO CDE CAUCUS HELD ITS FIRST SESSION OF THE EIGHTH ROUND ON NOVEMBER 4. MELLBIN (DENMARK) REPORTED ON GRINEVSKY'S VISIT TO COPENHAGEN OCTOBER 20-21, DURING WHICH GRINEVSKY INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO LIMIT THE COORDINATORS FOR THE CDE DRAFTING PHASE TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NNA, BUT THAT NATO AND WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE FORTHCOMING NNA PAPER SHOULD NEITHER BE CONSIDERED AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING NOR AS A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT. U.S. DEPREP HANSEN (THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), AND CITRON (FRG) ALL REPORTED THAT GRINEVSKY HAD PROBED WESTERN VIEWS ON THE POSSIBLILITY OF THE CDE SETTING ITS OWN RESUMPTION DATE. U.S. AMBASSADOR BARRY, HANSEN SAID, FIRMLY REJECTED THE SOVIET SUGGESTION.
5. NNA PAPER: IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE ANTICIPATED NNA PAPER, EDES (UK) AND BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) ADVISED THAT NATO SHOULD NOT APPEAR TOO ENTHUSIASTIC OVER ITS POSITIVE ELEMENTS, AS OVEREAGER SUPPORT WOULD COMPLICATE THE NNA'S POSITION AT A TIME WHEN SOME NNA MEMBERS (NOTABLY FINLAND) ALREADY FEAR THAT THE PAPER TILTS TOO FAR TOWARD THE WEST. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH BUWALDA'S SUGGESTION FOR THE NEAR TERM THAT, WHILE WE SHOULD POCKET THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF THE NNA POSITION, IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WE SHOULD NOTE ONLY THOSE POINTS OF SC.1 WHICH ARE MISSING AND OVERLOOK SIMILARITIES WITH THE WESTERN PACKAGE OF CSBM'S.
6. CALENDAR FOR 1986: A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS, OF COURSE, LARGELY INCONCLUSIVE BUT, ON A



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FUNDAMENTAL POINT, PRODUCED CONSENSUS THAT, CONTRARY TO GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL, THE CDE DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SET ITS OWN RESUMPTION DATE. THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FRENCH, WHO ARE PUSHING FOR JANUARY 14) THAT JANUARY 21 IS THE EARLIEST REASONABLE DATE TO START THE NINTH SESSION IN ORDER TO ALLOW TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS IN CAPITALS AND A POSSIBLE MEETING IN BRUSSELS. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC SCHEDULE FOR 1986, AS DELEGATIONS CONTINUE TO WRESTLE WITH DIVERGENT HOLIDAY, TRAVEL TIME REQUIREMENTS, ETC. TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF AN ENDING DATE FOR CDE, SOME DELEGATIONS (NOTABLY DENMARK AND NORWAY) WANTED TO AVOID CREATING ANY "ARTIFICIAL" CUTOFF DATE, WHICH, IN THEIR VIEW, COULD CREATE POLITICAL DANGERS FOR THE ALLIANCE, AND WERE PREPARED TO STAY IN SESSION UNTIL NOVEMBER 4. THE U.S. AND FRANCE STRONGLY OPPOSED THIS LINE AND ARGUED THAT STOCKHOLM MUST BE SUSPENDED BY SEPTEMBER 19 (IN FACT, FRANCE SUPPORTS ONLY A TECHNICAL SESSION AFTER THE FRENCH CUTOFF DATE OF JULY 18) IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE PROPER SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENT (CSCE) AND CHILD (CDE). IT WAS AGREED TO RETURN TO THIS SUBJECT AT A FUTURE CAUCUS.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE
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25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09615
SUBJECT: CDE DRAFTING AUTHORITY
REF: STATE 30L425
L. CDE VIII -
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: WHEN CDE RECONVENES IN LATE JANUARY, TIME LEFT FOR NEGOTIATING A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPCON WILL BE VERY LIMITED. IN ORDER TO GET AS SUBSTANTIVE AN AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE AND TO MINIMIZE LAST-MINUTE PRESSURES TO AGREE TO UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE OR A MINI-PACKAGE, USDEL CDE BELIEVES IT NOW NEEDS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO DRAFT DURING THE NEXT ROUND (IX). DRAFTING, OF COURSE, WILL BE AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS, AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED WILL BE OBSERVED. CF. ACTION REQUEST PARA 7 AND OSD NOTE PARA 8. END SUMMARY.
4. USDEL CDE BELIEVES THAT, FOR TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, IT MUST CONSOLIDATE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT EARLY ON AS MANY OF OUR CSBM POSITIONS AS POSSIBLE. TIME IS GROWING SHORT IN WHICH TO NEGOTIATE THE COMPLEX ISSUES WHICH MUST BE SETTLED IF A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT IS TO BE ACHIEVED BEFORE THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING BEGINS IN FALL, L986.
5. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN CDE IS AN AGREEMENT WHICH EMPHASIZES THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) PRINCIPLE AND EXTENDS THE CSBM ZONE THROUGH INCLUSION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, WHILE REDUCING TO A MINIMUM THE SUBSTANCE OF ANY CSBMS. AWARE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO WIN EXTENSION OF THE ZONE, THE SOVIETS ARE PURSUING THIS COURSE TO ENSURE A MINIMALIST OUTCOME TO CDE. AS PART OF THEIR TACTIC, THEY ARE NOW SPREADING THE WORD THAT KEY DECISIONS ON CDE WILL BE MADE AT TNE NEXT US-SOVIET SUMMIT IN JUNE, L986. SIMILARLY, THEIR TACTICS ON THE WORK PROGRAM FOR L986 SUGGEST THAT THEY PLAN TO "END-LOAD" THE NEGOTIATIONS BY MAKING THEIR MINIMAL CONCESSIONS IN THE SUMMER AND PRESSING FOR A LAST FRANTIC EFFORT TO RESCUE SOMETHING BEFORE VIENNA CONVENES.
6. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD PUT US IN A DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION. UNTIL WE ARE ABLE TO CONFRONT CONFERENCE ISSUES HEAD-ON IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PIN DOWN THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF GREATEST INTEREST TO US. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO RECORD AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE ON SUBSTANCE BEFORE THE NEXT US-SOVIET SUMMIT SO THAT WE WILL HAVE A CLEAR IDEA AS TO WHETHER AN AGREEMENT IS IN REACH AT ALL. WHAT WE WANT TO AVOID IS HEADING INTO A SUMMIT WITH ALL THE KEY ISSUES OPEN AND ENDING UP "TRADING" CONCESSIONS THERE AMONG CDE ISSUES, AS WELL AS BETWEEN CDE AND OTHER ISSUES. BECAUSE OF THE



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COMPLEXITY (IF NOT TO SAY IMPENETRABILITY) OF CDE ISSUES AND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT ASPECTS, USDEL WANTS TO KEEP CDE OUT OF THE SUMMIT VORTEX AS MUCH AS WE CAN. BUT, WITH PROBABLY ONLY FOURTEEN WEEKS IN OUR L986 WORK PROGRAM BEFORE THE SUMMIT, THERE ISN'T MUCH TIME REMAINING.

7. IN KEEPING WITH THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFTEL, USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE CDE IG WHICH WILL MEET IN EARLY JANUARY SHOULD AUTHORIZE DRAFTING. ALL TEXT WILL EMERGE FROM THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS AD REFERENDUM. ON THE BASIS OF THE ESTABLISHED CSCE PRINCIPLE, NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL ALL IS AGREED.

8. NOTE: THE ABOVE IS THE POSITION OF ALL USDEL AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES EXCEPT THE OSD REP. THE POSITION OF THE OSD REP IS THAT THE ISSUE OF DRAFTING SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE JANUARY IG AND THAT THE IG SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR DRAFTING IN CDE HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. END NOTE.

BARRY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08530
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOVEMBER 5
1. CDE VIII - 003
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE NOVEMBER 5 PLENARY, THE WEST (FRG, FRANCE, NORWAY) FOCUSED ON KEY UNRESOLVED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE CLOSER ATTENTION BEFORE MOVING INTO DRAFTING. THE EAST (BULGARIA, USSR) ARGUED THAT THE WEST MUST DISPLAY THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY IN ORDER TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS. AUSTRIA SUGGESTED AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS BE LINKED TO LIMITATION MEASURES AND COMMUNICATION/RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

4. AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD "WELCOME A TEST RUN OF DRAFTING ALREADY THIS YEAR." HE OUTLINED SOME KEY AREAS OF "REAL" COMMON GROUND WHICH NEED DETAILED DISCUSSION IF WE ARE TO MOVE INTO A "TEST RUN OF DRAFTING THIS YEAR." THESE AREAS INCLUDE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY; AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS; AND AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF VERIFICATION. CITRON STRESSED THAT NTM ALONE CANNOT SERVE AS A REFERENCE POINT FOR COMPLIANCE OF AN AGREED CSBM. HE CAUTIONED THE EAST AGAINST INSISTING ON NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATION.

5. AMBASSADOR MEVIK (NORWAY) SAID HIS DELEGATION, LIKE THE FRG, WOULD LIKE "AT LEAST SOME WEEKS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE DRAFTING MODE" THIS YEAR; HE ALSO STRESSED SUBSTANTIVE AREAS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IF WE ARE TO DRAFT "WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY." WITHIN THE "CORE" AREA OF COMMON GROUND, I.E., NOTIFICATION, MEVIK POINTED OUT THREE ISSUES WITH WHICH THE CONFERENCE MUST STILL COME TO GRIPS 1) THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT; 2) USE OF THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH AS THE MAIN NOTIFICATION PARAMETER, UNDERPINNED BY A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD, FIRST FOR EQUIPMENT AND SECONDARY FOR TROOPS; AND 3) A LOWER THRESHOLD FOR AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO SUPPORTED AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS, DISCUSSION OF "BALANCED CONSTRAINING MEASURES," ADEQUATE VERIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, OBSERVATION AND A REAFFIRMATION OF NON-USE OF FORCE. MEVIK MADE THREE POINTS OF PROCEDURE: 1) WE MUST AVOID PROCEDURAL EXERCISES IN THE FUTURE WHICH WILL DELAY PROGRESS; 2) THERE NEEDS TO BE A SMOOTH TRANSITION INTO DRAFTING, WITH SOME WEEKS OF EXPERIENCE IN DRAFTING BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR; AND 3) WE SHOULD REACH AN AGREEMENT "IN GOOD TIME BEFORE VIENNA BUT WITH NO ARTIFICIAL DEADLINE." (BEGIN COMMENT: ON THESE LAST TWO POINTS, NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE CAUCUS.



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END COMMENT.)
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6. AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) REFUSED TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH THOSE WHO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MOVE TO DRAFTING. HE ARGUED THAT DRAFTING CANNOT BE CONJURED UP AS A MANIFESTATION OF PROGRESS; RATHER, PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DRAFTING. IN THIS CONTEXT, GASCHIGNARD COMMENTED THAT A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN EXPRESSED AND THOSE AREAS WHERE THAT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE. AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION, AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION FALL INTO THE FIRST CATEGORY AND SHOULD FIGURE IN A FINAL AGREEMENT. THE SITUATION IS DIFFERENT FOR EXISTING PROPOSALS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE, HE SAID, ALTHOUGH FRANCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE A NUF REAFFIRMATION FROM AN AGREEMENT. HE LATER SAID SUCH A REAFFIRMATION WOULD BE A FUNCTION OF CSBM'S, NOT A CSBM ITSELF. THE SITUATION IS "RADICALLY
FROM USDEL
PM/CDE FOR AMBASSADOR BARRY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOVEMBER 5
DIFFERENT" FOR PROPOSALS FOR CEILINGS ON THE SCALE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ABOUT WHICH A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING HIS OWN, HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS, BECAUSE CEILINGS PRESUPPOSE LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE AND TRANSPARENCY WHICH ARE NOT PRESENT TODAY. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE STUDYING CONSTRAINTS FORMULAS, BUT REJECTED REDUCING CONSTRAINTS TO CEILINGS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CATEGORICALLY REJECTED CONSIDERATION OF A "POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY" WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CSBM'S BECAUSE 1) SUCH A MECHANISM CANNOT CONSTITUTE A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE, AND 2) CSCE STATES AGREED TWELVE YEARS AGO TO HOLD PERIODIC REVIEW MEETINGS TO EXAMINE THE OVERALL PROCESS OF CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION, AND 3) FRANCE CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE SUGGESTION THAT CONSULTATIONS BE INTEGRATED INTO CSBM'S OR EVEN SUBSTITUTE FOR SUCH CSBM'S AS INFORMATION OR VERIFICATION. TURNING TO THE WORK SCHEDULE FOR 1986, GASCHIGNARD ELABORATED THE FRENCH POSITION IN SUBSTANTIAL DETAIL: THERE SHOULD BE THREE OR FOUR SESSIONS BEFORE JULY; A POLITICAL AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE WOULD BE NEEDED BY THE END OF THE SPRING; IN JULY, IF NECESSARY, A DECISION COULD BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS TO HOLD A FINAL SESSION BEFORE THE PREPCON TO WORK ON TEXTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: ALL THREE WESTERN SPEAKERS, WHILE DEFENDING THE ALLIANCE POSITION, LAID DOWN CLEAR NATIONAL MARKERS IN TERMS OF THEIR PRIORITIES
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AND OUTLOOK TOWARD THE CONFERENCE. NORWAY AND FRG, FOR EXAMPLE, DISPLAYED AN URGENCY TO MOVE QUICKLY INTO DRAFTING, WHEREAS FRANCE MADE IT CLEAR IT REJECTED A TIMETABLE FOR DRAFTING. END COMMENT.)

7. AMBASSADOR TODOROV (BULGARIA) REVIEWED THE DECLARATION OF THE OCTOBER 22-23 WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN SOFIA. AFTER HIS LONG SUMMARY OF THE MEETING, HE HAILED AN ELABORATION OF NON-USE OF FORCE AS THE "MOST IMPORTANT" WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. TODOROV SUGGESTED AGREEMENT BE REACHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON A TRANSITION PERIOD INTO DRAFTING, AND THAT A START BE MADE ON DRAFTING TEXTS OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS.

8. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (USSR) MADE TWO POINTS IN A RIGHT OF REPLY TO CITRON'S STATEMENT: 1) CITRON'S EMPHASIS ON NATO PROPOSALS OMITTED THE IMPORTANT AREAS OF NUF AND CONSTRAINTS; IS CITRON'S DEFINITION OF COMMON GROUND, INCLUDING NUF AND CONSTRAINTS, NOT A DEPARTURE FROM THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE ON ALL OUTLINED AREAS? AND 2) "PRACTICALLY ALL SIDES" HAVE SAID THEY WELCOME GORBACHEV'S READINESS TO EXCHANGE MILITARY CALENDARS, BUT WHERE IS NATO'S RECIPROCAL MOVEMENT? NATO HAS DONE NOTHING TO ADVANCE THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE, GRINEVSKY CLAIMED. AFTER MAKING THESE POINTS, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON NATO TO GIVE UP THE "ILLUSION" THAT THERE CAN BE ONE-WAY NEGOTIATIONS. IN A DEFENSIVE RESPONSE, CITRON SAID HE HAD NOT SOUGHT TO INCORPORATE ALL AREAS OF COMMON GROUND IN HIS COMMENTS, BUT PREFERRED INSTEAD TO FOCUS ON A FEW KEY AREAS. CITRON ADDED THAT HE HOPED THESE REMARKS WOULD "APPEASE" THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

HANSEN

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# S T A T E M E N T

by Ambassador Stephan Todorov,
Head of the Bulgarian Delegation
to the CSCE Stockholm Conference
Plenary, November 5, 1985

Mr. Chairman,

On October 22 and 23 in Sofia took place the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, in which the highest ranking representatives of the member-states participated. In the capital of Bulgaria the States-members to the Warsaw Treaty again reaffirmed the top priority they attach to the betterment of the political climate in Europe and in the world, to the averting of the nuclear threat overshadowing Europe and the world.

As it is stated in the Declaration adopted at the meeting, the worsening of international tension has moved closer to the point beyond which events may get out of control. The spiral of the arms race is raising impetuously. The reasons of this state of affairs are well-known to everyone.

Particularly alarming is the threat of the arms race spreading to outer space which would lead to a destabilisation of the overall strategic situation. Even the layman is well aware that this would pose a particular threat to Europe.

The Sofia Declaration reaffirms - under no circumstances will the Warsaw Treaty member-states sacrifice the security of their peoples. At the same time however they are firmly opposed to the arms race and its escalation and declare themselves in favour of securing a balance of power at the lowest level. The principal objective of their foreign policy has always been the removal of the danger of nuclear war, the lowering of the level of military confrontation and the development of international relations in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and detente. A positive turn in the international situation demands a new



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political approach corresponding to the realities of the present-day world. As it was underlined at the meeting, such an approach should be based on mutual restraint and responsibility, on taking into account the legitimate interests of all, on predictability both in the political as well as in the military spheres.

Full support was expressed at the meeting to the recent initiatives of the Soviet Union submitted at the Soviet-American Geneva negotiations on the whole complex of space and nuclear issues. The moratoria in the sphere of nuclear weapons, declared by the Soviet Union, were also supported. The conviction was voiced that the undertaking of similar actions by the United States would be an important prerequisite for achieving results in the field of disarmament.

The leaders of the allied socialist States believe that the upcoming Soviet-American summit should contribute to allaying the present-day dangerous tensions in the world, to diminishing the military threat, to achieving mutually acceptable decisions aimed at curbing the arms race and real progress towards disarmament.

To achieve a positive shift in the international relations it is necessary to put an end to the power politics and confrontation. All States should abide strictly by the principles of respect for national independence and sovereignity, non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, a peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, equality of rights and other universally acknowledged norms in international relations. Slander campaigns giving a distorted account of the situation in some countries or others and of their politics are inadmissible

By proposing a wide-ranging set of measures and means to overcome the tensions in the present-day political situation the Warsaw Treaty member-states pointed out that they were guided by the



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premise thst ideological differencies should not be transferred into interstate relations and thus undermine their stability, and the energetic interaction between all States and between all forces which stand for a normalisation of the international situation is today more necessary than ever before.

As for the political and military situation on our continent the leaders of the allied States declared that an exceedingly important aspect of the drive for eliminating the nuclear menace is checking the present dangerous course of events and lowering the level of military course in Europe. They were guided by the understanding that European security and international security as a whole cannot be achieved by military means or by military force. Stable peace on the continent can be secured only through detente, disarmament, the strenghtening of confidence and the promotion of international cooperation. In this context the participants in the Sofia meeting called again for major complementary measures, both political and military to be mapped out in the nearest future at the Stockholm Conference, aimed at strenghtening confidence and security in Europe.

The States-members to the Warsaw Treaty emphasized again the great importance of the Conference of the leaders of the European States, the USA and Canada held ten years ago that adopted the most important principles and provisions on which security and cooperation were to be built, and reaffirmed their readiness to continue to participate constructively in the work of the European fora. The Helsinki Final Act, permeated by the spirit of detente has stood the test of time, and as the recent meeting of foreign ministers in Helsinki proved, remains a long-term programme for European cooperation.

It was underlined at the meeting that at the present moment it is vitally important to strenghten mutual confidence, to deepen on the basis of the Final Act the political dialogue between the European countries in various fields, by various forms and at various levels on the interest of healing the climate on the continent.



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various levels in the interest of healing the climate on the continent.

It was confirmed that the participants in the meeting intend to further their efforts so that the many-sided process which began in Helsinki should develop in a steady and balanced manner. The forthcoming meeting in Vienna in I986 of the participating States in the all-European conference is called upon to play a major role in this respect. It was also stated that the Warsaw Treaty member-states invariably declare for a consistent translation into practice of all principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act by the signatory parties. The development of inter-State relations on such a basis would help to make Europe a continent of lasting peace and mutually advantageous cooperation

The concrete initiatives launched by the participants at the Sofia meeting are contained at the published Declaration which the Bulgarian Delegation has the honour to submit in full extent to the attention of all participants to the Stockholm Conference.

"The Declaration which we have adopted - stated the Secretary General of the CC of the BCP and President of the State Council of the PR Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov - represents a wide-ranging platform, a realistic understanding of what is necessary to do in order to achieve a positive turn in the European and international situation".

Mr. Chairman,

The eighth session of the Stockholm Conference, in the opinion of the Bulgarian Delegation, starts its work in a moment when in the international and European context a tendency is gaining momentum to overcome the logic of confrontation. The political dialogue between state and political leaders of East and West has become more intensive. Representatives of various circles,



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


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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08549
SUBJECT: GERMAN TV INTERVIEW WITH USDEL CDE DEPUTY
1. CDE VIII - 006
2. WEST GERMAN TELEVISION'S CHANNEL 2 OF MAINZ HAS INTERVIEWED USDEL CDE DEPUTY LYNN HANSEN ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CDE AND THE UPCOMING GENEVA MEETING. THE INTERVIEW WILL BE AIRED ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, AS PART OF A LONGER STORY ON EUROPEAN SECURITY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY EVALUATION AMEMBASSY BONN MIGHT HAVE OF THE PROGRAM AND THE HANDLING OF THE INTERVIEW. HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08583
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 6, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 007
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: STANDAERT (BELGIUM) REPORTED ON A MEETING IN MOSCOW DURING THE CDE INTERSESSION BETWEEN THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR AND SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY IN WHICH GRINEVSKY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING A CDE SKELETON AGREEMENT IN THE SPRING OF 1986 AND THEN HAVING A MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING LATER TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. CAUCUS REACTION WAS HIGHLY NEGATIVE TO THIS IDEA. CANADA REOPENED THE DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDER BY PROVIDING OTTAWA'S VIEW THAT A TEXTUAL READING OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS INDICATES THAT THE CDE COULD CONTINUE UP TO OR BEYOND NOVEMBER 4 IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN. THIS INTERPRETATION WAS MET WITH VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS NEGATIVE REACTION, SPEARHEADED BY FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. END SUMMARY.
4. CONTACTS: THE NOVEMBER 6 NATO CAUCUS MEETING OPENED WITH STANDAERT (BELGIUM) REPORTING ON A MEETING IN MOSCOW BETWEEN THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR AND SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY DURING THE INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD. GRINEVSKY MADE THREE POINTS AT THE MEETING: 1) CDE IS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL CONFERENCE, THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE BOUND BY A STRICT TECHNICAL READING OF THE MADRID MANDATE; 2) THE USSR ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, WHICH IT VIEWS AS A REAL THREAT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE; AND 3) HE (GRINEVSKY) IS THINKING ABOUT ACHIEVING A SKELETON CDE AGREEMENT IN THE SPRING, WITH OUTSTANDING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED AT A POSSIBLE MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) INDICATED THAT GRINEVSKY HAD MADE THE SAME NOISES ABOUT A MINISTERIAL TO HIM SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, ALTHOUGH AT THAT TIME HE HAD REFERRED TO A VICE-MINISTERS' MEETING. IN RESPONSE TO THESE REPORTS, CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) OBSERVED THAT A CDE MINISTERIAL WOULD SERVE WELL THE SOVIET INTEREST IN DIMINISHING THE STATURE OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. CITRON (FRG) ADVISED THAT WE MAKE IT KNOWN TO GRINEVSKY EARLY ON THAT THIS IDEA WON'T FLY.
-
5. 1986 CALENDAR: DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS REJOINED WHEN, ON INSTRUCTIONS, ANSTIS (CANADIAN DEPREP), EXPRESSED OTTAWA'S VIEW THAT A PURELY TEXTUAL READING OF THE MANDATE AND DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING DO NOT SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT THE CDE MUST ADJOURN BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE BEGINS, NO MATTER HOW DESIRABLE THAT GOAL MAY BE. A CONSENSUS WILL BE REQUIRED TO ADJOURN THE CONFERENCE, ANSTIS OBSERVED AND, AS THIS



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WILL BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE CONTINGENCY OF WORKING UP TO (OR EVEN BEYOND) NOVEMBER 4. IN ORDER TO AVOID PROCEDURAL HASSLES, OTTAWA FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT WE ONLY SCHEDULE FOR NEXT YEAR ON A SESSION-BY-SESSION BASIS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MELLBIN (DENMARK), WHO SUPPORTED OTTAWA'S INTERPRETATIONS, CAUCUS SENTIMENT WAS CLEARLY IN OPPOSITION TO OTTAWA'S VIEWS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH UK AND FRG STATEMENTS THAT THE 1986 CALENDAR SHOULD BE AGREED UPON THIS SESSION AND NOT ON A SESSION-BY-SESSION BASIS WHICH COULD CREATE MORE PROCEDURAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS. CANADA'S INTERPRETATION THAT THE CONFERENCE GOES ON UNLESS THERE IS CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN MET WITH SIMILARLY NEGATIVE REACTION. HANSEN (U.S.) INDICATED THAT WASHINGTON WAS CONVINCED THAT THE CDE COULD NOT PROGRESS BEYOND THIS FIRST STAGE WITHOUT A DECISION FROM VIENNA AND THAT WE WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTINUE IN STOCKHOLM AFTER THE VIENNA MEETING BEGINS. HE ALSO STRESSED AGAIN THAT THE U.S. STRONGLY FAVORS A "NATURAL" CUTOFF DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19, I.E., BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPCON. CITRON (FRG) CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT THE EAST IS APPARENTLY WILLING TO ACCEPT A CUTOFF DATE, AND HE "PLEADED" THAT WE USE THIS FACT TO QUIETLY AND QUICKLY SET THE 1986 CALENDAR (FOR CITRON, WHO HAS A MARKED TENDENCY TO CAST HIS REQUESTS OF THE CAUCUS AS "PLEAS," THIS WAS HIS THIRD SUCH "PLEA" OF THE AFTERNOON, THUS GIVING HIM HIS FIRST "HAT TRICK" OF THE EIGHTH SESSION). ANSTIS PROMISED TO REPORT THE CAUCUS' REACTION TO OTTAWA AND ADDED THAT OTTAWA WOULD WELCOME ANY INTERPRETATION OF THE RELEVANT TEXTS THAT SUPPORTS NATO'S POLITICAL VIEWS ON ADJOURNING THE CDE. DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC DATES FOR THE 1986 SESSIONS MEANDERED ON WITHOUT CONCLUSION. END



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08642
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 8, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 8583
1. CDE VIII - 011
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF NOVEMBER 8 FAVORABLY REVIEWED WESTERN PERFORMANCE TO DATE IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN ALLIANCE COORDINATION. THE MOST PRCSSING ISSUE WAS HOW TO FEND OFF EASTERN QUCSTIONS ON THE DETAILS OF NOTIFICATION, OUSERVATION AND VERIFICATION FOR AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE CAUCUS REFERRED THIS MATTER TO THE OBSERVATION WORKING GROUP MINICLUSTER FOR STUDY, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS WOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR IMMEDIATE USE, WHILE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS GOING BEYOND SC.1 WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE AND CAPITALS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. END SUMMARY.
4. CONTACTS: MEVIK (NORWAY) REPORTED ON A NOVEMBER 6 LUNCH WITH GRINEVSKY (USSR), WHO HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT FIVE COORDINATORS WOULD BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE NUMBER FOR THE DRAFTING PHASE, DRAWING THREE FROM THE NNA, ONE FROM NATO, AND ONE FROM THE WARSAW PACT. HE ADDED THAT IN THE END HE COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT ONLY TWO NNA COORDINATORS (AS NATO FAVORS), BUT THAT IT QUICKLY WOULD BECOME APPARENT THAT THERE WAS TOO MUCH WORK FOR TWO PEOPLE. GRINEVSKY HAD ONCE AGAIN DISCUSSED HIS IDEA OF ACHIEVING A SKELETON AGREEMENT BY MAY OF NEXT YEAR BUT HAD TOLD MEVIK THAT OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES COULD BE RESOLVED BY HIGH LEVEL BILATERAL CONTACTS RATHER THAN AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING HE HAD MENTIONED TO EARLIER NATO INTERLOCUTORS (REFTEL). HE HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT THE MAIN OBSTACLE HE SAW TO AN AGREEMENT WAS THE WESTERN EXCLUSION OF THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME.
-
5. REVIEW OF INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS: THE MAIN AGENDA ITEM WAS A DISCUSSION OF NATO PERFORMANCE AND COORDINATION IN THE INFORMAL MEETINGS TO DATE (BACKGROUND: THE DUTCH, INTER ALIA, HAVE BEEN PUSHING THE CAUCUS TO CONSIDER A MORE FORMAL APPROACH TO THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS, I.E., TEAMS DE FILE, IN ORDER TO SMOOTH THE TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING PHASE, PRESUMABLY LATER THIS ROUND). GUNDERSEN (U.S.) STRESSED THAT THE FIRST WEEK OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTIVE AND WOULD BE BUILT UPON IN FUTURE INFORMAL MEETINGS. SINCE THIS WAS JUST THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, BY DEFINITION A TIME OF TRIAL AND ERROR, WE SHOULD USE THIS PHASE TO IMPROVE OUR COORDINATION AND DISCIPLINE AND TO



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FOCUS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THERE WAS, IN OTHER WORDS, NO NEED TO DISCUSS MOVING OEYOND THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AT THE PRESENT TIME. PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE DISCUSSION WERE THAT: 1) NATO HAS TURNED IN A GENERALLY GOOD PERFORMANCE ALTHOUGH COORDINATION COULD BE TIGHTENED SOMEWHAT AND DELEGATES COULD SHOW MORE RESTRAINT IN RISING TO EASTERN BAIT; 2) THE EXPLORATORY PHASE HAS BEEN VALUABLE IN ALLOWING THE WEST TO PROMOTE FURTHER ITS PROPOSALS AND AS AN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN PREPARATION FOR DRAFTING; 3) NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONDUCT A HOLDING OPERATION IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE CLUSTER; AND 4) OUR POSITION NEEDS TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED ON NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. ON THE LAST POINT EDES (UK) POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE ON THE DEFENSIVE; THE EAST HAS ASKED QUESTIONS, AND WE HAVE HAD NO ANSWERS. THE CAUCUS AGREED THAT THE NATO MINICLUSTER FOR THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP SHOULD EXAMINE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND CONSIDER THE CONTENT OF RELATED NOTIFICATION AND METHODS OF OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION. THE NETHERLANDS AND SPAIN SUGGESTED THAT THESE QUESTIONS BE REFERRED TO THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE IN BRUSSELS, BUT CITRON (FRG) ARGUED THAT THEY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED HERE FIRST. BLANK (U.S.) CAUTIONED THAT, WHILE THE MINICLUSTER COULD DEVELOP DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS TO BE USED IN REPONSE TO EASTERN QUESTIONS, NATO MILITARY COMMANDERS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE WE COULD SAY ANYTHING IN STOCKHOLM ON THE MODALITIES OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION OF FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES THAT WENT BEYOND SC.1. THE CAUCUS DIRCCTED THE MINICLUSTER TO PROCEED WITH ITS STUDY BUT THAT ONLY NEW DEFENSIVE AGRUMENTS WOULD OE USED NOW, WHILE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ARISING FROM ITS CONSIDERATION WOULD BE REFERRED TO BRUSSELS AND CAPITALS FOR FURTHER STUDY. END



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08644
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
- NOVEMBER 5-8, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 015
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE EIGHTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OPENED WITH HIGH EXPECTATIONS AND LOW THEATER. WITH THE ADVENT OF A MORE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AND ON THE EVE OF THE U.S.-USSR SUMMIT, MANY CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS HOLD HIGH EXPECTATIONS THAT THE EIGHTH ROUND WILL LEAD TO DRAFTING BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THE EAST, PLAYING TO THE PUBLIC -- AND NNA -- GALLERY, DISPLAYED A THEATRICAL SHOW OF IMPATIENCE WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD DRAFTING, ESPECIALLY ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND PRESSED FOR THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM'S REGIME. MEANWHILE, THE MUCH BALLYHOOED AND FREQUENTLY DELAYED CONFERENCE OPENING OF THE NNA PACKAGE IS STILL STRUGGLING ON THE ROAD, ESPECIALLY IN BELGRADE AND HELSINKI. THE WEST, IF NOT TOTALLY SATISFIED WITH THE ALLIANCE'S OPENING WEEK PERFORMANCES, SEEMS CONTENT TO USE THE EXPLORATORY PHASE TO PROMOTE ITS PROPOSALS AND TO IMPROVE ITS ORGANIZATION. END SUMMARY.
4. NATO: GOT A DATE? DURING THE INTERSESSIONAL BREAK, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY PROCED FOR WESTERN WEAKNESSES ON THE QUESTION OF WLETHER THE CDE COULD SET ITS OWN RESUMPTION DATE. HE FOUND NONE. ALL OUR ALLIES REPORTED THAT THEY HAD FIRMLY REUUFFED SOVIET OVERTURES; THE PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE OF THE CSCE ESTABLISH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CSCE MOTHER AND THE CDE CHILD, I.E., THE CDE CANNOT SET ITS OWN DATE FOR RESUMING WORK AFTER VIENNA. FURTHERMORE, MOST NATO DELEGATIONS AGREE THAT IT IS IN NATO'S SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL INTEREST TO SUSPEND THE CDE WELL BEFORE THE VIENNA CONFERENCE. ONLY CANADA, ON INSTRUCTIONS, WAVERED, ARGUING THAT A PURELY TEXTUAL READING OF THE MANDATE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING DID NOT SUPPORT THIS VIEW. THERE ALSO WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO THAT THE 1986 CALENDAR SHOULD BE AGREED UPON THIS SESSION AND NOT ON A SESSION-BY-SESSION BASIS AS SUGGESTED BY THE CANADIANS. DURING CAUCUS DISCUSSION ON THE CALENDAR U.S. DELEGATION STRESSED THAT WE STRONGLY FAVORED A "NATURAL" CUTOFF DATE BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPCON IN SEPTEMBER AND
-
PREFERRED A REASONABLE BREAK BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND, E.G. JANUARY 21.
5. THE EXPLORATORY PHASE: WHILE THE CAUCUS GENERALLY (AND GENEROUSLY) GAVE WESTERN ACTORS FAVORABLE REVIEWS FOR THEIR OPENING PERFORMANCES, BEHIND THE CURTAINS CAUCUS CRITICS WERE MORE CURT THAN KIND. LED BY THE



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DUTCH, THESE CRITICS ARGUED THAT WE MUST COORDINATE OUR PRESENTATIONS AND RESPONSES, PARTICULARLY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE AND ON NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND INSPECTION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE CAUCUS HAS RECOGNIZED EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO FORCE THE ISSUE ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES (SEE PARA 9 OELOW) AND TASKED MILITARY ADVISORS TO STUDY THE ISSUE. WE ARE NOT AS EXERCISED ABOUT THE EARLY COURSE OF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AS ARE SOME OF OUR ALLIES, WHO MAY HAVE ULTERIOR MOTIVES (THE DUTCH, NORWEGIANS, DANES, AND GERMANS HAVE ALL STATED THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SMOOTH THE TRANSITION INTO DRAFTING LATER THIS ROUND). AFTER ALL, THIS WAS ONLY THE FIRST WEEK OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, BY DEFINITION A TIME OF TRIAL AND ERROR. THIS PHASE SHOULD ALLOW THE ALLIANCE AMPLE TIME TO PROMOTE ITS PROPOSALS AND TIGHTEN ITS DISCIPLINE. OF COURSE, THE EAST ALREADY HAS DISCIPLINE TO SPARE (AND, AS THE PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR ONCE NOTED, THE EAST EUROPEANS ENVY US OUR DIFFERENCES, NOT OUR DISCIPLINE).

6. THE PLENARY: WHILE THE ALLIES MAY EQUIVOCATE IN PRIVATE, THEY REMAIN FIRM ON SUBSTANCE IN PUBLIC. THE FRG, FRANCE, AND NORWAY, WHATEVER THEIR TACTICAL DIFFERENCES -- AND THEY ARE LEGION -- ALL FOCUSED ON KEY UNRESOLVED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE CLOSER ATTENTION BEFORE MOVING INTO DRAFTING. THESE ISSUES INCLUDE: (1) THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT; (2) THE USE OF THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH FOR NOTIFICATION; (3) THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION; AND (4) THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS. THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO HAMMER HOME THESE THEMES IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS. ON DRAFTING, THE FRG AND NORWAY ARGUE FOR PROGRESS SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, I.E., BEFORE CHRISTMAS, THE FRENCH CONTEND THAT DRAFTING CANNOT BE CONJURED UP AS A MANIFESTATION OF PROGRESS; RATHER, PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DRAFTING.

7. THE NNA: DOES IT PLAY IN HELSINKI (OR BELGRADE)? THE MUCH BALLYHOOED AND FREQUENTLY DELAYED CONFERENCE OPENING OF THE NNA PACKAGE IS STILL STRUGGLING ON THE ROAD. WHEN WE LAST LEFT THE NNA TRAVELING SHOW AT THE FALL OF THE SEVENTH ROUND CURTAIN IN OCTOBER, IT HAD DEOUTED SUCCESSFULLY IN BERN, VIENNA, AND STOCKHOLM. ONLY THE PREDICTABLY PUGNACIOUS AND SURPRISINGLY STUBBORN AUDIENCES OF BELGRADE AND HELSINKI, RESPECTIVELY, HAD WITHHELD THEIR ACCOLADES FOR THE PACKAGE. A FEW WEEKS OF INTENSE OUT-OF-TOWN PRESSURE (INCLUDING FROM WASHINGTON) AND SOME MINOR CHANGES IN THE SCRIPT (E.G. MANEUVERS ARE NOW MENTIONED IN THE SAME BREATH WITH MOVEMENTS) HAVE WON OVER THE FINNISH AUDIENCE. THE YUGOSLAVS ARE A TOUGHER AUDIENCE TO PLEASE; THEY STILL



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INSIST ON DROPPING OR MODIFYING THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION SCENE, PARTICULARLY ITS LOCALE, I.E., NORMAL PEACETIME. THUS, THE NNA THEATER IS STILL DARK. IF THE TEMPERAMENTAL METHOD ACTOR, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC, CAN BE SOOTHED, THE SHOW MAY OPEN ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15. IF NOT, THE NNA'S CAREFULLY CRAFTED CONSENSUS MAY DISSOLVE INTO CACAPHONOUS SOLILOQUIES.

8. THE NNA ON NUF: IN ITS PRESENT INCARNATION (14 ELEMENTS) THE NNA NUF TEXT IS A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT ON EARLIER DRAFTS WHICH HAD INCLUDED UP TO 35 SEPARATE ELEMENTS. THE TEXT IMPLICITLY REJECTS THE AMBITIONS AND DANGEROUS APPROACH ADVOCATED OY THE CYPRIOTS AND YUGOSLAVS (I.E., A STOCKHOLM DECLARATION GIVING A EUROPEAN DIMENSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE) AND, INSTEAD, REFLECTS A MORE WESTERN ORIENTED APPROACH. MOST NATO DELEGATIONS, UPON SEEING THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA DOCUMENT, HAVE BREATHED WHAT AMOUNTS TO A COLLECTIVE

SIGH OF RELIEF. THE FIRST REACTION OF THE FRG REP WAS: "WHERE DO WE SIGN?" AND THERE'S THE RUB. EVEN IF WE WERE ABLE TO ACCEPT ALL THE NNA LANGUAGE -- AND WE'RE NOT -- BY APPEARING TOO EAGER TO EMBRACE NNA DRAFT LANGUAGE WE MAY GIVE IT THE KISS OF DEATH. THUS, FOR BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, WE HAVE RECOMMENDED A CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE NNA NUF TEXT.

9. THE EAST: DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE EIGHTH ROUND, EASTERN CONTORTIONISTS WORKED HARD TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION OF FLEXIBILITY WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONCESSIONS IN SUBSTANCE. THE CLEAR TOP PRIORITY FOR THE EAST WAS TO SELL ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE GREATER GIVE-AND-TAKE OF THE NEW WORKING S'RUCTURE, EASTERN SPEAKERS GRILLED NATO ABOUT ITS HANDLING OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, I.E., THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION ON THESE AIR AND NAVAL FORCES WOULD BE EXCHANGED? HOW WOULD SUCH ACTIVITIES BE OBSERVED AND VERIFIED? WHILE LESS CATEGORICAL THAN IN THE PAST IN THEIR REJECTION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, EASTERN INTERVENTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE UNFAILINGLY NEGATIVE; THEY CHARGED THAT THE WESTERN MEASURE WAS DISCRIMINATORY AND DID NOT SATISFY THE CSCE'S MULTILATERAL CHARACTER. THEY SUGGESTED AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH WHICH SHARED MUCH WITH THE AS YET UNTABLED NNA APPROACH: MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH PRESUMABLY WOULD PUT THE ONUS ON THE STATE REQUESTING THE INSPECTION TO CONVINCE THE 34 OTHERS OF THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS SUSPICIONS. BY EASTERN STANDARDS THEY FREELY DISCUSSED ANNUAL FORECASTS -- ALCEIT WITH THE UBIQUITOUS EASTERN CONDITION THAT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES BE INCLUDED.

10. FOLLOW THE LEADER: TAKING THEIR CUE FROM THE



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SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IN EACH WORKING GROUP, EASTERN SPEAKERS FOLLOWED A DISCIPLINED, IF UNIMAGINATIVE, PATTERN. THEY BARRAGED THE WESTERN KEYNOTE SPEAKER WITH QUESTIONS, APPARENTLY HOPING THAT, THROWN OFF BALANCE, HE MIGHT MISSPEAK. THE EAST SHOWED INCREASING IMPATIENCE TO MOVE TO DRAFTING, ESPECIALLY IN AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THEM, SUCH AS NUF. FRUSTRATED BY THEIR FAILURE TO GET THE WEST TO LOCK HORNS ON NUF, THEY URIDLED AT WESTERN INSISTENCE THAT THE NUF PRINCIPLE IS NOT A CSBM AND ACCUSED NATO OF RENEGING ON THE OCTOBER 14 PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT. DESPITE THEIR ILL-CONCEALED DISPLEASURE AT THE SUCCESSFUL WESTERN HOLDING ACTION ON NUF, THE WARSAW PACT DID NOT RETALIATE IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS DEALING WITH CSBM'S (THEY DID VENT THEIR FRUSTRATION IN THE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS IN WORKING GROUP AB). THIS QUASI-RESTRAINT ON THEIR PART MAY BE A SIGN THAT THEIR FLEXIBILITY DOES NOT REFLECT A REAL SEARCH FOR PROGRESS AT THIS POINT, BUT RATHER A DESIRE TO STAY IN THE NNA'S GOOD GRACES WHILE PAINTING THE WEST AS THE SPOILERS AT STOCKHOLM. END



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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08615
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, 11/11/85
1. CDE VIII - OLO
2. FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, MADE TO THE CDE TODAY, NOVEMBER 11. AMBASSADOR BARRY HAD JUST RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM FROM WASHINGTON, WHERE HE MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND HAD HIS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,
I REGRET RETURNING A WEEK LATE FOR THIS ROUND, BUT I USED MY TIME TO ADVANTAGE IN BRIEFING SENIOR ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL FIGURES ON OUR PROGRESS HERE. I RETURN WITH A STRONG SENSE OF WHAT MY GOVERNMENT HOPES FOR FROM STOCKHOLM.
ON NOVEMBER 5 I MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, CHIEF OF STAFF REGAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR MACFARLANE AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF PRESENT. AS REPORTED BY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN, THE PRESIDENT WELCOMED OUR ADOPTION OF A MORE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE DESIGNED TO OPEN MORE INTENSIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.
THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT LESS THAN A YEAR REMAINS BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CSCE; THUS THERE IS LITTLE TIME FOR US HERE IN STOCKHOLM TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MEASURES WHICH WOULD ENHANCE SECURITY AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN EUROPE. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE INSTRUCTED MY DELEGATION TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS, WORKING TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER SPONSORS OF SC.L.
LAST THURSDAY I TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IN CONNECTION WITH MY CONFIRMATION IN THIS POST. I FOUND THE SENATORS SUPPORTIVE OF MY EFFORTS HERE AND INTERESTED IN THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS. THERE IS GROWING ATTENTION TO THE APPROACHING VIENNA REVIEW MEETING, WHICH WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF JUDGING HOW THE REQUIREMENT FOR BALANCE AMONG THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IS BEING CARRIED OUT AND DECIDING WHETHER THE PROGRESS MADE HERE IN STOCKHOLM WARRANTS CONTINUATION OF THE CDE IN ITS CURRENT PHASE OR IN A NEW STAGE.
MY DELEGATION SHARES THE VIEW EXPRESSED ON NOVEMBER 5 BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY, AMBASSADOR MEVIK, THAT OUR "OVERRIDING NEED IS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE UNRESOLVED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES BEFORE US." THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WE HAVE NOW ENTERED WAS ADOPTED BECAUSE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS MUST BE ADDRESSED BEFORE DRAFTING CAN BEGIN; WE WILL NOT RESOLVE ALL



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DIFFERENCES, BUT WE MUST ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION AND DETERMINE MORE CLEARLY WHERE THE COMMON GROUND NEEDED FOR DRAFTING EXISTS AND WHERE IT DOES NOT. IN ONE PROMISING AREA, THE EAST APPEARS READY TO JOIN IN NEGOTIATION OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST OR CALENDAR OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. DETAILS FOR THE CONTENT OF SUCH A MEASURE EXIST IN MEASURE 2 OF SC.L/AMPLIFIED. WE ASK THE EAST TO COMMENT ON MEASURE 2 AND ALSO TO PROVIDE SIMILARLY PRECISE DETAILS ABOUT THEIR OWN POSITION ON AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF PLANS FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN THIS WAY, REAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE COULD BEGIN. THIS IS ONE EXAMPLE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WE LOOK FOR DURING THIS PHASE, THOUGH, OF COURSE, PROGRESS IN THIS AREA ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT.

IN THIS EXPLORATORY PHASE, AS THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE, MY DELEGATION AND THE OTHER FIFTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.L WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ALL DELEGATIONS ABIDE BY THE INSTRUCTIONS UNDER WHICH THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OPERATES. IN PARTICULAR, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SOME DELEGATIONS CONTINUE TO STATE THAT INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE ARE LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS FOR NEGOTIATION IN THIS CONFERENCE. THEY ARE NOT. THE MADRID MANDATE IS PERFECTLY CLEAR; I NEED NOT REPEAT THE ARGUMENTS. OUR THIRTY-FIVE DELEGATIONS MUST FOLLOW THE RULE OF THE MANDATE; WE CANNOT CHANGE IT. OUR DELEGATIONS DO NOT HAVE THAT POWER; ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSUME THAT POWER WILL CAUSE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TO FAIL.

MY DELEGATION IS NOT PREPARED TO CHANGE THE MANDATE AND WILL NOT ACCEPT ATTEMPTS BY OTHERS TO DO SO. WE WILL OBEY THE MANDATE IN EVERY PARTICULAR. FOR EXAMPLE, AS STATED IN SC.L/AMPLIFIED, WE WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH MEET THE TWO CRITERIA OF THE MANDATE FOR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE, THAT IS, ACTIVITIES WHICH "AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE . . ." WITHIN THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ACCEPTED BY ALL AT MADRID, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF HOW BEST TO DEAL WITH ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. WE ARE NOT PREPARED AND THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS NOT EMPOWERED TO GO BEYOND THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.

I WOULD POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT, BASED ON THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WILL AFFECT MANY MORE NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES THAN OTHER APPROACHES, SINCE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH INVOLVES NO THRESHOLD WHICH SUCH AN ACTIVITY MUST MEET BEFORE IT IS



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INCLUDED IN A NOTIFICATION; AN ACTIVITY MUST ONLY AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AND CONSTITUTE A PART OF AN ACTIVITY IN EUROPE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. UNDER THE TERMS OF MEASURE 3 OF SC.L/AMPLIFIED, ANY NAVAL OR AIR ACTIVITY, REGARDLESS OF ITS SIZE, WHICH SUPPORTS AN OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITY INVOLVING ONE HALF OR MORE OF A DIVISION'S COMBAT ELEMENTS WOULD BE COVERED BY NOTIFICATION.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE FIRST MEETINGS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE HAVE, BY AND LARGE, BEEN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE; THEY PROVIDE A GOOD START. DURING THE PAST WEEK, WE HAVE HEARD REFERENCES TO THE OCTOBER L4 AGREEMENT WHICH TOOK US INTO THIS PHASE AND ALSO REFERENCES TO AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT TO MOVE AHEAD IN ALL AREAS EQUALLY. MY DELEGATION WILL, OF COURSE, ABIDE BY ALL AGREEMENTS WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN, HERE, IN MADRID AND ELSEWHERE. WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND, HOWEVER, THAT OUR RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT TO CONSTRUCT A COMPROMISE OF ARTIFICIAL SYMMETRY GIVING ONE SIDE PART OF WHAT IT WANTS AND OTHERS PART OF WHAT THEY WANT. OUR RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ENACT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH, IN AMBASSADOR CITRON'S FELICITOUS PHRASE, ESTABLISHES "A SYSTEM OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY" FOR EUROPE.

SIMILARLY, OUR DELEGATIONS ARE NOT HERE TO ESTABLISH OUTLINES OR PRINCIPLES, TO CLEAR AWAY THE UNDERBRUSH, PERHAPS, SO THAT OTHERS MIGHT SOLVE THE REALLY TOUGH CORE QUESTIONS. AS MY DISTINGUISHED DANISH COLLEAGUE, AMBASSADOR MELLBIN, SAID MANY MONTHS AGO, WE HERE IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAVE OUR OWN VITALLY IMPORTANT JOB TO DO, AND WE MUST NOT WAIT FOR OTHERS TO DO IT FOR US; THE RESPONSIBILITY REMAINS OURS TO ENACT A SUBSTANTIVE, MILITARILY MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE, SECURE AND OPEN EUROPE. IF WE CANNOT DO THAT, WE CANNOT; AND THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING, NOT WE, MUST EVALUATE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT FAILURE. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS CONCERNED BY THE SHORT TIME REMAINING BEFORE VIENNA, WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO A MEANINGFUL AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT AND PLEDGE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE IT. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08763
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 13, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7987, B) USNATO 6481
1. CDE VIII - 017
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSED THE PENDING NNA PAPER (NOW EXPECTED TO BE TABLED ON NOVEMBER 15) AND DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD WELCOME IT IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT THEN FOCUS ON QUESTIONS AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS TO AVOID GIVING IT THE "KISS OF DEATH" VIS-A-VIS THE EAST. CAUCUS "WETS" PUSHED FOR A START TO DRAFTING BY THE LAST 2-3 WEEKS OF THIS ROUND, EITHER IN ALL GROUPS (NORWAY OPTION) OR IN ONE OF NATO'S CHOOSING (FRG OPTION). THE U.S., FRANCE, PORTUGAL, AND UK ALL OBJECTED TO EITHER OPTION. BARRY (U.S.) NOTED THAT WE COULD NOT SET A FIXED DATE FOR DRAFTING, BUT COULD IDENTIFY GOALS AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DRAFTING. DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR FOCUSED ON THE QUESTION OF AN ENDING DATE. BARRY (U.S.) DREW CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT BY OBSERVING THAT THIS WAS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL QUESTION AND ARGUING THAT A SEPTEMBER 19 DATE FOR SUSPENDING ALL CDE ACTIVITIES WOULD BEST SERVE THE WEST'S INTERESTS. DELWORTH (CANADA) CONTINUED TO STRESS THE MORE THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT THAT THE CDE COULD NOT ADJOURN/ SUSPEND UNTIL THERE WAS A CONSENSUS TO DO SO, WHICH MAY NOT BE UNTIL NOVEMBER 4. (SEE PARA 7 FOR DELEGATION COMMENT ON BRUSSELS DISCUSSION ON THE CALENDAR.) END SUMMARY.
4. THE NNA PAPER: CAUCUS DISCUSSION INITIALLY FOCUSED ON THE STILL PENDING NNA PAPER (NOW LIKELY TO BE TABLED AT THE NOVEMBER 15 PLENARY), AND HOW BEST TO HANDLE IT. ALTHOUGH ITALY AND SPAIN SUGGESTED THAT WE EMBRACE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE NNA PAPER, MOST DELEGATIONS AGREED WITH BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) THAT WE HAD TO AVOID GIVING THE PAPER THE "KISS OF DEATH" BY BEING OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC (COMMENT: WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO TAKE THIS APPROACH BY SEVERAL NNA INTERLOCUTORS, WHICH, TO TWIST THE OLD BING CROSBY STANDARD, IS BASICALLY TO "ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE AND ELIMINATE THE POSITIVE." END COMMENT). BUWALDA ALSO DREW SUPPORT WHEN HE OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH WE COULD SAY ABOUT THE PAPER AT ALL UNTIL IT HAD BEEN STUDIED BOTH IN STOCKHOLM AND IN CAPITALS. THE CHAIR (DENMARK) OBTAINED A CONSENSUS THAT, FOR THE TIME BEING, THE NATO CAUCUS MEMBERS WOULD WELCOME THE NNA PAPER BUT CONFINE ITSELF ONLY TO VERY GENERAL POSITIVE
-
COMMENTS, WHILE FOCUSING ON CONCRETE CRITICISMS AND CLARIFYING QUESTIONS. IT WAS FURTHER AGREED THAT THE RESPECTIVE MINI-CAUCUSES FOR EACH CLUSTER WOULD UNDERTAKE AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE PAPER.



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5. DRAFTING: INTERMINGLED WITH THE DISCUSSION OF THE NNA PAPER, THE CAUCUS "WETS," LED BY MEVIK (NORWAY), TOOK THE OCCASION TO PRESS YET AGAIN FOR A PASSAGE TO DRAFTING IN ALL GROUPS DURING THE LAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS OF THIS ROUND. THE FRG AND BELGIUM PLAYED A VARIATION OF THE THEME BY SUGGESTING THAT WE BEGIN DRAFTING IN A GROUP OF OUR CHOOSING (E.G. OBSERVATION OR NOTIFICATION) USING SC.1/AMPLIFIED AS THE BASIC TEXT AND TRYING TO FIND COMMON ELEMENTS THEREIN. MEVIK AND DELWORTH (CANADA), WHILE EXPRESSING SYMPATHY WITH THIS IDEA IN THE ABSTRACT, DOUBTED THAT THE EAST WOULD AGREE UNLESS WE SIMULTA-NEOUSLY STARTED DRAFTING ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF). BARRY (U.S.) REJECTED THE "WET" APPROACH, STATING THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SET A FIXED TIME WHEN DRAFTING SHOULD BEGIN, RATHER (BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REFTEL) HE OUTLINED A NUMBER OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AGAINST WHICH THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A TRANSITION TO DRAFTING COULD BE BE MEASURED. THESE OBJECTIVES INCLUDED CLARIFYING OUR POSITION ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES -- E.G., NO REINTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE, NO INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITES AND NO LINKAGE BETWEEN PROGRESS ON NUF AND ON CSBM'S. MACKLEY (UK
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 13, 1985
DEPREP), CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) SUPPORTED THE U.S. POSITION, WITH CUTILEIRO OBSERVING THAT IT WAS "PREMATURE" TO SPEAK OF DRAFTING AND GASCHIGNARD SAYING THAT FRANCE IS PREPARED TO DRAFT "WHEN WARRANTED," BUT THAT IN ITS VIEW IMPORTANT POINTS WERE BEING "EXTRACTED" FROM THE EAST IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. CITRON (FRG) OBSERVED THAT, WHILE WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TALK TOUGH BILATERALLY ABOUT THE EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR, WE SHOULD NOT MAKE EASTERN ACCEPTANCE A PRECONDITION FOR DRAFTING IN STOCKHOLM BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER DROP IT IN AN EXPLORATORY PHASE. MEVIK (NORWAY) ASKED BARRY WHETHER HE HAD MEANT THAT
-
NATO WOULD HAVE TO BE GAIN SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS FROM THE EAST BEFORE DRAFTING COULD BEGIN. BARRY REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT SAID WE HAD TO WIN SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO DO SO, BUT THAT WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CLARIFY OUR POSITIONS ON THE KEY ISSUES TO AVOID COMPLICATIONS DOWN THE LINE. DISCUSSION CLOSED WITH THE CHAIR CONCLUD-ING THAT THERE WAS NO AGREED CONCEPT ON THE TRANSITION TO DRAFTING.

6. 1986 CALENDAR: ALTHOUGH CAUCUS CONSENSUS IS STILL LACKING ON THE 1986 CALENDAR, THERE WAS DISCERNABLE MOVE-MENT IN OUR DIRECTION, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF



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CANADA. BARRY (U.S.) ARGUED THAT THE IMPORTANT CALENDAR QUESTION WAS THE ENDING DATE AND THAT IN CONSIDERING THIS ISSUE OUR PRIMARY CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE WHAT BEST SERVES NATO'S POLITICAL INTERESTS AND NOT SOME THEOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE MANDATE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPCON. HE CONTENDED THAT AN ENDING DATE PRIOR TO THE VIENNA PREPCON WOULD PUT THE MOST PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON CSBM'S, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DEMONSTRATING THE PROPER SUBORDINATION OF THE CDE TO THE FULL CSCE. BARRY ADDED THAT, IN HIS CONCEPTION, WE SHOULD FINISH OUR NEGOTIATING WORK AROUND THE FRENCH CUTOFF DATE OF JULY 18, WITH THE REMAINING WEEKS TO BE USED FOR TOILETTAGE (I.E., TECHNICAL "CLEANING UP" OF THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION INTO THE SIX OFFICIAL CSCE LANGUAGES). GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), WHILE STILL PRESSING FOR JULY 18, INDICATED THAT HE COULD AGREE TO AN OPTIONAL SESSION RUNNING TO SEPTEMBER 19 FOR TOILETTAGE, IF THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO HOLD ONE. ALL OTHERS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CANADA) SEEMED PREPARED TO ACCEPT SEPTEMBER 19, AT LEAST AS THE ENDING DATE FOR SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT SOME (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, FRG) WERE NOT CONVINCED THAT TOILETTAGE COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED IN OCTOBER. DELWORTH (CANADA), HOWEVER, PERSISTING IN TAKING THE THEOLOGICAL VIEW, AND, ALTHOUGH AGREEING FROM A POLITICAL VIEWPOINT WITH AN EARLY CUTOFF, ARGUED THAT THE RELEVANT TEXTS REQUIRED A CONSENSUS TO END OR SUSPEND -

THE CONFERENCE WHICH HE FEARED WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN FOR ANY DATE PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 4. HE ALSO CONTENDED THAT SEPTEMBER 19 WAS NOT A NATURAL CUTOFF DATE BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE VIENNA PREPCON AND CDE. AT BEST, DELWORTH EXPECTED THAT WE COULD AGREE NOW ON A SCHEDULE THROUGH SEPTEMBER 19 NOW, BUT WOULD THEN CONTINUE ON A WEEK-TO-WEEK BASIS UNTIL A CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN IS ACHIEVED. TAKING ISSUE WITH THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, GASCHIGNARD ARGUED THAT THE CONFERENCE SETS ITS MEETING SCHEDULE BY CONSENSUS, AND UNLESS THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO CONTINUE PAST SEPTEMBER 19 (OR JULY 18) THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER MEETINGS. GIVEN THE CANADIAN POSITION, NO CAUCUS POSITION WAS ACHIEVED ON A CUTOFF DATE. CAUCUS CONSENSUS DOES SEEM TO BE DEVELOPING, HOWEVER, TO BEGIN THE NINTH SESSION ON JANUARY 21, HOLDING A SINGLE SESSION OF 6-8 WEEKS BEFORE EASTER. CANADA NOW APPEARS ISOLATED IN SUPPORTING A JANUARY 14 STARTING DATE AND TWO FOUR-WEEK SESSIONS BEFORE EASTER.

7. COMMENT: RE USNATO 6481, WE AGREE THAT STOCKHOLM IS THE PLACE TO RESOLVE THE CALENDAR ISSUE. OUR BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE AXE MUST FALL ON SEPTEMBER 19 AND THAT FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL



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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 13, 1985
ALL ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE CONSENSUS TO CONTINUE, NOT CONSENSUS TO STOP. THANKS TO MISSIONARY WORK IN CAPITALS AND BRUSSELS, WE BELIEVE WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08814
SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF)
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 4366, B) STOCKHOLM 4334
1. CDE VIII - 019
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A DANISH REVISED WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF FORCE (SEE PARA 6). WHILE IT IS AN IMPROVEMENT ON THE ORIGINAL DANISH DRAFT, ITS FORM AND SOME OF ITS CONTENT WILL CAUSE US PROBLEMS. OVER THE COMING WEEKS THE DELEGATION WILL BE OFFERING SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THIS AND OTHER DRAFTS ON NUF WITH A VIEW TOWARDS DEVELOPING U.S. STRATEGY ON THE SUBJECT. END SUMMARY.

4. AT THE NATO CAUCUS OF NOVEMBER 13, DANISH AMBASSADOR MELLBIN DISTRIBUTED THE FOLLOWING REVISED WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF FORCE PREPARED BY THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY (SEE REFS A AND B FOR ORIGINAL WORKING PAPER). THIS REVISED PAPER, ACCORDING TO THE DANISH AMBASSADOR, TAKES INTO ACCOUNT COMMENTS ON THE EARLIER DRAFT IN STOCKHOLM AND AT THE BONN BRAINSTORMING SESSION. WHILE THE DANES STATE THAT THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THIS DRAFT "ONLY EXEMPLIFY POSSIBLE METHODS FOR SOLVING OUR (NUF) PROBLEM," THEY CLEARLY REFLECT WHAT DENMARK COULD ACCEPT IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
5. IT SHOULD FIRST BE NOTED THAT THE REVISED DRAFT IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE JUNE 1985 DRAFT. FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS DELETED EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCE" AND IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE BONN DECLARATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE DRAFT, INTER ALIA, STILL IS DIVIDED IN A PREAMUULAR AND AN OPERATIVE PART AND CONTAINS OUT-OF-CONTEXT LANGUAGE FROM THE UN'S DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION (RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX). WHILE THE REVISED PAPER HAS BEEN WHITTLED DOWN TO THREE PAGES, IT STILL IS ALMOST AS LONG AS, AND IN SOME CASES WORSE THAN, THE NNA TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE (SEE SEPTEL). OTHERS, MOREOVER, ARE SOON TO ENTER THE CROWDED NUF FIELD; THE CANADIANS HAVE ALREADY CIRCULATED THEIR NUF PAPER IN WASHINGTON AND THE ITALIANS TELL US THEY, TOO, ARE ABOUT TO ENTER THE FRAY WITH A LONG PAPER. FORTUNATELY -- AND SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY -- WORD OF EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THESE DRAFT TEXTS HAS NOT LEAKED OUT BEYOND THE CAUCUS TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. IN ADDITION, THE CAUCUS HAS MAINTAINED ADMIRABLE UNITY IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS AROUND A MINIMALIST NUF POSITION BASICALLY FORMULATED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION. HOWEVER, SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE CLEARLY CHAMPING AT THE BIT. OVER THE COMING WEEKS DELEGATION WILL BE OFFERING SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THE NNA WORKING PAPER AND OTHER NUF DRAFTS WITH A VIEW TOWARDS DEVELOPING U.S. STRATEGY ON THE SUBJECT. WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THE NNA, DANISH,



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OR ANY OTHER NUF PAPERS ARE WELCOME.
-
6. BEGIN TEXT DANISH REVISED WORKING PAPER:
REVISED WORKING PAPER
CONSIDERATION OF THE CONTENTS OF SOME ELEMENTS FOR A TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
IN A WORKING PAPER OF 10TH JUNE 1985, THE DANISH DELEGATION PUT FORWARD SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ELABORATING, WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, A TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE, AS A POSITION PAPER REFLECTING A CONSENSUS VIEW IN THE ALLIANCE AND FOR POSSIBLE USE AS GUIDANCE TO DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM WHEN THEY HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLE NNA TEXTS ON THIS ISSUE IN THE WORKING GROUP CONCERNED.
FOLLOWING DISCUSSION IN THE NATO CAUCUS IN STOCKHOLM AND A DISCUSSION IN PRINCIPLE DURING THE INFORMAL BONN MEETING OF HEADS OF CDE DELEGATIONS, WE FEEL IT EXPEDIENT TO
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF
OFFER A REVISED VERSION OF OUR WORKING PAPER FOR RENEWED CONSIDERATION BY ALLIES.
THIS REVISED VERSION SERVES THE SAME PURPOSE AS THE FIRST ONE: IT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CLARIFYING THE POSITIONS OF THE ALLIANCE WITH A VIEW TO DECIDING HOW TO PURSUE THE ISSUE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
IT IS NOT SUGGESTED THAT THE TEXT SHOULD AT THIS STAGE BE DISCUSSED WITH OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS REVISED TEXT IS SEEN SOLELY AS A MEANS FOR THE ALLIANCE TO REFINE ITS POSITIONS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE QUESTION AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO DISCUSS, ONE BY ONE, THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED IN A COMPROMISE TEXT, OR FOR THAT MATTER, IN A WESTERN WORKING PAPER, TO BE TABLED AT THE CONFERENCE AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT.
WE SHARE THE VIEW PUT FORWARD AT THE BONN MEETING THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOW CONCENTRATE ON AGREEING ON A LIST OF POSSIBLE ELEMENTS WHICH, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, OUGHT TO BE INCLUDED IN A WESTERN POSITION PAPER.
-
WE HAVE RECONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE STRUCTURE OF SUCH A DOCUMENT AND HAVE COME OUT IN FAVOR OF RETAINING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PREAMBULAR PART AND AN OPERATIVE PART. THIS SERVES THE PRACTICAL PURPOSES OF IDENTIFYING AND DISCUSSING ALL POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN A TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT ALL THESE ELEMENTS SHOULD BE RETAINED.
THE FORMAT OF THE PRESENT TEXT REPRESENTS ONE OF SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES. THE TEXT SHOULD THEREFORE BE TAKEN ONLY



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AS EXEMPLIFYING POSSIBLE METHODS FOR SOLVING OUR PROBLEM. WE ARE NOT AMONG THOSE WHO WOULD FA[illegible]OR AN EXPRESS REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE V ON THE PEA[illegible]FUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. IN THE MADRID DOCUMENT, THERE IS NO EXPRESS REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE II AS SUCH, BUT ONLY TO "THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE." AN EXPRESS REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE V COULD THEREFORE LEAD TO GIVING EMPHASIS TO SOME OF THE PRINCIPLES AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS, AND TO OPENING THE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER PRINCIPLES ARE BROUGHT INTO PLAY, WHICH, IN TURN, COULD BLUR THE ALREADY COMPLICATED ISSUE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE.

BELOW FOLLOWS THE NEW DRAFT TEXT:

ELEMENTS FOR A TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE TO BE CONSIDERED, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE ALLIES WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING THEIR POSITIONS DURING THEIR INFORMAL CONTACTS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

I. PREAMBULAR ELEMENTS

1) THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRM THEIR COMMON ADHERENCE TO THE TEN PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

-

2) THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND APPLY EACH OF THESE PRINCIPLES IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AND TO CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES IN THE SPIRIT OF THE SAID PRINCIPLES.

3) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE FURTHERMORE DETERMINED TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG THEM AND THUS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.

4) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THAT IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING THEY HAVE AGREED TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS.

5) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO REINFORCE THE RELEVANT COMMITMENTS IN THE FINAL ACT CONCERNING THIS DUTY OF STATES.

II. OPERATIVE ELEMENTS

1) THE OPERATING STATES SOLEMNLY DECLARE THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR



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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENCRAL, FROM ANY ACTS CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR A DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS STIPULATED IN THE CHARTER AND WITH THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

2) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE RESOLVED THAT NO CONSIDERATION OF WHATEVER NATURE, WHETHER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR OTHERWISE, MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED COMMITMENTS.

-

3) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE AGREED THAT THE USE OF FORCE BY A PARTICIPATING STATE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COMMITMENTS OF THE FINAL ACT WILL CONSTITUTE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF AGGRESSION.

4) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT A SET OF CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES COMPRISING THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, THE EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE VERIFICATION OF THESE MEASURES ARE PARTICULARLY WELL SUITED TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USC OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS.

5) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE THEREFORE DETERMINED TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THAT DUTY OF STATES BY ADOPTING THE FOLLOWING SET OF CONCRETE, MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE:

COMMENTARY

THE ABOVE TEXT REFLECTS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DISCUSSION SO FAR IN THE ALLIANCE ON THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE. THE TEXT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE PREFERENCE OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT WE SHOULD BASE OURSELVES ON TEXTUAL ELEMENTS RATHER THAN ON A CONSOLIDATED TEXT. FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, THE ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN DIVIDED INTO A PREAMBULAR PART AND AN OPERATIVE PART. APPLYING THE "BUILDING BLOCK"-METHOD FAVORED BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION ON SOME ELEMENTS AND LEAVE OUT OTHERS WHEN CONSIDERING THE WESTERN APPROACH.

SEVERAL OPTIONS FOR EXPRESSING REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE ARE STILL POSSIBLE, SUCH AS A CHAPTER OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, A PREAMBULAR TEXT, A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT OR A SEPARATE DOCUMENT, PERHAPS DESIGNATED AS A DECLARATION.

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I. COMMENTS ON THE PREAMBULAR ELEMENTS
RE PARA I.1: IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL VIEW THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO REAFFIRM THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF NATIONS, NO REFERENCE TO A REAFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTICS OF STATES UNDER THE CHARTER IS RETAINED. THE AIM OF THIS PARAGRAPH IS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT ANY TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE IS SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VALIDITY AND CO-EQUAL STATUS OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT DECALOGUE. ONLY A BACKGROUND REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
RE PARA I.2: THIS PARA CONTAINS A MORE SPECIFIC REAFFIRMATION OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES. THE AIM IS TO STATE THAT EACH OF THE PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE APPLIED ERGA OMNES AND COVERED IN ITS GLOBAL ASPECTS. IN THIS WAY A GENERAL CONTEXT IS ESTABLISHED, WITHIN WHICH THE NUF IS PERCEIVED IN ITS PROPER PERSPECTIVE.
RE PARA I.3: BASED ON PARA 1 AND 2 OF THE PREAMBLE TO THE CBM DOCUMENT OF THE FINAL ACT. THE AIM IS TO REFLECT THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN THE FINAL ACT AND THE PROSPECTIVE RESULTS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
RE PARA I.4: BASED ON THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING, MANDATE FOR THE CDE. THE AIM IS TO QUOTE THE MANDATE AS SPECIFICALLY AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING AND RETAIN A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE CONCEPT OF NON-USE OF FORCE.
RE PARA I.5: THIS PARA REFLEC'S THE UNDERLYING OBJECTIVE OF REINFORCING THE ALREADY EXISTING NUF COMMITMENTS. IT IS AIMED AT STATING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS OF PARTICIPATING STATES TO REINFORCE THESE COMMITMENTS.
II. COMMENTS ON THE OPERATIVE ELEMENTS

RE PARA II.1: THIS PARA IS INTENDED AS THE MAIN OPERATIVE DECLARATION, RESTATING A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE PER SE AND IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. THE TEXT REFLECTS, AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE, THE WORKING OF PRINCIPLE II OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.
WE HAVE DULY TAKEN THE POINT THAT THE QUESTION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF ARMED FORCE IS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE, AND HAVE, ACCORDINGLY, DELETED A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCE." BUT IN THE MADRID MANDATE NUF IS DISCUSSED IN THE PARTICULAR CONTEXT OF CSBM'S WHICH ARE MAINLY THOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY MEASURES. WE SEE SOME DIFFICULTY IN OMITTING ANY REFERENCE TO THE ASPECT OF ARMED FORCE, BECAUSE A LINK BETWEEN THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND THE CSBM'S MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN SOME WAY.



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THE CONCEPT, PUT FORWARD IN THE BONN DECLARATION, OF THE OVERALL NON-FIRST USE OF WEAPONS AS OPPOSED TO THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NOT INCLUDED, BUT MIGHT BE RESERVED FOR POSSIBLE USE AT A STAGE WHERE THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ONCE AGAIN WILL BE PUSHING THEIR IDEA OF THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
RE PARA II.2: UASED ON THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX, ART 5, PARA 1, ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION. THE PARA HAS BEEN ADAPTED TO REFLECT CLOSER THE WORDING OF THAT RESOLUTION.
RE PARA II.3: WE CONSIDER IT PREFERABLE TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO AGGRESSION WHICH IS A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE USE OF FORCE. THIS PARA IS AN ADAPTATION OF THE TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX, ART 2, STILL TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POLITICAL NATURE OF CSCE COMMITMENTS. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE WOULD BE A RISK INVOLVED IN INTRODUCING HERE THE EXPRESSION "FIRST USE," AS IT COULD BE USED AS A LEVER BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. ACCORDINGLY, THIS PARA IS PHRASED SO AS TO AVOID ANY REFERENCE TO "FIRST USE" EVEN THOUGH RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX CONTAINS SUCH A REFERENCE.
-
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF
RE PARA II.4: THIS PARA IS INTENDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING A CLOSE LINK BETWEEN THE CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES PROPOSED IN DOC SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND THE OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. THE TEXT RESTATES AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE THE CONTENTS OF THE MANDATE FOR THE CDE IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING.
RE PARA II.5: THIS PARA WHICH ALSO REFLECTS THE MADRID MANDATE, IS INTENDED AS A PIVOTAL PARA, REFLECTING AND ESTABLISHING THE INHERENT CONNECTION BETWEEN A TEXT ON THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE AND THE CONCRETE CSBM'S TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS OF E.G. A PROSPECTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMCNT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE COLON IS INTENDED FOR LINKING THE NUF PRINCIPLE, AS STATED ABOVE, TO THE CONCRETE CSBM'S AS A GENERAL QUALIFICATION.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08762
SUBJECT: USDEL CDE AMBASSADOR'S CHATHAM HOUSE PROGRAM
REF: CURTIN/ORLEY TELCONS
1. CDE VIII -020
2. AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD USDEL CDE, WILL SPEAK AT CHATHAM HOUSE (LONDON) ON "THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND US-EUROPEAN SECURITY RELATIONS" ON FEBRUARY 4, L986. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION AT THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE IS ALSO POSSIBLE. TRAVEL DETAILS WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. WE WILL REQUEST EMBASSY ASSISTANCE WITH GROUND TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS.
3. FOLLOWING IS BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON AMBASSADOR BARRY:
ROBERT L. BARRY WAS NAMED U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY- AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN SEPTEMBER 1985. THE STOCKHOLM-BASED CONFERENCE, WHICH INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES OF 33 EUROPEAN NATIONS, THE U.S. AND CANADA, WAS MANDATED BY THE MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE IN 1983 FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON MEASURES TO INCREASE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.
AMBASSADOR BARRY, A CAREER MINISTER IN THE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE, WAS THE FIRST JOHN SLOAN DICKEY FELLOW IN RESIDENCE AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE IN 1984-1985. HE WAS ALSO DISTINGUISHED VISITOR AT THE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCED STUDY OF THE USSR AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
IN MORE THAN 20 YEARS IN THE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE, AMBASSADOR BARRY HAS SPECIALIZED IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND UN AFFAIRS.
FROM 1981 UNTIL JULY 1984, HE WAS THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO BULGARIA. PRIOR TO THAT, HE WAS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE FROM 1979-1981.
AMBASSADOR BARRY DEALT WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE ON ASSIGNMENTS AS VICE-CONSUL IN ZAGREB, YUGOSLAVIA (1963-1965), SECOND SECRETARY AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW (1968-1970), AND DEPUTY PRINCIPAL OFFICER AT THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN LENINGRAD (1971-1973). IN WASHINGTON, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF SOVIET AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1965-1967) AND AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THAT OFFICE (1975-1977). HE DIRECTED U.S. BROADCASTING TO THE SOVIET UNION IN 1973-1975 AS CHIEF OF THE USSR DIVISION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA.
AMBASSADOR BARRY SERVED AT THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN IN 1970-1971; HE WAS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF UN POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN WASHINGTON IN 1977-78 AND THEN DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE BUREAU OF



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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.
HE RECEIVED A BACHELOR'S DEGREE SUMMA CUM LAUDE FROM DARTMOUTH COLLEGE IN 1956 AND AN M.A. DEGREE FROM COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY'S PROGRAM ON EAST CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1960. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE US ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE AT GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, F.R.G., AND ATTENDED OXFORD UNIVERSITY, ENGLAND. FROM 1957-1960 HE WAS AN OFFICER IN THE U.S. NAVY ASSIGNED TO ATLANTIC FLEET DESTROYERS. AMBASSADOR BARRY IS MARRIED TO THE FORMER MARGARET CRIM; THEY HAVE TWO CHILDREN; THEIR HOME IS IN RINDGE, NEW HAMPSHIRE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08788
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOVEMBER 15, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 022
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE NOVEMBER 15 PLENARY, CYPRUS INTRODUCED THE ELABORATED POSITION PAPER (SC.7) OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES. THE GDR, ITALY, AND IRELAND WELCOMED THE TABLING OF SC.7. ROMANIA OUTLINED ITS VIEWS ON CONSTRAINT (LIMITATION) MEASURES AND VERIFICATION. END SUMMARY.

4. READING FROM THE TEXT OF THE ELABORATED NNA PAPER (SC.7), AMBASSADOR PAPADOPOULUS (CYPRUS) INTRODUCED THE DOCUMENT ON BEHALF OF CYPRUS, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA, AND MALTA. HE STRESSED THAT NOTHING IN THE FORMAT OF THE DOCUMENT -- INCLUDING THE ORDER OF EACH SECTION -- INDICATES A PRIORITY OF IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECTS INCLUDED. (FULL TEXT OF SC.7 SENT SEPTEL.)
5. THE GDR, ITALY, AND IRELAND WELCOMED THE DOCUMENT AS A POSITIVE STEP IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. NONE OF THE INITIAL REACTIONS TOUCHED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DOCUMENT.
6. AMBASSADOR CETERCHI (ROMANIA) OUTLINED HIS DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON CONSTRAINT (LIMITATION) MEASURES:
-- IT IS NECESSARY TO AGREE IN CDE TO LIMIT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN TERMS OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND DURATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES.
-- ACTIVITIES COVERED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDARS SHOULD NOT EXCEED A CERTAIN NUMBER OF DIVISIONS AND NUMBERS OF TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT.
-- ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED ON SHORT NOTICE NOT COVERED BY THE ANNUAL CALENDAR SHOULD BE LIMITED IN NUMBER OF TROOPS, EQUIPMENT AND DIVISIONS TO A STRENGTH OF ONE HALF OF THEIR RESPECTIVE PARAMETERS FOR ACTIVITIES NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
-- THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED ANNUALLY SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A NUMBER TO BE AGREED UPON.
-- MANEUVERS SHOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED CLOSE IN SPACE AND TIME. RESTRAINT SHOULD BE SHOWN IN CONDUCTING MANEUVERS CLOSE TO "NATIONAL FRONTIERS."

-- THE ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO ASSERTED THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION MUST BE PROVIDED FOR EACH MEASURE AGREED UPON. IN THIS CONTEXT, VERIFICATION SHOULD CONSIST OF SEVERAL ELEMENTS: 1) OBSERVATION TO VERIFY THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY AND THE PARAMETERS ESTABLISHED FOR THE ACTIVITY; 2) NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS; 3) COMMUNICATION LINKS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, INCLUDING ESTABLISHMENT OF TELEX LINKS FOR RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, AN EXCHANGE OF MILITARY DELEGATIONS,



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AND AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF REGULATIONS ON ACCREDITED MILITARY PERSONNEL; 4) PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATIONS; AND 5) "SPECIAL MISSIONS" TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS IN CASES OF SERIOUS DOUBTS, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN CLEARED UP BY OTHER MEANS.

7. AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO (ITALY) OUTLINED THE QUESTIONS HE BELIEVES MUST BE RESOLVED IN EACH AREA OF NEGOTIATION PRIOR TO THE START OF DRAFTING;

-- NOTIFICATION: THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EXCLUDES INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AND AIR SPACE; THUS, REOPENING THIS QUESTION IS "YET ANOTHER BURDEN" TO REACHING AGREEMENT. THE OUT-OF-GARRISON AND STRUCTURAL PARAMETER PROPOSED BY THE WEST REMAINS THE MOST SIMPLE AND VIABLE APPROACH.

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOVEMBER 15, 1985

-- OBSERVATION: DEFINING ACTIVITIES WHICH MUST BE NOTIFIED IS NOT RELEVANT TO DEFINE THE FEATURES OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME. THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF OBSERVATION AND THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION SHOULD NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO WHAT ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED.

-- VERIFICATION: ON-SITE INSPECTION IS THE QUALITATIVE LEAP FORWARD NECESSARY FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.

-

-- CONSTRAINING MEASURES: ANNUAL CALENDARS ENJOY A BROAD CONSENSUS, AND SHOULD INCLUDE ALL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. THEREFORE, THE STRUCTURE AND FEATURES OF ANNUAL CALENDARS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. OTHER CONSTRAINTS WILL BE EXAMINED "IF BALANCED."

-- NUF REAFFIRMATION: A NUF REAFFIRMATION IS ONLY VALID TO THE EXTENT IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. THE EAST SHOULD GIVE UP ITS "PARALLEL APPROACH" TO NEGOTIATION OF NUF AND CONCRETE CSBM'S.

BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08782
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE PROPOSAL IN PLENARY, NOVEMBER 15, 1985 (SC.7)
REF: STOCKHOLM 8083
1. CDE-VIII - 023.
2. (C) SUMMARY. THE LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT HAS FINALLY COME TO AN END FOR THE NNA WITH THE TABLING IN PLENARY ON NOVEMBER 15 OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL. REACHING AGREEMENT AMONGST THEMSELVES HAS BEEN A STRUGGLE WHICH, NO DOUBT, HAS BEEN GOOD PRACTICE FOR THE DAYS AHEAD AS THEY ARE CALLED UPON TO EXPLAIN AND DEFEND THEIR PROPOSAL WHICH MAY NOT BE EASY AS THEY MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE; THEY OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE STILL DIFFERENCES IN THE GROUP. IN ORDER TO GET ALL BUT ONE ON BOARD (LIECHTENSTEIN REP WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR FINAL CONSULTATIONS), THE PROPOSAL HAS CHANGED SOMEWHAT FROM THAT REPORTED, IN GENERAL TERMS, AT THE END OF ROUND SEVEN (REF A). CHANGES OF INTEREST AND FULL TEXT ARE PROVIDED BELOW. MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS FOLLOWS SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.
3. (C) LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT. AFTER MANY MEETINGS -- DAY, NIGHT, WEEKENDS -- COUPLED WITH THREATS AND CAJOLING, THE NNA FINALLY REACHED AGREEMENT ON THEIR PACKAGE OF CSBMS LATE WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13 AND TABLED THE PROPOSAL IN PLENARY NOVEMBER 15 (SEE PLENARY CABLE SEPTEL.) IT IS CO-SPONSORED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRIA, CYPRUS, FINLAND, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, AND YUGOSLAVIA. LIECHTENSTEIN WILL, NO DOUBT, COME ON BOARD, BUT REP WAS UNAVAILABLE DURING FINAL CONSULTATIONS. THE PAPER HAS UNDERGONE SOME CHANGES SINCE U.S. DEL REPORTED ON ITS PROBABLE FRAMEWORK AT THE END OF ROUND SEVEN (REF A). CHANGES OF NOTE ARE INDICATED BELOW, ALONG WITH RATIONALE. THEY HAD A DIFFICULT TIME REACHING AGREEMENT AND OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE JUST PAPERED OVER DIFFERENCES ON SOME SENSITIVE ISSUES. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THEY HAVE YET TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE THE PROPOSAL IN WORKING GROUPS. IN THE NNA'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING THE PLENARY, NNA AMBASSADOR'S FIELDED QUESTIONS ON ISSUES OF NATIONAL INTEREST, AT TIMES INDICATING THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED WERE NATIONAL VIEWS -- NOT A GROUP VIEW. U.S. DEL'S ANALYSIS FOLLOWS SEPTEL.
4. (C) CHANGES OF NOTE.
--PROPOSAL NO LONGER SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON UNITS PARTICIPATING IN A MANEUVER "BY ORGANIZATIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS," DUE TO YUGOSLAV RELUCTANCE TO SPECIFY NORMAL PEACETIME



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LOCATIONS. INSTEAD, IN PARA 4.1 OF "GENERAL INFORMATION" SUB-CHAPTER OF "PRIOR NOTIFICATION" SECTION AND PARA 9 OF THE "ANNUAL CALENDAR" SECTION, IT TRIES TO FINESSE THE PROBLEM BY CALLING FOR PROVISION OF "ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION TO BE DEFINED ON THE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES."
--FOR THE SAME REASON, THE REFERENCES IN THE DOCUMENT TO "PEACETIME LOCATIONS" OR "SPECIFIED NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS" HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO READ SIMPLY "NORMAL LOCATIONS." (WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT A DEAL WAS STRUCK AMONG THE NNA THAT ANY WISHING TO DO SO COULD EXPRESS THEIR INTEREST IN AND ASK FOR INFORMATION ON "PEACETIME LOCATIONS" AS LONG AS NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE TERM "NORMAL LOCATIONS" OR TO THE AFOREMENTIONED PARAS 4.1 OR 9.)
--THE DEFINITION OF MANEUVERS HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE REWORKED BECAUSE OF FINNISH INSISTENCE THAT THE CONCEPT OF "MOVEMENTS" BE MAINTAINED ALONG WITH "MANEUVERS," OSTENSIBLY TO PRESERVE CONCEPTS SET OUT IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THUS, RATHER THAN REFERRING TO "RELOCATION OF SUCH FORMATIONS" IN THE CONTEXT OF A "COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISE," IT NOW REFERS TO "MOVEMENTS OF SUCH FORMATIONS" (SEE FIRST PARA OF "PRIOR NOTIFICATION" SECTION). THE DEFINITION OF "MOVEMENTS" AS "RELOCATIONS" NOT IN CONJUNCTION WITH "COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES" HAS BEEN DELETED.
-- IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE "DIVISION" DEFINITION AT "2-5" VICE "3-5" UNITS (WHICH THE FINNS HAD FOUGHT FOR), THE FOLLOWING TWO CHANGES WERE MADE:
1. THE TRIGGERING MECHANISM FOR NOTIFICATION HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT REVISED. WHILE MAINTAINING THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER OF A DIVISION AS ONE OF THE CRITERIA TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION, A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO A NUMERICAL PARAMETER HAS ALSO BEEN INCLUDED AS ANOTHER ELEMENT TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION, WITH USE OF THE CONJUNCTION "OR."
2. A "DIVISION" IS NOW DEFINED AS EITHER "A MOBILE MILITARY UNIT, ETC." OR REPEAT OR "ANY OTHER GROUP OF FORCES OF EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY."
--THE SECTION ENTITLED "NOTIFICATION" HAS BEEN RETITLED TO SPECIFIY PRECISELY WHAT IT ADDRESSES, I.E. "NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE."



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--THE CONSTRAINTS SECTION NOW COVERS "NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITES," RATHER THAN "NOTIFIABLE MILITARY MANEUVERS." AS THIS WAS A LAST MINUTE MALTESE PROPOSAL, WE QUESTION WHETHER THE INTENT OF THE CHANGE WAS TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A VEHICLE BY WHICH TO JUSTIFY INCLUSION AT A LATER DATE OF A CONSTRAINT ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
--IN THE "NON-USE OF FORCE" SECTION AN ADDITIONAL SENTENCE HAS BEEN ADDED, WE ASSUME BY MALTA, WHICH REFERS TO THE "INTERRELATION BETWEEN SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN."
5. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF PROPOSAL.
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRIA, CYPRUS, FINLAND, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, YUGOSLAVIA.
THE ABOVE-MENTIONED STATES,
RENEWING THEIR COMMITMENT TO DOCUMENT CSCE/SC.3,
EXPRESSING THEIR WISH TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE,
SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING:

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PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, I.E.
- THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED BELOW OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS IN COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES AND
- MOVEMENTS OF SUCH FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL BETWEEN THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS AND THE EXERCISE AREAS AS WELL AS BETWEEN THE AREAS OF THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE EXERCISES.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
SUCH MANOUVRES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION, WHENEVER THEY INVOLVE AT LEAST
- NUMERICAL TOTALS(S) - TO BE DEFINED - OF FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY AS A WHOLE, EMPHASIZING MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER OR
- ONE DIVISION OR EQUIVALENT FORMATION (ASTERISK 1) OR
(ASTERISK 1) FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT A DIVISION OR EQUIVALENT FORMATION IS DEFINED AS
- A MOBILE MILITARY UNIT STRUCTURED, PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY, UNDER ONE COMMAND IN HEADQUARTERS, COMBAT AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS OR
- ANY OTHER GROUP OF FORCES OR EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY CONTAINING 2-5 UNITS ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL WITH



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A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST X TROOPS AND Y TANKS/ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES/HELICOPTERS OR A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST Z TANKS/ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES/HELICOPTERS.
(END ASTERISK 1)
- THREE AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE, AIR-MOBILE UNITS ON BATTALION LEVEL OR COMBINATIONS THEREOF AND A TOTAL NUMBER OF XX TROOPS OR A TOTAL NUMBER OF XX TROOPS AND A TOTAL OF YY SQUARE METRES OF SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THESE MANOEUVRES TAKE PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO BE GIVEN BY STATES PARTICPATING IN THESE MANOEUVRES WHENEVER THEIR PARTICIPATION REACHES NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN 42 DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF THESE MILITARY MANOEUVRES IN A STANDARDIZED FORMAT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
1. GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1. TYPE AND DESIGNATION OF THE ACTIVITY
1.2. MAIN PURPOSES
1.3. TIMEFRAME OF THE ACTIVITY
1.4. AREA OF THE ACTIVITY
1.5. LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE ACTIVITY
1.6. PARTICIPATING STATES
1.7. NUMBER AND TYPES OF PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES
1.8. NUMBER AND TYPES OF PARTICIPATING AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIR-MOBILE BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS
1.9. NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ACTIVITY AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE
2. INFORMATION ON PARITICPATING UNITS
2.1. NUMBER, TYPES, AND, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, NAMES OF UNITS OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY, DOWN TO AND INCLUDING
- BRIGADE AND/OR REGIMENT LEVEL; EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES
- BATTALION LEVEL IN CASE OF AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
AIR-MOBILE UNITS
2.2. NUMERICAL STRENGTH (MANPOWER) OF
- DIRECTING STAFF, INCLUDING UMPIRES
- EACH MAJOR UNIT
- DIVISIONAL LEVEL OR ABOVE
- BATTALION LEVEL IN CASE OF AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE



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AND AIR-MOBILE UNITS
2.3. NUMBER AND/OR TYPE OF THE FOLLOWING (ASTERISK 2):
- TANKS
- OTHER ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
- RIVER CROSSING AND OTHER TYPES OF HEAVY ASSAULT ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT
- LOGISTIC ASSAULT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
- SELFPROPELLED ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (MORE THAN 100 MM)
- OTHER ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (MORE THAN 100 MM), AS WELL AS MOBILE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE LAUNCHERS
- HEAVY LIVE AMMUNITION
- COMBAT AIRCRAFT
- COMBAT HELICOPTERS
- TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
- TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS
- NAVAL COMBATANTS
- LANDING CRAFTS
- AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS, INCLUDING SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY
- AUXILIARY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS, INCLUDING SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY
(ASTERISK 2) LEVEL OF DETAIL TO BE DEFINED. (END ASTERISK 2)
3. INFORMATION ON DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION
3.1. THE STARTING AND FINISHING DATES OF THE MOVEMENTS OF FORCES INVOLVED, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFIABLE LEVEL, AS WELL AS THE PERIOD OF ABSENCE FROM THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS
3.2. DURATION OF EACH PHASE, TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS, INCLUDING STAGING AREAS, AND FINAL POSITIONS BEFORE RETURNING TO THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS
4. OTHER INFORMATION
4.1. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION TO BE DEFINED ON THE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.
4.2. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES AND ADDITIONS TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR (ASTERISK 3) AS WELL AS REASONS FOR SUCH CHANGES
4.3. RELATION TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
4.4. STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME

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ANNUAL CALENDAR OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL TRANSMIT TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES THE CALENDAR OF THEIR MILITARY



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ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND PLANNED FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR BEGINNING ON THE SUBSEQUENT JANUARY 1ST. THIS ANNUAL CALENDAR WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, NOT LATER THAN OCTOBER 1ST, IN A STANDARD-IZED FORMAT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
1. TYPE OF ACTIVITY
2. MAIN PURPOSES
3. TIMEFRAME OF THE ACTIVITY WITH ENVISAGED STARTING AND FINISHING DATES
4. AREA OF THE ACTIVITY
5. LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE ACTIVITY
6. STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY
7. NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES
8. NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE PARTICIPATING AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIR-MOBILE UNITS
9. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION TO BE DEFINED ON THE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES
10. NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ACTIVITY IN TERMS OF MANPOWER AS WELL AS THE NUMBER OF TROOPS OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE
(ASTERISK 3) SEE PAGE 6 ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL
(END ASTERISK 3)

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INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION

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THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY MANOEUVRES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT BELOW.
1. THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WILL BE EXTENDED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY.
2. IN ADDITION TO THE BASIC INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, GIVEN IN THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION, THE INVITATION WILL SPECIFY
- STATE RESPONSIBILE FOR THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME
- THE PERIOD OF OBSERVATION
- THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS INVITED PER PARTICIPATING STATE
- THE LANGUAGES USED IN INTERPRETATION AND TRANSLATION DURING THE OBSERVATION.
THE DEADLINE FOR ACCEPTING THE INVITATION WILL BE 21 DAYS BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION. IF NO REPLY IS GIVEN IN TIME, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT.
3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE SENT NOT LATER THAN 14 DAYS BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION TO
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST



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TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE

THOSE STATES WHICH HAVE ACCEPTED THE INVITATION OR WHICH REQUEST SUCH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. THE INFORMATION WILL INCLUDE

- BASIC SITUATION AND MAIN PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY
- MAPS OF THE AREA OF ACTIVITY WITH A SCALE TO BE SPECIFIED
- GENERAL PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OBSERVERS
- AUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT FOR THE OBSERVERS
- GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME

4. AT LATEST WHEN THE OBSERVATION BEGINS INFORMATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE OBSERVERS ON THE

- DETAILED OBSERVATION PROGRAMME
- DIRECTING STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OBSERVATION
- DETAILS OF PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

5. THE OBSERVATION WILL COVER THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY, AS NOTIFIED, WHENEVER IT REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL, DURING PHASES TO BE DEFINED.

6. THE INVITATION WILL BE VALID FOR AT LEAST ONE OBSERVER FROM EACH PARTICIPATING STATE; IN CASE OF LARGER SCALE ACTIVITIES AT LEAST TWO OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED. IN THE CASE OF PARTICULARLY LARGE ACTIVITIES AN EVER HIGHER NUMBER OF OBSERVERS COULD BE ENVISAGED.

7. WHILE THE OBSERVERS ARE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE WHERE THE ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE, THEIR PERSONS AND PROPERTY, AS WELL AS THEIR LIVING QUARTERS, WILL BE GRANTED THE SAME PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AS THOSE ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

8. THE INVITED STATE DECIDES WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS.

9. OBSERVERS FROM ALL PTHER PARTICIPATING STATES BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH REGARD TO POSSIBILITIES TO SUPPLEMENT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME IN ORDER TO MEET PARTICULAR CONCERNS EXPRESSED.

16. THE INVITING STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF ACTIVITIES. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE RELEVANT INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE INVITING STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISION SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT. THE INVITING STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS FORTIFICATIONS OR SIMILAR DEFENCE SITES.

17. OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR EMBASSIES AND/OR WITH THEIR HOME AUTHORITIES.

18. THE INVITING STATE WILL COVER THE COSTS OF BOARD AND LODGING DURING THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME.

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NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHOR NOTICE



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1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2.
2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF SUCH MILITARY MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT IN CONJUNCTION WITH COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES, OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO AND FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS/STAGING AREAS, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2.
3. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS TAKE PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT. NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO BE GIVEN BY STATES PARTICIPATING IN THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS WHENEVER THEIR PARTICIPATION REACHES NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
4. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO THE START OF THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS IN A STANDARDIZED FORMAT CONTAINING INFORMATION AS OUTLINED UNDER THE SECTION ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION WITH EXCEPTIONS TO BE DEFINED.
5. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY MANOEUVRES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHEN THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL EXCEEDS ... HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS TO BE ELABORATED.

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CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
COMMANDERS AND TROOPS
- TO BE BRIEFED ON UNIT LEVELS, TO BE DEFINED, BY COMMANDERS OR MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFF
- TO BE PROVIDED WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING THEIR APPROXIMATE POSITION, GEOGRAPHICALLY AND IN RELATION TO UNITS REFERRED TO IN EARLIER BRIEFINGS.
THEY WILL BE PROVIDED WITH APPROPRIATE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION.
15. THE INVITING STATE WILL ALSO CONSIDER REQUESTS MADE BY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH REGARD TO POSSI-BILITIES TO SUPPLEMENT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME IN



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ORDER TO MEET PARTICULAR CONCERNS EXPRESSED.
16. THE INVITING STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF ACTIVITIES. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE RELEVANT INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE INVITING STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISION SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT. THE INVITING STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS FORTIFICATIONS OR SIMILAR DEFENCE SITES.
17. OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR EMBASSIES AND/OR WITH THEIR HOME AUTHORITIES.
18. THE INVITING STATE WILL COVER THE COSTS OF BOARD AND LODGING DURING THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME.

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NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHOR NOTICE

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1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2.
2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF SUCH MILITARY MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT IN CONJUNCTION WITH COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES, OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO AND FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS/STAGING AREAS, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2.
3. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS TAKE PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT. NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO BE GIVEN BY STATES PARTICIPATING IN THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS WHENEVER THEIR PARTICIPATION REACHES NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
4. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO THE START OF THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS IN A STANDARDIZED FORMAT CONTAINING INFORMATION AS OUTLINED UNDER THE SECTION ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION WITH EXCEPTIONS TO BE DEFINED.
5. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY MANOEUVRES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHEN THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL EXCEEDS ... HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS TO BE ELABORATED.

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CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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FROM USDEL CDE



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GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING CONSTRAINTS ON THE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN THIS SECTION.
2. NO INDIVIDUAL MILITARY MANOEUVRE WILL EXCEED FIVE TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AND ITS DURATION AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL WILL NOT EXCEED 17 DAYS.
3. THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICPATE IN MORE THAN A TOTAL OF FIVE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY MANEUVRES PER CALENDAR YEAR WHICH ARE OF A SIZE LESS THAN TWO TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL: MOREOVER, THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE (ASTERISK 4) IN A TOTAL OF MORE THAN ONE SUCH MANOEUVRE AT THE SAME TIME.
HOWEVER, IF SUCH MANOEUVRES ARE NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BY THE STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THEY TAKE PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT, THE TOTAL NUMBER PER CALENDAR YEAR AND THE NUMBER OF SUCH MANOEUVRES TAKING PLACE AT THE SAME TIME WILL NOT BE RESTRICTED.
4. THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE (ASTERISK 4) IN MORE THAN A TOTAL OF FIVE MILITARY MANOEUVRES PER CALENDAR YEAR, WHICH ARE OF A SIZE OF TWO TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL OR ABOVE. SUCH MANOEUVRES WILL BE NOTIFIED ALREADY IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BY THE STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THEY TAKE PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT.
THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE (ASTERISK 4) IN A TOTAL OF MORE THAN TWO SUCH MANOEUVRES AT THE SAME TIME. HOWEVER, ONCE A YEAR TWO SUCH MANOEUVRES MAY BE COMBINED BUT NOT EXCEED A TOTAL OF SEVEN TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
(ASTERISK 4) TO BE DEFINED. (END ASTERISK 4)

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OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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A PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH CONSIDERS THAT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE OR THAT THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT IS SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED BECAUSE OF SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE PRECEDING SECTIONS, WILL BE ENTITLED TO REQUEST TO SEND OBSERVERS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITIES OR PRESUMED



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ACTIVITIES ARE CARRIED OUT. IT WILL DEFINE THE REQUESTED OBSERVATION AREA AND CITE THE RELEVANT MEASURES ON WHICH THE REQUEST IS BASED AS WELL AS STATE THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST.
THE STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL, WITHIN TWELVE HOURS AFTER RECEIVING THE REQUEST, INVITE THE REQUESTING STATE TO CARRY OUT THE OBSERVATION. THE MODALITIES AND GUIDELINES FOR SUCH OBSERVATION, INCLUDING EXCEPTIONS WHICH APPLY TO RESTRICTED AREAS, WILL BE DEFINED.
IF OBSERVERS FROM A THIRD STATE TAKE PART, THEY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE WHOLE OBSERVATION TOGETHER WITH THE OBSERVERS FROM THE REQUESTING STATE, AND BE PROVIDED WITH THE SAME FACILITIES.
AFTER A REQUESTED OBSERVATION HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT, THE REQUESTING STATE, THE INVITING STATE AS WELL AS THE INVITED THIRD STATE, WILL EACH SUBMIT A REPORT TO
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES WITHIN ... HOURS UPON COMPLETION OF THE OBSERVATION.
THE REQUEST AND THE ANSWER THERETO AS WELL AS THE REPORTS ON THE OBSERVATION WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE FOLLOWING SECTION.

---

ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THE MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED

---

1. GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR COMMUNICATION
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL TRANSMIT ALL COMMUNICATIONS FORESEEN IN THE PRECEDING SECTIONS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES.
SUCH COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE TRANSMITTED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE MODALITIES FOR RAPID COMMUNICATIONS SET OUT BELOW.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES CAN ALSO MAKE USE OF THE RAPID COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AND REQUEST CLARIFICATION AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS WELL AS IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IN THE PRECEDING SECTIONS.
2. MODALITIES FOR RAPID COMMUNICATIONS
IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE TRANSMITTED WITHOUT DELAY AND AT ALL TIMES, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL KEEP TELECOMMUNICATION LINES ACCESSIBLE BETWEEN THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES



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OF THE PARTICIATING STATES FOR TRANSMITTING AND
RECEIVING PRINTED TEXT, CHARTS AND MAPS.
ACCESS TO ALL SUCH COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE RESTRICTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSCE PRACTICE.
CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHORT MEETINGS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES, IN RELATION TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IN THE PRECEDING
SECTIONS, SHOULD ALSO BE ENVISAGED.
SUCH MEETINGS COULD BE CONVENED
- ON AN AD HOC BASIS, AT THE REQUEST OF ANY PARTICI-
PATING STATE, TO DEAL WITH EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS
- AT INTERVALS AND DATES TO BE DECIDED BY THE
PARTICIPATING STATES, TO PROCEED TO AN EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS ON THE ROUTINE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES
---
NON-USE OF FORCE
---
THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED
AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS,
AND THUS TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY
AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY
CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. THEY ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF
THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A
WHOLE, AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA.
ALL THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT ARE OF
PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, WILL ALL BE
EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING
INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS. RESPECT
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
FOR THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NORMAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE PROGRESS OF
CO-OPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL
FIELDS.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE
COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY
ASPECTS OF SECURITY WITHIN THE CSCE.
THEY STRESS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IS A UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED
OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BINDING ALL STATES,
AND THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH IT CONSEQUENTLY
CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
THEY REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT THIS
PRINCIPLE, CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, SO AS TO ENSURE
THAT, AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, IT IS STRICTLY



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AND EFFECTIVELY OBSERVED. NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE. THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL,
- FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE FINAL ACT, AND, ACCORDINGLY,
- FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS,
REGARDLESS OF THIS STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THIS STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE. NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE EXISTING OR ARISING BETWEEN THEM. THEY ALSO EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO REINFORCE, IMPROVE AND DEVELOP THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE-PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR TO SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME OF ANOTHER PARTICIATING STATE. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AND WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND
FROM USDEL CDE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN
THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY
DECLARE, THAT THEIR EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS,
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT
DOCUMENT.
THEY CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR
OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL
PREVAIL.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE CONVINCED, THAT THE
SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THE EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE
LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EVERY PARTICIPATING
STATE REQUIRE DETERMINED EFFORTS BY ALL OF THEM TO
BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION,
STRENGTHEN SECURITY FOR ALL AND PROMOTE DISARMAMENT.
BY THEIR VERY NATURE CONCRETE CSBMS SERVE TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN



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REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

SECRET

# S T A T E M E N T

BY DR ANDRESTINOS N. PAPADOPOULOS
HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF CYPRUS TO THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

15 NOVEMBER 1985



SECRET

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Mr. Chairman,

on behalf of the Delegations of Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia I have the honour to present a proposal, the text of which is now being circulated by the Secretariat and which will later be distributed as document CSCE/SC.7.

Mr. Chairman,

the above - mentioned countries renew their commitment to document CSCE/SC.3 submitted on March 9th, 1984, in which they presented a proposal which reflected their common view of the task of the Conference during its first stage.

Since then the sponsors, during the work of the Conference in plenary and in working group sessions, have commented and discussed their ideas and concepts with the intention of presenting, at an appropriate moment, a more detailed version of their original proposal, with a view to furthering the work of the Conference.

The proposal now being introduced contains the following sections:

The section on "Prior notification of military activities" foresees that prior notification will be given, 42 days in advance, to all other participating States of military manoeuvres, covered by the mandate, i.e.

- the engagement of military formations at or above the notifiable level outside their normal locations in combat-related exercises and

- movements of such formations at or above the notifiable level between their normal locations and the exercise areas as well as between the areas of the different phases of the exercises.



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Such manoeuvres will be subject to prior notification, whenever they involve at least

- numerical total(s) - to be defined - of forces participating in the activity as whole, emphasizing mobility and firepower or
- one division or equivalent formation or
- three amphibious, airborne, air-mobile units on battalion level or combinations thereof and a total number of xx troops or a total number of xx troops and a total of yy square metres of shipborne loading capacity.

For the purpose of the agreement a division or equivalent formation is defined as

- a mobile military unit structured, permanently or temporarily, under one command in headquarters, combat and support elements or
- any other group of forces of equivalent capability

containing 2-5 units on brigade/regiment level with a total number of at least x troops and y tanks/armoured fighting vehicles/helicopters or a total number of at least z tanks/armoured fighting vehicles/helicopters.

Prior notification will be given in a standardized format containing detailed information specified in our proposal.

Mr. Chairman,
I would like to draw attention to the fact that these parameters for prior notification also constitute the notifiable level for all activities covered in other sections of this proposal.

Mr. Chairman,
according to the subsequent section "Annual calendar of military activities", the participating States will transmit every year, not later than October 1st, to all other participating



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States the calendar of their military activities subject to prior notification and planned for the next calendar year beginning on the subsequent January 1st. The annual calendars will, in a standardized format, contain information as specified in our proposal.

The next section deals with the "Invitation of observers to military activities subject to prior notification". We propose that the participating States invite observers from all other participating States to military manoeuvres subject to prior notification. The invitation will be extended simultaneously with the prior notification.

This section contains detailed provisions on the information to be given to the observers as to the purpose, the basic situation and the progress of the activity. This information and the working conditions laid down in the proposal should enable them to evaluate whether the activities are carried out in conformity with the prior notification and whether they are non-threatening in nature.

According to the next section "Notification and observation of military activities carried out at short notice" the participating States will give notification of military manoeuvres, which are carried out at short notice.

The participating States will also give notification of such military movements which are not in conjunction with combat-related exercises, of military formations at or above notifiable level to and from normal locations/staging areas, covered by the mandate, whenever they reach notifiable level.

Notification will be given at the earliest possible opportunity prior to the start of these manoeuvres and movements.



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The sponsors propose that the participating States invite observers from all other participating States to military manoeuvres carried out at short notice, when the duration of the activity at or above notifiable level exceeds a certain number of hours, in accordance with provisions to be elaborated.

In the next section concerning "Constraints on certain military activities" we propose that no individual military manoeuvre will exceed five times the notifiable level and that its duration at or above notifiable level will not exceed 17 days.

Furthermore, States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate in more than a total of five notifiable military manoeuvres per calendar year which are of a size less than two times the notifiable level; moreover, the States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate in a total of more than one such manoeuvre at the same time. However, if such manoeuvres are notified in the annual calendar the total number per calendar year and the number of such manoeuvres taking place at the same time will not be restricted.

The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate in more than a total of five military manoeuvres per calendar year, which are of a size of two times the notifiable level or above. Such manoeuvres will be notified already in the annual calendar. The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate in a total of more than two such manoeuvres at the same time. However, once a year two such manoeuvres may be combined but not exceed a total of seven times the notifiable level.



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The section "Observation upon request of military activities" states the general conditions and outlines the modalities for a participating State to request to send, on very short notice, observers to another participating State. As the CSCE process takes place outside military alliances, the requested State will in addition invite observers from a third participating State with which it does not maintain relations of military alliance.

The request, and the answer thereto, as well as the reports on the observation will be transmitted in accordance with the procedures for rapid communications.

The section "Arrangements for dealing with information, notification and rapid exchange of views with regard to the measures to be adopted" outlines the modalities for using telecommunication lines between the participating States for the rapid transmission of communications foreseen in the preceding sections.

In the section on "Consultative arrangements" the sponsors propose that arrangements be envisaged for short meetings of representatives of all the participating States, in relation to the implementation of the measures contained in the preceding sections.

Such meetings could be convened

- on an ad hoc basis, at the request of any participating State, to deal with exceptional situations
- at intervals and dates to be decided by the participating States, to proceed to an exchange of views on the routine implementation of the measures.



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The section on the "Non-use of force" contains an elaboration on this principle.

It is stressed that the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force is a universally recognized obligation in international law, binding all States, and that non-compliance with it consequently constitutes a violation of international law.

The sponsors are also convinced that the situation in Europe and the equal respect for the legitimate security interests of every participating State require determined efforts by all participating States to build mutual confidence, lessen military confrontation, strengthen security for all and promote disarmament.

We believe that by their very nature concrete CSBMs serve to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force.

Likewise, we recall that the peaceful settlement of disputes is an essential complement to the non-use of force.

Mr. Chairman,
this completes the presentation of the general contents of our proposal. Sponsors will later individually take up various questions in more detail.

Mr. Chairman,
the countries sponsoring this proposal also wish to stress that nothing in its format, including the order of the sections, is intended as indicating any relative priority or importance.

Allow me to recall that our first proposal SC.3 advocates that the negotiations in Stockholm should aim at timely and



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substantial progress in order to provide the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting with sufficient new elements when considering the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in order to deal also with disarmament.

It is our hope and wish that today's proposal contributes to such progress and to the successful outcome of this Conference.

Thank you,Mr. Chairman.



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08860
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
NOVEMBER 11-15, 1985

1. CDE VIII - 29
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN CDE WORKING GROUPS FOR THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 11-15 THE EAST CONCENTRATED ITS FIRE ON ALLEGED WESTERN FOOTDRAGGING IN DISCUSSING THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) AND ON THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. IN CONTRAST, NATO SPEAKERS FOCUSED ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, SUCH AS THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, AND TRIED TO MINIMIZE DISCUSSION OF THE NAVAL AND AIR ISSUE. THE NNA, ENTIRELY FOCUSED ON FINALIZING ITS LONG AWAITED PAPER, WAS SILENT ALL WEEK. FOR THE FUTURE, NATO WILL DEVELOP NEW ARGUMENTS BASED ON SC.1 TO PROMOTE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND WILL ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE ALLIANCE COORDINATION FURTHER. WE ANTICIPATE NO CHANGE IN EASTERN TACTICS. END SUMMARY.
4. EAST: IN CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS FOR THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 11-15, THE EAST FOCUSED ON TWO MAJOR THEMES: ALLEGED WESTERN FOOTDRAGGING IN DISCUSSING THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF); AND THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CSBM'S. GRINEVSKY (USSR) OPENED THE FOOTDRAGGING THEME IN THE NOVEMBER 11 MEETING OF WORKING GROUP AB, AND THE SAME LINE WAS PURSUED IN THE NUF CLUSTER AS THE SOVIETS TRIED TO PAINT THE WEST AS STALLING ON NUF, NOT LIVING UP TO THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT AND (WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE U.S.) ABANDONING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DUBLIN AND STRASBOURG PLEDGES TO DISCUSS THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IN PARALLEL WITH CSBM'S. HOWEVER, AS THE WEEK DEVELOPED SOVIET STATEMENTS SEEMED TO REFLECT THAT THEY WERE NOT SEEKING SIMPLE PARALLELISM, BUT DOUBLE LINKAGE, TYING PROGRESS ON NUF TO PROGRESS ON CSBM'S AND PROGRESS ON CONCRETE CSBM'S TO THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. THE EAST HAMMERED ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN ALL WORKING GROUPS EXCEPT NON-USE OF FORCE, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS IN THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION GROUPS. THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS CLEARLY TO ELICIT SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WHICH THEY COULD THEN USE TO JUSTIFY SEPARATE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHETHER INDEPENDENT OR COMBINED WITH GROUND ACTIVITIES.
5. THE EAST ALSO EMPLOYED THE THEME OF WESTERN FOOTDRAGGING IN THE CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS WORKING GROUP, ACCUSING THE WEST OF DISTORTING THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT BY REJECTING CEILINGS. IN THE NUF GROUP, THE VARIATION WAS THAT THE WEST HAD "VIOLATED" THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT BY ENGAGING IN A PHILOSOPHICAL



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DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER NUF WAS A CSBM. THE EAST TRIED -- UNSUCCESSFULLY -- TO MAKE USE OF THE STATEMENT BY FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER IN SUPPORT OF "CONCRETIZATION" OF NUF TO DRAW THE FRG INTO DEFINING SPECIFIC TYPES OF FORCE TO BE BANNED. THE FRG, HOWEVER, WAS PREPARED FOR THE EASTERN ASSAULT AND EXPLAINED THAT GENSCHER'S STATEMENT HAD REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR CONCRETE CSBM'S, NOT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE. IN A WEAK ATTEMPT TO BUTTRESS THE EAST'S CASE THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION IS A CSBM, HUNGARY ARGUED THAT IT MET THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION OF THE MADRID MANDATE SINCE NON-COMPLIANCE WOULD BE AN ILLEGAL ACT AGAINST ANOTHER STATE OR GROUP OF STATES. IT DID NOT TAKE MUCH IMAGINATION TO SEE WHAT SOLUTION THIS EASTERN ASSERTION HAS IN MIND: CONSULTATIONS WHICH A THREATENED STATE COULD CONVOKE.

6. THE EAST CONTINUED TO INTERPRET THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT AS LIMITING THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION TO NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES AND TO REJECT NATO'S INFORMATION MEASURE AS A SEPARATE MEASURE.

7. NATO: NATO TACTICS FOR THE WEEK WERE TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON WESTERN PROPOSALS ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES SUCH AS THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION, AND FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,

THE BASIC MODALITIES OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME (I.E., ALL SHOULD UE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES), WHILE TRYING TO AVOID ADDRESSING THE AIR AND NAVAL ISSUE. AS THE LATTER OFTEN SEEMED TO BE THE ONLY ISSUE WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD SERIOUSLY ADDRESS, DISCUSSION WAS NOT PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVE. WHERE AND WHEN NATO TACTICS WORKED, THE ALLIANCE MET WITH SOME SUCCESS IN DEMONSTRATING THAT THE EAST WAS NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY EVEN ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, SUCH AS THE CONTENT OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF OBSERVATION. HOWEVER, WHEN THE EAST MANAGED TO TURN THE DISCUSSION TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE WAS SPOTTY AT BEST.

8. THE WEEK STARTED OUT WELL IN THE NOVEMBER 12 NOTIFICATION GROUP WITH HANSEN (U.S.) AND OTHER NATO SPEAKERS MAKING THE CASE THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE NOTIFICATIONS OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH THAN IN THE CORRESPONDING WTO PROPOSALS. OUT PROBLEMS DEVELOPED IN THE INFORMATION/VERFICATION AND COMMMUNICATIONS CLUSTER AND IN THE OBSERVATION GROUP WHEN THE FRENCH MILITARY ADVISOR (MERIC) STATED FRANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WHAT INFORMATION NATO WOULD PROVIDE UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND ACCEPTED MORE LIBERAL OBSERVATION OF



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FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THE FRENCH (WHO ARE CLEARLY OUT IN FRONT OF THE ALLIANCE ON THIS ISSUE) WERE ROUNDLY CRITICIZED IN CAUCUS POST-MORTEMS FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE ON THE NAVAL AND AIR ISSUE, BUT THE SITUATION HAS BROUGHT A POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM TO THE ALLIANCE'S ATTENTION-- NATO IS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN ANY DETAIL INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATION OR IN THE OBSERVATION BRIEFING OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.

9. THE WEST HAD MORE SUCCESS IN THE NUF GROUP WHERE, UNDER SOVIET ATTACK FOR FOOTDRAGGING, SEEMINGLY FORTHCOMING WESTERN RESPONSES SUPPORTING A NUF REAFFIRMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A SET OF CSBM'S SEEMED TO THROW THE EAST OFF BALANCE.

10. THE NNA: THE NNA, WHICH WAS IN THE FINAL THROES OF PUTTING ITS LONG AWAITED PAPER INTO FINAL FORM, WAS SILENT ALL WEEK. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY OUR NNA CONTACTS, THAT THEY MAY BE NO MORE VOCAL THIS WEEK (NOVEMBER 18-22), AS THE DELICATE INTERNAL COMPROMISES REQUIRED TO GET FINAL APPROVAL OF THEIR PAPER MIGHT NOT WITHSTAND A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THEIR VARIOUS PROPOSALS. IN LIGHT OF THIS WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY OUR NNA FRIENDS NOT TO PROBE TOO DEEPLY TOO SOON INTO THE INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THEIR PAPER.

11. THE FUTURE: ANTICIPATING NO LETUP IN EASTERN PRESSURE ON NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, THE NATO CAUCUS HAS TASKED THE MINI-CAUCUSES FOR THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION GROUPS TO PRODUCE NEW ARGUMENTS, BASED ON SC.1, TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. AS SEVERAL CAUCUS MEMBERS, LED BY FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS, FEEL THAT SC.1 HAS TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED IN THIS AREA, THE MINI-CAUCUSES WILL ALSO CONSIDER POSSIBLE QUESTIONS TO BE POSED TO CAPITALS AND TO BRUSSELS THAT WOULD GO BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN SC.1. TURKEY, ON THE OTHER HAND, BELIEVES THAT FOR NOW WE SHOULD STICK WITH SC. 1 AS TABLED AND THAT TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING AT THIS TIME AMOUNTS TO A NET SOVIET GAIN WITHOUT THEIR HAVING TO NEGOTIATE FOR IT OR TO OFFER A QUID PRO QUO. IN THE INTERIM, THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON OUR OWN PROPOSALS AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO LIMIT DISCUSSION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. ALSO, IN RESPONSE TO WIDESPREAD ALLIED CRITICISM, INCREASED EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO COORDINATE ALLIANCE INTERVENTIONS AND TO AVOID PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED IN THE PAST WEEK WHEN TOO MANY WESTERN SPEAKERS WANTED THE FLOOR AND TOO OFTEN STRAYED OFF THE AGREED THEME, CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EAST TO SEIZE THE AGENDA. ON NUF, THE WEST WILL CONCENTRATE ON DISCUSSING FROM USDEL

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TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
A NUF REAFFIRMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATION OF A COMPLETE SET OF CSBM'S. SOME WESTERN DELEGATIONS (E.G. ITALY, NETHERLANDS, DENMARK), HOWEVER, BELIEVE WE MUST SOON GO BEYOND THIS MINIMALIST POSITION AND BEGIN TO DISCUSS, AMONG OURSELVES AT FIRST, WHAT NUF LANGUAGE WE COULD EVENTUALLY ACCEPT. WITH REGARD TO THE NNA PAPER, IT IS NOW BEING STUDIED, AND, FOR THE TIME BEING, THE WEST WILL CONFINE ITSELF TO CLARIFYING QUESTIONS COMPARING THE PAPER WITH OUR OWN PROPOSAL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08881
SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7)
REF: STOCKHLM 08782
1. CDE VIII - 030.
2. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)
3. SUMMARY. THIS CABLE CONTAINS U.S. DEL CDE'S PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE RECENTLY TABLED NNA PROPOSAL, SC.7, AS WELL AS INFORMATION ON NNA ATTITUDES. THE TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA PAPER IS CONTAINED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.
4. A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME. . . REGRESSION AND PURPOSEFUL AMBIGUITY. THE NNA ROSE DOES NOT SMELL AS SWEET AS IT DID WHILE BUDDING. THIS IS THE INEVITABLE, HOWEVER UNFORTUNATE, OUTCOME OF NNA BARGAINING AMONG THEMSELVES IN ORDER TO SECURE A PROPOSAL ALL COULD ENDORSE, ALBEIT WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM. OF PARTICULAR NOTE IS THE FACT THAT THE PROPOSAL IS BUILT AROUND A PURPOSEFUL AMBIGUITY - IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT THE NNA ATTITUDE IS TOWARDS THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (THE AMBIGUITY REFLECTS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THOSE WHO LIKE IT AND THOSE WHO DON'T). THE PROPOSAL IS AMBIGUOUS ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE COVERED. THIS AMBIGUITY, OF COURSE, AFFECTS THE INTERPRETATION OF A VARIETY OF THE PROPOSALS INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE. WHILE OPTICALLY EMPLOYING THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD OF A DIVISION, A CLOSER READING REVEALS THAT THE REAL OPERATIVE THRESHOLD APPEARS TO BE A NUMERICAL ONE, AS TROOP NUMBERS ARE A KEY COMPONENT IN THE DIVISIONAL DEFINITION. ON OBSERVATION THE NNA SAY THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES -- BUT IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE ACTIVITY WILL BE OBSERVED FROM START TO FINISH. IT CONTAINS A CONSTRAINT MEASURE THAT IS UNBALANCED AND COULD LIMIT NATO AND U.S. MILITARY PRACTICES, BUT NOT THE WTO'S. THE VERIFICATION MEASURE ("OBSERVATION BY REQUEST") CONTAINS A RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND PROVIDES FOR THIRD (NNA) PARTY PARTICIPATION IN ANY INSPECTION (OBSERVATION).
5. WHAT'S IN A NAME? THE NNA HAVE INTENTIONALLY REFRAINED FROM LABELING THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS IN SC.7 AS "MEASURES," IN ORDER TO AVOID WHAT THEY PERCEIVED TO BE A TRAP SC.1 CO-SPONSORS HAVE FALLEN INTO THROUGH USE OF THAT TERM. THE MADRID MANDATE CALLS FOR MEASURES TO BE "PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT." IN THE VIEW OF ONE SWEDE, SC.1 SPONSORS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE ADEQUATELY THAT EACH OF ITS MEASURES MEETS THAT CRITERION. (IN A RECENT WORKING GROUP A MEETING ON INFORMATION, VERIFICATION,



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AND COMMUNICATION, THE USSR HAS QUESTIONED THE VERIFIABILITY OF SC.1'S MEASURE 1 ON INFORMATION, LAYING THE GROUNDS FOR REJECTING IT AS A DISCRETE MEASURE.) THE NNA'S, ACCORDING TO THE SWEDE, REGARD THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS IN SC.7 AS "ELEMENTS" OF THEIR OVERALL PROPOSAL. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, HOW THEY BELIEVE SC.7'S ELEMENTS CAN BE VERIFIED.

6. THE TIME HAS COME THE WALRUS SAID, TO SPEAK OF MANY THINGS. SOME OF THE NNA WALRUSES, HOWEVER, INTEND TO LET THE NNA PROPOSAL SPEAK FOR ITSELF. DESPITE REPORTED ATTEMPTS BY SWEDISH AMB. LIDGARD TO ORGANIZE A SYSTEMATIC PRESENTATION AND PROMOTION OF THE VARIOUS SC.7 ELEMENTS BY DIFFERENT NNA MEMBERS IN THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUPS, IT APPEARS THAT MANY OF THE OTHER NNA'S WILL, FOR THE MOST PART, SIT QUIETLY AND SPEAK ONLY WHEN SPOKEN TO. BECAUSE OF THE FRAGILE COMPROMISES IN THE DOCUMENT, THERE IS CONCERN ON THE PART OF SOME NNA THAT TOO MUCH TALK COULD RESULT IN OPEN -- AND PREMATURE -- SPLITS IN THEIR TENUOUS SOLIDARITY.

FROM USDEL CDE
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AND, BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES, SOME NNA DON'T WANT OTHERS TO PUT THEIR OWN INTERPREPATION ON CERTAIN ISSUES. SOME, HOWEVER, HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY INTEND TO DISCUSS THE PACKAGE IN DETAIL. DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH WERE OBVIOUS IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS THIS WEEK. ON NOTIFICATION, SWITZERLAND OBLIQUELY SUPPORTED THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON" APPROACH, YUGOSLAVIA REJECTED IT, AND SWEDEN SUPPORTED THE COMPROMISE APPROACH REFLECTED IN SC.7. ON NUF, CYPRUS CONTINUED TO PUSH THE "CDE DIMENSION"/MANISFESTATION OF FORCE, WHILE AUSTRIA DELIVERED A LONG STATEMENT WITH A DECIDED WESTERN TWIST. NONETHELESS, THEY WISH TO AVOID OPEN SPLITS FOR THE TIME BEING. HOW LONG WILL THIS TENUOUS SOLIDARITY HOLD ? -- ACCORDING TO ONE NNA DELEGATE UNTIL IT BECOMES OBVIOUS THAT PARTICULAR APPROACHES REFLECTED IN THEIR PROPOSAL HAVE BEEN REJECTED BY WTO AND NATO.

7. PRELIMINARY U.S. CDE DELEGATION ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL, SC.7, FOLLOW.

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PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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UNTIL THE MALTESE INSISTED ON A LAST-MINUTE CHANGE, THIS HEADING READ "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS". THE DEFINITION WHICH THEN FOLLOWED (NOW IN THE FIRST TWO TICS) WAS AN ATTEMPT BY THE NNA TO DEFINE "MANEUVERS" IN A WAY IDENTICAL TO THE WESTERN



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"OUT-OF-GARRISON" CONCEPT. SOME NNA STILL SEE THE MEASURE IN THIS WAY. NEVERTHELESS, THE SUBSTITUTION OF "ACTIVITIES" FOR "MANUEVERS" IS A MOVE TOWARD THE SOVIET POSITION, ALLOWING AN INTERPRETATION WHICH COULD INCLUDE INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. THIS COULD ALSO IMPACT ON THE CONSTRAINTS MEASURE, INASMUCH AS THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE WILL SET THE PARAMETERS FOR THE CONSTRAINTS MEASURE.
MOREOVER, THE FINNS INSISTED ON SPLITTING THE DEFINITION OF MILITARY MANEUVER INTO TWO TICS SO AS TO HIGHLIGHT THE FACT THAT MOVEMENTS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED DIFFERENT THAN MANEUVERS.
BOTH THESE LAST MINUTE CHANGES, ACCEPTED BY THE NNA GROUP IN THE INTERESTS OF GAINING CONSENSUS, COULD BECOME AMMUNITION FOR THE EAST IN SUPPORTING ITS CLAIMS THAT MILITARY ACTIVITY MEANS MORE THAN THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, I.E., MILITARY ACTIVITY ALSO COVERS INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS).
OTHER COMMENTS
-- THE NNA HAVE REFUSED TO TAKE A STANCE ON THE MEANING OF THE MANDATE; THEY ONLY NOTE THAT MILITARY MANEUVERS COVERED BY THE MANDATE WILL BE COVERED.
-- AS NOTED ABOVE, THE SEPARATION OF MANEUVER AND MOVEMENT INTO TWO SUBPARAS HIGHLIGHTS A DISTINCTION NOT FOUND IN SC-1'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. NEVERTHELESS, SOME NNA CLAIM THAT THE MOVEMENT OF U.S. FORCES TO OR THROUGH EUROPE WILL NOT BE CAPTURED BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY DESCRIBE THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, I.E., THE DIVISION.
-- DESPITE ATTEMPTS TO INCLUDE A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, THE REAL OPERATIONAL THRESHOLD IN SC-7 IS STILL A NUMERICAL ONE, THE BOTTOM LINE BEING THEIR ATTEMPT TO DEFINE A GROUP OF FORCES EQUIVALENT TO A DIVISION: "2-5 UNITS ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL WITH I.E., PLUS A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST X TROOPS AND Y TANKS/ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES/HELICOPTERS OR REPEAT FROM USDEL CDE
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OR AT LEAST Z TANKS/ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES."
THIS ESTABLISHES TWO POSSIBLE THRESHOLDS, BOTH NUMERICAL.
-- BOTH NUMERICAL THRESHOLDS INCLUDE EQUIPMENT. THE VIEW AMONG SOME NNA WAS THAT THE EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD FOR DEFINING A DIVISION WOULD EXCLUDE U.S. MOVEMENTS (AND TRANSITS?) FROM THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT. IT WAS ALSO DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE THE SWISS MOUNTAIN CORPS FROM CSBM OBLIGATIONS.



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-- THE NNA HAVE DESCRIBED A DIVISION IN TERMS OF FROM TWO TO FIVE REGIMENTS/BRIGADES TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF DIFFERENT STATES. THIS RAISES THE QUESTION OF HOW MANY OF A DIVISION'S SUB-ELEMENTS MUST BE OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS IN ORDER TO MEET THE THRESHOLD. BUT THIS APPARENT GAP IN LOGIC IS COVERED BY THE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD FOR TROOPS.
-- AS FURTHER SOP TO THE FINNISH DELEGATION, THERE IS A REFERENCE TO NUMERICAL TOTALS "TO BE DEFINED". NEVERTHELESS, IN THE VIEW OF SOME NNA DELEGATIONS, THE NUMERICAL TOTALS MIGHT BE NUMBERS OF STRUCTURAL UNITS; IN THIS VIEW, THE EMPHASIS ON MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER JUSTIFIES SUCH AN APPROACH.
-- THE EMPHASIS ON "MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER," HOWEVER, IS AMBIGUOUS AND COULD BE SEEN AS CORRESPONDING ONLY TO THE ARMOUR/MECHANIZED INFANTRY ASPECTS OF SC.1'S "MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS," AND DOESN'T SEEM TO CAPTURE INFANTRY ELEMENTS.
-- FILLING IN THE BLANKS FOR THE VARIOUS NUMERICAL THRESHOLDS IS JUDGED TO BE A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE NNA POSITION SINCE THESE FIGURES WILL DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTRAINT MEASURES THEY HAVE PROPOSED. VARIOUS NNA'S HAVE ASKED OUR ADVICE ON WHAT THE EQUIPMENT FIGURES SHOULD BE.
-- THE COMPROMISE ON THE WORDS "OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS" VICE AN EARLIER FORMULATION OF "SPECIFIED NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION AREAS" WAS TO MEET YUGOSLAV CONCERNS ABOUT IDENTIFYING PEACETIME LOCATIONS. THIS LANGUAGE IS SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE AS TO CALL INTO QUESTION WHAT THESE LOCATIONS ARE. NONETHELESS, THE NEW LANGUAGE, AS WITH THE OLD, WAS DESIGNED BY MOST OF THE NNA TO SERVE AS THE EQUIVALENT OF "OUT-OF-GARRISON." REFERENCE TO COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES WAS TO EXCLUDE SUCH ACTIVITIES AS HARVEST ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF WHERE THE EQUIPMENT PARAMETERS WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE MET.
-- AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE UNITS ARE LUMPED TOGETHER IN, MORE-OR-LESS, A SINGLE CATEGORY WITH NOTIFICATION LEVELS AT A SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER LEVEL FOR AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE UNITS THAN IN SC-1 WHICH USES THE OOG CONCEPT AND THUS MAKES AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES THE ONLY UNIQUE CATEGORY.
-- AS SC-7 NOW READS, NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE A CERTAIN CAPACITY FOR CARRYING TROOPS (SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY) COULD BECOME NOTIFIABLE WHETHER OR NOT AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ASHORE IS CONTEMPLATED. THIS IS THE SAME AS A REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY AN INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITY.
-- UNDER ITEM 1.7, WE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO GIVE INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF EQUIVALENT



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FORMATIONS OF NAVAL AND AIR FORCES.
-- ITEM 2.1 CALLS FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON PARTICIPATING FORCES DOWN TO THE REGIMENT/BRIGADE
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SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL
LEVEL. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO PROVISION FOR AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AGAINST WHICH THIS COULD BE CHECKED. SOME NNA BELIEVE PARA. 4.1 ALLOWS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF NORMAL LOCATIONS SIMILAR TO THAT PROVIDED IN MEASURE 1 OF SC-1, BUT 4.1 IS SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE IN ORDER TO MEET YUGOSLAV CONCERNS ABOUT PROVIDING INFORMATION ON ACTUAL LOCATIONS.
-- UNDER ITEM 2.1, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON PARTICIPATING NAVAL AND AIR FORCES AT LEVELS EQUIVALENT TO REGIMENT/BRIGADE.
-- UNDER ITEM 2.3, WE WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE THE NUMBER OF: COMBAT AIRCRAFT, COMBAT HELICOPTERS, TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS AND NAVAL COMBATANTS AS WELL AS AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS AND AUXILIARY TRANSPORTS (IDENTIFYING THEIR SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY).
-- ITEM 3.1 FORESEES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE STARTING AND FINISHING DATES OF THE MOVEMENTS OF FORCES; PUTTING THIS UNDER THE HEADING OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT SUCH MOVEMENTS WOULD INCLUDE BOTH NAVAL AND AIR MOVEMENTS. MOREOVER, IT CALLS FOR PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE PERIOD OF TIME ABSENT FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS WHICH, IN THE CASE OF DUAL-BASED (LAND, AIR, OR NAVAL) FORCES, COULD MEAN FROM THEIR BASES IN THE U.S. IT MIGHT ALSO BE INTERPRETED AS A CALL FOR INFORMATION ON HOW LONG NAVAL UNITS BASED OUTSIDE THE ZONE WILL BE AWAY FROM BASES.

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ANNUAL CALENDAR

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THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH THIS PART OF SC-7 IS THAT IT ALSO CALLS FOR THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES PARTICIPATING IN ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE FORECAST ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. POINT 9 ALLOWS THE PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, YET TO BE DEFINED, ON UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. THIS IS SEEN BY SOME NNA AS BEING INFORMATION ANALOGOUS TO THAT REQUIRED IN OUR MEASURE 1.

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OBSERVATION

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THERE ARE MANY COMMON POINTS BETWEEN OBSERVATION IN SC-7 AND IN SC-1. THE NNA, LIKE US, INSIST THAT ALL



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PARTICIPATING STATES BE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. EVEN MORE THAN SC-1, SC-7 ASKS FOR THE PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. IT DOES, HOWEVER, HAVE ITS NEGATIVE, OR AT LEAST AMBIGUOUS, POINTS:
-- BECAUSE OF THE AMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE OF THE NNA TO THE FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION OF THE MANDATE AND THE SUBSEQUENT AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHICH ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION.
-- SC-7 CALLS FOR OBSERVATION WHEN THE THRESHOLD IS REACHED. THIS WOULD EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDE OBSERVATION OF "MOBILIZATION" ACTIVITIES AS DEFINED IN SC.1. (AND, WE UNDERSTAND, IS WHAT WAS INTENDED BY AT LEAST THE SWISS AND SWEDISH DELEGATIONS). IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR OBSERVATION OF TROOPS LEAVING THE GARRISON (OR NORMAL LOCATION) FOR THE EXERCISE AREA. THE PROPOSAL DOES SEEM TO PROVIDE FOR OBSERVATION OF TROOPS DEPARTING THE EXERCISE AREA, BUT NOT NECESSARILY FOR OBSERVATION OF THEIR ACTUAL RETURN TO "GARRISON" OR "NORMAL LOCATIONS," ONLY FOR OBSERVATION OF "FINAL POSITIONS" BEFORE
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-- IN PARA. 6, THE NNA PROPOSAL SETS UP THREE DIFFERENT (UNDETERMINED) THRESHOLDS FOR OBSERVATION AND ASSIGNS A DIFFERENT NUMBER OF OBSERVERS TO EACH. THE RATIONALE IS UNCLEAR.
-- PARA. 14 CONTAINS TWO POTENTIAL PROBLEMS. THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION MAY NOT BE AS BROAD AS THAT PROVIDED FOR IN SC.1 AS SC.7 PROVIDES ONLY FOR OBSERVATION OF THE "MAIN ACTIVITIES." SC.1 PROVIDES FOR OBSERVERS "TO VIEW DIRECTLY ALL FORMATIONS ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY," AND, IN THE CASE OF OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITIES, ALLOWS FOR OBSERVATION OF "ALL PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY . . . IN THE ZONE BETWEEN THE GARRISON AND THE AREA OF OUT OF GARRISON DEPLOYMENT." IN ADDITION, PARA 14 CALLS FOR THE OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR UNITS CARRYING OUT MAIN ACTIVITIES. EVEN IF ONLY READ AS APPLYING TO OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, IT WOULD STILL CLASH WITH OUR POSITION SINCE WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNLESS THOSE ACTIVITIES ARE VISIBLE TO AN OBSERVER ON LAND WHO IS WATCHING GROUND ACTIVITY.

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NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE



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THIS SECTION DEALS WITH ACTIVITIES NOT LISTED ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, E.G., ALERT ACTIVITIES. LIKE SC-1, IT ALLOWS OBSERVATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES IF THEY LAST LONGER THAN A CERTAIN NUMBER OF HOURS.
-- RATHER THAN PROVIDING NOTIFICATION SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE START OF THE ACTIVITY, SC-7 CALLS FOR NOTIFICATION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT PRIOR TO THEIR START.
-- BOTH MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS ARE INCLUDED. HOWEVER, THE THRESHOLD CRITERIA FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION SHOULD APPLY.
-- PARA. 2 IS SEEN BY SOME NNA AS A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE CARRYING OUT OF A MOVEMENT, NOT A MANEUVER, FOR PURPOSES OF INTIMIDATION.

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CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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-- HERE, EVEN MORE THAN IN PRIOR NOTIFICAITON, THE CHANGE FROM "MANEUVERS" TO "ACTIVITIES" MUST BE REGARDED WITH GREAT CAUTION BECAUSE IT INDICATES THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRAINTS ON NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. THIS IS CERTAINLY WHAT SOME NNA'S (YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA) WANT.
-- PARA. 2 ESTABLISHES A NUMERICAL CEILING ON MILITARY MANEUVERS WHICH IS ESTABLISHED AT FIVE TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL WERE TO BE 6000 TROOPS THEN THE CEILING WOULD BE 30,000 TROOPS. THUS THE DESIRE TO GET MORE NOTIFICATIONS THROUGH A LOWER THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION CONFLICTS WITH THE REQUIREMENT FELT BY MOST STATES, INCLUDING SOME NNA, TO BE ABLE TO EXERCISE AT SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER LEVELS.
-- THIS ALSO LIMITS THE DURATION OF AN ACTIVITY TO 17 DAYS; THIS WOULD LIMIT A COMMANDER'S FLEXIBILITY TO EXECUTE OPTIONS FOR WEATHER DELAYS, EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS, ETC. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS 17 DAY LIMITATION APPLIES TO THE EXERCISE OR THE POINT AT
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WHICH THE THRESHOLD IS MET.
-- PARA. 3 STIPULATES THAT NO STATE MAY CONDUCT MORE THAN FIVE ACTIVITIES UP TO TWO TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL (E.G. TWO DIVISIONS) WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN PRE-NOTIFIED ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT SEEMS TO BE TO LIMIT BOTH THE SIZE AND THE NUMBER OF ALERT ACTIVITIES. POSSIBILITIES FOR ABUSE ARE LIMITED BY THE STIPULATION THAT ONLY ONE OF



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THESE CAN BE CONDUCTED AT ANY TIME.
-- PARA. 4 IS A SECOND CEILING IN THAT IT LIMITS STATES TO FIVE MANEUVERS PER YEAR AT A LEVEL FROM TWO TO FIVE TIMES THE THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION (E.G. FROM TWO TO FIVE DIVISIONS). SUCH ACTIVITIES MUST HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
-- BUT, TWO MANEUVERS OF THIS SIZE MAY BE CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY PROVIDED THE COMBINATION OF THE TWO DOES NOT EXCEED SEVEN TIMES THE THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION. THIS IS A CHANGE INSISTED UPON BY SOME NNA WHO FELT THAT ALLOWING A TOTAL OF 10 TIMES THE THRESHOLD (E.G. 10 DIVISIONS) TO BE OUTSIDE NORMAL LOCATIONS AT ONCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A CONSTRAINT. THE SWISS INSISTED THEY MUST BE ABLE TO EXERCISE SIX DIVISIONS AT ONCE, HENCE THEY PURSUADED THE OTHER NNA TO AGREE TO SEVEN TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
-- IN SUM, NATO ARGUMENTS ON THE CONSTRAINTS POINT WILL CENTER ON THE FACT THAT IT DOES NOT MEET OUR CRITERION: EQUALITY OF EFFECT.

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OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON SHORT NOTICE

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THIS IS THE VERIFICATION MEASURE IN SC.7. IT DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM MEASURE 5 OF SC-1. IT:
-- PROVIDES NO ROLE FOR NTM'S. THE NNA HAVE TAKEN A CUE FROM WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE A VULNERABILITY IN SC-1. THEY HAVE WITNESSED THE SOVIT TACTIC OF FAULTING OUR CASE FOR REQUESTING INSPECTIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT INSPECTIONS WOULD CONSISTUTE A BONUS FOR STATES WITH A WIDE RANGE OF NTMS AN) PENALIZE THOSE STATES WITHOUT.
-- PROVIDES FOR AN "OBSERVATION" REQUEST ONLY IF STIFF CONDITIONS ARE MET -- THAT THE STATE MAKING SUCH A REQUEST JUDGES THAT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE OR IF IT JUDGES THAT THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT IS SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED.
-- CONTAINS AN ESCAPE CLAUSE ALLOWING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE A REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION. THE ESCAPE CLAUSE IS THE PRINCIPAL DEFICIENCY IN THE CONCEPT. IT ALLOWS THE REFUSAL OF A REQUEST ON THE GROUNDS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST (WHATEVER THAT MAY MEAN). THESE GROUNDS WOULD INVARIABLY BE SUBJECTIVE. THE NNA, HOWEVER, HAVE CALCULATED THAT A REFUSAL WOULD CARRY A POLITICAL PRICE SINCE THE STATE REFUSING WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE AN ELABORATION OF ITS REASONS FOR REFUSING (ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD NOT DETER THE WTO FROM INVOKING "SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST"). SOME NNA ANTICIPATE FEW REFUSALS SINCE REQUESTS FOR OBSERVATION WOULD BE RESERVED FOR EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES.



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-- SETS NO QUOTAS FOR THE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR OBSERVATION. NO QUOTAS ARE PROVIDED FOR SINCE THIS WOULD AVOID A SITUATION WHERE A STATE, HAVING EXHAUSTED ITS QUOTA, PERCEIVES A NEED TO REQUEST AN OBSERVATION. THE NNAS APPARENTLY HAVE CONSIDERED SCENARIOS IN
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL
WHICH STATES ARE INDUCED TO EXPEND THEIR RATION OF REQUESTS FOR SPURIOUS ACTIVITIES. SHOULD QUOTAS BE SET, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE SPONSORS OF SC-1 CAN ACCEPT A LOW INSPECTION NUMBER BECAUSE VARIOUS ALLIES CAN BE CALLED UP TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS ON BEHALF OF OTHERS.
-- CONTAINS A THIRD PARTY PROVISION, I.E., PARTICIPATION OF THE NNA IN ANY OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST. MEASURE 5 OF SC-1 SPECIFIES THAT THIRD PARTIES MAY BE INCLUDED IN AN INSPECTION AT THE DISCRETION OF THE INSPECTING STATE; THEY MAY BE ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, OTHER THAN THE INSPECTED STATE. BY CONTRAST, SC-7 WOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF THIRD-PARTY, NON-ALLIED, STATES. THIS WOULD ENSURE THE NNAS AN ENHANCED ROLE IN THE VERIFICATION OF A CDE AGREEMENT SINCE THEY WOULD BE THE THIRD PARTY IN ANY NATO OR WARSAW PACT REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION.
-- IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NNA HAVE ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONSULTATIONS BEFORE OBSERVATION BY REQUEST. MOREOVER, THE WORDING OF THEIR PROPSOAL STIPULATES THAT THE STATE RECEIVING THE REQUEST WILL REPEAT WILL INVITE THE REQUESTING STATES TO CARRY OUT THE OBSERVATION, PROVIDING, OF COURSE, THE "ESCAPE CLAUSE" IS NOT EXERCISED. TWO REASONS FOR REQUESTING AN INSPECTION ARE GIVEN: EITHER A STATE CONSIDERS ITS NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE OR THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSBMS REGIME IS SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. THE YUGOSLAVS ATTEMPTED TO ELIMINATE THE SECOND CONDITION, BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.
-- AT THE END OF AN OBSERVATION BY REQUEST, THREE REPORTS ARE REQUIRED: FROM THE OBSERVING STATE, THE THIRD-PARTY STATE AND THE STATE WHICH WAS OBSERVED.

---

ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THE MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED.

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THIS SECTION APPEARS NOT TO CONTAIN ANYTHING OF AN EXCEPTIONAL OR CONTROVERSIAL NATURE. INSTEAD OF CALLING FOR DEDICATED COMMUNICATION LINKS, IT CHARGES



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STATES TO KEEP TELECOMMUNICATION LINES ACCESSIBLE INCLUDING FACILITIES FOR TRANSMITTING AND RECEIVING CHARTS AND MAPS. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THIS SECTION MAY NOW BE BETTER THAN SC.1.

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CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

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A COMPROMISE HAS BEEN STRUCK BETWEEN THE SWISS CONCEPT OF "SALON DES AMBASSADEURS" CONVENED ON AN AD HOC BASIS (THE FIRST TICK) AND THE AUSTRIAN CONVICTION THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT OUGHT TO MEET AT INTERVALS AND DATES TO BE DECIDED. THE SWISS HAVE WANTED TO AVOID THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SUCH A CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENT WHILE THE AUSTRIANS APPEAR TO FAVOR SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.
IT DOES EXCLUDE NUF CONSULTATIONS AND SEEMS TO AVOID THE PITFALL OF USING CONSULTATIONS AS A PRELIMINARY (OR SUBSTITUTE) FOR OBSERVATION ON REQUEST (VERIFICATION).

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NON-USE OF FORCE

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ANALYSIS ON THE NUF SECTION OF THE NNA PAPER WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08841
SUBJECT: CSCE/CDE: REGISTERING ALLIED CONSENSUS ON A CUTOFF DATE
REF: (A) STATE 353905 (B) STOCKHOLM 8763
1. CDE VIII-031 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS INDICATED IN REFTEL (B) I BELIEVE STOCKHOLM, NOT USNATO, IS THE PLACE TO REACH CONSENSUS ON THE CLOSING AND SCHEDULE FOR CDE. THIS PROCESS IS UNDERWAY HERE AND A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION IS IN SIGHT. ATTEMPTING TO RECORD CONSENSUS IN BOTH PLACES AT ONCE WILL ONLY CONFUSE MATTERS.
3. THE NATO CAUCUS HERE WILL MEET TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE LATER TODAY. WE SUGGEST THAT USNATO HOLD OFF ON MAKING THE POINTS IN REF (A) UNTIL IT RECEIVES OUR REPORT OF THAT DISCUSSION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08885
SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE
1. CDE VIII - 034
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PRESENTS THE TEXT OF AND USDEL COMMENTARY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) PORTION OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED (NNA) DOCUMENT, SC.7, FORMALLY TABLED AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1985. END SUMMARY.
-
4. THE NNA INTRODUCED THEIR LONG ANTICIPATED AND MUCH DEBATED DRAFT PACKAGE AT FRIDAY'S (NOVEMBER 16) PLENARY. THE FINAL SECTION OF THE 22-PAGE PACKAGE IS A 3-1/2 PAGE NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT CONTAINING 15 SEPARATE ELEMENTS.
5. THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA PAPER IS A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT OVER EARLIER DRAFTS WHICH INCLUDED UP TO 35 SEPARATE ELEMENTS. THE PRESENT TEXT IMPLICITLY REJECTS THE AMBITIOUS AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS APPROACH ADVOCATED BY THE CYPRIOTS AND THE YUGOSLAVS, I.E., A STOCKHOLM DECLARATION GIVING A EUROPEAN DIMENSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE, AND, INSTEAD, REFLECTS A MORE WESTERN APPROACH TO NUF. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DRAFT EMPHASIZES THE PRIMACY OF UN CHARTER LANGUAGE (ARTICLE 103) AND THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
6. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NNA PACKAGE WAS ONE OF THE WORST KEPT SECRETS IN TOWN OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. AFTER SEEING SOME OF THE EARLIER LEAKED VERSIONS OF THE NNA NUF TEXT, MOST NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE BREATHED A COLLECTIVE SIGH OF RELIEF AT THE TEXT EVENTUALLY TABLED. THE FIRST REACTION OF THE FRG REPRESENTATIVE WAS: "WHERE DO WE SIGN?" AND THERE'S THE RUB. EVEN IF WE WERE ABLE TO ACCEPT ALL THE NNA LANGUAGE -- AND WE'RE NOT -- BY APPEARING TOO EAGER TO EMBRACE THE NNA DRAFT WE MAY GIVE IT THE KISS OF DEATH. A WESTERN ENDORSED DOCUMENT WILL BE REJECTED IPSO FACTO BY THE EAST AND EVEN SOME OF THE NNA. THE NATO CAUCUS HAS BEEN DULY SENSITIZED TO THIS FACT OF CONFERENCE POLITICS AND WILL REACT ACCORDINGLY. FURTHERMORE, WHAT AT FIRST BLUSH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE UNCONTENTIOUS AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED NUF LANGUAGE, MIGHT NOT, UPON CLOSER READING, SERVE ALLIANCE INTERESTS IN STOCKHOLM. THEREFORE, FOR BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, USDEL BELIEVES WE SHOULD TAKE A CAUTIOUS AND QUESTIONING APPROACH TO THE NNA NUF TEXT.
-
7. AS WITH ANY DOCUMENT CONCEIVED AND DESIGNED BY A COMMITTEE -- IN THIS CASE A GROUP OF VERY INDEPENDENT (READ: STUBBORN) NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED STATES RANGING FROM SWITZERLAND TO YUGOSLAVIA TO MALTA -- THE NNA NUF TEXT DEFIES CATEGORIZATION. IT IS A HODGEPODGE OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS LARGELY DRAWN FROM THE HELSINKI



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FINAL ACT. FORTUNATELY IT REPRESENTS MORE OF A LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR APPROACH, I.E., ONLY ELEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL OF THE NNA, THAN THE EARLIER CHRISTMAS TREE APPROACH, I.E., CONTAINING EVERYBODY'S FAVORITE NUF ORNAMENT. IN ADDITION, THE FINAL VERSION ELIMINATED THE EARLIER UP-FRONT REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT THE FOLLOWING NUF LANGUAGE CONTAINED AN "INDICATIVE LOT OF ELEMENTS," THEREBY SUGGESTING THAT THE NNA ELEMENTS WERE NOT EXHAUSTIVE. THIS ORIGINAL REFERENCE WAS INTRODUCED BY THE SWEDES, PRESUMABLY IN ANTICIPATION OF EASTERN DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE "RESTRICTED" NATURE OF THE NNA NUF TEXT. FORTUNATELY, THE SWISS AND AUSTRIANS STRONGLY OBJECTED TO THE REFERENCE TO AN "INDICATIVE LIST OF ELEMENTS" AND THE REFERENCE WAS DROPPED IN THE FINAL VERSION. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, THE LENGTH (THREE AND A HALF PAGES) AND DETAIL (THERE IS, FOR EXAMPLE, AN EXTENDED PARAGRAPH ON TERRORISM) OF THE NNA TEXT MIGHT INVITE ELABORATION RATHER THAN CONDENSATION. LASTLY, IN ORDER TO BUY MALTA'S ACQUIESCENCE, THE NNA ACCEPTED AN UNFORTUNATE REFERENCE TO "SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN" IN THE TEXT. GIVEN THE IMPORTANT ROLE THE NUF TEXT (AS WELL AS THE WHOLE NNA PACKAGE) IS LIKELY

FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE

TO PLAY IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS, IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE ALLIANCE TO ESTABLISH A COMMON LINE ON THE PACKAGE. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE OFFER SOME OF U.S. DELEGATION'S INITIAL THOUGHTS ON THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA DOCUMENT.

8. NUF SECTION OF THE NNA DOCUMENT (WITH USDEL COMMENTS).

NON-USE OF FORCE - TEXT

1) THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS, AND THUS TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. THEY ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA.

ANALYSIS

THIS LANGUAGE IS BASED ON SC.3 AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IT INTRODUCES THE NEED FOR "IMPROVED AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS (THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT) PROVISIONS." SUCH LANGUAGE, PARTICULARLY UP FRONT IN THE NUF TEXT, CLEARLY BUTTRESSES THE WEST'S CASE REGARDING THE NECESSITY OF IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HFA. FINALLY, IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE NNA CHOSE



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| | |
|---|---|
| - - - | TO APPEASE THE MALTESE |
| - - - | BY PLACING A REFERENCE |
| - - - | TO MEDITERRANEAN SECU- |
| - - - | RITY EARLY IN THE NUF |
| - - - | TEXT. THE SWISS CLAIM |
| - - - | THAT THIS REFERENCE WAS |
| - - - | THE LEAST HARMFUL OF |
| - - - | THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE. |
| - - - | ANOTHER OPTION, FOR |
| - - - | EXAMPLE, WAS TO PLACE |
| - - - | THIS REFERENCE IN THE |
| - - - | NOTIFICATION SECTION OF |
| - - - | THE TEXT. IN ANY CASE, |
| - - - | PUTTING THE REFERENCE |
| - - - | IN THE CONTEXT OF |
| - - - | "SECURITY IN EUROPE AS |
| - - - | A WHOLE" REINFORCES THE |
| - - - | MANDATE'S ZONE OF |
| - - - | APPLICATION, ACCORDING |
| - - - | TO THE SWISS. |
| - | |
| 2) ALL THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, WILL ALL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS. RESPECT FOR THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE PROGRESS OF COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS. | THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THIS PARA IS LIFTED DIRECTLY FROM THE HFA (AFTER THE "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PAR- TICIPATING STATES") AND REINFORCES OUR POINT ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF BALANCE BETWEEN ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE HFA. |
| 3) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY WITHIN THE CSCE. | THIS LANGUAGE IS ALSO LIFTED FROM THE HFA. THE "COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF |
| - - - | SECURITY" REFERS TO THE |
| - - - | COMPLEMENTARITY AND |
| - - - | IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL |
| - - - | TEN HFA PRINCIPLES AND |
| - - - | SECURITY IN EUROPE, |
| - - - | OASED ON OUR READING OF |
| - - - | THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY |

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE



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OF HELSINKI. IT IS NOT, AS THE EAST WILL CLAIM, THAT BOTH POLITICAL, I.E., DECLARATORY, AND MILITARY, I.E., CSBMS, AGREEMENTS CAN AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE.

4) THEY STRESS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IS A UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BINDING ALL STATES, AND THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH IT SUBSEQUENTLY CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

THIS SENTENCE REFLECTS THE JUS COGENS NATURE OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE, I.E., THAT NUF IS A UNIVERSAL NORM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WHICH EXTENDS BEYOND TREATY OBLIGATIONS. HOWEVER, THE LAST PORTION OF THE PHRASE, MISCHIEVOUSLY INTRODUCED BY THE CYPRIOTS, MIGHT WARRANT FURTHER ANALYSIS. WHAT DOES NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THIS OBLIGATION ENTAIL? WHO DETERMINES NON-COMPLIANCE? ANY LANGUAGE SPONSORED BY THE CYPRIOTS, FURTHERMORE, CANNOT BE DIVORCED FROM THEIR UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE ON THE GREEK/TURKISH/CYPRIOT DISPUTE.

5) THEY REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT THIS PRINCIPLE, CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, SO AS TO ENSURE THAT, AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, IT IS STRICTLY AND EFFECTIVELY OBSERVED. NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.

THIS SECTION IS AN AMALGAM OF HFA AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT LANGUAGE. IT, AS WELL AS THE PREVIOUS SECTION, REFLECTS A SLOPPY MIX OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONCEPTS OF NUF. FURTHERMORE, ITS ASSERTION THAT "NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED" TO WARRANT THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IS UNCOMFORTABLY CATEGORICAL. THE NUF PRINCIPLE CONTAINED IN THE



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- - - UN CHARTER (ARTICLE
- - - 2(4)) IS BALANCED, FOR
- - - EXAMPLE, BY THE CHAPTER
- - - VII AUTHORITY OF THE
- - - SECURITY COUNCIL TO
- - - DETERMINE A BREACH OF
- - - THE PEACE, E.G. AN ACT
- - - VIOLATING THE PRIN-
- - - CIPLE, INCLUDING
- - - MEASURES TAKEN PURSUANT
- - - TO ARTICLE 51 OF THE
- - - CHARTER (INDIVIDUAL AND
- - - COLLECTIVE SELF-
- - - DEFENSE). THE PRIMACY
- - - OF THE CHARTER'S PROVI-
- - - SIONS, WHILE NOTED
- - - LATER ON, IS NOT
- - - DIRECTLY RELATED TO
- - - THIS SECTION.
-

6) THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS.

INTRODUCES ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER INTO THE CSCE CONTEXT.

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE

7) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL,
-- FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NA'IONS AND WITH THE FINAL ACT, AND, ACCORDINGLY,
-- FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS,
REGARDLESS OF THE STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THIS STATE RELATIONS OF

THIS SECTION, PARTIALLY TAKEN FROM THE HFA, REPRESENTS WHAT IS LEFT OF THE LONG (UP TO TEN SEPARATE ELEMENTS) LIST OF ELEMENTS OF THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, FIRST INTRODUCED BY THE CYPRIOTS. THE SECTION WAS THE CORE OF THE EARLIER VERSIONS OF THE NUF TEXT. WE CAN, THEREFORE, BE THANKFUL THAT THIS SECTION HAS BEEN EMASCULATED. THE SECTION IS NOT,HOWEVER, IMPOTENT. BY DISCUSSING "ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" IT OPENS THE TEXT UP FOR DISCUSSION OF TYPES OF MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, A DISCUSSION THE EAST WOULD



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ALLIANCE.

CERTAINLY WELCOME. FURTHERMORE, WHAT DOES "DIRECT OR INDIRECT" MEAN IN THIS CONTEXT. IF IT IS ALL-INCLUSIVE OF TYPES OF THE USE OF FORCE, IT IS UNNECESSARY; IF IT IS NOT, IT INVITES SPECULATION AS TO WHAT TYPES OF FORCE ARE EXCLUDED AND, THEREFORE, PERMISSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EAST WILL CERTAINLY HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THIS SECTION, WHICH CLEARLY AND POINTEDLY REJECTS THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE.

8) NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.

HFA LANGUAGE, WHICH THE CYPRIOTS WILL, NO DOUBT, CLAIM IS PERTINENT TO TURKISH "OCCUPATION" OF CYPRUS. IT COULD ALSO, OF COURSE, BE INTERPRETED AS RELATING TO SOVIET POST-WAR POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE, GENERALLY, AND THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, SPECIFICALLY.

9) THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE EXISTING OR ARISING BETWEEN THEM. THEY ALSO EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO REINFORCE, IMPROVE AND DEVELOP THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FROM USDEL

BASED ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES LANGUAGE IN THE HFA AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WE WILL HAVE TO LOOK AT THIS SECTION MORE CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE IF IT PREJUDICES THE WEST'S POSITION ON PSOD AS DEVELOPED IN ATHENS FOR FUTURE MEETINGS ON THIS SUBJECT. THE SECTION, FOR EXAMPLE, CALLS PSOD "AN ESSENTIAL" ELEMENT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE



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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

| | |
|---|---|
| - - - | AND, THEREFORE, LINKS NUF AND PSOD MORE FIRMLY THAN PREVIOUSLY. |
| - | |
| 10) THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES. | THIS SECTION WAS INCLUDED BECAUSE OF STRONG SWISS INSISTENCE (THE SWISS SAID THEY WOULD NOT CO-SPONSOR THE FULL NNA PACKAGE WITHOUT A HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE IN THE NUF PORTION OF THE TEXT). IT IS THE FIRST TIME, IN OUR RECOLLECTION, |
| - - - | THAT HUMAN RIGHTS HAS |
| - - - | BEEN SO DIRECTLY AND |
| - - - | PROMINENTLY LINKED TO |
| - - - | SECURITY IN THE CSCE |
| - - - | CONTEXT. WHILE WE, OF |
| - - - | COURSE, MUST WELCOME |
| - - - | THIS LINKAGE, WE SHOULD |
| - - - | BE AWARE THAT THIS |
| - - - | CREATES A PRECEDENT FOR |
| - - - | ELEVATING THE STATUS OF |
| - - - | THE OTHER TEN HFA PRIN- |
| - - - | CIPLES IN THE CDE |
| - - - | CONTEXT. |
| - | |
| 11) THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR TO SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AND WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES | IF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE BECAME KNOWN AS "THE SWISS OBSESSION," A TERRORISM REFERENCE (OR THE PREVENTION THEREOF) WAS ADOPTED WITH EQUAL PASSION BY THE YUGOSLAVS. THE YUGOSLAVS, OF COURSE, ARE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF CROATIAN EXILE ORGANIZATIONS. THE EARLIER LANGUAGE OF THE SECTION IS BORROWED FROM THE HFA AND THE LATTER FROM THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT (P.34). GIVEN THE |



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ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM.

IMPORTANCE AND THE LEGAL COMPLEXITIES INVOLVED WITH THE ISSUE, DEPARTMENT LEGAL EXPERTS MAY WANT TO COMMENT ON THIS PASSAGE.

12) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY DECLARE THAT THEIR EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT DOCUMENT.

THE FIRST SENTENCE IS LIFTED FROM ARTICLE X OF THE HFA. THE SECOND SENTENCE, HOWEVER, SEEMS TO STAND ARTICLE X LOGIC ON ITS HEAD. INSTEAD OF DECLARING THAT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, THIS SECTION DECLARES THAT "THEIR (THE PARTICIPATING STATE'S) EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT DOCUMENT." THUS, THIS A PRIORI LOGIC SEEMS TO

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE

POSITIVELY PREJUDGE THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN. FURTHERMORE, WHAT DOES "INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS" MEAN? UN CHARTER? HFA? BILATERAL AGREEMENTS? BREZHNEV DOCTRINE?

13) THEY CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL.

THIS SECTION, BASED ON THE HFA, REAFFIRMS THE PRIMACY OF THE UN CHARTER (ARTICLE 103). WHILE WE CAN FULLY SUPPORT THE CONTENT, WE MAY HAVE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS PLACEMENT. WHY IS IT NOT GIVEN A PRIDE OF PLACE EARLY IN THE NUF TEXT?



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|---|---|
| 14) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THE EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE REQUIRE DETERMINED EFFORTS BY ALL OF THEM TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION, STRENGTHEN SECURITY FOR ALL AND PROMOTE DISARMAMENT. | THE PASSAGE REFLECTS AN AMALGAM OF MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND SC.3 LANGUAGE AND CONTAINS A STRANGE MIX OF POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME POLITICAL CONCEPTS. IT WAS INCLUDED AT THE INSISTENCE OF THE SWEDES AND THE YUGOSLAVS. DOES THE "SITUATION IN EUROPE" REQUIRE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO "PROMOTE DISARMAMENT" AS THE SOVIETS FREQUENTLY INSIST? DOES THE CALL FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO "PROMOTE DISARMAMENT" PREJUDICE OUR POSITION ABOUT A POSSIBLE SECOND CDE STAGE? CAN DISARMAMENT, A MEANS TO AN END, BE EQUATED WITH BUILDING CONFIDENCE OR STRENGTHENING SECURITY AS THIS PASSAGE SUGGESTS? |
| 15) BY THEIR VERY NATURE CONCRETE CSBM'S SERVE TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. | THIS FIRST SENTENCE IS A PARAPHRASE OF A MUCH MORE COMPLETE AND, IN OUR MIND, MORE EFFECTIVE REFERENCE TO THE LINKAGE OF NUF AND CSBM'S CONTAINED IN SC.3. NEVERTHELESS, THIS LINKAGE, I.E., THE NUF COMMITMENT IS A FUNCTION OF THE CSBM'S AGREED UPON, UNDERSCORES THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT. |
| BARRY<br>END OF MESSAGE | CONFIDENTIAL<br>NNNN |



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SUBJECT: <><>CDE<><> NATO CAUCUS MEETING, NOVEMBER 15, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 8763
1. <><>CDE<><> VIII - 027
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NOVEMBER 15 SESSION OF THE <><>CDE<><> NATO CAUCUS FOCUSED ON THE ALLIANCE'S PERFORMANCE IN THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) CRITICIZED FRANCE BOTH FOR INVITING EASTERN QUESTIONS ON THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND FOR STATING THAT "WE" (IMPLYING NATO) REJECT THE IDEA OF CEILINGS AS A MEASURE OF CONSTRAINT. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), HOWEVER, WAS UNREPENTANT. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE CAUCUS NEEDED TO GENERATE BETTER DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS ON THE BASIS OF SC.1. TO RESPOND TO EASTERN DEMANDS FOR MORE DETAILS ON NATO'S PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. HOWEVER, THE CAUCUS SPLIT ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER WE SHOULD DEVELOP POSITIONS THAT GO BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN SC.1. THE NETHERLANDS LED THOSE ARGUING THAT WE HAD TO FILL IN THE "BLANKS" ON THIS ISSUE, WHILE THE U.S. AND TURKEY URGED A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH. WITH REGARD TO THE NNA PAPER, THE CAUCUS DECIDED TO LET THE NNA TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO EXPLAIN IT IN THE WORKING GROUPS. THE NNA, HOWEVER, FEAR SUCH AN EXERCISE COULD DESTROY THEIR TENUOUS UNITY. END SUMMARY

4. INFORMAL WORKING GROUP PERFORMANCE: BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) OPENED BY APPEALING FOR BETTER ALLIANCE COHESION AND AGAIN PRESSED STRONGLY FOR THE CAUCUS TO DESIGNATE NATO TEAMS FOR EACH WORKING CLUSTER. HE CRITICIZED "ONE DELEGATION" (FRANCE) FOR INVITING EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF FUNCTIONALLY RELATED NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES AND ZEROED IN ON THE FRENCH AGAIN FOR STATING THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE NOT CSBM'S AND FOR REJECTING THE IDEA OF CEILINGS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES. BUWALDA REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT THIS WAS NOT THE ALLIANCE POSITION AND THAT DELEGATIONS WHICH FEEL



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THEY HAVE TO MAKE SUCH A POINT SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE DOING SO IN THEIR NATIONAL CAPACITY. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) WAS UNREPENTANT AND DEFLECTED BUWALDA'S CRITICISM BY SIMPLY IGNORING THE NAVAL AND AIR ISSUE (AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE FRENCH SEEM INTENT ON PLAYING THEIR OWN HAND) AND NOTING THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATO POSITION ON CONSTRAINTS, FRANCE HAD MADE THE TACTICAL DECISION TO REJECT CEILINGS NOW, SO THAT ANY ALLIANCE DECISION TO ACCEPT A CEILING LATER COULD BE MADE TO APPEAR AS A CONCESSION. WHILE SUPPORTING BUWALDA'S CALL FOR IMPROVED ALLIANCE COHESION, BARRY (U.S.) OFFERED SOME SUPPORT TO GASCHIGNARD BY OBSCRVING THAT ON THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE THE CAUCUS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE CONCLUSION THAT AN ACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINT CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE FOUND. BUWALDA'S TEAM SUGGESTION WAS STUDIOUSLY IGNORED BY ALL.

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5. AIR AND NAVAL: THE CAUCUS TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN TO PRESSURE NATO FOR MORE DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSAL ON THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. SOMC DELEGATIONS (NO'ABLY THE FRG, NETHERLANDS AND UK) BELIEVE THAT WE ARE VULNERABLE ON THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF DETAIL IN SC.1. WHILE THERE WAS GENERAL UNDERSTANDING THAT WE COULD NOT GO BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN SC.1 WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS AND BRUSSELS, THE CAUCUS SPLIT OVER WHETHER THIS WAS THE TIME TO SECK SUCH INSTRUCTIONS. THE NETHERLANDS, SPAIN AND FRANCE FELT THAT WE HAD TO FILL IN THE "BLANKS" IN SC.1 ON WHAT CAN AND CANNO' BE NOTIFIED UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE U.S. AND TURKEY URGED MORE CAUTION. BARRY (U.S.) CONTENDED THAT WE SHOULD RALLY OUR ARGUMENTS AROUND SC.1 AND NOT BE EMBARRASSED IF WE HAVE TO BE EVASIVE ON CERTAIN ISSUES. BOLUKBASI (TURKISH DEPREP) FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: <><>CDE<><>, CSCE, PARM, PREL

STRONGLY ARGUED THAT GIVEN PRESENT SOVIET "ATTITUDES" TOWARD SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF CSBM'S THIS WAS NOT THE TIME TO CONSIDER IMPROVEMENTS OR AMENDMENTS TO SC.1. SUCH CHANGES, HE SAID, SHOULD BE SAVED FOR THE END-GAME. CITRON (FRG) OBSERVED THAT THERE WERE TWO TASKS WHICH NEEDED TO BE PERFORMED; 1) ON THE BASIS OF SC.1, THE WEST NEEDS TO IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS TO BEST PROMOTE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (ALL AGREED); AND 2) QUESTIONS NEED TO BE DEVELOPED ON STEPS GOING BEYOND SC.1, WHICH THE CAUCUS COULD THEN DECIDE TO REFER TO CAPITALS AND/OR BRUSSELS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO REFER 'MESE TWO QUESTIONS BACK TO THE RESPECTIVE NATO MINI-CAUCUSES FOR THE OBSERVATION AND NOTIFICATION GROUPS, WHICH WILL UNDERTAKE BOTH TASKS AND REPORT TO THE CAUCUS.

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6. NNA PAPER: THE CAUCUS DISCUSSED THE NNA PAPER BRIEFLY AND IN GENERAL CONFIRMED THE APPROACH DECIDED UPON ON NOVEMBER 13 (REFTEL). THE ENTIRE NNA PACKAGE WAS REFERRED FOR ANALYSIS TO THE RESPECTIVE NATO MINI-CAUCUSES, AND IN THE MEANTIME IT WAS AGREED TO LET THE NNA TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO EXPLAIN THEIR PAPER IN THE WORKING GROUPS WHILE THE ALLIANCE LIMITS ITSELF TO NON-LEADING, CLARIFYING QUESTIONS. (COMMENT: SINCE THE NOVEMBER 15 CAUCUS MEETING, USDEL HAS LEARNED FROM NNA CONTACTS THAT THE DELICATE BALANCE ENGINEERED AMONG THE PAPER'S FRACTIOUS SPONSORS MAY NOT WITHSTAND A DETAILED EXPLANATION. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY OUR NNA FRIENDS TO ADDRESS NON-CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS TO THEM FOR THE TIME BEING AND TO AVOID PROBING TOO DEEPLY INTO THOSE AREAS OF THE PAPER WHERE JERRY-BUILT COMPROMISES MAY NOT WITHSTAND CLOSE INSPECTION. END COMMENT.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE



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SUUJECT: <><>CDE<><> WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, NOVEMBER 11-15, 1985
1. <><>CDE<><> VIII - 028
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE LONG AWAITED AND MUCH DELAYED COMPREHENSIVE NNA WORKING DOCUMENT (SC.7) FINALLY SAW THE LIGHT OF DAY ON NOVEMBER 15. THE BIRTH OF THE NNA BABY WAS BOTH PROTRACTED (IT WAS FIRST EXPECTED IN EARLY OCTOBER) AND PAINFUL (COMPLICATIONS AROSE AS VARIOUS NNA FATHERS DISCLAIMED PATERNITY). WHILE WE HAVE WELCOMED THE HAPPY EVENT, WE HAVE AVOIDED DISPLAYING TOO MUCH AFFECTION. THE EAST, MEANWHILE, CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATING A COMPLETE PACKAGE OF CSBM'S,
-

INCLUDING NATO'S PROPOSALS COVERING GROUND ACTIVITIES, IS CONTINGENT ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. FURTHERMORE, PROGRESS IN DRAFTING CSBM'S IS CONTINGENT ON COMPARABLE PROGRESS IN DRAFTING A NUF COMMITMENT. THIS DOUBLE LINKAGE, OF COURSE, IS A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE. END SUMMARY.
4. NEW LEADERSHIP/OLD FACES: WITH THE ADVENT OF A NEW WORKING STRUCTURE MOST CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS EXPECTED
<> THE EIGHTH ROUND OF THE <><>CDE<><> TO YIELD SOME PROGRESS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW, AFTERO ALL, HAD ALTERED THE TONE, IF NOT THE SUBSTANCE, OF ITS MESSAGE TO THE WEST. IN STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN LESS POLEMIC AND MORE FORTHCOMING DURING THE SEVENTH ROUND. HOWEVER, CONTRARY TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF SOME, THE EAST HAS CHOSEN TO STALL ON SUBSTANCE AND TO BLAME THE WEST FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS. WHY THEN, ON THE EVE OF THE U.S.-USSR SUMMIT, DID THE NEW LEADERSHIP CHOOSE TO SHOW ITS OLD FACE IN STOCKHOLM?
-
5. A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE: HOW MUCH OF THE SOVIET APPROACH IS SUBSTANTIVE AND HOW MUCH IS TACTICAL IS DIFFICULT TO FATHOM. SUBSTANTIVELY, THE SOVIETS HAVE LITTLE NEW TO SAY ON WESTERN CSBM'S. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WOULD LIKE THE WEST TO ADDRESS THEIR PROPOSALS ON NON-USE OF FORCC AND INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THESE TWO SUBJECTS ARE NOT UNRELATED, IN THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE. THE SOVIETS WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO





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REDEFINE THE MADRID MANDATE AND TO CAPTURE U.S. AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE ZONE; FURTHERMORE, THEY WANT TO MAKE NUF THE CENTERPIECE OF ANY AGREEMENT COMING OUT OF STOCKHOLM. THEY HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED ON BOTH COUNTS. NEITHER NATO NOR THE NNA HAVE ACCEPTED THIS PECULIAR EASTERN NOTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S. SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO WIN THE DAY ON SUBSTANCE, THEY HAVE RESORTED TO TACTICAL SUBTERFUGES TO MAKE THEIR POINTS. THE EAST NOW ARGUES THAT PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATING A COMPLETE PACKAGE OF CSBM'S, INCLUDING NATO'S PROPOSALS COVERING GROUND ACTIVITIES, IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF THE WEST ACCEPTS NEGOTIATIONS ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. FURTHERMORE, PROGRESS IN DRAFTING CSBM'S IS CONTINGENT ON COMPARABLE PROGRESS IN DRAFTING A NUF COMMITMENT. THIS DOUBLE LINKAGE, OF COURSE, IS A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE.

6. THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT: THE EAST POINTS TO THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14 TO BUTTRESS ITS CASE. THIS AGREEMENT, THE EAST CLAIMS, CALLS FOR PARALLEL PROGRESS TOWARD DRAFTING ON BOTH NUF AND CSBM'S. THE WEST, BY NOT DISCUSSING THE SOVIET NUF PROPOSAL, BY ARGUING THAT NUF IS NOT A CSBM, AND BY NOT SUBMITTING ITS OWN NUF LANGUAGE, HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS PART OF THE BARGAIN, ACCORDING TO THE EAST. THE GENTLEMEN'S

AGREEMENT, OF COURSE, SAYS NOTLING OF THE SORT. IT CALLS FOR "INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCESS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE ON A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S" (NOT DRAFTING ON NUF AND CSBM'S). IN ANY CASE, WE HAVE ARGUED THAT THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT WILL SERVE US ONLY IF IT ENABLES US TO MOVE AHEAD ON SUBSTANCE; IT WILL DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD IF IT BECOMES A TOPIC OF SERIOUS DEBATE AND AN EXCUSE FOR AVOIDING KEY ISSUES.

FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: <><>CDE<><>, CSCE, PARM, PREL

7. GODOT HAS ARRIVED; THE EAST HAS SAID, IN EFFECT, THAT ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES ARE PREMATURE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT AND IN ANTICIPATION OF THE LONG AWAITED AND MUCH DELAYED NNA DOCUMENT. THE EAST WAS NOT ALONE IN WAITING FOR GODOT. HOWEVER, CONTRARY TO BECKETT'S CLASSIC, GODOT HAS FINALLY ARRIVED IN THE FORM OF A COMPREHENSIVE NNA WORKING DOCUMENT (SC.7), TABLED IN PLENARY ON NOVEMBER 15. THE BIRTH OF THE NNA BABY WAS BOTH PROTRACTED AND PAINFUL. THE BABY WAS FIRST EXPECTED IN EARLY OCTOBER BUT DUE TO COMPLICATIONS, THE DATE HAD TO BE CHANGED ALMOST ON A WEEKLY BASIS. ONLY WHEN THE CONGENITALLY OPTIMISTIC SWEDISH AMBASSADOR LIDGARD, THE CONFERENCE'S BEST REVERSE BAROMETER, BEGAN TO EXPRESS DOUBTS LAST WEEK THAT THE NNA COULD GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER DID WE SUSPECT THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT WAS IMMINENT. AS WITH ANY DOCUMENT CONCEIVED AND DESIGNED BY A COMMITTEE (IN THIS CASE AUSTRIA,



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CYPRUS, FINLAND, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, YUGOSLAVIA, AND LIECHTENSTEIN), THE NNA PAPER DEFIES CATEGORIZATION. IN ORDER TO GET ALL OF THE NNA ON BOARD, THE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CHANGED SOMEWHAT FROM EARLIER DRAFTS, E.G., REFERENCES IN THE DOCUMENT TO "NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION" HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO "NORMAL LOCATIONS" TO MOLLIFY THE YUGOSLAVS, AND THE DEFINITION OF MANEUVERS HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY REWORKED BECAUSE OF FINNISH INSISTENCE THAT THE CONCEPT OF "MOVEMENTS" BE MAINTAINED ALONG WITH "MANEUVERS." WHILE WE WILL CERTAINLY NEED TIME TO STUDY THE NNA TEXT MORE CAREFULLY, IT IS CLEAR THAT THESE ELEVENTH-HOUR CHANGES TO THE PACKAGE DO NOTHING TO ASSIST WESTERN CSBM CONCEPTS. (FULL ANALYSIS OF THE PAPER FOLLOWS SEPTEL.)

8. U.S. LINE. WHILE WE HAVE WELCOMED THE NNA DOCUMENT, WE WILL AVOID EMBRACING IT TOO WARMLY, BOTH BECAUSE WE HAVE CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES, E.G. ON CONSTRAINTS AND CONSULTATIONS, AND BECAUSE A WARM WESTERN EMBRACE COULD BECOME THE KISS OF DEATH IN A CONFERENCE FULL OF JEALOUS SUITORS. WE HAVE SAID THAT THE PAPER IS AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE, NECESSARILY, THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS. IT IS NOT, IN OUR VIEW, A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT, SINCE IT REFLECTS THE NNA'S SOVEREIGN SECURITY INTERESTS; IT DOES NOT REPRESENT AN ARBITRARY MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS. OVER THE COMING WEEKS, BASED ON NNA EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR OWN PAPER, WE WILL BE QUESTIONING AND PROBING THE NNA. NATURALLY, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO DRAW OUT THE NNA ON POSITIONS WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO SC.1/AMPLIFIED. FOR THE TIME BEING, WE WILL AVOID NEURALGIC POINTS FOR THE NNA, E.G. NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, MOVEMENT VS MANEUVERS, TO GIVE THEM TIME TO GET THEIR OWN ACT TOGETHER. INTERESTINGLY, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, IN HIS FIRST COMMENTS ON THE PAPER, HAS ALREADY REJECTED CERTAIN NNA CONCEPTS, SUCH AS "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST."

9. TROUBLE SPOTS: SOME NATO CAUCUS MEMBERS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ALLIANCE'S PERFORMANCE TO DATC IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS. THE UNREPENTANT FRENCH, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR CRITICISM. THE DUTCH HAVE BEEN MOST EXPLICIT IN THEIR CRITICISM. THE FRENCH, ACCORDING TO THE DUTCH, HAVE DEPARTED FROM COMMON ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON A SERIES OF ISSUES FROM NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS. THIS LACK OF ALLIANCE COHESION, IN THE DUTCH VIEW, CALLS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A "TEAM DE FILE" SYSTEM, I.E., COORDINATING TEAMS WHO WILL ALSO ACT AS PRIMARY SPEAKERS IN EACH WORKING GROUP WITHIN NATO.





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WHILE WE COULD SUPPORT THE STATED DUTCH GOAL, I.E., IMPROVED COORDINATION OF WORKING GROUP INTERVENTIONS, WE CANNOT, AT THIS STAGE, SUPPORT THEIR RECOMMENDED MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS END. THE TEAM DE FILE SUGGESTION WAS STUDIOUSLY IGNORED IN THE CAUCUS. OVER THE COMING WEEKS, MOREOVER, WE WILL FACE ANOTHER PROBLEM: THE PROLIFERA-
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: <><>CDE<><>, CSCE, PARM, PREL
TION OF DRAFT NUF TEXTS. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE ITALIANS AND THE FRENCH WILL SOON THROW THEIR NUF HATS INTO AN ALREADY CROWDED NATO RING (DENMARK AND CANADA HAVE ALREADY FLOATED NUF LANGUAGE WITHIN NATO AND THE SOVIETS, ROMANIANS, AND NNA HAVE INTRODUCED TEXTS IN STOCKHOLM). FINALLY, EVERYBODY'S LEAST FAVORITE GADFLY HAS ALIGHTED AGAIN. THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, ACCORDING TO THE NEW MALTESE AMBASSADOR, IF WE ARE TO REACH AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE



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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08824
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, 11/18/85
L. CDE VIII - 026
2. FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, MADE TO THE CDE TODAY, NOVEMBER L8.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
LAST WEEK THE ATTENTION OF THIS CONFERENCE WAS DIRECTED INWARD -- ON OUR NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COLLEAGUES AND THE PROPOSALS WHICH THEY PRESENTED ON NOVEMBER L5. MY DELEGATION WELCOMES THE INTRODUCTION OF CONFERENCE DOCUMENT SC.7. WE RECOGNIZE THAT A VAST AMOUNT OF WORK HAS GONE INTO IT AND THAT IT HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT TASK TO NEGOTIATE COMMON POSITIONS ON KEY NATIONAL SECURITY QUESTIONS AMONG A GROUP OF COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND VARIED NATIONAL DEFENSE PROBLEMS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RESULTING PROPOSALS DO NOT REPRESENT AN EFFORT TO DEFINE A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF EAST AND WEST, BUT RATHER AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE SOVEREIGN INTERESTS OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MADRID MANDATE. MY DELEGATION WILL GIVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO ALL ASPECTS OF SC.7 IN THIS CONTEXT.
WHILE NOT WISHING TO PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME OF OUR STUDY OR ANTICIPATE THE EXPLANATIONS WHICH WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM SC.7'S CO-SPONSORS, I WANT TO SAY THAT I STILL BELIEVE THAT SC.L/AMPLIFIED PROVIDES THE BEST BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE VERIFIABLE AND HAVE REAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. BUT AS WE PURSUE OUR EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND FOR AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, WE WILL TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF SC.7 AS A SERIOUS AND INDEPENDENT CONTRIBUTION TO OUR WORK. IN SC.L/AMPLIFIED AND SC.7, WE NOW HAVE TWO DETAILED, FULLY DEVELOPED NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE CONFERENCE.
THIS WEEK, MR. CHAIRMAN, AT LEAST PART OF OUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED OUTWARDS -- ON GENEVA AND THE MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WHICH WILL BE TAKING PLACE TOMORROW AND WEDNESDAY. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT WHAT THE UNITED STATES SEEKS IN GENEVA AND HOW WE BELIEVE THIS CAN AFFECT OUR WORK HERE.
PERSONALLY, I HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN EACH OF THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS SINCE L972 AT VARIOUS LEVELS AND IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES. THEREFORE, I PERSONALLY SEE THE GENEVA MEETING AS A RESUMPTION OF A PROCESS WHICH HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED FOR TOO LONG. MY GOVERNMENT REGRETTED THAT, IN VIENNA IN L979, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO AGREE TO REGULARLY SCHEDULED SUMMIT MEETINGS AND A



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SERIES OF REGULAR MEETINGS AT SUBORDINATE LEVELS. AND WE REGRETTED THAT EVENTS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS SINCE THEN MADE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE. SO IT IS OUR HOPE THAT GENEVA WILL MARK THE RESUMPTION OF A PROCESS WHERE OUR LEADERS CAN GRAPPLE WITH ISSUES AND TRY TO CLEAR THE ATMOSPHERE. BUT AN AGREEMENT TO HOLD MORE MEETINGS IS NOT ALL THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE ACHIEVED IN GENEVA. WE HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN ALL FOUR AREAS ON THE US AGENDA: ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

ON ARMS CONTROL, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS ON THE COMPLEX NUCLEAR ISSUES BEING NEGOTIATED BY OUR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA. BUT WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE SOME FURTHER CLOSURE OF US AND SOVIET POSITIONS, THUS EASING THE TASK OF OUR GENEVA NEGOTIATORS. IN OTHER AREAS, INCLUDING THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, WE HOPE TO FORGE A BETTER BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN

FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. L2356: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, LL/L8/85

OTHER NEGOTIATING FORUMS.

SINCE US AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUES ARE SO FAR APART, AGREEMENT ON THEM WOULD SEEM BEYOND OUR GRASP. BUT DISCUSSION OF THESE QUESTIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, SUPPLEMENTING THE CONTINUING BILATERAL DIALOG WE HAVE HAD IN RECENT MONTHS, CAN DO FOR OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD WHAT THIS CONFERENCE IS TRYING TO DO FOR EUROPE -- REDUCE TENSIONS, MINIMIZE THE DANGERS OF MISCALCULATION, AND FOSTER A CONTEXT OF RESTRAINT.

ON BILATERAL ISSUES, WE BELIEVE SOME IF NOT ALL OF THE AGREEMENTS WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR MANY MONTHS WILL BE READY FOR SIGNATURE IN GENEVA. ADDRESSING THE NATION BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR GENEVA, PRESIDENT REAGAN SPOKE ELOQUENTLY ABOUT THE VALUE OF EXCHANGES OF YOUNG PEOPLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS WHICH WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES WHICH SEEMS READY FOR SIGNATURE.

AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS, REGRETTABLY, UNLIKELY; IT IS NOT EVEN AN AGREED AGENDA ITEM. BUT THE QUESTION WILL SURELY BE DISCUSSED, AND SOME HUMANITARIAN CASES REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN RESOLVED IN THE PRE-SUMMIT PERIOD. NATURALLY, WE HOPE MORE WILL BE DONE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, US OBJECTIVES AT THE GENEVA MEETING RESEMBLE IN SOME WAYS OUR GOALS HERE IN STOCKHOLM. IN BOTH PLACES WE WANT TO REAFFIRM AND GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE THROUGH



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SPECIFIC, CONCRETE MEASURES AND AGREEMENTS. IN BOTH PLACES WE WANT TO BUILD CONFIDENCE, REDUCE SUSPICION AND AVOID MISCALCULATION. COMPLIANCE, COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION ARE CENTRAL TO OUR POSITION IN GENEVA AS WELL AS STOCKHOLM.

THERE IS NO DOUBT, THEN, THAT WHAT HAPPENS IN THE TALKS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL BE RELEVANT TO OUR WORK HERE. THE COMPLEX MULTILATERAL ISSUES OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ARE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO RESOLUTION IN BILATERAL MEETINGS, HOWEVER ELEVATED; BUT, AS A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF MY GOVERNMENT SAID LAST WEEK, THE US SEEKS PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT WITH REGARD TO THE APPROACHES WHICH THE US AND THE USSR WILL TAKE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THIS COULD ACT AS A CATALYST FOR OUR WORK HERE AND HELP TO ASSURE THAT WE MAKE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ON THE ISSUES TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT POSSIBLE BEFORE TIME RUNS OUT ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE NEXT SUMMER.

IT IS, OF COURSE, POSSIBLE THAT THE GENEVA MEETING WILL NOT RESULT IN CLOSER APPROACHES ON OUR ISSUES HERE. MY GOVERNMENT WOULD REGRET THIS, BUT IT WOULD IN NO SENSE DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OR TO THE ENERGY WE WILL DEVOTE TO ACHIEVING IT. MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE, NO MATTER WHAT THIS WEEK BRINGS. IT IS TIME FOR US TO GET ON WITH IT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08916
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 20, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 8839
1. CDE VIII - 035
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS CONSIDERED A NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE 1986 CALENDAR THAT WOULD SCHEDULE FOUR SESSIONS WITH A JULY 18 TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND AN ABSOLUTE CUTOFF DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19. USDEL CAN SUPPORT THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF THIS PROPOSAL AND ANTICIPATES A FAVORABLE CAUCUS DECISION, ALTHOUGH CANADA CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT A CONSENSUS WILL BE NEEDED TO ADJOURN PRIOR TO THE NOVEMBER 4 VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. THERE WILL BE A SPECIAL CAUCUS SESSION TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION, PROBABLY NOVEMBER 25. WE THINK A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION IS WITHIN REACH. THE CAUCUS FURTHER DETERMINED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BEGIN TO ASK QUESTIONS ON THE NNA PAPER DESIGNED TO HIGHLIGHT PARALLELS BETWEEN THEIR PROPOSALS (SC.7) AND SC.1. FOR THE LONGER TERM, THE CAUCUS WILL CONSIDER TACTICS DESIGNED TO BREAK FRAGILE NNA UNITY ON POINTS WHICH ARE NOT IN OUR INTEREST. THE UK AND PORTUGAL VOICED CONTINUED CONCERN ABOUT ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE IN RESPONDING TO THE WARSAW PACT ON THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THE CAUCUS DISCUSSED WITHOUT RESOLUTION THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF NNA COORDINATORS TO BE EMPLOYED IN THE WORKING GROUPS. END SUMMARY.
-
4. 1986 CALENDAR: THE KEY ISSUE REMAINS THE CUTOFF DATE. A DRAFT PROPOSAL TO THE CONFERENCE GRID GROUP ON THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS TABLED AS A "COMPROMISE NON-PAPER" BY THE CANADIAN AND DUTCH DEPREPS (OUR REPS ON THE GRID GROUP) FOR CAUCUS CONSIDERATION. IT PROPOSES FOUR SCHEDULED SESSIONS IN 1986 BEGINNING ON JANUARY 21. THE THIRD SESSION WOULD CONCLUDE JULY 18 (THE TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT), AT WHICH TIME THE CONFERENCE COULD DECIDE BY CONSENSUS TO CONCLUDE, BUT A FOURTH SESSION IS PROPOSED FOR AUGUST 19 - SEPTEMBER 19, IF NECESSARY "TO COMPLETE THE DRAFTING OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT." IT NOTES THAT NO CDE MEETINGS WILL TAKE PLACE DURING THE VIENNA PREPCON OR MAIN REVIEW MEETINGS, AND STATES THAT THIS DECISION CAN ONLY BE ALTERED BY CONSENSUS. USDEL SUPPORTS THE THRUST OF THIS PROPOSAL BUT WILL TRY TO AMEND IT SO THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT EDITING SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY SEPTEMBER 19. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY THE FRENCH POSITION. CAUCUS CONSENSUS IS BUILDING FOR THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF. DELWORTH (CANADA), HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO EXAMINE THE ENTRAILS OF CSCE DOCUMENTS FOR THEOLOGICAL GUIDANCE AND HAS DETERMINED



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THAT THERE MUST BE A CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN OR SUSPEND THE CONFERENCE, AND THUS, IN HIS VIEW, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO WORK UNTIL NOVEMBER 4 (OR EVEN BEYOND). ALTHOUGH SOME OTHERS (UK, PORTUGAL) DO NOT DISAGREE WITH DELWORTH'S READING OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, NO ONE IS LIKELY TO SUPPORT HIM IN BLOCKING AN EMERGING CAUCUS CONSENSUS. IT IS THE USDEL'S VIEW THAT WE CAN ENGINEER A FAVORABLE CONCLUSION TO THIS DISCUSSION HERE IN STOCKHOLM. A SPECIAL CAUCUS SESSION WILL DEAL EXLUSIVELY WITH THIS TOPIC NEXT WEEK.

-

5. DEALING WITH THE NNA: AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) OBSERVED THAT HIS NNA CONTACTS INDICATE THAT DETAILED EXPLANATIONS OF THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING FOR FEAR SUCH EXPLANATIONS MIGHT UNRAVEL THE NNA'S POORLY WOVEN UNITY. BARRY ALSO REPORTED THAT NNA REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ENCOURAGED THE WEST ACTIVELY TO QUESTION THEIR PROPOSAL, WITH THE CAVEAT THAT NATO SHOULD AVOID THOSE AREAS OF THE PAPER WHERE COMPROMISES AND INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES MIGHT NOT WITHSTAND CLOSE SCRUTINY. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH BARRY'S SUGGESTION THAT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WE SHOULD DEVELOP QUESTIONS TO PUT TO THE NNA THAT HIGHLIGHT PARALLELS BETWEEN THEIR PAPER AND SC.1, WHILE AVOIDING
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 20, 1985
THE NNA'S SORE POINTS. FOR THE LONGER TERM, HOWEVER, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR EDES'S (UK) SUGGESTION THAT IT MAY BE IN OUR INTEREST TO BREAK NNA UNITY ON A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH WE DO NOT LIKE -- E.G., THEIR VARIATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, THE DETAILS OF THEIR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION REGIMES AND THEIR NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) PROPOSAL. DELWORTH (CANADA) ADDED THAT THE NNA'S HOUSE OF CARDS IS LIKELY TO FALL OF ITS OWN ACCORD. (COMMENT: IN FACT, WE HAVE ALREADY HEARD DIVERGENT VIEWS EXPRESSED ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE BY THE CYPRIOT AND AUSTRIAN REPRESENTATIVE, AND SEVERAL DIFFERENT SHADES OF THEIR POSITION ON INFORMATION FROM AUSTRIA, SWEDEN AND FINLAND DELEGATIONS. END COMMENT.) ONLY FRANCE WAS VOCAL IN OPPOSING THIS LINE AS GASCHIGNARD CAUTIONED AGAINST EMBARRASSING THE NNA OR REDUCING THEIR INFLUENCE, WHICH WE MAY NEED LATER. HOWEVER, EVEN DELWORTH, WHO USUALLY "SWIMS" WITH THE CAUCUS "WETS," SUPPORTED EDES ON THIS "GET TOUGH" TACTIC, ALTHOUGH HE ALSO ADVOCATED A LONGER TERM STRATEGY WHICH WOULD USE OUR QUESTIONS ON THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF SC.7 AS A MEANS OF DISCOVERING CONSENSUS LANGUAGE. IN RESPONSE TO THE LATER POINT, CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) ECHOED AN EARLIER ITALIAN WARNING THAT WE HAVE TO AVOID GIVING



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ANY IMPRESSSION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE NNA PROPOSALS. FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF EDES'S PROPOSAL WAS PUT INTO ABEYANCE UNTIL AFTER THE CAUCUS HAS HEARD A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SC.' FROM THE CAUCUS MINI-CLUSTER COORDINATING GROUPS.

6. AIR AND NAVAL: THE CAUCUS CONTINUES TO AWAIT THE MINI-CAUCUSES REPORT ON NEW ARGUMENTS TO BE USED IN RESPONDING TO EASTERN QUESTION ON THE MODALITIES OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN REGARD TO THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THE UK AND PORTUGAL WERE PARTICULARLY AGITATED ON THIS ISSUE. EDES (UK) OBSERVED THAT NATO IS VULNERABLE AND NEEDS TO DEVELOP PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENTS FOR OUR POSITION, IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST'S "REASONABLE QUESTIONS." HE ADDED THAT OUR PRESENT STANCE RUNS THE RISK OF LOSING THE ARGUMENT FOR THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. (COMMENT: OF IRONIC INTEREST WAS GASCHIGNARD'S (FRANCE) STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT THINK WE HAD TO BE IN A HURRY TO DEVELOP ANSWERS FOR THE EAST, WHEN, IN FACT, IT HAS BEEN HIS OWN MILITARY ADVISOR WHO HAS BEEN ROUNDLY CRITICIZED FOR WELCOMING EASTERN QUESTIONS ON THIS ISSUE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE FRENCH DELEGATION RECENTLY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO KEEP QUIET ON THIS ISSUE. END COMMENT.)

7. COORDINATORS: THE CAUCUS CONSIDERED, INCONCLUSIVELY, A HOST OF OPTIONS ON THE QUESTION OF HOW MANY NNA COORDINATORS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN THE WORKING CLUSTERS. KEY FACTORS CONSIDERED WERE THAT: 1) THE NNA CAN AGREE TO TWO COORDINATORS (NATO'S CURRENT POSITION), ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD PREFER FIVE; 2) IF ONLY TWO ARE EMPLOYED, THEY WOULD LIKELY BE LOIBL (AUSTRIA) AND LIDGARD (SWEDEN) WITH KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) HELD IN RESERVE FOR LATER (PERHAPS FOR WORKING GROUP AB); AND 3) THE EAST, ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY WILLING TO ACCEPT TWO COORDINATORS, WOULD PREFER TO HAVE FOUR, WITH ONE FOR EACH GROUP EXCEPT INFORMATION/VERIFICATION (A-2) WHICH WOULD BE SUBSUMED UNDER OTHER CLUSTERS; THUS ACHIEVING THE SOVIETS' OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING THOSE TOPICS AS INDEPENDENT MEASURES. THE CAUCUS PREFERENCE CONTINUES TO BE FOR TWO COORDINATORS (WHILE HOLDING OPEN THE OPTION OF MORE LATER), WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) WHO IS STUBBORNLY INSISTING ON FIVE COORDINATORS BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY WORK LOAD. THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO ARE MOST EAGER TO DRAFT (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, CANADA) ALSO PROPOSED, WITHOUT ATTRACTING MUCH SUPPORT, THAT COORDINATORS BE BROUGHT IN BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION, I.E., IN EARLY DECEMBER.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08980
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORIAL STATEMENT IN CDE 11/22/85
1. CDE VIII - 037
2. FOLLOWING ARE THE REMARKS MADE BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, TO THE CDE TODAY, NOVEMBER 22.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEK I WENT OUT ON A LIMB SOMEWHAT AND TALKED ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE ACHIEVED IN GENEVA AND HOW THIS MIGHT AFFECT OUR WORK HERE. I GUESS IT'S ONLY FAIR TO MEASURE MY EXPECTATIONS AGAINST THE REALITY OF THE PAST FEW DAYS. I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT MY RATHER MODEST PLAN HAS BEEN OVER-FULFILLED. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS CAME IN THE INTENSE, PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, OR THAT THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS ON SUCH FUNDAMENTALS AS IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL PURPOSE. AS THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY IN GENEVA SAYS, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON A NUMBER OF CRUCIAL ISSUES. BUT, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID BEFORE LEAVING GENEVA YESTERDAY, WE MAVE A PROCESS UNDERWAY WHICH CAN LEAD TO A MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP -- A "FRESH START" AS PRESIDENT REAGAN PUT IT.
PROFESSIONAL COMMUNIQUE READERS LIKE OURSELVES DEVELOP FAVORITE PASSAGES THEY PORE OVER. LET ME PICK OUT A FEW FROM THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT WHICH SEEM PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO OUR WORK HERE.
FIRST, THE TWO LEADERS "AGREED ABOUT THE NEED TO IMPROVE US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE."
SECOND, THEY EXPRESSED A "STRONG DESIRE TO SEEK COMMON GROUND ON EXISTING PROBLEMS."
THIRD, "THEY EMPHASIZED THE IMPERATIVE OF PREVENTING ANY WAR BETWEEN THEM, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL."
FOURTH, THEY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR CONFERENCE HERE IN STOCKHOLM AND "STATED THEIR INTENTION TO FACILITATE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE." THERE ARE MANY OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS MADE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT, BUT THESE FOUR SEEM PARTICULARLY RELEVANT.
WHAT DO THESE STATEMENTS MEAN FOR US HERE? LET ME BEGIN BY SAYING WHAT THEY DO NOT MEAN. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAVE NOT ROBBED US OF OUR MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD. THEY HAVE NOT TAKEN THE SUBSTANCE OUT OF OUR HANDS AND RESOLVED OUR PROBLEMS FOR US. INDEED, THEY COULD NOT; THIS IS A MULTILATERAL FORUM WHERE ALL MUST CONTRIBUTE TO SOLUTIONS ON THE BASIS OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY.
WHAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAVE



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PROVIDED TO US -- AND TO OTHER BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATING FORUMS -- IS A POLITICAL IMPULSE, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID -- PERHAPS A BIT OF ELECTRIC SHOCK DESIGNED TO SERVE AS A CATALYST TO OUR WORK. IN HIS REPORT LAST NIGHT TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS ON HIS RETURN FROM GENEVA, PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT THE TWO LEADERS MEANT TO GIVE A BOOST TO OUR EFFORTS HERE IN STOCKHOLM, AND TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AND ELSEWHERE AS WELL. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE TOLD ME BEFORE THE GENEVA MEETING; AS I SAID ON NOVEMBER LL, THE PRESIDENT INSTRUCTED ME ON NOVEMBER 5 TO REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENHANCE SECURITY AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN EUROPE.
FROM USDEL CDE
USIA FOR P/PFE
E.O. L2356: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORIAL STATEMENT IN CDE 11/22/85
WE ALL KNOW WHAT THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD LOOK LIKE. IT WILL EVOLVE FROM THE WORKING STRUCTURE; IT WILL INCLUDE A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AS WELL AS SPECIFIC, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. WE ALL ACCEPT THIS HERE IN THIS ROOM.
WE ALSO KNOW HOW AN AGREEMENT MUST BE PRODUCED. IT WILL BE THE RESULT OF STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND, NOT EFFORTS TO WIN DEBATING POINTS ON AREAS IN WHICH WE DISAGREE. THIS MEANS SETTING ASIDE AREAS WHERE THERE IS NO CONVERGENCE IN HOPES THAT THE MOMENTUM ACHIEVED IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WILL CARRY US THROUGH SOME PAINFUL COMPROMISES. ABOVE ALL, PROGRESS REQUIRES THAT WE NOT REFIGHT PROCEDURAL BATTLES OR ENGAGE IN THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES. WE DON'T HAVE THE TIME TO IMITATE THE CHURCH COUNCILS OF THE MIDDLE AGES.
MY DELEGATION IS READY TO PURSUE THIS APPROACH, AS ARE THE OTHER SPONSORS OF SC 1. WE DON'T HAVE TIME FOR ANY OTHER. WE ARE READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND WITH ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS HERE IN THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA WHICH HAS EMERGED THIS WEEK.
END TEXT.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09110
SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMUNIQUE
REF: A) GUNDERSEN/BURTON TELCON NOVEMBER 26,
- B) STOCKHOLM 8979
1. CDE VIII - 044.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CLAIMS THAT THE WORD "BOTH" IS PRESENT IN THE RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSIONS OF THE CDE PORTION OF THE GENEVA JOINT COMMUNIQUE. NEVERTHELESS, GRINEVSKY HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE USDEL'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMUNIQUE, I.E., IT IS A STATEMENT MEANT TO GIVE A POSITIVE "POLITICAL SIGNAL" TO THE STOCKHOLM AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND, THEREFORE, THE CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT INVOLVE ITSELF IN THEOLOGICAL DEBATES AS TO THE MEANING OF SPECIFIC WORDS OR PHRASES. ACTION REQUESTED IN PARA 8. END SUMMARY.
4. IN A NOVEMBER 26 CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR BARRY SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CLAIMED THAT THE CDE PORTION OF THE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE GENEVA JOINT COMMUNIQUE INCLUDED THE WORD "BOTH" WHEN REFERRING TO CSBM'S AND NUF, I.E., " . . . THEY REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE /BOTH/ MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE." THE SOVIETS AND SOME OF THEIR ALLIES IN CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALREADY ALLUDED THE UNOFFICIAL RUSSIAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE (PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA) WHICH INCLUDES THE PHRASE "KAK . . . TAK I" IN THE ABOVE SENTENCE, WHICH ALSO CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO "BOTH . . . AND" IN ENGLISH. AS NOTED REF B, ADDING "BOTH" TO THE TEXT GIVES EMPHASIS TO THE SOVIET APPROACH WHICH SEPARATES MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CSBM'S AND THE "CONCRETIZATION" OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. BARRY SAID OFFICIAL U.S. TEXT DID NOT USE THIS WORDING AND THAT HE ASSUMED IT APPEARED ONLY IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION AND WAS THUS NOT AUTHENTIC. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD DOUBLE CHECK WITH WASHINGTON IF GRINEVSKY WOULD CHECK WITH MOSCOW.
5. BASED ON REF TELCON, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE WORD "BOTH" DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. FURTHERMORE, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE WORD "BOTH" WAS DROPPED BY U.S. AND SOVIET NEGOTIATORS BY MUTUAL CONSENT IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEXT (THE WORKING LANGUAGE) DURING THE DISCUSSION IN GENEVA OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. FINALLY, WE ARE INFORMED THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS YET TO RECEIVE FROM THE SOVIETS THEIR OFFICIAL RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF THE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE AND IS DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE APPROPRIATE BILATERAL CHANNELS.



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6. IN ANY CASE, IN STOCKHOLM WE HAVE CONVEYED THE STRONG MESSAGE TO GRINEVSKY AND OTHERS THAT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE IS A POLITICAL STATEMENT THAT, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ NOTED, SHOULD SERVE AS "A POLITICAL IMPULSE" TO OUR WORK HERE. IT IS AN AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO IMPROVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, MOREOVER, AND SHOULD SET THE TONE FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE AND ELSEWHERE. FINALLY, THE JOINT STATEMENT STRESSES THE MULTILATERAL NATURE OF THE CSCE PROCESS. THEREFORE, FOR US HERE IN STOCKHOLM TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A THEOLOGICAL DEBATE REGARDING THE MEANING OF SPECIFIC WORDS OR PHRASES OF THE JOINT, I.E., BILATERAL STATEMENT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE "SPIRIT OF GENEVA." FURTHERMORE, SUCH A DEBATE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE; A STERILE THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION MIGHT EVEN BE DESTRUCTIVE, COMING SO CLOSE ON THE HEELS OF AN IMPORTANT MEETING WHICH HAS PROVIDED US WITH A "FRESH START" IN STOCKHOLM AND ELSEWHERE.

7. GRINEVSKY HAS AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH IN PRINCIPLE AND HAS NOT PRESSED THE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH SOME OF HIS FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMUNIQUE

EASTERN MINIONS, E.G. THE GDR AMBASSADOR, HAVE ALLUDED TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE TO BUTTRESS THE EASTERN APPROACH TO NUF.

8. ACTION REQUESTED: DELEGATION RECOMMENDS THAT THE MATTER BE TAKEN UP WITH THE SOVIETS IF THEY PERSIST IN USING THE UNOFFICIAL RUSSIAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE TEXT, I.E., INCLUDING THE RUSSIAN TERM "KAK . . .I".

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08979
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 22, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 038.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NOVEMBER 22 PLENARY FEATURED POSITIVE U.S. AND SOVIET CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. MALTA, REPORTING ON THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED MEETING OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS OF MEDITERRANEAN MEMBERS OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, STRESSED ITS DESIRE TO MERGE MEDITERRANEAN FORA WITH THE CSCE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.
-
4. DRAWING FROM THE U.S.-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPORT TO CONGRESS, AND COMMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ, AMBASSADOR BARRY STRESSED THAT THE SUMMIT IS THE START OF A PROCESS DESIGNED TO LEAD TO A MORE STABLE, CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS CONTEXT, BARRY SAID THE SUMMIT PROVIDES A POLITICAL IMPULSE -- A CATALYST -- TO THE WORK OF CDE. HE POINTED OUT THAT SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS MUST BE RESOLVED IN STOCKHOLM, BECAUSE CDE IS A MULTILATERAL FORUM IN WHICH ALL STATES ENJOY SOVEREIGN EQUALITY. HE URGED PARTICIPANTS TO SET ASIDE AREAS IN WHICH THERE IS NO CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS, AND TO AVOID DEBILITATING PROCEDURAL AND THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES. AMBASSADOR BARRY PLEDGED TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIETS AND OTHER DELEGATIONS -- IN THE "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" -- IN ORDER TO PRODUCE A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. (FULL TEXT FOLLOWS SEPTEL.)
5. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CHARACTERIZED THE SUMMIT AS HAVING "EXCEEDING IMPORTANCE" TO IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE CITED GORBACHEV'S NOVEMBER 21 PRESS CONFERENCE, THE PCC MEETING IN SOFIA, AND HE REVIEWED SOVIET ARMS CONTROL "INITIATIVES" AS FURTHER PROOF OF THE SOVIET INTENTION TO FIND NEW SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. WHILE GRINEVSKY ADMITTED THERE WERE "MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION" AND IMPORTANT QUESTIONS WERE NOT SOLVED, HE NONETHELESS SAID WORK WILL CONTINUE TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR QUOTED THE SECTION ON CDE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT, AND NOTED SIMPLY THAT "THE TEXT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF."
-
6. BEGIN COMMENT: WE HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION WHAT IS SAID TO BE THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WHICH INCLUDES THE PHRASE "KAK . . . TAK I" IN THE SECOND SENTENCE, WHICH CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO "BOTH . . . AND" IN ENGLISH. THE SENTENCE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH THUS READS: " . . . THEY REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD



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INCLUDE /BOTH/ MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLC CSBM'S /ANL/ GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE." ADDING "BOTH" TO THE TEXT GIVES EMPHASIS TO THE SOVIET APPROACH WHICH SEPARATES MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CSBM'S AND THE "CONCRETIZATION" OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. ACCORDING TO SOVIET THINKING, "CONCRETIZATION" MEANS DEVELOPMENT AND ELABORATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. ACCORDINGLY, THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO EXPLOIT THEIR VERSION OF THE COMMUNIQUE. WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AND THAT IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" TO ENGAGE IN THEOLOGICAL DEBATES ON THE MEANING OF THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE.

7. AMBASSADOR GAUCI (MALTA) NOTED THAT MEDITERRANEAN ECONOMIC EXPERTS OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT RECENTLY MET IN VALETTA TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC PROPOSALS ON TRADE, COMMUNICATIONS, AND RESEARCH; SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS RESULTED FROM THIS MEETING. GAUCI ALSO STRESSED MALTA'S DESIRE TO MERGE MEDITERRANEAN PROCESSES WITH EUROPEAN PROCESSES, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09109
SUBJECT: CDE: "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" IN STOCKHOLM
1. CDE VIII-044 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS ARE HINTING TO US THAT THEY READ THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT AS A MANDATE TO RELEASE THEIR STRANGLEHOLD ON MILITARY MEASURES IN CDE. THE QUALIFICATIONS ARE THAT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WILL ONLY COME AFTER COORDINATORS HAVE BEEN APPOINTED. THE CSBM-NUF LINKAGE WILL REMAIN IN PLACE. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW THESE ATMOSPHERICS WILL TRANSLATE INTO REALITY. END SUMMARY.
3. WE HAVE DEVOTED THE LAST FEW DAYS TO DETERMINING HOW THE SOVIETS INTERPRET GENEVA AS A MANDATE FOR CDE. OUR LINE, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, IS THAT THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT WAS INTENDED TO GIVE A POLITICAL IMPULSE TO THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. OUR INTENTION IS NOT TO ARGUE OVER INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WORDING OF THE CDE PARAGRAPH BUT TO GET ON WITH AN EFFORT TO FIND COMMON GROUND ON CSBMS. IN AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN OUR HOLD ON THE HIGH GROUND, WE HAVE PUBLICLY PLEDGED OUR READI-NESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION (AND ALL OTHERS) TO THIS END.
-
4. THE SOVIETS BEGAN TO RESPOND PRIVATELY IN A SERIES OF BILATERAL CONTACTS ON NOVEMBER 25/26. (BARRY/ GRINEVSKY, DASD FEITH/GRINEVSKY, DASD FEITH AND MEMBERS OF US DEL/TATARNIKOV, SOLOMENKO, ROZANOV ET AL., DASD FEITH AND GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING) SEVERAL KEY POINTS EMERGED;
-- GRINEVSKY SEEMS TO AGREE THAT WE SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE CDE PARAGRAPH IN THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT AND ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE. (BARRY/GRINEVSKY)
-- THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE PREPARED TO SET ASIDE NAVAL (AND POSSIBLY AIR) ACTIVITIES ISSUES AND MOVE AHEAD ON IDENTIFYING COMMON GROUND ON CSBMS. GRINEVSKY TOLD BARRY THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO PLACE NAVAL AND AIR ISSUE IN BRACKETS AND DISCUSS CSBM CONCEPTS WHERE THERE WAS COMMON GROUND. IN DISCUSSION WITH FEITH, ROZANOV SUGGESTED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE US POSITION ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND THAT THIS NEED NOT BE AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS. AMBASSADOR BUHRING (GDR) IN A BILATERAL WITH FEITH ALSO HINTED AT WTO SOFTNESS ON NAVAL ISSUE WHILE CLAIMING A SPECIAL GDR INTEREST IN AIR ACTIVITIES OVER THE ZONE.
-- GRINEVSKY TOLD BARRY THAT THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN RESUMING SUBSTANTIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US HERE. THIS WAS TRIED BRIEFLY DURING ROUND 6 WHEN THERE WERE MEETINGS BETWEEN US AND SOVIET MILITARY; NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE CAME OF THIS. THE SUGGESTION IS THAT SOME PROGRESS COULD NOW BE MADE PROVIDED THAT WE



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ARE PREPARED TO SAY A LITTLE ABOUT OUR VIEW ON HOW NUF SHOULD BE TREATED. GRINEVSKY SUGGESTED THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AS ONE WHERE BILATERAL PROGRESS COULD BE MADE SINCE "WE ARE BOTH SAYING THE SAME THING IN DIFFERENT WORDS."

5. GRINEVSKY'S MAIN QUALIFIER IN ALL THIS WAS THAT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS COULD NOT BE MADE IN PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE WORKING GROUPS. ONLY WHEN COORDINATORS HAD BEEN APPOINTED AND POSITION SHIFTS COULD BE RECORDED PRIVATELY WOULD THINGS BEGIN TO HAPPEN. BARRY'S MAIN QUALIFIER WAS THAT THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT COORDINATORS -

WOULD STICK TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE OCTOBER 14 AGREEMENT SETTING UP THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE; WE WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS CHOSEN - AND THE NUMBER CHOSEN - WOULD NOT PREJUDICE OUR PROPOSALS.

6. COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST HINT OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON SUBSTANCE WE HAVE SEEN SINCE AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S DISCUSSION WITH GRINEVSKY IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER. PART OF THIS IS NO DOUBT SIMPLY A REACTION TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE NNA PAPER AND THE FACT THAT THEY WERE AFRAID TO MAKE A MOVE UNTIL THE SUMMIT WAS OVER. BUT PART MAY BE A RESULT OF THE BOOST WE RECEIVED FROM THE GENEVA JOINT

FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PAR, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" IN STOCKHOLM

STATEMENT AND THE SUMMIT'S "FRESH START." IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW THESE ATMOSPHERICS WILL TRANSLATE INTO REALITY.

BARRY

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MALTA
DELEGATION

Remarks
made by Ambassador V. J. Gauci
in Plenary 22 November 1985

Mr. Chairman,

In October 2, 1984, the Maltese Delegation to the CDE brought to the attention of all participants the positive results and solemn undertakings agreed to by the Foreign Ministers of all the Mediterranean members of the non-aligned movement, in the historic first meeting held in Valletta on 10 and 11 September 1984. The text of the Valletta Declaration was at that time made available to all, and hence I will not repeat the details.

I am glad to be able to report today that a follow-up meeting of economic experts has just been completed in Valletta this month. While taking note of developments of interest to the Mediterranean region that have occurred in the intervening period - most notably the discussions held in this forum - the economic experts examined in depth proposals on economic co-operation between themselves and with European countries which could be further developed, and made specific recommendations which will be taken up at Ministerial level at a subsequent stage early next year. The proceedings of the Venice Seminar on economic, scientific and cultural co-operation in the Mediterranean were fully taken into account. The proposals concentrated principally on trade, communications and research.

It will therefore be noted, Mr. Chairman, that the decision of the non-aligned countries to concert views and devise joint activities for strengthening co-operation is gaining strength and finding avenues for implementation. It is, as we indicated previously, a process which parallels and derives inspiration from the proceedings taking place in this forum within the CSCE process, as defined by the Mediterranean Chapter of the Helsinki Final Act. It is our earnest desire that these processes will eventually merge. And our participation here will seek to bring this about.



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Mr. Chairman, I was glad to note the outcome of the recent Geneva summit between the United States President and the General Secretary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in so far as it relates not only to the CDE meeting, but also to all other aspects of bilateral and international relations. It is our sincere hope that the dialogue thus having been restored, after its regrettable interruption for far too many precious years, will now herald a new spirit of what I might perhaps call the "entente essentielle" - the realisation that we all inhabit a small and fragile planet, and that we can only survive as long as we all pull in the same direction towards disarmament, justice and peace throughout the world.



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09070
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
NOVEMBER 18-22, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 8860
1. CDE VIII - 043
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SOVIET UNION CLEARLY WAS AWAITING THE SUMMIT TO SEE WHICH WAY THE WIND WOULD BLOW IN STOCKHOLM. MARKING TIME IN A NUMBER OF MEETINGS, THE EAST WAS LESS COMBATIVE THAN LAST WEEK, ALTHOUGH IT CONTINUED TO PUSH ITS TWO BASIC THEMES: 1) THE WEST IS TO BLAME FOR FOOTDRAGGING IN STOCKHOLM AND 2) GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES MUST BE INCLUDED IN A CSBM'S REGIME. AT THE SAME TIME NATO COORDINATED ITS STATEMENTS MORE EFFECTIVELY IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS, ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUALS OCCASIONALLY STRAYED OFF THE RESERVATION. NOW FREE TO ELABORATE ON THEIR NEW PROPOSAL, THE NNA EXPLAINED SC.7'S "INTERLINKAGES" AND IN SO DOING DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION EMERGED. END SUMMARY.
THE EAST:
4. THE SUMMIT AND STOCKHOLM: IN CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS DURING THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 11-15, THE USSR CLEARLY WAS WAITING FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT TO DETERMINE WHICH WAY THE WIND WOULD BLOW IN STOCKHOLM. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIETS WERE FAR LESS COMBATIVE THAN THEY HAD BEEN THE WEEK BEFORE (REFTEL), ALTHOUGH THEY PUSHED THE SAME THEMES: 1) THE WEST IS BLOCKING PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM AND 2) AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, IN ADDITION TO GROUND ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE CSBM'S TO BE AGREED IN STOCKHOLM. THEY TRIED TO HANG THE WEST BY ITS OWN ROPE, REQUESTING SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH NOTIFIABLE GROUND ACTIVITIES, IN OTHER WORDS UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THEY ALSO CRITICIZED SC.1'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AS BEING NARROW CONCEPTS BECAUSE THEY EXCLUDE AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
-
5. NUF: DISCUSSION WAS MORE HARMONIOUS IN THE NUF MEETING THAN LAST WEEK WHEN THE WEST WAS ACCUSED OF VIOLATING THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT. SOVIET REP RAKHMANINOV IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED A U.S. STATEMENT (BY NOT REJECTING IT ON THE SPOT) THAT THE USSR HAD ACCEPTED THE NOTION THAT THE ADOPTION OF CONCRETE AND MANDATORY CSBM'S WOULD MAKE THE USE AND THREAT OF USE OF FORCE LESS LIKELY. RAKHMANINOV CLEARLY WAS PLEASED BY THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE NATO (NETHERLANDS) EXPLORATION OF HIS OUTLINE FOR A NUF AGREEMENT PRESENTED TO THE GROUP AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND.
6. ROMANIA'S "DECLARATION:" ROMANIA SUBMITTED DETAILED CONTENTS OF A NUF "DECLARATION, AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF



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THE FUTURE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT." ACCORDING TO ROMANIA, THE DECLARATION WOULD CONSIST OF FOUR "BUILDING BLOCKS," THREE OF WHICH CONSIST OF EASTERN-STYLE DECLARATORY LANGUAGE, WHILE THE FOURTH WOULD CONTAIN CSBM'S TO BE AGREED UPON.

7. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: THE EAST YET AGAIN WAS MUTE ON THE SUBJECT OF INFORMATION. AS LONG AS THE MEETING FOCUSED ON INFORMATION, THE GDR CHAIRMAN WAS NOTICEABLY ANXIOUS TO GAVEL THE MEETING CLOSED. THE EAST CAME TO LIFE, HOWEVER, WHEN NATO TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO VERIFICATION. THE SOVIET UNION CLAIMED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION ON INSPECTIONS HAD CHANGED: INSTEAD OF BEING RESERVED FOR EXCEPTIONAL CASES AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, INSPECTION NOW WAS "ROUTINE." (BEGIN COMMENT: THIS STATEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO HIGHLIGHT THE WEST'S ISOLATION ON THIS ISSUE IN LIGHT OF A SWEDISH STATEMENT ON THE ROLE OF "OBSERVATION BY REQUEST" (SEE PARA 11 BELOW). END COMMENT.) THE SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS ALSO REJECTED THE DUTCH "ULTIMATUM" THAT WITHOUT ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,

INSPECTION THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT.

-

NATO:

8. ON AND OFF THE RESERVATION: THE WESTERN ALLIANCE HAS HELD TOGETHER AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED UNDER THE NEW DEMANDS OF THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. NATO SPEAKERS HAVE FOCUSED ON SC.1'S CENTRAL CONCEPTS -- THE OOG CONCEPT AND THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER -- AND HAVE STRESSED THAT SC.1 PROVISIONS WOULD RESULT IN A GREATER NUMBER OF NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES THAN WOULD THE WTO'S PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, THERE INEVITABLY HAVE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN INDIVIDUALS HAVE STRAYED OFF THE RESERVATION -- AS WHEN THE FRENCH MILREP CALLED VERIFICATION A "POLITICAL" MEASURE AND WHEN THE DUTCH MILREP SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT ADEQUATE INSPECTION (THE MANDATE CALLS FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION). MOREOVER, A NUMBER OF NATO DELEGATIONS ARE CALLING FOR BETTER ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND AGAINST INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM'S REGIME. AND FINALLY, WITH YET ANOTHER (ROMANIAN) NUF TEXT ON THE TABLE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE MORE TROUBLE HOLDING BACK THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO ARE EAGER TO DRAFT NATO NUF LANGUAGE.

THE NNA:

9. INTERLINKAGES AND DIFFERENCES: NNA SPEAKERS STRESSED THE "INTERLINKAGES" AMONG DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF SC.7, E.G. THE USE OF THE SAME PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION,



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OBSERVATION AND CONSTRAINTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: WE HAD HEARD BEFORE THE NNA TABLED THEIR PAPER THAT THEY REALIZED THAT THESE INTERLINKAGES WOULD POSE PROBLEMS FOR THEM WHEN THEY TRIED TO BREAK THEIR PACKAGE UP FOR DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUPS. END COMMENT.) IN ADDITION, NOW FREE TO DISCUSS THEIR PROPOSAL, DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE NNA GROUP QUICKLY SURFACED. WHILE THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR CONTINUED TO PUSH FOR HIS CDE/CSCE DIMENSION (THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE), AUSTRIA DELIVERED AN IMPORTANT STATEMENT ON NUF WHICH SHARED FAR MORE WITH THE WEST'S STATED POSITION THAN WITH THOSE OF THE EAST OR OF HIS CYPRIOT COLLEAGUE.

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10. COMMON GROUND ON OBSERVATION: NNA SPEAKERS (SWEDEN AND FINLAND) ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT EVERY NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY SHOULD BE OBSERVED, ON THE PURPOSES OF OBSERVATION AND ON THE OBLIGATION TO INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. THE USSR WAS QUICK TO DISABUSE ALL OF THE NOTION THAT COMMON GROUND EXISTED ON THESE PRINCIPLES, INSISTING THAT NOTHING COULD BE DECIDED UNTIL THE REAL QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE -- WHAT WOULD BE OBSERVED -- HAD BEEN RESOLVED.

11. OBSERVATION BY INVITATION VS. OBSERVATION BY REQUEST: THE NNA BLURRED THE DISTINCTION WHICH THE WEST HAS SOUGHT TO PRESERVE BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION BY CALLING OBSERVATION THE "PRINCIPAL FORM OF VERIFICATION;" FINLAND NOTED THAT OBSERVATION WOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION FOR SMALL STATES WITHOUT NTM'S. ACCORDING TO NNA THINKING, INSPECTIONS, OR "OBSERVATIONS BY REQUEST" AS THEY PREFER TO CALL THEM, WOULD BE USED AS A LAST RESORT FOR SUSPECTED UNNOTIFIED ACTIVITIES.

12. INFORMATION: AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND CALLED FOR A MUCH BROADER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION THAN WOULD OCCUR IN THE NARROWEST CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. THE LATTER ARGUED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF BOTH STATIC AND DYNAMIC INFORMATION IS IMPORTANT MILITARILY, ESPECIALLY FOR STATES WITHOUT NTM'S. THE SWISS MILREP NOTED THAT IT WOULD EQUALIZE THE ABILITY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE AND PUSHED FOR THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION.

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13. ANNUAL FORECASTS VS. CALENDARS: SWEDEN SPARKED A PROCEDURAL DEBATE OVER THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREE-

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,

MENT ON INFORMAL STRUCTURE BY REFUSING TO ANSWER AN FRG QUESTION REGARDING THE NNA'S ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL IN THE MEETING ON CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS. (BEGIN FYI: THE NNA LONG HAVE INSISTED THAT THEIR ANNUAL CALENDAR IS



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PART OF THEIR SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION AND, THUS, SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE NOTIFICATION MEETING. END FYI.) THE U.S. TRIED TO SUPPORT THE FRG BY SHOWING THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NATO AND NNA CALENDAR PROPOSALS IS NEARLY IDENTICAL AND DOES NOT MERIT SABOTAGING THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT. A NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES PRIVATELY WORRY THAT UNLESS AGREEMENT IS REACHED TO DISCUSS DIFFERENT CALENDAR PROPOSALS IN THE SAME MEETING, THIS WILL PRESENT PROBLEMS WHEN WE MOVE TO DRAFTING AND WILL SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD UTILIZE IN THE FUTURE TO MOVE DISCUSSION OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION TO THE NOTIFICATION MEETING.

14. THE MALTESE MARKER: MALTA LAID A CLEAR MARKER BOTH IN THE JOINT WORKING GROUP (AB) AND IN THE PLENARY MEETING THAT AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE THE "MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION" OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR INSISTED THAT GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES BE CONSIDERED EQUALLY AND CALLED THE MALTESE PROPOSAL (SC.5) "A SUPPLEMENT TO SC.3 -- OR SC.7," INDICATING THAT WE WILL BE HEARING MORE IN THE FUTURE ABOUT MALTA'S MEDITERRANEAN PROPOSALS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09066
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
- NOVEMBER 18-22, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 8881, B) STOCKHOLM 8789
1. CDE VIII - 042
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) MOVED ONTO CENTER STAGE STOCKHOLM TO LESS THAN A ROUSING RECEPTION. THE PURPOSEFUL AMBIGUITIES AND AWKWARD COMPROMISES CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSAL ALREADY HAVE BEGUN TO UNRAVEL UNDER CLOSER SCRUTINY. NATO HAS BEGUN TO QUESTION SC.7 ACTIVELY IF GINGERLY WHILE STILL FOCUSING ITS EFFORTS ON PROMOTING THE WESTERN PACKAGE. THE EAST HAS LARGELY STAYED CLEAR OF THE NNA PROPOSAL WHILE DEVELOPING ITS OWN TWISTS ON SUCH WESTERN CONCEPTS AS THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. END SUMMARY.

4. NATO: AFTER DEVOTING TOO MANY HOURS TO GRANDILOQUENT IF UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF NATO TACTICS AND PROCEDURES IN THE WORKING GROUPS, THE CAUCUS ULTIMATELY DECIDED TO LEAVE MOST TACTICAL DECISIONS TO THE INDIVIDUAL NATO MINI-CLUSTERS. ACCORDINGLY, THE MINI-CLUSTERS HAVE DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED THEIR OWN APPROACHES. REGARDING THE NNA PROPOSAL, THE WEST HAS BEGUN TO QUESTION SC.7 ACTIVELY BUT GINGERLY, WITH A VIEW TOWARDS HIGHLIGHTING PARALLELS BETWEEN SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND ASPECTS OF THF NNA PAPER. IN WORKING GROUP B, NATO SPEAKERS ARE BEGINNING TO IDENTIFY AREAS OF COMMON GROUND. AT THE SAME. TIME, NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE TRIED TO AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF SC.7. ON NUF, WHERE, ABSENT A FORMAL NATO PROPOSAL, NO COMMON GROUND CAN BE IDENTIFIED, THE WEST HAS TRIED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE NUF COMMITMENT. ALONG THESE LINES, THE WEST WAS ABLE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO ACKNOW-LEDGE AT THE LAST WORKING GROUP THAT THE ADOPTION OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONCRETE AND MANDATORY CSBM'S WOULD MAKE THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE LESS LIKELY.
-

5. WHILE THE MINI-CLUSTERS WRESTLED WITH THE PROSAIC ISSUES OF WORKING GROUP TACTICS, THE CAUCUS TACKLED THE COSMIC ISSUES, E.G. WHEN TO START AND STOP WORKING IN 1986. THESE SEEMINGLY FRIVOLOUS PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, HOWEVER, DO HAVE LONG-TERM SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. WHO SHOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, DETERMINE THE ULTIMATE FATE OF THE CDE -- STOCKHOLM OR VIENNA? THERE SEEMS TO BE A CONSENSUS IN THE CAUCUS THAT IT MUST BE VIENNA. A "COMPROMISE NON-PAPER" WAS FLOATED IN THE CAUCUS WHICH CALLS FOR FOUR SCHEDULED SESSIONS IN 1986, BEGINNING JANUARY 21. THE THIRD SESSION WOULD CONCLUDE JULY 18 (THE TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT),



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AT WHICH TIME THE CONFERENCE COULD DECIDE BY CONSENSUS TO CONCLUDE, BUT A FOURTH SESSION IS PROPOSED FOR AUGUST 19 - SEPTEMBER 19, IF NECESSARY "TO COMPLETE THE DRAFTING OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT." THE PAPER NOTES THAT NO CDE MEETINGS WILL TAKE PLACE DURING THE VIENNA PREPCON OR MAIN REVIEW MEETING AND STATES THAT THIS DECISION CAN ONLY BE ALTERED BY CONSENSUS. WE SUPPORT THE THRUST OF THIS PROPOSAL, AND CAUCUS CONSENSUS SEEMS TO BE BUILDING FOR THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE. HOWEVER, CANADIAN AMBASSADOR DELWORTH CONTINUES TO EXAMINE THE ENTRAILS OF CSCE DOCUMENTS FOR THEOLOGICAL GUIDANCE AND HAS DETERMINED THAT THERE MUST BE A CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN OR SUSPEND THE CONFERENCE AND THUS, IN HIS VIEW, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO WORK UNTIL NOVEMBER 4 (OR EVEN BEYOND).

6. THE CAUCUS WAS ALSO UNABLE TO ESTABLISH A COMMON LINE ON THE QUESTION OF HOW MANY NNA COORDINATORS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN THE WORKING CLUSTERS. THIS QUESTION, IN OUR VIEW, IS NOT AS PRESSING AS THE CALENDAR ISSUE. THE CAUCUS PREFERENCE CONTINUES TO BE FOR TWO COORDINATORS (WHILE HOLDING OPEN THE OPTION FOR MORE LATER). NEITHER THE NNA NOR THE EAST APPEARS WILLING TO LAY THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE AND PREFERS TO HAVE NATO PUT IN THE OPENING FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,

BID. THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO MOVE INTO DRAFTING (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, CANADA), ACCORDINGLY, ARE THE MOST ANXIOUS TO SOLVE THIS ISSUE, PREFERABLY BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION. WE ARE IN NO SUCH HURRY.

7. NNA: THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) DRAFTED WITH SUCH PAINSTAKING IMPRECISION, IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO UNRAVEL UNDER EVEN THE MOST GENTLE QUESTIONING FROM THE WEST. ON NUF, AUSTRIA AND CYPRUS CLASHED OVER HOW BEST TO REAFFIRM THE NUF COMMITMENT; THE AUSTRIANS WANT A SHORT UNAMBIGUOUS REAFFIRMATION BASED ON THE UN CHARTER; THE CYPRIOTS, AN ELABORATION OF THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT. ON INFORMATION, AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, AND FINLAND HAVE ALREADY PRESENTED DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DATA TO BE PROVIDED UNDER SC.7.

8. ON ANNUAL CALENDARS, HOWEVER, THE NNA WERE ABLE TO SING A COMMON TUNE DESPITE (OR MORE LIKELY BECAUSE OF) A LACK OF A REAL SUBSTANTIVE DICUSSION ON THE SC.7 PROPOSAL. SWEDEN SPARKED A PROCEDURAL DEBATE OVER THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT WHICH SET UP THE CURRENT INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE BY REFUSING TO ANSWER A FRG QUESTION REGARDING THE NNA'S ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL. SWEDEN ARGUED THAT SINCE THE NNA SEE THE CALENDAR AS PART OF ITS SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION, THEY WOULD ANSWER APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS IN THE TUESDAY NOTIFICATION MEETING. IN A



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POINT OF ORDER, THE FRG, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF NATO, TERMED THIS A VIOLATION OF THE OCTOBER GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT, WHICH CALLED FOR "CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS" TO BE DISCUSSED ON THURSDAY IN WORKING GROUP A. THE NNA COUNTERED THAT THE ORIGINAL DECEMBER 3, 1984 DECISION SETTING OUT THE CDE WORKING STRUCTURE APPLIES TO OUR CURRENT INFORMAL PHASE AND, THUS, ALLOWS PROPOSAL SPONSORS TO DISCUSS THEIR PROPOSALS WHEREVER THEY WISH. WHILE THIS SOMETIMES HEATED DEBATE SEEMED TO HAVE TOUCHED THE NNA'S PRICKLY PRIDE, COOLER HEADS MAY PREVAIL IN THE END. THE AUSTRIANS CLAIM THAT THE NNA WERE MOST CONCERNED THAT NATO WOULD FILIBUSTER ON ANNUAL CALENDARS IN THE THURSDAY WORKING GROUP AND WOULD REFUSE TO DISCUSS CONSTRAINTS; THEREFORE, THEY INTENDED TO LAY DOWN A MARKER THAT BOTH SUBJECTS MUST BE DISCUSSED (OTHERS VIEWED THE NNA TACTICS NOT SO BENIGNLY; THE NNA, ACCORDING TO THIS VIEW, WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT "CONSTRAINTS," NOT ANNUAL CALENDARS, DOMINATES IN

-

WORKING GROUP A DISCUSSION ON THURSDAY). FURTHERMORE, THIS DEBATE HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DELICATE COMPROMISE WHICH LED TO THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN AND IF WE REACH THE DRAFTING STAGE: HOW WILL IT BE INTERPRETED? HOW WILL IT BE IMPLEMENTED?

9. AS NOTED IN REFTELS, UPON CLOSER SCRUTINY THE NNA ROSE DOES NOT SMELL AS SWEET AS IT DID WHILE BUDDING: THE BUILT-IN AMBIGUITIES OF SC.7 ARE PARTICULARLY TROUBLING. IT IS UNCLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT THE NNA ATTITUDE IS TOWARDS THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, THE KEY TO THE NATO PACKAGE. THE NNA NOTIFICATION MEASURE MAY, IN FACT, ALIGN THEM MORE CLOSELY WITH THE EAST THAN THE WEST. BY TYING AN UNBALANCED CONSTRAINTS MEASURE TO THEIR NOTIFICATION REGIME, MOREOVER, THE NNA MAY HAVE CREATED A CATCH-22 SITUATION FOR THEMSELVES, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH COMMON GROUND ON EITHER NOTIFICATION OR CONSTRAINTS. WHILE WE CAN LIVE WITH THE LATER RESULT, WE CANNOT WITH THE FORMER. CONSEQUENTLY, WE ARE WORKING WITH THE NNA, PARTICULARLY THE SWEDES AND AUSTRIANS, TO GET THEM OUT OF THEIR SELF-CREATED CONUNDRUM.

10. FINALLY, MALTA'S MERCIFULLY MUTED MESSAGE IS ONCE AGAIN MAKING THE CDE ROUNDS. AT FRIDAY'S PLENARY THE NEW MALTESE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN STATES MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE MALTESE DELEGATION HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO INSIST ON THE INCLUSION OF, AT LEAST, INDEPENDENT FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,



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NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN ANY CSBM'S REGIME AGREED UPON IN STOCKHOLM.

11. THE EAST: FOR THE PAST FEW WEEKS THE SOVIETS QUIETLY PUT OUT THE WORD THAT LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE COULD OCCUR AT THE CONFERENCE UNTIL THE GENEVA SUMMIT WAS CONCLUDED. TRUE TO THEIR WORD, THE SOVIETS STONEWALLED IN THE WORKING GROUPS DEALING WITH CSBM'S BY REFUSING EVEN TO FLESH OUT THEIR OWN PROPOSALS, E.G. ON NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND ANNUAL CALENDARS, UNTIL THE WEST ADDRESSED INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND TABLED ITS POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE. THIS PAST WEEK, HOWEVER, PERHAPS SENSING A FAVORABLE BREEZE FROM GENEVA, THE EAST HAS ALTERED ITS COURSE, IF EVEN SO SLIGHTLY. THE EAST NOW DOES NOT OBJECT QUITE SO STRONGLY WHEN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION TURNS TO COMMON GROUND ON CSBM'S, E.G. IN THE OBSERVATION WORKING GROUP; IT NO LONGER ACCUSES THE WEST OF VIOLATING THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT; AND IT PUTS LESS EMPHASIS ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND MORE ON FUNCTIONALLY RELATED ACTIVITIES -- SOVIET STYLE.

12. THIS CHANGE IN THE EASTERN TACK DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN CLEAR SAILING FOR THE WEST, HOWEVER. RATHER THAN FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION SOLELY ON CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE ISSUES, E.G. INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, EASTERN SPEAKERS NOW PRESS THE WEST FOR SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH NOTIFIABLE GROUND ACTIVITIES, IN OTHER WORDS, UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. SOME OF OUR ALLIES, UNCOMFORTABLE AND UNACCUSTOMED TO SAYING "NYET," ARE PUSHING FOR A MORE FORTHCOMING WESTERN APPROACH, I.E., SUPPLYING MORE INFORMATION ON FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

13. FINALLY, THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN UNIQUE -- AND NOT SO COMFORTING -- INTERPRETATION OF THE "FIRESIDE SUMMIT." BASED ON THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE, THEY ARE SAYING THAT THE CALL FOR AN "EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE" MEANS THAT DRAFTING SHOULD BEGIN THIS ROUND. MOREOVER, THE COMMUNIQUE'S CALL FOR A CDE DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE "BOTH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CSBM'S AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE" UNDERSCORES THE NECESSITY OF PARALLEL PROGRESS ON CSBM'S AND NUF, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIETS. ADDING THE WORD BOTH" ("KAK . . . TAK I" IN THE RUSSIAN TEXT) SEPARATES MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CSBM'S AND THE "CONCRETIZATION" OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. ACCORDING TO SOVIET THINKING, CONCRETIZATION" MEANS DEVELOPMENT AND ELABORATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AND THAT IT IS INCONSISTENT



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WITH THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA TO ENGAGE IN THEOLOGICAL DEBATES ON THE MEANING OF THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE.

14. FUTURE ISSUES.

-- THE CALENDAR: REGRETTABLY, WE HAVE NOT HEARD THE LAST OF THE 1986 CALENDAR DEBATE. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO AGREE UPON A SCHEDULE FOR NEXT YEAR WITH A DEFINITE CUTOFF DATE BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION, WE MAY BE BEGINNING A LONG SLIDE DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE TOWARD AN ENDLESS SUMMER IN STOCKHOLM. WHEN IT THEN BECOMES TIME TO CLOSE UP SHOP BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPCON WE CAN BE SURE THAT THE SOVIETS -- AND MALTA -- WILL HAVE SOME LAST-MINUTE SUGGESTIONS.

-- FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: IS IT TOO MALLEABLE? FREQUENT NATO SPEAKERS IN THE CAUCUS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST EITHER COME UP WITH "NEW ARGUMENTS" TO PROMOTE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH OR FIND "NEW TACTICS" TO ENGAGE THE EAST ON SOMETHING OTHER THAN AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HOWEVER, CALLS FOR NEW ARGUMENTS AND NEW TACTICS DO NOT A POLICY MAKE. AND WE MUST BE CAREFUL, MOREOVER, NOT TO CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE FUNCTIONAL

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,

APPROACH BY SHIFTING THE FOCAL POINT AWAY FROM GROUND ACTIVITIES OR DEPARTING FROM THE CAREFULLY CRAFTED LANGUAGE OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED.

-- RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TRANSLATION: THE SOVIETS ARE UP TO THEIR OLD MISCHIEVOUS TRICKS. THE MOSCOW-SUPPLIED RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS CONSTANTLY USE THE RUSSIAN WORD FOR "LIMITATIONS" TO REFER TO "CONSTRAINTS." MOREOVER, THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION (AS WELL AS THE TRANSLATIONS IN THE OTHER OFFICIAL CSCE LANGUAGES) OF SC.7 ALSO USES THE WORD "LIMITATIONS" FOR "CONSTRAINTS." WE ARE WORKING WITH THE NNA AND THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT TO CORRECT THESE NOT-SO-INNOCENT MISTAKES.

BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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# S T A T E M E N T

by Ambassador Stefan Todorov,
Head of the Bulgarian Delegation,
Group A + B, November 25, I985



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Check against delivery Unofficial translation

Only a few days ago an important event took place in Geneva. At present the work of the Stockholm Conference proceeds under the conditions of a resumed (after 6 years of interruption)Soviet-American dialogue. Let me share the conviction voiced that this new factor should bear a positive influence on our work and accelerate its pace.Moreover that in the joint statement on the summit the common intention is underlined " to facilitate together with other participating States, an early and successful completion of the work of the Conference."

For fourth week in a row the Conference is working within the framework of informal negotiations and is completing the transition to drafting mutually acceptable accords. We also have in front of us the new specific draft submitted by the neutral and non-aligned States. We consider this document to be an important positive step. It provides impetus towards a forward movement of the work of the Conference,towards the completion of the basic task of this session-the start of drafting. Positive and constructive spirit has always been a dominant feature of the N + N contributions in the field of the all-European process. At present, as the elaboration of a common denominator to their positions has been left behind,these delegations have joined us in full in the practical work,going on at the informal meetings and have engaged as well in the solution of other common tasks of ours.

At present - as the N + N document has been submitted - we need the efforts of all, we need reciprocal steps, we expect the presentation of new ideas and approaches to overcome the difficulties, to work out a mutually acceptable document.

One can note that at the informal working meetings there is an increase of the level of activity on the part of delegations. This is conducive to a better clarification and widening of the common ground, of what is bringing the positions of delegations or groups of delegations closer. And before examining in brief certain specific issues I would wish also to comment on the following - by



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all evidence the importance of strictly abiding by the agreement of October 14th is ever on the rise. The bona fide implentation of this agreement is the only guarantee that its aims would be fully put into practice.

But let me now dwell upon what we feel to be basic trends revealed by the discussion.The answer to this could be illustrated by several examples of key importance.

Let us take for example the idea of concluding a Treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace. As it has been already stressed at one of the Conference's meetings - the question of the non-use of force is at present an undisputable theme at our negotiations. At this stage the debate is focused on the elements,which are to become part of the concrete expression of this principle to a maximum binding degree; the concrete expression of this principle taking into account present day European realities; efforts are concentrated on reaffirming the political will of partcipating States to abide by this principle both among themselves as well as in their international relations. This development could be welcome were it not for certain regrettable negative phenomena. Not all delegations have adopted a genuinly creative approach towards this matter. The positive solution of this problem will have the nature of common-shared by all-value. However the practice is still being pursued of asking questions, without listening to the answers provided. And generally it is difficult to understand why some delegations are in favour of a parallel progress in the work of the Conference during non-use of force meetings, while in other groups they are against parallelism as such.

Let me touch upon briefly the meetings on military matters. The discussion revealed that the notification measures are such an element from the set - a vital link from the chain - of mutually complementary measures, whereupon were we to achieve agreement this could considerably facilitate our work. And this is really so. But here we notice also a clear leaning back from the accords of the Madrid mandate. As we see it, a leaning back from agreements already reached cannot be excused in any way, even less so that in the political-military situation in Europe no positive changes have occured, on the contrary. The scale of the threatening activities by naval and air forces did increase, as did also the threat from such military activities as the large-scale movements/transfer



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of troops and air forces. Against this background of general increase of the dimensions of military activities in Europe, the adjoining sea and ocean areas and the airspace above, to exclude one or another activity from the notification system would have a rather strange character. Or as we see it, it would hardly be possible in light of all this to achieve a qualitative development of the measures in the Final act, since we face a definite trend to narrow artificially the scope of the notification measures.

Or let us consider the constaints measure. Constraints are also an element of the qualitative development of the system of CSBMs. It provides for real reduction of the risk of military confrontation in Europe. But we consider as totally unrealistic the attempts to put constraints on the constraining measures, or to reduce them to an exchange of annual plans for military activities subject to notification. The annual exchange in our view is a notification measure pure and simple. Here in this context the problem of reciprocating in a good will has also emerged. There has not been a reciprocating response to the readiness expressed to discuss annual exchange of plans. Therefore we have the feeling, as my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Konarski has already put it that some understand the give and take process of negociations only as the possibility to take, without giving anything in exchange.

Recently we were presented a proposal of nine States on this measure. We are still studying it. But what comes immediately to one's mind and on which I wish to comment in a preliminary manner is that as we see it there is a golden rule - the simpler a constraining measure is, the easier it will be to verify its implementation.

This is the approximate summing up, as we approach the middle of the eighth session of the Stockholm Conference. The past four weeks of informal discussion have shown that it is unrealistic to approach the solution of issues selected, establishing arbitrary priorities. Advance should be strived for along the entire front on all aspects of the problems discussed. The Bulgarian Delegation of course is far from considering the parallel approach as a linkage in accordance with the principle "word for word,sentence



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for sentence". We are in favour in discussing all questions in substance in the search of mutually acceptable approaches and solutions, in the spirit of co-operation and in accordance with the aims and tasks of the Stockholm Conference. To our mind such is the right path towards strenghtening the common ground, towards achieving substantial results from our work. The informal exploration has already borh fruit - probably to a greater extent it indicated what should not be done. This valuable experience should serve us in continuing our smooth transition to drafting.

The experience accumulated also indicates that the problems - although clustered in the informal working groups - are many and sometimes of rather different order. This complicates the straight, organized, orderly flow of the discussion and of the clarification of positions of States. At times it is rather easy to be left with the impression that in one working group, at one and thesame meeting simultaneously several discussions are taking place, or one, but very multifaceted debate is being held, including on procedure; there is an exchange of views on greatly differring aspects of the problems discussed. Naturally on the one hand this is inevitable at this stage - but as we see it a prolongation of this stage might slow down our work, even erode earlier reached agreements. Therefore possibly the time approaches when we should also consider how better to co-ordinate our efforts. This logically follows from the present stage of our work.

In brief - we need to set a business-like rhythm for the negotiations in Stockholm.



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09144
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 27, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 045
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CAUCUS HAS DECIDED TO INDICATE TO THE NNA OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER BRINGING TWO COORDINATORS INTO PLAY IN THE WORKING GROUPS BY THE END OF THIS ROUND IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THE ULTIMATE CHOICE. DISCUSSION OF WHICH NNA MEMBERS ARE THE ALLIANCE'S PREFERRED CANDIDATES IS CONTINUING. ALTHOUGH CANADA AND SOME OTHER DELEGATIONS STILL BELIEVE WE CAN BE "BLACKMAILED" BY THE CONSENSUS RULE INTO CONTINUING PAST ANY CDE CUTOFF DATE, ALL DELEGATIONS, EXCEPT FRANCE, HAVE NOW AGREED THAT AN EARLY NATO POSITION SHOULD BE DEVELOPED ON A 1986 CALENDAR AND THAT CONFERENCE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT THIS SESSION. THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE NOW IS FRANCE, WHICH IS TENACIOUSLY AND SOLITARILY CLINGING TO ITS JULY 18 CUTOFF PROPOSAL. (COMMENT: THE RESULT OF SUCH AN IMPASSE COULD WELL BE THAT NO CONSENSUS IS REACHED ON A CUTOFF DATE BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION AND THAT WE WILL RESTART ON JANUARY 21, 1986, WITH NO END TO THE SESSION SET. THIS WOULD SUIT THE WARSAW PACT VERY WELL, BUT WOULD BE DAMAGING TO OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE JULY 18 DATE WILL NEVER FIND CONSENSUS IN THE CAUCUS, BUT IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THE FRENCH DELEGATION IS UNABLE TO MOVE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS. IN THIS REGARD, WE REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES, DRAWING ON POINTS PROVIDED SEPTEL, RAISE THIS MATTER WITH FRENCH MFA DISARAMENT DIRECTOR D'ABOVILLE DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. END COMMENT.) END SUMMARY.
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4. COORDINATORS: THE NOVEMBER 27 NATO CAUCUS DIRECTED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY GRONDAL (ICELAND) TO SIGNAL TO THE NNA THAT THE ALLIANCE IS NOW PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE NAMING OF COORDINATORS IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS, AND THAT NATO WOULD PREFER THAT TWO COORDINATORS BE EMPLOYED (FOR GROUPS A AND B RESPECTIVELY). THE NNA WILL ALSO BE ASKED TO INFORM US OF WHOM THEY WOULD PROPOSE TO FILL THESE POSITIONS. THE CAUCUS FURTHER DETERMINED THAT, ALTHOUGH WE ARE ONLY PREPARED TO INDICATE TO THE NNA OUR PREFERENCE FOR TWO COORDINATORS AT THIS TIME, NATO IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER AN INCREASE TO FIVE SHOULD THE VOLUME OF WORK WARRANT SUCH AN EXPANSION. THE CAUCUS TOOK THIS DECISION AT THE URGING OF THE U.S., ITALY AND THE FRG. BARRY (U.S.) HAD PRESSED FOR AN EARLY CAUCUS POSITION IN ORDER TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT ON THE NNA'S DELIBERATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE ENSUING DISCUSSION AND DECISION WAS IN TERMS OF PUTTING THE TWO COORDINATORS IN



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PLACE BY THE END OF THIS SESSION, BARRY CAUTIONED THAT AT THE MOMENT WE SHOULD ONLY CONSIDER THE NNA'S SUGGESTIONS WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMMITMENT TO A FIXED DATE. (COMMENT: IN OUR VIEW THE NAMING OF COORDINATORS IS A NECESSARY PRELUDE TO DRAFTING, BUT NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH IT. DETAILS BY SEPTEL.)

5. "HEADS ON A PLATTER:" THE CAUCUS FURTHER AGREED THAT WE NEEDED TO INFLUENCE TO A MAXIMUM EXTENT WHICH NNA COORDINATORS ARE ASSIGNED TO WHICH GROUPS, IN EDES'S (UK) WORDS, WHO WAS MOST DESIRABLE OUT OF "A FAIRLY MEDIOCRE BUNCH OF COORDINATORS." REFERRING TO THE RECENT CONTROVERSY WITH THE NNA OVER WHICH WORKING GROUP ANNUAL FORECASTS/CALENDARS WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN, BARRY (U.S.) OBSERVED THAT WE HAD TO BE ASSURED THAT THE CHOSEN COORDINATORS WOULD ABIDE BY THE OCTOBER 14 "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT." WHILE ALL AGREED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THE RIGHT PEOPLE COORDINATING THE RIGHT GROUPS, SEVERAL DELEGATIONS JOINED WITH CITRON (FRG) IN OBSERVING THAT NATO COULD NOT GO TO THE NNA WITH "HEADS ON A PLATTER" OF THOSE CANDIDATES WE WERE DEMANDING. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO TRY A SUBTLE APPROACH TO THIS RELYING ON INFORMAL CONTACTS TO INFLUENCE NNA DECISIONS ALONG THE PROPER CHANNELS.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 27, 1985

6. "PRISONERS OF CONSENSUS" (1986 CALENDAR): BARRY OPENED DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC BY STRESSING THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A NATO POSITION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HE CAUTIONED THAT WE WOULD PUT OURSELVES IN THE "WORST POSSIBLE TACTICAL POSITION" IF WE WENT INTO THE NINTH SESSION WITHOUT AN AGREED CALENDAR AND CUTOFF DATE. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT ABSENCE OF A FIXED CUTOFF WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE OUR SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE AND INVITE EASTERN OR NNA ATTEMPTS (READ MALTA) TO CONTINUE THE CONFERENCE DURING THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OR TO SET A RESUMPTION DATE FOR THE CDE. BECAUSE IT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE A COUPLE OF WEEKS TO NEGOTIATE A CLOSING DATE WITH THE EAST AND THE NNA, NATO WOULD HAVE TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON ITS POSITION BEFORE DECEMBER 7 OR THERE WOULD BE A DANGER OF DEFERRING THE QUESTION UNTIL 1986, WHICH WOULD LIMIT OUR CHANCES OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON A CUTOFF DATE.

7. THERE WAS UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF BARRY'S ANALYSIS AND ON THE NEED TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE THIS SESSION, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE EAST NOW SEEMS WILLING TO ESTABLISH AN ENDING DATE. HOWEVER, DELWORTH SAID THAT THERE ARE STILL SEVERAL LIVE OPTIONS ON SPECIFIC ENDING DATES. 14 CAUCUS MEMBERS AGREE ON A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE, ALTHOUGH SOME (FRG,



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NETHERLANDS, NORWAY) PREFER NOVEMBER 4. FRANCE INSISTS ON JULY 18 AS A CUTOFF EVEN AT THE PRICE OF NO CLOSING DATE AT ALL. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) PRIVATELY AGREES THAT THE FRENCH POSITION IS TACTICALLY UNWISE BUT HE IS A PRISONER OF PARIS -- SPECIFICALLY D'ABOVILLE. CANADA IS HOLDING OUT FOR NOVEMBER 4, BUT WILL FALL BACK TO SEPTEMBER 19 IF FRANCE ABANDONS ITS INSISTENCE ON JULY 18.

8. A SPECIAL CAUCUS SESSION HAS NOW BEEN PLANNED FOR DECEMBER 2 TO HAMMER OUT A NATO POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, WE ANTICIPATE THAT FRANCE WILL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH A CONSENSUS AT THIS SESSION. IN THE FACE OF ZERO SUPPORT FROM OTHER DELEGATIONS, GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) EMPHATICALLY REASSERTED THE FRANCE CANNOT AGREE TO ANY CUTOFF DATE OTHER THAN JULY 18.

9. COMMENT: WE NOTE THAT THE FRENCH AND U.S. POSITIONS ON THIS MATTER ARE NOT FAR APART -- BOTH ARE ADAMANT ABOUT A FULL STOP ON SEPTEMBER 19, BUT THE FRENCH INSIST ON JULY 18 IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT "NO POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS" OCCUR IN A LAST, OPTIONAL AUGUST-SEPTEMBER ROUND. WHILE WE HAVE CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR THE FRENCH VIEW, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CAUCUS WILL NEVER ACCEPT A CUTOFF DATE SO FAR IN ADVANCE OF THE VIENNA MEETING. WE ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT APPARENT EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO SET A 1986 CALENDAR WILL EVAPORATE IF NATO REMAINS WITHOUT A POSITION ON THIS QUESTION AS THE EAST SEES NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO KEEP THE CDE OPEN-ENDED. IN THIS REGARD, WE UNDERSTAND THAT D'ABOVILLE WILL BE IN WASHINGTON THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 1. WE REQUEST THAT HIS WASHINGTON INTERLOCUTORS MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO RECONSIDER THE FRENCH POSITION IN LIGHT OF OUR COMMON INTEREST IN CONCLUDING CDE BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING AND OF THE TACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING THE 1986 CALENDAR BEFORE THE END OF THIS ROUND. CONCERNED AGENCIES SHOULD DRAW ON TALKING POINTS PROVIDED SEPTEL. END COMMENT.

BARRY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09145
SUBJECT: COORDINATORS AND THE CDE
1. CDE VIII - 046
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CAUCUS HAS INITIATED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NNA TO INFLUENCE THE ULTIMATE CHOICE OF COORDINATORS. USDEL SHARES THE VIEW THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF APPROPRIATE NNA COORDINATORS, PERHAPS BY THE END OF THE SESSION, WOULD SERVE ALLIED INTERESTS AT THE CONFERENCE. WITH THIS IN MIND, THIS CABLE OUTLINES THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH BEING CONSIDERED BY NATO, DETAILS THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS INFLUENCING OUR CHOICE OF COORDINATORS AND, BASED ON THESE ASSUMPTIONS, NOTES SOME OF THE ADVANTAGES WE SEE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF NNA COORDINATORS DURING THIS EXPLORATORY PHASE. END SUMMARY.

4. NOW THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE IS IN FULL SWING THE QUESTION OF APPOINTING COORDINATORS, PRESUMABLY FROM AMONG THE NNA, HAS BECOME MORE PRESSING. THE CURRENT "ROTATING CHAIRMEN" CLEARLY DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY, THE INCLINATION OR OFTEN THE ABILITY TO DIRECT WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS ON CONCRETE CSBM'S IN HARMONY WITH THE MANDATE. USDEL BELIEVES THEREFORE THAT THE TIME IS RIPE TO INITIATE DISCUSSION WHICH WILL LEAD EVENTUALLY TO THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS ACCEPTABLE TO WESTERN DELEGATIONS. AS INDICATED REFTEL (ON NOVEMBER 27 CAUCUS) CAUCUS IS ALREADY EVOLVING TOWARD A COMMON POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF COORDINATORS. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A POSITION, IF PROPERLY COORDINATED WITHIN THE CAUCUS AND ARTICULATED TO THE NNA, WILL HELP INFLUENCE THE ULTIMATE CHOICE OF COORDINATORS. THE NNA, IN FACT, HAVE SUGGESTED TO VARIOUS WESTERN DELEGATES THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME A SIGNAL -- AND SOME GUIDELINES -- FROM NATO ON THE SUBJECT.
5. ACCORDINGLY, THE CAUCUS IS EVOLVING TOWARD THE FOLLOWING STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH LEADING TO THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS:
-- WE INTEND TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE TO THE NNA THAT THE TIME IS RIPE TO APPOINT COORDINATORS TO GUIDE WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS DURING THE EXPLORATORY PHASE;
-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE NNA ARE THE SUITABLE CANDIDATES FOR COORDINATORS (NOT A MIXTURE OF EASTERN, WESTERN, AND NNA CANDIDATES AS SUGGESTED BY THE EAST);
-- WE PREFER, AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE, THAT TWO COORDINATORS BE APPOINTED: ONE FOR WORKING GROUP A AND ONE FOR WORKING GROUP B TO MAINTAIN TWO DISTINCT WORKING GROUPS IN ORDER, INTER ALIA, TO BURY NUF AMONG OTHER SUBJECTS IN WORKING GROUP A;

-- IF THE NNA ARE GENERALLY AGREEABLE TO THIS APPROACH, I.E., TWO COORDINATORS, WE CAN THEN ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE



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ON WHO THE COORDINATORS SHOULD BE AND WHAT WILL BE THEIR TASKS;
-- IF WE CAN FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE COORDINATORS APPOINTED DURING THIS ROUND.
6. AGREEING ON THIS WITHIN THE CAUCUS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, MEAN IMPLEMENTING IT IN THE CONFERENCE. THE EAST FAVORS FOUR COORDINATORS IN ORDER TO HIGHLIGHT THE NUF WORKING GROUP AND IN ORDER TO BURY INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION AND VERIFICATION IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP. AT THE SAME TIME, SOME OF THE NNA, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO GROUP POSITION, ARE LEANING TOWARDS THREE COORDINATORS AS A COMPROMISE NUMBER. FURTHERMORE, SOME OF THE ALLIES, E.G. THE NETHERLANDS, FAVOR FIVE COORDINATORS BUT AT THIS STAGE ARE WILLING TO JOIN A NATO CONSENSUS AROUND TWO COORDINATORS INITIALLY WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDING SUB-COORDINATORS IF THE JOB IS TOO ONEROUS FOR TWO. OF COURSE THE SUCCESS OF ANY COORDINATOR WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE TRUST THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS PLACE ON HIS OR HER ABILITIES AND IMPARTIALITY. IN ANY CASE,
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: COORDINATORS AND THE CDE
IN ORDER TO HAVE A MAXIMUM IMPACT ON THE ULTIMATE DECISION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS, WE BELIEVE IT IS NOW TIME TO INITIATE THE DISCUSSION WITH THE NNA.
7. DELEGATION OPERATES UNDER CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS IN REACHING THIS CONCLUSION:
-- ANY COORDINATOR ACCEPTABLE TO US MUST ADHERE STRICTLY TO THE OCTOBER 14 AGREEMENT AND ITS DIVISION OF SUBJECTS;
-- THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH ENTERING INTO THE DRAFTING STAGE. THE CONFERENCE WOULD REMAIN IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AND TEXT WOULD NOT BE DRAFTED UNTIL WARRANTED. DISCUSSION WOULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE, ALBEIT PRESUMABLY IN A MORE DISCIPLINED AND PRODUCTIVE MANNER;
-
-- NO COORDINATOR WOULD BE APPOINTED WHO HAD A SPECIAL OR A VESTED INTEREST IN A SUBJECT; E.G. THE CYPRIOT IN THE "NUF" MEETING OR THE YUGOSLAVS IN THE "CONSTRAINTS; ANNUAL FORECAST" MEETING;
-- ONLY NNA COORDINATORS WOULD BE APPOINTED.
8. IF THE ABOVE ASSUMPTIONS ARE MET, WE BELIEVE THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF NNA COORDINATORS WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
-- THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY COULD BE FLEXIBLE ON CERTAIN POINTS OF SUBSTANCE WHEN NNA COORDINATORS ARE IN PLACE, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT REAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE CORRIDORS NOT IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS;
-- NNA COORDINATORS MIGHT BE ABLE TO CHANNEL DISCUSSION



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AWAY FROM UNPRODUCTIVE AREAS TO ISSUES WHERE COMMON GROUND CAN BE IDENTIFIED;
-- AT THE MEETINGS COORDINATORS COULD, THROUGH INFORMAL CONTACTS, CONTINUE TO IDENTIFY AND DEVELOP COMMON GROUND AND THEREBY PREPARE THE WAY FOR THE DRAFTING PHASE;
-- THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS ALSO SERVES THE PURPOSE OF COOLING OFF SOME OF OUR MORE EAGER ALLIES, E.G. THE FRG, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, WHO ARE EAGER TO MOVE INTO DRAFTING IMMEDIATELY;
-- THE INTRODUCTION OF COORDINATORS INTO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WOULD CREATE, IN EFFECT, AN INTERMEDIATE PHASE BETWEEN THE PRESENT PHASE AND ACTUAL DRAFTING;
-- NO PRUDENT NNA COORDINATOR, MOREOVER, WOULD CONSIDER TRYING TO DRAFT ON A SUBJECT UNTIL HE RECEIVED A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT WE THOUGHT THE TIME WAS RIPE. DURING THE EARLY WEEKS UNDER AN NNA COORDINATOR, DISCUSSION WOULD FOCUS ON WHAT SUBJECTS ARE RIPE FOR DRAFTING, E.G. WE COULD ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE READY FOR SOME SORT OF SEQUENTIALISM.
-
-- FINALLY, AND NOT LEAST IMPORTANT, U.S. SUPPORT FOR SUCH A STEP WOULD MEET THE GROWING REQUIREMENT TO GIVE CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CALL TO "REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS" IN STOCKHOLM.
9. FOR ALL THE ABOVE REASONS, OVER THE REMAINING WEEKS OF THIS SESSION DELEGATION INTENDS TO ENGAGE OUR ALLIES AND THE NNA, AS WELL AS THE EAST, AS TO THE WHOS, WHYS AND WHEREFORES OF THE APPOINTMENT OF WORKING GROUP COORDINATORS.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09176
SUBJECT: USDEL EVALUATION OF EXPLORATORY PHASE
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 7987; B. STOCKHOLM 9L45
1. CDE VIII - 048
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS USDEL'S EVALUATION OF PROGRESS MADE SO FAR TOWARDS MEETING THE OBJECTIVES FOR THE CURRENT EXPLORATORY PHASE OUTLINED IN REF A. GENERALLY, NATO HAS PROGRESSED IN ALL FOUR AREAS: ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, OUR PACKAGE, CONVERGENCES/DIVERGENCIES, AND NNA SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH PROGRESS HAS BEEN UNEVEN, AND MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE IN SOME AREAS, THIS PHASE IS APPROACHING THE END OF ITS USEFULNESS, AND COORDINATORS WILL SOON BE NEEDED TO FURTHER CONCENTRATE DISCUSSION AND DEVELOP COMMON GROUND. END SUMMARY.
4. WITH THE END OF ROUND VIII IN SIGHT, USDEL THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO MEASURE OUR PROGRESS AGAINST THE GOALS WE SET FOR OURSELVES AT THE END OF ROUND VII (REF A). THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS IS KEYED TO THOSE GOALS.
5. MAINTAINING/ENHANCING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND EDUCATION: IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS, NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE AT TIMES OPERATED WITH MORE ENERGY AND SPONTANEITY THAN COORDINATION. THE CAUCUS HAS NOT ORGANIZED DELEGATIONS INTO TEAMS OR OTHERWISE TRIED TO IMPOSE STRUCTURES ON ALLIANCE PARTICIPATION IN THE GROUPS. ALTHOUGH A FEW DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING USDEL, TEND TO DOMINATE, BETTER COORDINATION IS DESIRABLE; IT IS NOT, HOWEVER, LIKELY TO BE FOUND DURING THIS PHASE. IN THE MEANTIME, INDIVIDUALS ARE GAINING SKILL AS THEY GAIN EXPERIENCE, AND NATO AS A WHOLE IS INCREASING ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN ADVOCATING THE POSITIONS OF SC.L. IF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS HAVE REVEALED SOME LACK OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON SC.L, THEY HAVE ALSO HELPED TIGHTEN ARGUMENTATION ON THE NATO PACKAGE. IN THE CAUCUS, ON THE OTHER HAND, DURING THIS PERIOD A DIVERSITY OF APPROACHES FLOURISHES, EG. ABOUT NUF, ON WHICH DRAFT TEXTS ARE BEGINNING TO PROLIFERATE, AND ON THE QUESTION OF THE L986 CALENDAR.
6. TOUTING OUR PACKAGE: DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS HAVE CENTERED ON SC.L AND, SINCE ITS TABLING NOVEMBER L5, ON SC.7, THOUGH TO A LESSER DEGREE. WE HAVE CLARIFIED AND STRENGTHENED OUR POSITION IN AREAS OUTLINED IN REF A PARA 6. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INSIST ON LINKAGE BETWEEN NUF AND CSBMS AND ON DEALING WITH NAVAL AND AIR, AND THEY HAVE CLEARLY INDICATED THEY WILL NOT MOVE SUBSTANTIVELY DURING THIS PHASE. NEVERTHELESS, OUR EVALUATION IS THAT THIS UNCONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH IS LOSING THE EAST SUPPORT FROM THE NNA, MOST OF WHOM RECOGNIZE AND APPRECIATE WESTERN EFFORTS TO BE FORTHCOMING.



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7. WITH THE EAST REFUSING TO MOVE IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, LITTLE SOLID CONVERGENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS HAS OCCURRED. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, SEEN SUPPORT OR AT LEAST UNDERSTANDING STRENGTHEN FOR SOME OF OUR POSITIONS, ESPECIALLY ON THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, OBSERVATION AND, TO A LESSER DEGREE, VERIFICATION. ON THE ISSUE OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, THE EAST HAS BEEN FORCED TO TONE DOWN ITS INSISTENCE ON 'INDEPENDENT' ACTIVITIES AND INSTEAD IS ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES THROUGH THEIR OWN BRAND OF THE 'FUNCTIONAL APPROACH' WHICH IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM OURS AND WHICH, IN FACT, WOULD CAPTURE INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN ANOTHER GUISE.

8. THE NOVEMBER 15 TABLING OF SC.7 ENDED OUR EFFORTS TO SHAPE THE FORMAL NNA DOCUMENT, BUT WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO ALIGN INDIVIDUAL NNA DELEGATIONS WITH OUR OWN VIEWS. RESULTS ARE PROMISING AMONG THE USUAL NNAS -- AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND SWEDEN. THE EXPLORATORY PHASE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIVELY USEFUL IN THIS REGARD; WE

FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. L2356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: USDEL EVALUATION OF EXPLORATORY PHASE

DO NOT EXPECT CONCRETE CHANGES IN NNA POSITIONS, ANY MORE THAN IN THOSE OF THE EAST, UNTIL DRAFTING BEGINS.

9. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE CONTINUES TO BE VALUABLE AND THAT, ALTHOUGH SOME OBJECTIVES HAVE YET TO BE MET, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF ALLIANCE COORDINATION, THERE IS THE INCREASING FEELING WITHIN THE CAUCUS THAT THIS WORKING ARRANGEMENT IS APPROACHING THE END OF ITS USEFULNESS. THUS, THE NEXT STEP, APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS, SHOULD BE TAKEN SOON.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09164
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON CALENDAR FOR 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 9144
1. CDE VIII - 049
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: DELEGATION BELIEVES IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO RESOLVE THE WORKING SCHEDULE CALENDAR FOR 1986 DURING THIS ROUND. AT THIS POINT, THE FRENCH, AND SPECIFICALLY DISARMAMENT CHIEF BENOIT D'ABOVILLE, ARE THE KEY TO ESTABLISHING A COMMON NATO POSITION AND PROBABLY A CONFERENCE DECISION ON THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE CLOSE OF THIS SESSION. ACCORDINGLY, WE REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON INTERLOCUTORS -- AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE -- MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE D'ABOVILLE TO RECONSIDER THE FRENCH POSITION DURING HIS CURRENT WASHINGTON VISIT. SEE PARA 5 FOR SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS. END SUMMARY.
-
4. BACKGROUND: AFTER ENDLESS HOURS OF CAUCUS DISCUSSION, A FRAGILE CONSENSUS SEEMS TO BE EMERGING AROUND A NATO POSITION FOR A WORKING CALENDAR NEXT YEAR. THIS COMPROMISE CALLS FOR FOUR SCHEDULED SESSIONS IN 1986, BEGINNING JANUARY 21. THE THIRD SESSION WOULD CONCLUDE JULY 18 (THE TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT) AT WHICH TIME THE CONFERENCE COULD DECIDE BY CONSENSUS TO CONCLUDE, BUT A FOURTH SESSION IS PROPOSED FOR AUGUST 19 - SEPTEMBER 19, IF NECESSARY "TO COMPLETE THE DRAFTING OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT." ALL OF OUR CAUCUS COLLEAGUES EXCEPT CANADA AND FRANCE NOW AGREE ON A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE, ALTHOUGH SOME (E.G. THE FRG, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY) PREFER A NOVEMBER 4 DATE. CITING PAST CSCE PRECEDENTS, CANADA IS HOLDING OUT FOR NOVEMBER 4, BUT WILL FALL BACK TO SEPTEMBER 19 IF FRANCE ABANDONS ITS INSISTENCE ON JULY 18. FRANCE STILL INSISTS ON JULY 18 AS A CUTOFF DATE EVEN AT THE PRICE OF NOT AGREEING TO ANY CLOSING DATE FOR THE CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD HAS PRIVATELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FRENCH POSITION IS TACTICALLY UNWISE, BUT HE IS A PRISONER OF PARIS -- SPECIFICALLY DISARMAMENT CHIEF BENOIT D'ABOVILLE.
5. DELEGATION BELIEVES IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO RESOLVE THE WORKING SCHEDULE CALENDAR FOR 1986 BEFORE WE ADJOURN FOR CHRISTMAS FOR REASONS OUTLINED IN REFTEL, I.E., THE ABSENCE OF A FIXED CUTOFF DATE WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE OUR SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE AND INVITE EASTERN OR NNA ATTEMPTS (READ MALTA) TO CONTINUE THE CONFERENCE DURING THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OR TO SET A RESUMPTION DATE FOR THE CDE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON INTERLOCUTORS -- AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE -- MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE D'ABOVILLE TO RECONSIDER THE



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FRENCH POSITION (BASED ON OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN STOCKHOLM, DOD/DAS FEITH MAY TAKE THIS ISSUE UP WITH HIM DURING THEIR SCHEDULED MEETING). CONCERNED AGENCIES MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS IN THEIR MEETING WITH D'ABOVILLE:

-

-- AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE U.S. HAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED YOUR POSITION THAT IT IS IN THE WEST'S INTEREST TO CONCLUDE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AT THE EARLIEST DATE POSSIBLE.

-- WE, TOO, WOULD HAVE PREFERRED AN EARLY CUTOFF DATE, E.G. JULY 18; HOWEVER, IT IS NOW CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT NEITHER THE CAUCUS NOR THE CONFERENCE AT LARGE WILL ACCEPT A CUTOFF DATE THIS FAR IN ADVANCE OF THE VIENNA MEETING.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW SUGGESTED THAT THEY ARE BACKING OFF FROM THEIR EARLIER APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO SET A CALENDAR FOR 1986, INDICATING THAT THE EAST SEES NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO KEEP THE CDE OPEN-ENDED IF NATO REMAINS WITHOUT A POSITION ON THIS QUESTION. SUCH A TURN OF EVENTS CLEARLY WOULD NOT BE IN THE ALLIANCE'S INTERESTS.

-- IT IS, ON THE OTHER HAND, IN OUR COMMON INTEREST TO

DEPARTMENT FOR PM DIRECTOR HOLMES
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON CALENDAR FOR 1986

CONCLUDE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING AND OF TACTICAL IMPORTANCE TO ESTABLISH THE 1986 CALENDAR BEFORE THE END OF THIS ROUND.

-- IF WE ARE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH A CUTOFF DATE FOR 1986 WELL BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE DURING THIS ROUND, WE WILL OPEN OURSELVES UP TO DANGEROUS PROCEDURAL MISCHIEF DURING THE END GAME NEGOTIATIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE ABSENCE OF A FIXED CUTOFF WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE OUR SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE AND INVITE EASTERN OR MALTESE ATTEMPTS TO CONTINUE THE CONFERENCE DURING THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE OR TO SET A RESUMPTION DATE FOR THE CDE.

-- IN ORDER TO REACH A CONFERENCE CONSENSUS ON A CALENDAR FOR 1986 NATO MUST ESTABLISH A COMMON POSITION WELL BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND, E.G., BY DECEMBER 7.

-

-- SUCH A NATO AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. WHILE CANADA IS HOLDING OUT FOR A NOVEMBER 4 DATE, IT HAS INDICATED TO US THAT IT WILL FALL BACK TO SEPTEMBER 19 IF FRANCE IS ABLE TO ACCEPT THIS DATE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ALL OTHER NATO MEMBERS WILL THEN JOIN A CONSENSUS CALLING FOR A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE.

-- TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. WE, THEREFORE, URGE YOU TO



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JOIN A NATO CONSENSUS ESTABLISHING A CALENDAR FOR 1986
WITH A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE FOR THE CDE.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09211
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 29, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 050
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE NOVEMBER 29 PLENARY, FRG STATE SECRETARY MEYER-LANDRUT STRESSED THE NEED FOR BALANCED PROGRESS IN ALL SECTIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. HE ALSO OUTLINED POINTS IN SC.1 WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT AND WHICH WOULD REINFORCE A "SUBSTANTIAL REAFFIRMATION" OF NUF. KONARSKI (POLAND) REFERRED TO THE POSITIVE IMPETUS GIVEN TO THE CONFERENCE BY THE GENEVA SUMMIT, AND ARGUED THAT EASTERN PROPOSALS, E.G. NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, NUF, AND LIMITATIONS WOULD LEAD TO "MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT" IMPROVEMENTS OVER THE HFA. ALLENDESALAZAR (SPAIN) DESCRIBED THE POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE OF: THE SUMMIT, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS, AND THE TABLING OF SC.7. IN A SPEECH CRITICAL OF EASTERN TACTICS, BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) ACCUSED THE EAST OF VIOLATING THE MADRID MANDATE; NOTING THAT THE CONFERENCE IS FALLING BEHIND IN "ITS RACE AGAINST THE VIENNA DEADLINE," HE OFFERED FIVE "REMEDIES" TO THE CURRENT STALEMATE. COUNTERING BUWALDA, GRINEVSKY (USSR) BLAMED THE WEST FOR THE SLOW PROGRESS IN CDE; HE THEN DOLED OUT A POLITICAL STATEMENT REVIEWING THE SUMMIT. END SUMMARY.
-
4. STATE SECRETARY OF THE FRG FOREIGN OFFICE, ANDREAS MEYER-LANDRUT, ASSESSED THE ROLE OF CDE WITHIN THE OVERALL CSCE PROCESS. DRAWING ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT, THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HFA, AND THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM, HE STRESSED THE NEED -- AND REQUIREMENT -- FOR BALANCED PROGRESS IN ALL BASKETS OF THE FINAL ACT. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE STATE SECRETARY LINKED SECURITY ISSUES WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL, AND HUMAN CONTACTS ISSUES. THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING, HE SAID, MUST CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF BALANCE. TURNING TO CDE, MEYER-LANDRUT NOTED THAT THE FRG IS "WORKING RESOLUTELY" FOR A "SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME," NOT MERE COSMETIC IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FINAL ACT. IN THIS REGARD, HE SPECIFIED NATO PROPOSALS WHICH VENTURE BEYOND "TRADITIONAL MILITARY CONCEPTS:" OUT-OF-GARRISON; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD; OBLIGATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES FROM START TO FINISH; INSPECTION; AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. A "SUBSTANTIAL" REAFFIRMATION OF NUF, HE ARGUED, WOULD BE MEANINGFUL ONLY IF REENFORCED THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CSBM'S. THE STATE SECRETARY ALSO CALLED FOR A "START BEING MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE DRAFTING OF THE FIRST PASSAGES" OF A CONCLUDING CDE DOCUMENT.
5. AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND) DESCRIBED A TWO-FOLD



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POSITIVE IMPACT OF THE SUMMIT ON CDE: 1) IT OFFERS HOPE FOR A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS; AND 2) IT CALLS FOR AN EARLY AGREEMENT FOR CDE. KONARSKI ATTACKED THE WEST'S CONTENTION THAT EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE NOT "MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT;" HE ARGUED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON NUF, LIMITATIONS, AND INCLUSION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME CONSTITUTED A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING. THE POLISH AMBASSADOR SINGLED OUT THE NEED FOR AIR AND NAVAL THRESHOLDS, ALTHOUGH HE QUALIFIED THIS IMPORTANCE AS A FUNCTION OF EXISTING SECURITY INTERESTS. (COMMENT: KONARSKI APPEARED TO BE REPLYING TO THE WEST'S ARGUMENT THAT EASTERN AIR AND NAVAL THRESHOLDS ARE NOT MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT. IMPLIED IN HIS COMMENT IS THAT ONCE AIR AND NAVAL THRESHOLDS ARE ESTABLISHED -- WHATEVER THEIR LEVEL -- THEY CAN BE ADJUSTED IN THE FUTURE. END COMMENT.)

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6. AMBASSADOR ALLENDESALAZAR (SPAIN) OFFERED GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS IN CDE. HE FOCUSED ON THE POSITIVE, NOTING FAVORABLE IMPACT OF THE SUMMIT, NNA INTRODUCTION OF SC.7, AND CONSENSUS ON THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 29, 2985

7. STRESSING HIS CONCERN FOR THE LACK OF TIME REMAINING BEFORE THE VIENNA "DEADLINE," AMBASSADOR BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) FORCEFULLY BLAMED THE EAST FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN CDE. HE ACCUSED THE EAST OF ATTEMPTING TO REDEFINE THE MADRID MANDATE THROUGH INSISTENCE ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES -- WHICH ARE CLEARLY OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MANDATE. HE ALSO CRITICIZED THE EAST'S UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS INSPECTION -- THE "CORNERSTONE OF SUCCESS" IN CDE. BUWALDA ALSO DEFENDED THE WEST'S APPROACH TO NUF AND CONSTRAINTS. THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR OFFERED FIVE "REMEDIES" FOR THE CURRENT STALEMATE: 1) PROPOSALS NOT WITHIN THE MANDATE SHOULD BE DROPPED; 2) WORKING GROUPS SHOULD EMPHASIZE POINTS OF CONVERGENCE, NOT HAMMER AT DIFFERENCES; 3) COORDINATORS FOR THE INFORMAL MEETINGS SHOULD BE APPOINTED ASAP; 4) THERE THEN SHOULD BE AN "EARLY TRANSITION TO DRAFTING," WHICH COORDINATORS SHOULD FACILITATE; AND 5) AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED ON 1986 WORK CALENDAR PRIOR TO THE END OF THIS SESSION.

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8. IN RIGHT OF REPLY, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (USSR) CURTLY REJECTED BUWALDA'S ASSERTION THAT INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARE EXCLUDED BY THE MANDATE. HE CHASTISED THE WEST FOR USING AN "ULTIMATUM-LIKE TONE" ON



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INSPECTION. FINALLY, HE TOOK ODDS WITH BUWALDA'S ASSERTION THAT NUF IS NOT A PROBLEM; GRINEVSKY SAID THIS IS NOT THE CASE, BECAUSE THE WEST HAS STILL NOT DEFINED ITS POSITION ON NUF. TURNING TO PREPARED REMARKS, GRINEVSKY FOCUSED ON SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WHICH REMAIN UNSOLVED POST-SUMMIT; HE SPECIFICALLY SAID "STAR WARS" WAS THE CAUSE NO ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS WAS MADE. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALSO QUOTED AT LENGTH GORBACHEV'S REPORT TO THE SUPREME SOVIET, AND THE SUPREME SOVIET DECREE WHICH REAFFIRMS THE SOVIET INTENTION TO GIVE PRACTICAL EFFECT TO THE SUMMIT AGREEMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
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# Statement

by Ambassador Wladimiera Konarski
Head of the Polish Delegation

Plenary Meeting 29 November 1985

Mr Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,

We have all awaited the outcome of the Geneva summit meeting since we all of us understood it as a major East-West event the results of which would also have an impact upon our Conference. The significance of Geneva for the Stockholm negotiations may be twofold: through the expected improvement of East-West relations and progress in disarmament negotiations, and also directly through the declared intention to "facilitate together with other participating States an early and succesful completion of the work of the Conference".

The USSR and the United States have also declared that "they will not seek to achieve military superiority". This phrase seems to be of utmost importance for all disarmament negotiations, which should be conducted on the basis of equal treatment of security interests. We all know that this is also an essential concept of the Madrid mandate, constituting, together with the equally important notions of balance and reciprocity, a fundamental element of the mandate and of our Conference itself. Consequently, in our understanding, a certain symmetry in the final decisions will be essential and indeed inevitabl Otherwise it is hard to understand how we could assure the required implementation of the above-mentioned three important notions.

In the joint statement we also find an encouraging reference to the "great importance" which the two sides attach to the Stockholm Conference. We find that it is a helpful indication showing the appreciation for this unique all-European experience which is a confidence-building and disarmament effort by 35 participating States on the CSCE basis of consensus. Common sense obliges one to agree with the remarks made two days ago by General Secretary Gorbatchev in the



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Supreme Soviet in Moscow when he pointed out that it is through concrete actions and deeds that the spirit of Geneva and of joint statement will reveal their real value and influence. The hope for such actions was also expressed in the special resolution of the Polish Parliament which welcomed the Geneva results.

Mr Chairman,

At our Conference also there has been a development which helps to move the negotiations forward. I refer to document SC.7, the submission of which is a positive step, whatever may be one's appreciation of its content. Poland, which has so often pronounced itself in favour of the acceleration of our work, welcomes appearance of SC.7 on the negotiating table. However, the authors will not be disappointed, I hope, if I say that we did not find in their text a panacea for all the crucial problems the Conference is faced with. Nevertheless, we receive SC.7 with due respect as an expression of the security interests of a number of participating States whose role we have always tried to see as helpful in achieving the goal of the Conference. We have put forward a number of questions in the informal groups. We still have others in mind. The answers given will help us to understand the authors' attitude better and will probably help to develop a concrete debate leading us soon, I hope, to the beginning of the drafting phase.

On the eve of drafting it is worthwhile to understand each other better on the question of the military significance of the future set of measures. Sometimes this question is referred to in another way when it is said that the measures in question should constitute a significant progress in comparison to those of the Helsinki Final Act. Directly or indirectly it is implied that SC.1 would mean such progress while SC.4 would not. For the delegation of Poland the arguments presented up to now in support of this contention are not at all convincing.

It is to be borne in mind that SC.4 speaks clearly in terms of measures "more significant in nature". First of all a framework of the principle of non-use of force, particularly military force, properly developed in a document will be, together with the other CSBMs, obviously helpful in strenghtening the effectiveness and significance of all our final decisions.

Furthermore, what is a mandate prerequisite in this respect? That the measures be "politically binding". This in itself makes the



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future Stockholm decisions much more militarily significant. It may also give them the character of a system if the requirement of complementarity is duly respected.

In our proposals there are two other particular features which add to their military significance. These are a measure of limitation and the measures which include in a set or a system the respective types of naval and aerial military activity which affect European security. If those measures are adopted who will say that a set including them will not be militarily much more significant by comparison with the Final Act?

There remains a problem of thresholds. These are also important as a technical military requirement. They may have some political significance as well. However, one should see them, I think, rather as an indication of given security interests at a given time. They will most probably not be agreed once and for all, since the military situation in Europe is in a state of permanent evolution and what is acceptable and adequate today may be seen as too modest and hence insufficient tomorrow.

In today's Europe we are faced with the pluralism of military situations and the variety of security patterns and requirements. The future set of measures may serve as a common denominator for those various security interests and may help to express them so that they become more understandable and acceptable.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09224
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
- NOVEMBER 25-29, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 054
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: NATO TURNED IN A RELATIVELY STRONG PERFORMANCE IN CDE WORKING GROUPS NOVEMBER 25--29, EXPLOITING THE PRESENCE OF SC.7 (THE NNA PAPER) AND PUTTING THE EAST ON THE DEFENSIVE FOR NOT HAVING CONCRETE VERIFICATION AND OBSERVATION PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. THE WEST ALSO WARNED THOSE WHO ARE TRYING TO REINTERPRET THE MANDATE IN ORDER TO EXTEND THE CDE ZONE THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD LEAD THE CONFERENCE DOWN A "BLIND ALLEY." THE EAST STILL SEEMS CONFUSED ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE SC.7, AND THAT CONFUSION HAS CLEARLY LED TO A DETERIORATION IN EASTERN PERFORMANCE. A NEW SOVIET TACTIC CONTINUES TO EMERGE ON THE AIR AND NAVAL ISSUE, WHICH IS TO ADOPT AN ELASTIC BROADENING DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WHICH COULD EVENTUALLY RAISE THE FUNCTIONAL LINK TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES TO THE "EURO-STRATEGIC" LEVEL. THE NNA CONTINUE, WITHOUT MARKED SUCCESS, TO TRY TO MAINTAIN THEIR TENUOUS UNITY; EVEN THE MOST BENIGN QUESTIONS SEEMED TO HIGHLIGHT NNA FAULT-LINES, CLEAR FISSURES ALREADY HAVE OPENED BETWEEN SWITZERLAND AND MALTA/YUGOSLAVIA ON THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, AND AUSTRIA AND CYPRUS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. END SUMMARY.
4. NATO: THE ALLIANCE HAD A RELATIVELY STRONG WEEK IN THE WORKING GROUPS, AS COORDINATION SEEMS TO BE IMPROVING AND THE TACTICAL ERRORS (PARTICULARLY ON THE AIR AND NAVAL ISSUE) WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY PLAGUED NATO WERE AVOIDED. DELWORTH (CANADA) OPENED THE WEEK IN WORKING GROUP AB, WITH A STRONGLY WORDED STATEMENT WHICH BLAMED THE EAST FOR INHIBITING PROGRESS AND WARNED THAT ATTEMPTS TO REDEFINE THE CDE ZONE (I.E., TO CAPTURE AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES) WOULD LEAD THE CONFERENCE DOWN A "BLIND ALLEY." IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP, HANSEN (U.S.) RESPONDED TO CONTINUED SOVIET EMPHASIS ON THE "THREAT" INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES POSE FOR EUROPE BY NOTING THAT IF "THREAT" WERE TO BE THE ONLY CRITERION FOR CSBM'S THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE COVERED. THIS WAS CLEARLY NOT GOING TO BE THE CASE. THE ONLY BASIS FOR COVERING
-
AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IS THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH SPELLED OUT IN THE MADRID MANDATE. NATO WAS SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING THE AIR AND NAVAL DISCUSSION FROM DOMINATING THE WEEK'S ACTIVITIES. THE EAST WAS PUT ON THE DEFENSIVE IN BOTH THE OBSERVATION AND INFORMATION/VERIFICATION GROUPS AS THE UK AND FRANCE RESPECTIVELY, NOTING
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THE DETAILED PROPOSALS NOW ON THE TABLE ON THESE TOPICS FROM BOTH THE WEST AND THE NNA, PRESSED THE EAST FOR ITS PROPOSALS. THE UK LED THE CHARGE IN THE OBSERVATION GROUP CALLING THE EAST'S INFORMAL "SCENARIOS" FOR OBSERVATION "MEANINGLESS." WESTERN PRESSURE MAY EVEN HAVE PROVIDED A SUBSTANTIVE PAYOFF IN THE INFORMATION/ VERIFICATION CLUSTER WHERE TATARNIKOV (USSR) DID NOT CATEGORICALLY REJECT INSPECTION, BUT NOTED THAT THE EAST DOES NOT "LIKE" INSPECTIONS. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT AN INSPECTION REQUEST IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ACCUSATION AND THAT INSPECTION DOES NOT PROVIDE EQUALITY FOR ALL PARTICIPATING STATES.

5. THE ALLIANCE ALSO IDENTIFIED COMMON GROUND BETWEEN SC.1 AND SC.7 ON ANNUAL CALENDARS, ON NOTIFICATION OF GROUND ACTIVITIES, AND ON AN OBSERVATION REGIME. SURPRISINGLY, NATO'S BEST EFFORT OF THE WEEK MAY HAVE COME IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE GROUP. EVEN AS NUF TEXTS PROLIFERATE WITHIN THE CAUCUS AND PRESSURE BUILDS FOR A MORE FORTHCOMING WESTERN LINE, NATO APPEARED CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE WORKING GROUP, WHILE OFFERING NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE. THE NNA PAPER HELPED IN THIS REGARD, ALLOWING THE WEST TO GET OFF THE DEFENSIVE BY FOCUSING ON THE NNA TEXT. (COMMENT: ONE OF THE KEYS TO THE SOLID WESTERN

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,

NUF PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN PUTTING SOME OF THOSE NATO DELEGATIONS WHO ARE MOST ANXIOUS ABOUT THE WEST'S NUF POSITION OUT IN FRONT WHERE THEY HAVE FELT TEAM PRESSURE TO TOE THE CAUCUS LINE, E.G. DENMARK, NORWAY. END COMMENT.)

6. THE EAST: THE EAST WAS CLEARLY OFF ITS GAME MOST OF THE WEEK AND STILL SEEMS TO HAVE NO CLEAR STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE NNA PAPER (SC.7). FOR INSTANCE, IN WORKING GROUP A (NUF) THEY ONLY VENTURED A COMMENT ON SC.7'S OMISSION OF "ARMED FORCE" FROM THE NUF TEXT. IN GENERAL, THE EAST HAS WELCOMED SC.7 IN VAGUE TERMS BUT HAS CONTINUED TO ADDRESS THE BULK OF ITS SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS TO NATO. EVEN WHEN PROMOTING ITS OWN IDEAS, HOWEVER, THE EAST HAD PROBLEMS THIS WEEK. IN THE NUF GROUP BUHOARA (ROMANIA), DURING HIS CEASELESS SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, IMPLIED THAT THE WTO HAD FALLEN OFF ITS EARLY PROPOSAL FOR A NUF TREATY, A COMMENT WHICH CLEARLY LEFT RAHMANINOV (USSR) UNHAPPY AS HE HAD TO REMIND THE GROUP THAT ALL PROPOSALS, INCLUDING THE TREATY PROPOSAL, WERE STILL ON THE TABLE. THE ROMANIAN DEPUTY ALSO MADE A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND IN THE OBSERVATION GROUP, BUT ON THE KEY QUESTION OF MANDATORY INVITATION TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, HE HEDGED BY SAYING STATES "SHOULD" INVITE OBSERVERS, NOT "WILL"



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INVITE.
7. NAVAL AND AIR: WHILE THE EAST CONTINUED TO BEAT THE DRUM FOR INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM REGIME THERE WERE ALSO SIGNS OF A NEW APPROACH. TODOROV (BULGARIA) STARTED THE WEEK OFF BY ACCUSING NATO OF IGNORING THE PRINCIPLE OF PARALLEL PROGRESS ADVOCATED BY DELWORTH IN WORKING GROUP AB BY REFUSING TO DISCUSS AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP WHILE INSISTING ON PARALLEL PROGRESS VIS-A-VIS NUF AND CSBM'S. A DIFFERENT LINE OF ATTACK, HOWEVER, WAS TAKEN THE NEXT DAY IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP AS SOLOMENKO (USSR) ARGUED THAT THE MEANING OF THE MANDATE WAS CLEAR IN MADRID AND IS CLEAR NOW. THE MANDATE LANGUAGE "MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE" MEANS ACTIVITIES OF ALL KINDS OF FORCES, AND THE FUNCTIONAL LINK DOES NOT ONLY MEAN A TACTICAL LINK TO GROUND FORCES, BUT A LINK AT A HIGHER LEVEL -- A "EURO-STRATEGIC LINK" WHICH REQUIRES NOTIFICATION OF A WIDE RANGE OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. TATARNIKOV (USSR), ALSO FOCUSING ON THE "FUNCTIONAL LINK," GAVE A CLEAR EXPOSITION OF THIS NEW EASTERN TACTIC IN THE OBSERVATION GROUP, SAYING THAT ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EUROPE WAS IN ESSENCE FUNCTIONALLY RELATED, AS ALL ACTIVITIES WERE INTERDEPENDENT, NOT INDEPENDENT. IN AN APPLICATION OF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE "FUNCTIONAL APPROACH" HE FOCUSED ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AND ASKED FOR NATO'S SCENARIO FOR THEIR OBSERVATION. OF COURSE, HE OBSERVED, THAT SCENARIO SHOULD INCLUDE OBSERVATION OF EMBARKATION/DISEMBARKATION OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES, AIR SUPPORT, NAVAL ARTILLERY SUPPORT, ETC., AND NOT JUST THE LANDING OF FORCES, AS ALL OF THESE ACTIVITIES ARE CLEARLY RELATED TO LAND ACTIVITIES AND ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. IN A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE RIPOLL (SPAIN) INDICATED THAT AN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE IS ONLY OF A THREATENING NATURE WHEN IT COMES ASHORE. (COMMENT: WHAT TATARNIKOV IS CLEARLY DOING IS ADOPTING THE "FUNCTIONAL APPROACH" TO SOVIET PURPOSES. AND HIS DEFINITION SEEMS TO BE INEXORABLY BROADENING THE CONCEPT TO THE POINT WHERE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AND INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES BECOMES VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS. TAKEN TO ITS LOGICAL EXTREME, TATARNIKOV'S DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WOULD LEAD TO THE EURO/STRATEGIC LINK THE SOVIETS ARE CONTENDING WAS MEANT BY THE MADRID MANDATE. END COMMENT.)
8. THE NNA: THE FACADE OF NNA UNITY BECAME EVEN MORE TRANSPARENT THIS WEEK. THE NNA CONTINUED TO TRY TO
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
EXPLAIN SC.7 WITHOUT REVEALING ITS INTERNAL FISSURES;



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HOWEVER, IN BOTH THE NUF AND NOTIFICATION GROUPS, SIGNIFICANT DIVISIONS WERE APPARENT. IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP SCHARLI (SWITZERLAND) PROVOKED NO LESS BY MALTA'S INSISTENCE THAT SC.7 PROVIDES FOR THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES THAN BY THE SOVIET UNION'S, STATED SWITZERLAND'S SUPPORT FOR THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND ITS VIEW THAT THE NNA PROPOSAL EXCLUDED INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. IN THE NUF GROUP, INTERNAL NNA DISCORD ONCE AGAIN REARED ITS HEAD WHEN PAPADOPOULOS (CYPRUS) TRIED TO PUSH HIS CASE FOR A "SOLEMN DECLARATION" ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (OF WHICH HE WOULD BE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECT) BY DECOUPLING THE MANDATE LANGUAGE TO "GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION" TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE, TO MEAN THAT CSBM'S WOULD GIVE "EFFECT" TO NUF, WHILE HIS "SOLEMN DECLARATION" WOULD PROVIDE "EXPRESSION." (ROMANIA WAS MAKING A SIMILAR ARGUMENT DURING THIS SESSION.) LOIBL (AUSTRIA) CLEARLY REFUTED THIS INTERPRETATION ONLY MINUTES LATER WHEN HE NOTED THAT IT WAS HIS DELEGATION'S POSITION THAT CSBM'S GIVE BOTH EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO NUF. (COMMENT: AS THE CYPRIOT HAS BECOME MORE AND MORE THE "DARLING" OF THE EAST ON NUF, HE HAS APPEARED INCREASINGLY ISOLATED FROM HIS OWN NNA COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT CONCRETE CSBM'S MUST UNDERPIN ANY NUF COMMITMENT. END COMMENT.) AMBASSADOR GAUCI (MALTA) CONTINUED TO PURSUE HIS OWN AGENDA BY RAISING THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CSBM'S WHEREVER THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF AND NOT ALWAYS TO THE SATISFACTION OF HIS NNA COLLEAGUES. IN AB, FOR INSTANCE, HE TRIED TO ASSOCIATE THE CDE STATES (UK, CANADA, CYPRUS) WHICH ARE ALSO COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS WITH THE MALTESE POSITION BY CITING A COMMONWEALTH STUDY WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE SECURITY OF SMALL STATES ALSO DESERVED ATTENTION. THE QUESTION NATO WAS CONSIDERING BY WEEK'S END WAS WHETHER OR NOT THE NNA HOUSE OF CARDS WOULD STAND UP LONG ENOUGH TO ALLOW THE WEST TO HELP KNOCK IT DOWN.

9. ANNUAL CALENDARS: LAST WEEK'S NNA-NATO DISPUTE OVER WHICH WORKING GROUP ANNUAL CALENDARS/FORECASTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN APPEARS HEADED FOR A FAVORABLE RESOLUTION. INFORMAL CONTACTS HAD REVEALED THAT THE NNA'S (PRIMARILY FINLAND'S) PRINCIPLE CONCERN HAD BEEN THAT THE WEST WOULD FILIBUSTER ON THE ANNUAL FORECAST MEASURE AND REFUSE TO DISCUSS CONSTRAINTS AT ALL IN THE "CONSTRAINTS; ANNUAL FORECASTS" GROUP. IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE NNA CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE, HANSEN (U.S.) ADDRESSED THE NNA CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL ON THURSDAY AND, ALTHOUGH HANSEN'S COMMENTS WERE HIGHLY NEGATIVE, THE NNA SEEMED FULLY SATISFIED THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT SIMPLY IGNORE CONSTRAINTS; AS A RESULT, THE NNA NOW APPEAR READY TO DISCUSS ANNUAL CALENDARS/ FORECASTS IN THE THURSDAY GROUP A MEETING AS CALLED FOR IN THE OCTOBER 14 "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT." HOWEVER, AS



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ONE PROCEDURAL DISPUTE RECEDES, ANOTHER MAY BE ARISING. FINLAND INDICATED IN THE OBSERVATION GROUP THAT THE NNA WILL DISCUSS ITS VERIFICATION MEASURE "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" THERE, RATHER THAN IN THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION MEETING WHERE THE "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT" PLACES IT. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH IT IS IN THE WEST'S INTEREST TO MAINTAIN THE SANCTITY OF THE "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT," THIS PARTICULAR NNA MOVE COULD BE TACTICALLY EXPLOITED BY THE ALLIANCE TO ARGUE THAT EVEN THE NNA RECOGNIZES ITS "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" PROPOSAL DOESN'T AMOUNT TO MUCH OF A VERIFICATION MEASURE. END COMMENT.)

10. THE FUTURE: FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE SESSION NATO WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO AN AIR AND NAVAL DEBATE BASED ON TATARNIKOV'S DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND RESIST ANY ATTEMPTS TO ALLOW THE "EURO-STRATEGIC LINKAGE" CONCEPT TO GAIN ANY CURRENCY WITHIN THE CONFERENCE. NEW ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH NOW BEING FINALIZED BY THE CAUCUS MINI-CLUSTERS SHOULD HELP IN THIS REGARD. SOME CONCERN

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,

ALSO HAS BEEN EXPRESSED ABOUT CONCENTRATING TOO MUCH ATTENTION ON THE NNA PAPER AND INCREASED EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO CAST OUR QUESTIONS IN LIGHT OF HOW IT COMPARES WITH SC.1 RATHER THAN ADDRESSING IT ON ITS OWN MERITS. FOR THE TIME BEING, NATO WILL CONTINUE TO STEER AWAY FROM PROVOCATIVE QUESTIONS THAT COULD FURTHER FRACTURE NNA UNITY, ALTHOUGH RECENT EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT EVEN THE MOST INNOCUOUS PROBES HAVE REVEALED FLAWS IN THAT DELICATE STRUCTURE. AS FOR THE EAST, IT NOW APPEARS LIKELY THAT IT MAY CONDUCT A HOLDING OPERATION FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS SESSION IN ANTICIPATION OF A TRANSITION TO DRAFTING.

BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09209
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 29, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 9144
1. CDE VIII - 052
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: CIARRAPICO (ITALY) REPORTED THAT GRINEVSKY (USSR) HAD INDICATED TO HIM THAT HE NO LONGER BELIEVES A 1986 CALENDAR WITH A CUTOFF DATE CAN BE SET DURING THIS ROUND, BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OF PROGRESS THE CONFERENCE WILL HAVE MADE BY NEXT SUMMER CANNOT BE GAUGED. INSTEAD, GRINEVSKY PROPOSES TO SCHEDULE ONLY THE FIRST TWO 1986 SESSIONS NOW. THE NNA WELCOMED NATO'S WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER BRINGING COORDINATORS INTO PLAY, BUT THE CAUCUS SUSPECTS THEY WILL COME BACK WITH A PROPOSAL FOR FIVE COORDINATORS, RATHER THAN THE WEST'S PREFERRED TWO, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY IDENTIFYING FIVE WILLING CANDIDATES WITHIN THEIR RANKS. THE CAUCUS NOTED THAT THE RECENT DISPUTE OVER WHICH WORKING GROUP THE NNA'S ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL WILL BE DISCUSSED IN SEEMS TO BE RESOLVING ITSELF TO OUR SATISFACTION. END SUMMARY.
4. CONTACTS: A NUMBER OF CONTACTS SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE EAST IS BACKING OFF ITS EARLIER APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO A 1986 CALENDAR WHICH INCLUDES A CUTOFF DATE. GRINEVSKY TOLD CIARRAPICO (ITALY) THAT HIS PRESENT THINKING IS THAT WE ONLY SHOULD AGREE NOW TO A SCHEDULE FOR THE FIRST TWO SESSIONS OF 1986, BECAUSE WE COULD NOT GAUGE HOW FAR WE WILL HAVE PROGRESSED BY NEXT JUNE/JULY. GRINEVSKY HAD ALSO NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER U.S.-USSR SUMMIT BY THAT TIME THAT COULD AFFECT THE CONFERENCE AND OUR THINKING ABOUT THE SCHEDULE. OTHERS REPORTED THAT ROMANIA AND HUNGARY WERE NOW PUSHING A LINE THAT, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD SUSPEND THE CDE BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING IF POSSIBLE, THEY DID NOT FEEL THAT A CUTOFF DATE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED.
-
5. COORDINATORS: GRONDAL (ICELAND) REPORTED THAT HE HAD INDICATED TO THE NNA NATO'S READINESS TO CONSIDER BRINGING NNA COORDINATORS INTO PLAY AND OUR PREFERENCE FOR TWO COORDINATORS (REFTEL). GAUCI (MALTA, AND PRESENT NNA CAUCUS CHAIRMAN) HAD WELCOMED THIS SIGNAL (AS HAS THE NNA IN GENERAL), ALTHOUGH HE HAD PROBED FOR AN INDICATION OF NATO'S WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A HIGHER NUMBER (GRONDAL HAD OFFERED HIM NO ENCOURAGEMENT). THE CAUCUS SUSPECTS THAT THE NNA MAY WELL RESPOND WITH A PROPOSAL FOR FIVE COORDINATORS. ON THIS POINT, BARRY (U.S.) NOTED THAT THE CAUCUS HAD DISCUSSED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER FIVE AT SOME FUTURE TIME, BUT URGED THAT NATO STICK WITH ITS PROPOSAL OF TWO IN BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTACTS AND AWAIT THE NNA CAUCUS' RESPONSE. ITALY AND THE UK NOTED



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THAT THE NNA MAY HAVE A TECHNICAL PROBLEM IDENTIFYING FIVE WILLING CANDIDATES, AS GAUCI (MALTA) AND BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN THE JOB, WHILE PAPADAPOULOS (CYPRUS) HAS INDICATED HE WOULD ONLY CONSIDER COORDINATING THE NUF GROUP, WHERE HE IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. AS AN OPTION FOR LONG-TERM CONSIDERATION, BARRY SUGGESTED IRELAND AS A POTENTIAL COORDINATOR.

6. TACTICS AND OTHER ISSUES: THE CAUCUS REVIEWED THE PAST WEEK'S WORKING GROUP MEETINGS AND MADE NO MAJOR CHANGES TO ALLIANCE TACTICS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. BARRY (U.S.) NOTED THAT THE DISPUTE OVER WHICH GROUP ANNUAL CALENDARS/FORECASTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN SEEMS TO HAVE FADED, AS THE NNA WAS WILLING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON THEIR ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL IN THE CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS (GROUP) AND POSED QUESTION TO OUR FORECASTS MEASURE. (COMMENT: THE NNA APPARENTLY DECIDED NOT TO PUSH THIS ISSUE AFTER BEING ASSURED THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT "FILIBUSTER" ON ANNUAL CALENDARS AND REFUSE TO ENGAGE IN ANY DISCUSSION OF CONSTRAINTS. END COMMENT.) THE CAUCUS ALSO TASKED THE MILITARY ADVISORS GROUP TO PREPARE A WRITTEN ANALYSIS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MILITARY ISSUES ARISING OUT OF SC.7 TO BE READY FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CAUCUS ON DECEMBER 13. THE MEETING CLOSED WITH A DESULTORY DISCUSSION OF WHETHER AND, IF SO, WHEN TO HAVE A "BRAINSTORMING" SESSION PRIOR TO THE NEXT ROUND. THE ONLY SALIENT POINT OF THIS DISORGANIZED DISCUSSION WAS MADE BY CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) WHO REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT IN ORDER TO HAVE A "BRAINSTORMING" SESSION "YOU FIRST HAVE TO HAVE A BRAIN."

BARRY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09238
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
- NOVEMBER 25-29, 1985
REF: USNATO 6815
1. CDE VIII - 055
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NA'O CAUCUS WRESTLED WITH TWO PROSAIC PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS WITH POLITICAL PURPORT: SETTING A CUTOFF DATE FOR THE 1986 WORKING CALENDAR AND APPOINTING NNA COORDINATORS FOR THE WORKING GROUP. AGREEMENT ON THE FORMER, IN OUR VIEW, WILL MINIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR EASTERN AND MALTESE "BLACKMAIL" DURING END GAME NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRENCH HAVE YET TO BE PERSUADED. MEANWHILE, THE NNA STRUGGLE, WITH MINIMAL SUCCESS, TO MAINTAIN THEIR FRAGILE FACADE OF UNITY ON THEIR OWN PROPOSAL (SC.7). THE SOVIETS, DESPITE PRIVATE AND UNDEFINED HINTS AT FLEXIBILITY, CONTINUE TO INSIST ON THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THEIR OWN EXPANDED VERSION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. END SUMMARY.
4. NATO
- ----
CALENDARS: AFTER WEEKS OF QUERULOUS DISCUSSION, THE CAUCUS MAY BE EVOLVING TOWARDS CONSENSUS ON PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS WITH SUBSTANTIVE OVERTONES. ON THE 1986 WORK CALENDAR, THE ALLIANCE IS ATTEMPTING TO SET A CUTOFF DATE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE PREPARATORY MEETING (SEPTEMBER 19). CANADA AND SOME O'HER DELEGATIONS STILL BELIEVE THAT WE CAN BE "BLACKMAILED" BY THE CONSENSUS RULE INTO CONTINUING PAST AN ARBITRARILY FIXED CUTOFF DATE. HOWEVER, ALL DELEGATIONS, EXCEPT FRANCE, NOW AGREE THAT AN EARLY NATO AND CONFERENCE CONSENSUS ESTABLISHING A 1986 CALENDAR WILL MINIMIZE THE CHANCES OF MISCHIEF-MAKING BY MALTA (AND OTHERS) LATER ON. WE ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE FRENCH HERE, WITH SOME SUCCESS, TO JOIN A NATO CONSENSUS DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE FRENCH CDE DELEGATION PRIVATELY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT PARIS' STUBBORN REFUSAL TO CONSIDER ANY DATE AFTER JULY 18 IS NEITHER HELPING WESTERN INTERESTS NOR ALLIANCE UNITY IN STOCKHOLM. THE ABSENCE OF A FIXED CUTOFF DATE, IN OUR VIEW, WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE OUR SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL LEVERAGE DURING END GAME NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD INVITE ATTEMPTS TO CONTINUE THE CONFERENCE DURING THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. DESPITE HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH DELEGATION HERE ESSENTIALLY REMAINS A PRISONER OF PARIS' PASSION FOR AN EARLY CUTOFF DATE.
5. COORDINATORS: THE CAUCUS HAS INITIATED A DIALOGUE WITH THE NNA ON COORDINATORS IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THEIR



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ULTIMATE CHOICE. WE HAVE INFORMED THE NNA THAT WE PREFER, AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE, THAT TWO NNA COORDINATORS BE APPOINTED, ONE EACH FOR WORKING GROUP A AND WORKING GROUP B. THE NNA ARE NOW DISCUSSING THE WHOS, WHYS, AND WHEREFORES OF THEIR ULTIMATE CHOICES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE NNA THAT ANY COORDINATORS AGREEABLE TO US MUST ABIDE BY CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS: (1) THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT WITH ITS STRICT DIVISION OF SUBJECT MATTER WILL GUIDE AND DETERMINE DISCUSSIONS; (2) THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH ENTERING INTO THE DRAFTING PHASE; AND (3) COORDINATORS WILL NOT BE APPOINTED WHO HAVE A PERSONAL (CYPRUS - NUF) OR NATIONAL (YUGOSLAVIA - CONSTRAINTS) INTEREST IN A SUBJECT. EXCEPT FOR THE NUMBER OF COORDINATORS (A GROUP POSITION HAS YET TO BE ESTABLISHED), THE NNA SEEM TO BE GENERALLY AMENABLE TO THIS APPROACH.

6. THE WORKING GROUPS: WHILE THE BIG BOYS TALKED OF CALENDARS AND COORDINATORS AND SUCH THINGS, THE TROOPS FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,

FLOGGED THE WESTERN PROPOSALS IN THE WORKING GROUP TRENCHES. NATO SPEAKERS CONTINUED TO STRESS SC.1, DRAWING COMPARISONS BETWEEN IT AND RELEVANT PARTS OF SC.7. NATO DELEGATES ALSO WARNED THAT EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO REINTERPRET THE CDE MANDATE IN ORDER TO EXTEND THE ZONE WOULD LEAD THE CONFERENCE DOWN A "BLIND ALLEY." NATO WAS SUCCESSFUL, MOREOVER, IN PREVENTING DISCUSSION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES FROM DOMINATING THE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS. SURPRISINGLY, THE WEST'S BEST EFFORTS MAY HAVE COME IN ONE OF THE AREAS WHERE WE HAVE LEAST TO SAY -- NON-USE OF FORCE. MORE BECAUSE OF EASTERN INEPTNESS THAN WESTERN SKILL, NUF DISCUSSION HAS SO FAR CENTERED ON THE "ORGANIC" RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONCRETE CSBM'S AND NUF. HOWEVER, PRESSURE CONTINUES TO BUILD WITHIN THE CAUCUS FOR A MORE FORTHCOMING WESTERN APPROACH ON THE ISSUE -- WITNESS THE PROLIFERATION OF UNOFFICIAL NUF TEXTS.

7. THE NNA

THIS WEEK'S TEMPEST IN A TEAPOT: THE MOMENTARY FIREWORKS (SET OFF BY AN IMPASSIONED SWEDISH DEFENSE OF NNA PREROGATIVES) SURROUNDING THE NNA'S REFUSAL TO DISCUSS THEIR ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL IN THE PROPER WORKING GROUP SEEM TO HAVE FADED. THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR, THE AUTHOR OF THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT GOVERNING INFORMAL WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS, PERSUADED THE NNA TO BACK OFF THEIR ADAMANT STAND AFTER THEY HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT "FILIBUSTER" ON



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ANNUAL CALENDARS OR REFUSE TO DISCUSS CONSTRAINTS IN THE "CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS" MEETING. WE HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATELY NEGATIVE IN ADDRESSING THE NNA CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUP MEETING. IN FACT, THE NNA HAVE SHOWN A GREAT DEAL OF INTELLECTUAL ARROGANCE -- NOT TO MENTION CHUTZPAH -- BY INTRODUCING A "CONSTRAINTS" MEASURE THAT UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS WOULD ONLY CONSTRAIN NATO. THE NNA (AND, IT APPEARS, THE EAST), IN EFFECT, GET OFF SCOT-FREE. SO MUCH FOR THE CHERISHED NNA (AND EASTERN) PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY FOR ALL.

8. AS THE DISPUTE OVER THE PLACEMENT OF THE NNA ANNUAL CALENDAR/CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL WANES, ANOTHER ONE IS WAXING. THIS TIME THE GOOD GUY/BAD GUY ROLES SEEM TO BE REVERSED. FINLAND HAS INDICATED THAT THE NNA MAY WANT TO DISCUSS THEIR VERIFICATION MEASURE ("OBSERVATION ON REQUEST") IN THE OBSERVATION MEETING RATHER THAN IN THE VERIFICATION/INFORMA'ION/COMMUNICATIONS MEETING. THIS TIME IT IS THE SWEDES WHO ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A MOVE ON THE OCTOBER AGREEMENT.

9. THE NNA STRUGGLED, WITH MINIMAL SUCCESS, TO MAINTAIN THEIR FRAGILE FACADE OF UNITY. IN BOTH THE NOTIFICATION AND THE NUF MEETINGS THE NNA ARE ALREADY DEPARTING FROM THE COLLECTIVE SCRIPT. PRODDED BY MALTESE ASSERTIONS THA' SC.7 COUNTENANCED THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, THE SWISS COUNTERED THAT THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE NNA APPROACH; I.E., THE CONDITIONS FOR THE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WERE CUMULATIVE; SUCH ACTIVITIES BOTH HAD TO AFFECT EUROPEAN SECURITY AND BE LINKED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE ZONE. ON NUF, AUSTRIA STATED THAT CONCRETE CSBM'S WOULD GIVE "EFFECT AND EXPRESSION" TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE WHILE CYPRUS ATTEMPTED TO DECOUPLE "EFFECT" FROM "EXPRESSION," I.E., CSBM'S WOULD GIVE NUF "EFFECT" WHILE A SOLEMN NUF DECLARATION WOULD PROVIDE "EXPRESSION." (THIS IS ALSO A LINE THE EAST HAS BEEN DEVELOPING.)

10. FINALLY, THE NNA ARE BEGINNING TO TACKLE THE VEXING QUESTIONS OF CALENDARS AND COORDINATORS. ON CALENDARS, IT IS OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THE NNA WILL GO ALONG WITH A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE IF NATO CAN SOON GET ITS FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,

COLLECTIVE ACT TOGETHER. IF NOT, THE NNA WILL BE MORE TEMPTED TO ACQUIESCE TO EASTERN ARGUMENTS ABOUT AN OPEN-ENDED CALENDAR FOR 1986. ON COORDINATORS, THE NNA ARE NOW DISCUSSING VARIOUS OPTIONS RANGING FROM ONE MAIN NNA COORDINATOR TO TWO MAIN COORDINATORS AND FIVE



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SUB-COORDINATORS TO COORDINATORS FOR FIVE MEETINGS, AS WELL AS THE VARIOUS MIXES OF NATIONALITIES CONTAINED IN EACH OPTION. THE NNA, LIKE NATO, LEAN TOWARDS RESOLVING BOTH PROBLEMS BEFORE THE CLOSE OF THIS ROUND. IN FACT, SOME OF THE NNA ARE SUGGESTING A PACKAGE DEAL BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND: THE EAST WOULD ACCEPT A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE IF THE WEST WOULD ACCEPT THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS THIS ROUND. GIVEN THE RIGHT CONTENTS, THIS PACKAGE MAY NOT BE A BAD CHRISTMAS PRESENT.

11. THE EAST

POST-SUMMIT MIXED SIGNALS: ON THE HEELS OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT, THE SOVIE'S HINTED PRIVATELY BUT VAGUELY AT INCREASED EASTERN FLEXIBILITY ON SUCH KEY CONCEPTS AS OUT-OF-GARRISON AND STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION. THE SOVIETS ALSO INDICATED THAT, ONCE COORDINATORS ARE IN PLACE, THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SET ASIDE THE AIR AND NAVAL ISSUE DURING THE PRE-DRAFTING AND EARLY DRAFTING PHASES, I.E., "PUT IT IN BRACKETS" AND CONCENTRATE ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. HOWEVER, THE PROOF OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY WILL BE IN THE DRAFTING PUDDING.

12. IN THIS NEWLY FOUND SPIRIT OF COOPERATION, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AGREED TO TREAT THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT AS AN EXPRESSION OF POLITICAL WILL TO MOVE AHEAD IN STOCKHOLM AND NOT TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC THEOLOGICAL DEBATE OVER THE WORDING OF THE CDE PARAGRAPH. DESPITE THIS BILATERAL PLAY IN STOCKHOLM, GRINEVSKY AND OTHER EASTERN DELEGATES "QUOTED" FROM THE RUSSIAN TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, WHICH TALKS OF A DOCUMENT CONTAINING "BOTH" NUF "AND" CSBM'S, TO ARGUE FOR A PARALLEL APPROACH TO NUF AND CSBM'S (SEE STOCKHOLM 9110); A CZECH DELEGATE WHO FOLLOWS NUF TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT HE ENVISAGED A "BALANCED" FINAL TEXT IN WHICH THE NUF AND CSBM'S SECTIONS WOULD BE ROUGHLY THE SAME LENGTH; HE SAID THAT TWO PAGES FOR NUF "WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH."

13. AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO INSIST ON INCLUDING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM'S REGIME, DESPITE IMPRECISE HINTS OF SOVIET GIVE ON THIS ISSUE. COOPTING THE WEST'S FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, THE EAST HAS TAKEN IT OUT OF ITS BASIC CONTEXT (E.G. AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT OF TACTICAL-LEVEL GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES) AND IS APPLYING IT INSTEAD ON THE EURO-STRATEGIC LEVEL, I.E., INSISTING THAT ALL TYPES OF ACTIVITIES -- GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL -- ARE LINKED UNDER ONE STRATEGIC PLAN. THE WARSAW PACT CONTINUES TO TRY TO LURE THE WEST INTO REVEALING AT WHAT LEVEL IT WOULD "NOTIFY" FUNCTIONALLY LINKED AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE CLEARLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE PRESENT NATO POSITIONS ON THESE



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ISSUES AND CALL FOR A MORE FORTHCOMING RESPONSE (SEE PARA 16).
14. DISINFORMATSIYA OR CREATIVE DISSONANCE? THE EAST GAVE CONFLICTING SIGNALS REGARDING ELEMENTS OF A STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT. ON THURSDAY THE POLISH AMBASSADOR DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND SC.7'S ANNUAL CALENDAR) AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (LIMITATIONS AND NATO'S ANNUAL FORECAST). THE FOLLOWING DAY, HE REARRANGED HIS AGENDA, CALLING FOR MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CSBM'S WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON NUF, LIMITATIONS AND INCLUSION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME.
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
15. AT A LOSS OVER SC.7: THE EAST CONTINUED TO TREAT THE NNA PACKAGE WITH KID GLOVES IN PUBLIC, WHILE AGGRESSIVELY ATTACKING IT IN PRIVATE AS LOPSIDEDLY PRO-WESTERN. THESE STRONG-ARM TACTICS CLEARLY ARE INTENDED TO PRESSURE THE NNA INTO MOVING EASTWARD ON A NUMBER OF CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. HOWEVER, THE EAST'S PUBLIC RETICENCE REGARDING SC.7 MAY REFLECT LESS A CONSCIOUS STRATEGY THAN CONFUSION OVER HOW TO UNRAVEL SC.7'S "INTERLINKAGES" SO AS TO BEST SERVE MOSCOW'S INTERESTS. THIS TACTIC, IN SHORT, WILL PROBABLY NEITHER WIN ANY NNA FRIENDS NOR INFLUENCE NNA DELEGATES.
16. FUTURE ISSUES: AS NOTED REFTEL, THE ITALIANS HAVE BROKEN RANKS WITH THEIR CAUCUS COLLEAGUES IN STOCKHOLM AND HAVE APPEALED TO EVERE TO STUDY THE OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH NOTIFIABLE AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER SC.1. UNDERLYING THE ITALIAN REQUEST IS THE CONVICTION THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST BE MORE FORTHCOMING REGARDING THE INFORMATION WE ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE ITALIANS ARE NOT ALONE IN THIS BELIEF. THE USUAL "WETS" WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SUPPORT SUCH A STUDY; EVEN THE UK AND THE FRENCH (WHO HAVE MOMENTARILY MUZZLED THEIR MERCURIAL MILREP'S MUSINGS ON THE SUBJECT) ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE PRESENT NATO POSITION IN STOCKHOLM. (PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, UK REPS EXPLAIN THAT THEY ARE NOT SEEKING A NEW POSITION, BUT RATHER BETTER ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF NATO'S CURRENT POSITION.) IN A RELATED DEVELOPMENT, THE SOVIETS HAVE QUIETLY MOVED AWAY FROM AN INFLEXIBLE ADVOCACY OF THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO AN ELASTIC DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (SEE PARA 13). IN THE LONG RUN, SUCH SOVIET FLEXIBILITY MAY PRESENT US WITH MORE PROBLEMS THAN SOVIET OBDURACY.
BARRY



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09286
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 2, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 056
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE DECEMBER 2 NATO CAUCUS FOCUSED ON THE CALENDAR FOR 1986 ON BUT FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A CUTOFF DATE OR EVEN AN APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE ON THE ISSUE. THE FRENCH DID NOT ABANDON THEIR SOLITARY SUPPORT FOR JULY 18 AS THE CUTOFF DATE BUT DID PROPOSE MOVING THE SPECIFIC DATE TO THE BACK BURNER WHILE TRYING TO ACHIEVE CONFERENCE CONSENSUS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A CUTOFF. THE NE'HELANDS AND FRG LED THOSE WHO ARGUED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISCUSS THE PRINCIPLE WITHOUT PROPOSING A DATE. BARRY (U.S.) OFFERED A COMPROMISE APPROACH WHICH WOULD TRY TO ELICIT EASTERN AND NNA PROPOSALS ON AN ENDING DATE AS AN IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF THE CUTOFF PRINCIPLE PRIOR TO NATO PUTTING FORWARD ITS OWN DATE. WHILE THE FRENCH SEEMED WILLING TO CONSIDER THIS APPROACH, IT WAS QUESTIONED BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT INSISTED THE CAUCUS AGREE ON A CUTOFF DATE BEFORE ANY DISCUSSION OUTSIDE NATO BEGINS. THE CAUCUS WILL RETURN TO THIS SUBJECT ON DECEMBER 5. (COMMENT: CONTINUED FRENCH INFLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION MAY HAVE BECOME COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AS OTHERS (FRG, ITALY) ARE HINTING AT FALLING OFF A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF AND DROPPING BACK TO NOVEMBER 3. END COMMENT.) END SUMMARY.
4. 1986 CALENDAR: THE NATO CAUCUS, THE "PRISONERS OF CONSENSUS," MET DECEMBER 2 TO PLAN THEIR ESCAPE FROM STOCKHOLM VIA THE 1986 CALENDAR ONLY TO FIND FRANCE STILL BLOCKING CONSENSUS ON HOW TO ENGINEER THAT ESCAPE. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) OFFERED SOME HOPE OF FRENCH FLEXIBILITY, HOWEVER, WHEN HE INFORMED THE CAUCUS THAT, WHILE FRANCE STILL WANTED A JULY 18 CUTOFF, IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF A CUTOFF THAN A SPECIFIC DATE. HE PROPOSED OPENING DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST AND NNA ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A CUTOFF AND, IF ALL COULD AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLE, THE SPECIFIC DATE COULD BE DISCUSSED LATER. IMPLICIT IN THIS PROPOSAL WAS THAT FRANCE WOULD THEN BE WILLING TO CONSIDER FALLING BACK TO THE SEPTEMBER 19 DATE TO WHICH ALL OTHER CAUCUS MEMBERS SEEM PREPARED TO AGREE. HOWEVER, IF THE CONFERENCE COULD
-
NOT AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE, GASCHIGNARD SAID, THEN FRANCE WOULD INSIST ON ONLY SCHEDULING UNTIL JULY 18, TO ALLOW MAXIMUM TIME BEFORE VIENNA TO SOLVE THE BLACKMAIL PROBLEM (I.E., ONE OR SEVERAL DELEGATIONS REFUSING CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN). AS A FURTHER CONDITION, GASCHIGNARD ALSO SOUGHT TO HAVE A WRITTEN AGREEMENT ON THE 1986 CALENDAR WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THE SUBORDINATION OF



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CDE TO THE CSCE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. ON THIS LAST POINT, BARRY (U.S.) OBSERVED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE THE EAST EXPLICITLY AGREEING TO THAT PRINCIPLE AND THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO CONCENTRATE ON THE CUTOFF DATE. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) EXPRESSED THE SENTIMENT OF MANY BY NOTING THAT THE PRINCIPLE WAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED AND THAT "TO RAISE THE PRINCIPLE IS TO PUT IT IN DOUBT." GASCHIGNARD APPEARED WILLING TO DROP THIS POINT IN LIGHT OF GENERAL CAUCUS OPPOSITION.
5. REACTION TO THE FRENCH APPROACH WAS GENERALLY NEGATIVE. THE FRG AND THE NETHERLANDS ARGUED THAT WE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE THE PRINCIPLE OF A CUTOFF DATE WITHOUT HAVING A DATE TO NEGOTIATE. EDES (UK) WONDERED WHAT OUR NEXT MOVE WOULD BE UNDER THE FRENCH APPROACH IF THE EAST REJECTED THE PRINCIPLE. BARRY (U.S.) MUSED THAT IF THE EAST REFUSED TO AGREE TO A CUTOFF, WE CONCEIVABLY COULD REFUSE TO AGREE TO ANY SCHEDULE FOR NEXT YEAR; BUT THE CAUCUS CLEARLY HAD NO STOMACH FOR THIS APPROACH. CITRON (FRG) CAUTIONED THAT ALREADY BONN HAS ITS DOUBTS ABOUT ANY CUTOFF DATE OTHER THAN NOVEMBER 3 AND IMPLIED THAT IF THE FRENCH FAIL TO SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY THE FRG MAY NOT AGREE TO A CAUCUS POSITION FOR THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF. BARRY (U.S.) SUGGESTED A THREE-STAGE COMPROMISE FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: . DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 2, 1985
APPROACH: 1) NATO REPRESENTATIVES TO THE GRID GROUP (WHICH SETS THE CONFERENCE SCHEDULE) WOULD INDICATE THAT THE WEST WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A FULL CALENDAR FOR 1986 THROUGH ADJOURNMENT AND ASK FOR EASTERN AND NNA PROPOSALS (IF THOSE PROPOSALS CONTAIN AN ENDING DATE, NATO COULD ASSUME THE CUTOFF PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED); 2) THE NATO CAUCUS WOULD THEN DECIDE ON AN ENDING DATE; 3) THE GRID GROUP WOULD MEET
-
AGAIN TO FINALIZE A CALENDAR. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) INDICATED THAT THIS COMPROMISE APPROACH APPEARED TO MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, AND FRG LED A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO TORPEDO THE BARRY PROPOSAL, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. THEY CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT OPENING DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT AN AGREED DATE WOULD PUT OUR GRID GROUP NEGOTIATORS IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION, AND ADDED THAT THE EAST WILL NEVER PRODUCE A SCHEDULE UNTIL THEY SEE WHAT THE WEST IS PROPOSING. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, THEY SUGGESTED REWORKING THE DUTCH/ CANADIAN COMPROMISE NON-PAPER WHICH PROPOSES A TARGET DATE OF JULY 18 AND A CUTOFF DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19 AND IS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL DELEGATIONS BUT FRANCE. FROM THIS POINT, THE MEETING DISSOLVED INTO AN UNPRODUCTIVE FFFORT TO PRESSURE GASCHIGNARD TO BUY OFF ON THE NON-



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PAPER FURTHER ADJUSTED TO MEET FRENCH CONCERNS. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO SUSPEND THIS DISCUSSION UNTIL WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5. IN THE INTERIM NATO GRID REPS. (CANADA, NETHERLANDS) AND OTHER INTERESTED DELEGATIONS (AT A MIMIMUM, U.S., FRANCE AND NORWAY) WILL REDRAFT THE DUTCH/ CANADIAN NON-PAPER IN AN EFFORT TO FURTHER HIGHLIGHT THE CUTOFF PRINCIPLE.

6. COMMENT: WHILE WE UNDERSTAND AND TO SOME EXTENT SHARE FRENCH CONCERNS ON THIS ISSUE, THEIR POSITION IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THE EMERGING CAUCUS CONSENSUS FOR A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE MAY EVEN BE THREATENED IF THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT. ALREADY THE FRG, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK TO NOVEMBER 3 (WHICH CITRON (FRG) SAID BONN REGARDED AS "THE ONLY CONVINCING CUTOFF"). IF THE FRENCH ARE UNABLE TO AGREE TO THE SEPTEMBER 19 DATE ON WEDNESDAY, WE INTEND TO PURSUE THE COMPROMISE APPROACH OUTLINED BY AMBASSADOR BARRY AS THE ONLY MEANS OF GETTING DISCUSSION STARTED IN THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE. HOWEVER, THE CHANCES OF GETTING AGREEMENT ON THIS APPROACH IN THE CAUCUS REMAIN UNCLEAR FOR AT LEAST THREE REASONS: 1) THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR A JULY 18 CUTOFF DATE, AND THE FRENCH HAVE OFFERED NO GUARANTEES THAT THEY WILL DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON IT; 2) MANY CAUCUS MEMBERS SEE THE FRENCH POSITION AS ILLOGICAL (E.G. AN ENDING DATE PROPOSED BY THE EAST PRIOR TO A WESTERN PROPOSAL ESTABLISHES THE CUTOFF PRINCIPLE, WHILE A DATE PROPOSED BY THE EAST FOLLOWING A WESTERN PROPOSAL DOES NOT); AND 3) THERE REMAINS A LINGERING UNDERCURRENT OF RESENTMENT OVER FRENCH TACTICS DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF THE "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT" WHICH IS MANIFESTING ITSELF IN GENUINE RELUCTANCE IN SOME DELEGATIONS (NOTABLY THE NETHERLANDS) TO ACCOMMODATE FRANCE YET AGAIN. END COMMENT.

7. CONTACTS: A NUMBER OF CONTACTS REVEALED THAT THE NNA HAS NO CLEAR VIEW ON HOW TO HANDLE THE ISSUE OF COORDINATORS. LOIBL (AUSTRIA) TOLD MEVIK (NORWAY) THAT HE COULDN'T AGREE TO ONLY TWO COORDINATORS, BUT ALSO THAT THE NNA COULD NOT OFFER FIVE BECAUSE GAUCI (MALTA), BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) AND PAPADOPOULOS (CYPRUS) WERE NOT INTERESTED. LOIBL SUGGESTED FOUR COORDINATORS -- ONE EACH FOR OBSERVATION, NON-USE OF FORCE, AND THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION GROUPS, AND ONE TO HANDLE TWO GROUPS, NOTIFICATION AND CONSTRAINTS; ANNUAL FORECASTS. CITRON (FRG) REPORTED THAT BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT RULE OUT ONLY TWO COORDINATORS TO START AND DID NOT COMPLETELY RULE HIMSELF OUT AS A POSSIBLE COORDINATOR. STANDEART (BELGIUM) AND CIARRAPICO (ITALY) FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL



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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 2, 1985
REPORTED THAT SCHENK (SWITZERLAND) HAD SAID HE DID NOT SEE ANY REASON TO MOVE TO COORDINATORS NOW AS THE NNA NEEDS MORE TIME TO PROMOTE THEIR PACKAGE. WHEN COORDINATORS ARE EMPLOYED, SCHENK SAID, TWO WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER. (FYI: OTHERS IN THE USDEL HAVE HEARD THAT THE SWISS WILL BE ARGUING FOR FOUR COORDINATORS. END FYI.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09285
SUBJECT: FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITES
REF: USNATO 6818
1. CDE VIII - 057.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. REFTEL REPORTS ITALIAN PROPOSAL FOR STUDY AT EVERE OF OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS OF COMBINED ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE NOTIFIED UNDER MEASURE 1. THIS PROPOSAL APPEARS TO HAVE ITS ORIGINS WITH THE ITALIAN DELEGATION IN STOCKHOLM WHICH EITHER DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE MANDATE AND THE ALLIANCE POSITION OR REFUSES TO ACCEPT EITHER.
4. THE ITALIAN NAVY MILREP HERE ARGUES THAT THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE REFLECTED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WOULD "LEAD TO THE ACCUSATION THAT THE ALLIANCE IS NOT CORRECTLY OR FULLY APPLYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, AS IT IS STILL PROPOSING TO TREAT NAVAL FORCES ON A DIFFERENT BASIS FROM GROUND FORCES, EVEN WHERE THEY ARE PARTICIPATING IN FUNCTIONALLY RELATED ACTIVITIES." AT THE BASIS OF THIS ARGUMENT THERE APPEARS TO BE AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE, A REJECTION OF THE ALLIANCE UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANDATE, AND CONCERN THAT SC.1/AMPLIFIED IS TOO RESTRICTIVE.
5. THE PARAGRAPH IN THE MANDATE WHICH SPECIFIES HOW MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE WOULD BE NOTIFIED STATES THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES MUST BE PART OF ACTIVITIES IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS REFERRED TO IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH, WHICH THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY. THIS PLACES THE FOCUS CLEARLY ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE PROPER WITH AIR AND NAVAL PARTICIPATION BEING OF A SECONDARY AND SUPPLEMENTARY NATURE. THROUGH A CLEVER LINGUISTIC TRICK IN TRANSLATING THE MANDATE INTO RUSSIAN, THE SOVIETS ARGUE THAT THE PHRASE "AS REFERRED TO ABOVE" REFERS TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE, WHICH THE THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY.
6. THE ITALIANS APPEAR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA MUST BE FUNCTIONALLY LINKED BEFORE THEY ARE NOTIFIABLE, BUT THEY SEEM TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES MUST BE TREATED AS EQUAL TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. HENCE THE ITALIANS, AND POSSIBLY SOME OTHER DELEGATIONS, BELIEVE THE WEST MUST BE MORE FORTHCOMING BOTH ON THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION ON NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND ON ISSUES RELATED TO THEIR OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION.
7. NOT ONLY IS THE ITALIAN POSITION SUBSTANTIVELY INCORRECT, IT IS TACTICALLY WRONG, EVEN DANGEROUS. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IS TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE THAT



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SO-CALLED "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS" ARE INCLUDED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE CDE. THE THRESHOLDS THEY HAVE PROPOSED FOR NOTIFYING INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL "MANEUVERS" SHOWS THAT THE NOTIFICATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES IS NOT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THEM. THE CURRENT SOVIET TACTIC WHICH HAS EVOLVED IS TO MOVE FROM AN EMPHASIS ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO FOCUS ON AIR ACTIVITES WHICH OCCUR AT THE STRATEGIC ("EURO-STRATEGIC") LEVEL FOR WHICH THERE IS NOT A DEMONSTRABLE TACTICAL LINK TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. THEIR CONCEPT WOULD EMBRACE CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT AND, BASED UPON THE LONE EXAMPLE OF WESTERN ACTIVITIES PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS, EVEN SAC AIRCRAFT. THIS CHANGE IN FOCUS EMPHASIZES THE FUNCTIONAL LINK (AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL) BETWEEN AIR ACTIVITIES AND GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE.

8. IN THE TACTICS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE CONSIDER IT A PLUS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE REDUCED THEIR EMPHASIS ON

FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC: USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITES

INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LACK OF CHANGE IN THEIR SUBSTANTIVE GOALS. THE ITALIAN APPROACH COULD RE-ENERGIZE THIS ASPECT OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTICS. BUT PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY IT GIVES SUSTENANCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS THAT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARE NO LESS PERTINENT TO CSBMS IN EUROPE THAN ARE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, THE IDEA THAT AIR COMPONENTS OF JOINT ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE TREATED THE SAME AS GROUND FORCE COMPONENTS IS WALKING STRAIGHT INTO SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO BROADEN THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN WAYS INIMICAL TO ALLIANCE INTERESTS.

9. AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, WE HAVE WITNESSED THE SOVIETS ESTABLISH A DOUBLE LINKAGE SITUATION IN WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO MOVE ON OUR MEASURES UNTIL 1) WE MOVE ON NUF AND 2) WE AGREE TO INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL. HAVING HAD SOME SUCCESS IN MOVING THE SOVIETS OFF INDEPENDENT NAVAL, WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO REMAIN FIRM ON THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AS IT APPLIES TO AIR ACTIVITIES AND ENSURE THAT DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE HERE IS ON OUR TERMS - NOT THEIRS. WE BELIEVE OUR ARGUMENTS ARE SOUND AND WILL FIND RESONANCE IN THE CONFERENCE. THE ITALIAN APPROACH UNDERMINES OUR EFFORTS AS IT FORESEES GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE WEST EVEN BEFORE THE DOUBLE LINKAGE PROBLEM HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED.

10. RECOMMENDATION: AGAINST THE ABOVE BACKGROUND, DELEGATION BELIEVES A FIRM STAND MUST BE TAKEN IN EVERE WHICH REAFFIRMS THE ALLIANCE UNDERSTANDING OF



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THE MANDATE WHEN IT WAS ADOPTED. IN PRINCIPLE, DELEGATION FEELS THAT THOUGH SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE ITALIANS MAY BE USEFUL AT A LATER DATE, WE WILL GAIN NOTHING AND HAVE NO FLEXIBILITY LATER UNLESS WE HAVE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ACCEPTANCE OF THE MORE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. WASHINGTON MAY WANT TO CONSIDER THESE VIEWS IN REPLYING TO REFTEL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09329
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 4, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 9286
1. CDE VIII - 060
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE DECEMBER 4 CDE NATO CAUCUS REACHED AGREEMENT ON A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE PROPOSAL MADE BY AMBASSADOR BARRY (REFTEL) TO OPEN DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST AND NNA ON THE 1986 CALENDAR. NATO'S GRID GROUP REPRESENTATIVES WERE INSTRUCTED TO SIGNAL THE ALLIANCE'S INTEREST IN DISCUSSING A FULL CALENDAR FOR 1986 AND TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE NATO ATTACHES TO ESTABLISHING AN "ADJOURNMENT" OR "SUSPENSION" (I.E., "CUTOFF") DATE BEFORE VIENNA. THE GRID REPRESENTATIVES WILL NOT DISCUSS SPECIFIC DATES AS FRANCE CONTINUES TO BLOCK CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON SEPTEMBER 19, ALTHOUGH GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) HAS IMPLIED THAT FRANCE WILL BE FLEXIBLE ON THE SPECIFIC DATE IF THE EAST AND NNA ACCEPT THE "CUTOFF" PRINCIPLE. END SUMMARY.
4. CONTACTS: BARRY (U.S.) REPORTED THAT HE HAD ASKED GRINEVSKY IF IT WAS HIS CONTINUED UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE COULD BE NO OVERLAP BETWEEN CDE AND VIENNA. GRINEVSKY HAD CONFIRMED THAT THIS REMAINED HIS VIEW BUT ALSO HAD INDICATED THAT HE WAS NO LONGER PREPARED TO DISCUSS A SCHEDULE FOR NEXT AUGUST-SEPTEMBER BECAUSE WE COULD NOT KNOW NOW WHERE WE WOULD STAND IN AUGUST, AND BECAUSE CERTAIN "HIGH LEVEL" MEETINGS MAY TAKE PLACE IN JUNE WHICH WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE CONFERENCE'S WORK.
5. 1986 CALENDAR: UNDER PRESSURE OF TIME (WITH ONLY TWO WEEKS LEFT IN THIS ROUND), THE CAUCUS RETURNED TO THE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL RAISED BY BARRY (U.S.) AT THE LAST CAUCUS (REFTEL) AS A MEANS TO ACCOMMODATE FRENCH CONCERNS AND OPEN THE 1986 CALENDAR DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST AND NNA. UNDER THE EFFECTIVE CHAIRMANSHIP OF MEVIK (NORWAY), CONSENSUS WAS ACHIEVED ON THE BARRY PROPOSAL MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
(INSTRUCTIONS TO NATO GRID GROUP REPRESENTATIVES:)
1) WE INSTRUCT OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO THE GRID GROUP TO SOUND OUT THE OTHER REPRESENTATIVES ON THAT GROUP WITH RESPECT TO THEIR VIEW OF THE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986.
-
2) OUR REPRESENTATIVE WILL IMPRESS UPON THE OTHER REPRESENTATIVES THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO A COMPLETE PROGRAM OF WORK FOR THE NEXT YEAR, STRESSING THAT THERE WILL BE NO OVERLAP WITH VIENNA.
3) IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS, OUR REPRESENTATIVES WILL AVOID THE WORD "CUTOFF" DATE AND RATHER EMPLOY TERMS LIKE "DAY OF ADJOURNMENT" OR "SUSPENSION DAY."
4) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE NATO CAUCUS WILL WORK INTERNALLY TO REACH AGREEMENT AS SOON AS



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POSSIBLE ON A DATE OF ADJOURNMENT.
THE BRITISH WERE PARTICULARLY INSISTENT ON THE INCLUSION OF POINT 4 IN THIS DOCUMENT AND CONDITIONED THEIR AGREEMENT ON AN "ENERGETIC" CAUCUS EFFORT TO REACH A QUICK DECISION ON A "CUTOFF" DATE. BARRY (U.S.) SUGGESTED THAT THE GRID GROUP REPS AVOID THE TERM "CUTOFF" BECAUSE THE FAST WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT. THE TERM "DAY OF ADJOURNMENT," WHICH IS SUBSTANTIVELY IDENTICAL TO "CUTOFF DAY" WAS EVENTUALLY CHOSEN. BARRY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE WORD "STRESSING" BE SUBSTITUTED FOR "ADDING" TO UNDERSCORE OUR POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO OVERLAP WITH THE VIENNA MEETING AND TO ALLAY FRENCH CONCERNS. THE CAUCUS ACCEPTED THIS SUGGESTION.
5. THE AGREEMENT WAS THREATENED WHEN GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) INDICATED THAT HE COULD ONLY ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL IF POINT 2 WERE CHANGED TO READ ". . . THAT THERE WILL BE FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 4, 1985
NO OVERLAP WITH THE VIENNA PREPARATORY MEETING."
(COMMENT: THIS CHANGE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO EITHER THE FRG OR THE NETHERLANDS, WHO ARE NOT PREPARED TO FALL ENTIRELY OFF A NOVEMBER 3 CUTOFF UNTIL FRANCE HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO JOIN THE CAUCUS CONSENSUS FOR SEPTEMBER 19. END COMMENT). BARRY (U.S.) NOTED THAT WE SHARED FRANCE'S CONCERNS BUT ARGUED THAT THE SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS REFERENCE TO "VIENNA" AFFORDED BETTER PROTECTION TO THE FRENCH POSITION THAN THEIR LANGUAGE, WHICH SEEMED TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PREPCON AND THE MAIN MEETING OR EVEN DURING THE MAIN MEETING. GASCHIGNARD (WHO HAS APPRECIATED U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTFR) RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD FAVORABLY CONSIDER BARRY'S ARGUMENT, BUT HE ASKED FOR A "DAY TO REFLECT" (READ CONSULT WITH PARIS) BEFORE GIVING HIS FINAL AGREEMENT. THE SILENCE PROCEDURE WAS AGREED TO AND, AS FRANCE HAD VOICED NO OBJECTION BY 1700, DECEMBER 5, THE POSITION WAS AGREED AND THE NATO GRID REPRESENTATIVES WILL PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THEIR INSTRUCTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (COMMENT: THE FRENCH ARE ONCE AGAIN MAKING NO FRIENDS WITH THEIR CAUCUS TACTICS. THE FRG AND THE NETHERLANDS HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT THEY HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT COMPROMISES TO AGREE TO SEPTEMBER 19 AND HINTED THAT IF THE FRENCH DO NOT QUICKLY SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY, THAT THEY MAY WELL FALL BACK TO NOVEMBER 4. END COMMENT.)
6. COORDINATORS: THE CAUCUS BRIEFLY REVIEWED CONTACTS ON THE QUESTION OF COORDINATORS, BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF A UNIFIED NNA POSITION THE DISCUSSION WAS ABBREVIATED. THE SENSE OF THE CAUCUS, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE NNA WILL PROBABLY NOT ACCEPT OUR PREFERENCE FOR TWO COORDINATORS,



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BUT WILL PROPOSE EITHER FOUR OR FIVE. BARRY (U.S.) SUGGESTED THAT IN THIS EVENT THE NATO COUNTERPROPOSAL MIGHT BE TWO PRINCIPAL COORDINATORS FOR GROUPS A AND B RESPECTIVELY AND FIVE DEPUTY COORDINATORS DRAWN FROM THE DEPUTIES OF THE TWO PRINCIPALS AND THREE OTHER DELEGATIONS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09288
SUBJECT: POLADS: GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE MEETINGS/CDE
REF: USNATO 06949
1. CDE VIII - 58
2. C - NATO CAUCUS DECIDED TODAY, DECEMBER 4, TO RECOMMEND THAT A COUNCIL MEETING WITH CDE DELEGATION HEADS BE SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 17, 1986. USDEL SUPPORTED SELECTION OF THIS DATE. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09427
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, DECEMBER 8, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 066
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE DECEMBER 8 PLENARY, CYPRUS CALLED FOR AN "ALL-EMBRACING" DECLARATION ON NON-USE OF FORCE WHICH IS GIVEN EFFECT BY CONCRETE CSBM'S. REZNIK (CSSR) POINTED OUT AREAS OF CONTENTION WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE MOVING INTO DRAFTING. GAUCI (MALTA) PONTIFICATED ON NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, ARGUING THAT NUMERICAL AND STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS ARE NEEDED FOR GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES. TATARNIKOV (USSR) INSISTED ON NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES; HE ASKED NATO TO SPECIFY HOW IT PLANS TO NOTIFY THESE ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF SC.1. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR PAPADOPOULOS (CYPRUS) INTERPRETED THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT STATEMENT AS GIVING "EQUAL FOOTING TO NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) AND CSBM'S AND AS SUPPORTING THE NOTION OF GIVING BOTH "EXPRESSION" AND "EFFECT" TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE. HIS FORMULA WOULD INCLUDE A "SOLEMN DECLARATION ON NUF" TO GIVE EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE AND CONCRETE CSBM'S TO GIVE EFFECT" TO IT. IN ADDITION, THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR RAISED THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS FOR GIVING NUF ITS "CDE DIMENSION:"
-- A COMPREHENSIVE EXPRESSION OF NUF (I.E., A DECLARATION) WOULD NOT CONFLICT WITH THE UNIVERSAL NUF PRINCIPLE OF THE UN CHARTER AND HELSINKI FINAL ACT (HFA);
-- A CDE DIMENSION TO NUF WOULD NOT UPSET THE BALANCE OF THE TEN HFA PRINCIPLES. THE MADRID MANDATE SINGLES OUT THE NEED TO GIVE EXPRESSION TO NUF; MOREOVER, THE PURPOSE OF A NUF REAFFIRMATION IS NOT TO REINVENT THE PRINCIPLE, BUT TO DULY CONSIDER THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION;
-- THE FINAL ACT'S, AS WELL AS SC.7'S, MENTION OF "DIRECT" AND "INDIRECT" FORCE AND "THREAT OF THE USE" OF FORCE ALLOWS FOR THE DISCUSSION OF THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE IN A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT;
-
-- CSBM'S WOULD CONSTITUTE THE "OPERATIONAL BARRIERS" TO THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE. THUS, THERE IS A LINKAGE BETWEEN NUF AND CSBM'S. BOTH SHOULD BE PART OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
PAPADOPOULOS ALSO COMMENTED ON THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN CDE. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO AGREE ON NEUTRAL COORDINATORS FOR THE WORKING GROUPS BY THE LAST WEEK OF THE CURRENT SESSION. HE ALSO CALLED FOR ADOPTION OF A 1986 WORK CALENDAR IN FULL, WHICH WOULD END THE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPARATORY MEETING.
5. AMBASSADOR REZNIK (CSSR) ONCE AGAIN NOTED THE GDR-



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA PROPOSAL TO THE FRG FOR NEGOTIATION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. TURNING TO CDE, HE POINTED OUT TWO AREAS OF CONTENTION WHICH HAVE DELAYED THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. REZNIK ARGUED THAT THESE AREAS MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE CDE CAN MOVE INTO A DRAFTING PHASE: (1) DRAFTING MUST INCLUDE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES; AND (2) THE WEST HAS NOT TAKEN ANY CONCRETE STEPS TO NEGOTIATE NUF. THE WEST TAKES A "SIMPLISTIC VIEW," I.E., ITS INTENTION IS TO COPY THE LANGUAGE OF HFA NUF LANGUAGE. THE CZECH AMBASSADOR ALSO WARNED THAT PROCEDURAL ISSUES SHOULD NOT TAKE A CENTRAL PLACE IN OUR WORK.

6. AMBASSADOR GAUCI (MALTA) DISCUSSED ON THE NEED TO INCLUDE ALL TYPES OF ACTIVITIES IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME. HE POINTED OUT DIFFERING THREAT PERCEPTIONS AMONG PARTICIPATING STATES; THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES; AND THE INHERENT LINKAGE OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO SECURITY IN EUROPE. THE MALTESE

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, DECEMBER 8, 1985

AMBASSADOR ARGUED THAT "SO-CALLED" INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES CANNOT BE DISASSOCIATED FROM THE CDE "FUNCTIONAL LINK," BECAUSE THE ACTIVITIES OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES HAVE A "PERMANENT" FUNCTIONAL LINK TO ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE SAID NUMERICAL AND STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS MUST BE DEVELOPED FOR AIR, NAVAL, AND LAND FORCES. HE HINTED THAT THE MALTESE WILL PROVIDE

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SUCH THRESHOLDS IN THE FUTURE. (BEGIN COMMENT: THE MALTESE ARGUMENT IS CENTERED ON A "STRATEGIC" INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, I.E., ANY MILITARY ACTIVITY CANNOT BE REGARDED AS "INDEPENDENT" BECAUSE IT HAS A LINK TO EUROPEAN SECURITY/GROUND ACTIVITY. IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, THE MALTESE HAVE STATED THAT THEIR THRESHOLDS FOR AIR AND NAVAL WILL BE RIDICULOUSLY LOW; THEY WILL BE INTENDED TO COUNTER WHAT THE MALTESE REGARD AS RIDICULOUSLY HIGH EAST BLOC AIR AND NAVAL THRESHOLDS. END COMMENT.)

7. GENERAL TATARNIKOV (USSR) AGAIN QUOTED AT LENGTH FROM THE MADRID MANDATE TO ARGUE FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HE CRITICIZED THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON" AS NOT PROVIDING A COMPREHENSIVE BASIS FOR NOTIFICATION. TATARNIKOV THEN DELVED INTO DETAIL ON NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. HE CONTENDED THAT THE WEST'S PROPOSAL TO NOTIFY THE LANDING OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY WOULD NOT COVER THE ENTIRE AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY, SINCE THE EMBARKATION MOVEMENT AND RECOVERY PHASES WERE EXCLUDED FROM NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION. THE SOVIET GENERAL ASKED THE WEST SEVERAL QUESTIONS:



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-- WHAT IS AN INDEPENDENT ACTIVITY, AND WHY IS IT NOT A THREAT?
-- WHY ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES NOT SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION?
-- IN THE CONTEXT OF SC.1, HOW DOES THE WEST PROPOSE TO NOTIFY AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES? WHAT WOULD BE THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION?
-- IS THE WEST READY TO NOTIFY AN AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY FROM START TO FINISH? WOULD OBSERVERS BE INVITED TO SEE THE ENTIRE ACTIVITY?
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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**Statement by**
**Ambassador Victor J Gauci**
**Head of the Maltese Delegation**
**in Plenary meeting, 6 December 1985**

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Mr. Chairman,

In a previous comprehensive intervention, I outlined briefly Malta's own perspectives and preoccupations on CSBM's covering all types of military activities taking place in Europe, and in its adjoining sea area and air space. I emphasised the essential timeless link, not only between the activities themselves, but also between their political and security features.

Since then, other participants have expressed their view in the sense that, although, because of their geographic situation, naturally interested, in aerial and naval activities, they do not perceive any sense of threat, and hence no need for notification, unless significant land formations of troops are also concurrently involved in the activity. It has also been stressed that the threat perception is in any case an extreme consideration, which should preferably be downgraded in our discussions.

This may be so for some, but not for all participants. In the first place, the dividing line between concern and threat perception is very thin. Secondly, it is obvious that not all participants in the CDE -- not even all island participants -- can be expected to be in the same geographic region, or belong to the same political orientation. It is equally obvious that they are not identical in size, economic power and military perception or preparation.

And yet, even despite this disparity, a common factor still emerges; although in different degrees, and in varying circumstances, apprehension exists. Furthermore, due either in part, or through the full impact of the military exercise, legitimate apprehension and uncertainty arises, and may call for reaction. That frame of mind is the exact opposite of confidence. It is <u>not</u>, therefore, what we are trying to achieve. On the contrary, it is what we are trying to allay. Hence we cannot fail to deal with it, comprehensively.



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That should be the common starting point on which to base our confidence-building regime. Apprehension probably will never be felt equally among all participating states -- except perhaps in the case of a nuclear alert -- but every effort must still be made to ensure that genuine and identifiable concerns of participating states are adequately met.

I also mentioned here that a few months ago, the Commonwealth Secretariat published an in-depth expert study on the vulnerability of small states in the *global* society. The recommendations for regional and *global* action were endorsed by the Commonwealth Heads of State or Government. Malta and Cyprus -- states participating in the CSCE -- are in fact among the countries covered by that survey. Adequate consideration for their security concerns was recommended for study by the Commonwealth Heads of Government, including of course those Commonwealth countries participating here. Can the Stockholm Security Conference do any less when it comes to mere CSBM's? Surely with CSBM's we can do a little bit more! Or, from another perspective, if the EEC recognise that island countries have valid geographic considerations when measures of health are under consideration, can the CSCE do less in terms of CSBM's?

I had also expressed in my previous statement -- amongst other things -- my belief that the concept of confidence is principally psychological, rather than military. This aspect was subsequently commented on informally by other speakers, notably the representatives of Austria and of the United States; the former even developed the concept further, correctly recognising CSBM's as a political investment in a more secure future.

I naturally agree with that assessment, and I believe it behoves us to give the concept of confidence our most imaginative and generous interpretation and scope here, as we embark on the exercise of trying to reach agreement. I will elaborate this point a bit further later on in my statement.

It is worth observing, for a start, that since we are trying to instill confidence where it does not yet exist, and to build it up where (and if) it does, then we should on this occasion give particular regard to the concerns of those whom we are trying to reassure. It is important that we should not try to do this in the way we perceive their interests, but as the interests are perceived



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by those at the watching end of the uncompromising and blatant manifestation of military preparedness which is the distingueshing feature of military activities. Not only that, but it should be done on the perceptions of individual countries, not from the perspectives of the two greatest military alliances the world has ever known.

I realise, of course, Mr. Chairman, that, from a psychological point of view, it is difficult for countries either to forget their own gigantic size and strength, or not to rely on cosy, confortable, common positions formed in groups of, let us say, ten, twelve or sixteen countries. We ourselves -- in the common interest -- try to rise above our own level of perception. I suggest that, with a little bit of effort, this sould be done by all, in accordance with the CSCE rules, for therein lies the secret of our common success in Stockholm.

For this purpose, it might be useful for all of us to look again at the starting point and the raison d'étre for our meeting -- the concept of 'confidence'. I have informally given an example from our common experience in daily life which, I hope, has demonstrated that confidence needs to be full and comprehensive to justify its noble objectives. Confidence is defined, even in the COD, as the "telling of private matters with mutual trust -- a firm trust, an assured expectation".

In truth, Mr. Chairman, the most comprehensive confidence-building measure we can devise is to do away with the need for these measures. And the best way of doing that is not to carry out any type of military exercises -- a self-imposed restriction.

Since that, regrettably, is not at this stage possible, we have to follow the next best course. But we must at least be comprehensive. Any notion of confidence-building, if it is circumscribed heavily by reliance on only one side of a known triangle, is incomplete. In terms of our mandate, 'confidence'-building, based principally on only one aspect of the three elements of the armed services, or even of a selective and restrictive use thereof is, in all sincerity, a contradiction in terms. We should not try to create a cripple as the basis of our work.

There is no denying that the natural environment of each and every individual participating country comprises three elements -- land, sea and air. Correspondingly, the functional sinews



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of military activities of those participating states amongst us who are heavily armed comprise land, sea and air components'. hese are specifically designed and equipped not only to protect respective national sovereignity but also to project national interests world-wide, with inevitable repercussions on the vital interests of other participating states -- and also on those of non-participating states.

Europe itself as a continent does not exist in a vacuum, and shares the same environmental and military characteristics of its component states. In that sense, therefore, no single element of the armed forces can be considered 'independent'. Nor is there anywhere in the Madrid mandate any artificial insistence on a contemporaneous time-element for the notification process to come into operation.

It therefore follows logically that none of the three component elements can be artifically excluded from our calculations, if we want 'ab initio' to devise a comprehensive, rational regime. Even though some individual countries may lay greater or lesser emphasis on one or other of the component elements of its own armed services, and on those of others, the common factor again emerges that the armed services form an intergrated and inter-related whole, and cover the land, sea and air-spaces comprising and surrounding Europe.

This, Mr. Chairman, is not a mere whim, or a dogged insistence on logic. It is also a highly significant factor of our work here in Stockholm. Since the signature of the Helsinki Final Act, the ground forces situation is Central Europe has more or less remained static, perhaps with an overall slight reduction in man-power terms. A proposal for a further reduction is soon to be tabled at the MBFR talks right now. By contrast, activities in the internal and external maritime spaces of Europe have increased both in number and in scope; they have in fact increased significantly in the 1980's. There has also been a rise in reported violations of air space. The sea and air spaces adjoining Europe are gaining in importance for many reasons.

These developments are considered likely to continue. The exercises by one side attract substantial reconnaissance from others. Since we are enjoined to propose confidence-building measures which are militarily significant, surely we cannot overlook what



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is actually happening on Europe's doorstep, while considering only the activities within Europe's courtyard.

I might add that most analysts see less danger of a crises arising within Europe itself. It is the more volatile periphery of Europe where the greatest danger lies, and where consequently the major efforts at confidence-building should be concentrated. A start was in fact considered necessary through a bilateral agreement to prevent accidents at sea. But that by itself is not enough.

Many have stressed the need for clarity in our terms. I agree completely that our final product should be understood in the same terms by all participants -- by the man-in-the-street, in fact. We therefore owe it to ourselves to start from the very beginning with a rational and comprehensive approach. Surely, in such an exercise, we cannot afford to turn facts, logic, geography and history upside down, if we wish to set off on to a good start. No mandate can ride roughshod over realities. Sensibly the Madrid mandate does not attempt to do so. It explicitly recognises the obvious.

After having made this general statement, I do not wish to repeat arguments already adduced. Like all others, I sense that the time for that is behind us, that our respective positions should by now be known and understood, and that we should henceforth enter the phase of negotiation, with all open and accommodating determination to succeed.

It is precisely for this reason that my delegation devoted precious priority time to the negotiations within the NNA group so as to produce SC7. We consider it a basic and comprehensive document covering all aspects of our work under our mandate. It is precisely because we recognise the linkage and direct relevance of the various recommended measure of information, notification, observation, verification and constraints that we have favoured the continuity provided by the comprehensive structure of SC7. It is our understanding that all aspects of our work can thus be covered under this umbrella approach, and that an informal arrangement for better co-ordination of our discussions will now add a new impetus to our work.

As I indicated in my previous statement, it is now time to consider adequate numerical and structural paramenters for



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all types of military activities, in the knowledge that even military activities which may for purposes of convenience be described as indpendent cannot be disassociated functionally from their unitary state control. In other words, the functional element is always present, irrespective of which arm of the services moves first, and of the time-frame involved. There is no inherent contradiction between the temporarily independent and the functionally-linked -- the link is permanent, structural and real -- two sides of the same coin. In any case, since our entire planet can now be criss-crossed in less than thirty-six hours, the relevance of the time-factor has practically disappeared.

The "out of normal location" concept in SC7 consequently covers all contingent components of the armed services, including of necessity point-to-point transportation of military personnel within the European zone of application, especially those in close proximity to the territory of participating states. The ultimate objective is after all to reduce, not to preserve-or even to increase-- the risk of confrontation, so much prevalent in the present situation. We should also aim to respect, not disregard, genuine security pre-occupations.

Like others, I sense that a number of encouraging signs are finally emerging. We should now apply our collective skills to devising parameters which meet the demands of expressed concerns, and of factual realities. At the appropriate time we will ourselves make some modest suggestions.

One aspect in particular deserves to be fully explored to its maximum potential. As I indicated previously, surface naval activities provide a unique scope for a qualitative advance in our work. The numbers of units involved, though numerous and large in themselves, are small in comparison to the other branches of the armed services. They can easily all be seen and individual units distinguished from one another-even by the legendary man-in-the street. They can also be counted and observed with reaonable and reassuring accuracy. Their movements and formations can be monitored constantly by independent and non-intrusive surveillance. Quite often -- as others have rightly pointed out, their excercises are reported in the press.

It is thus relatively uncomplicated to provide prior



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to eliminate apprehension, to reduce the chance of miscalculation and the risk of accident, to turn naval "war games" into a real exercise of confidence-building. We can therefore in this case quite easily make virtue out of necessity. and give an early and welcome boost to the process of confidence-building, in an effective, relatively uncomplicated manner.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to apologise if I have taken up somewhat more time than I had intended, but you will appriciate that, as we enter a more intensive phase in our work, it is important that our perspectives should be clear.

We feel the legitimate necessity of sounding our particular concern at the unacceptably high level of armed confrontation in the Mediterranean, which, as we have explained in the past, is a direct result of European security concerns. The massive naval deployment in the Mediterranean is not an independent phenomenon, but a direct result of its geo-strategic connection with the mainland; it is an immutable feature of Europe's past, present and future history. The message therefore clearly reads both ways -- security cannot be reduced in Europe, unless it is equally reflected in the Mediterranean and vice-versa.

We are prepared to leave to others the role of protagonists in the defence of the logic of confidence-building measures on the European land mass. Our main concern lies in Europe's adjoining sea -- Europe's window to its closest neighbours. Without that window, Europe cannot breathe. And, as we all know, to breathe is to live. That therefore is a question of survival.

And since, as has rightly been pointed out, our final outcome will be a first step, but still an investment for the future, let us endeavour to give to our product the added benefit of inspiring and generating confidence within a wider audience, to those who have at least as much interest in lessening tension and increasing confidence as we do, so that parallel regional processes will complement and strengthen each other to mutual benefit. We all stand to gain from this approach, as surely as we will falter if we do not follow it.



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REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

SECRET

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

# S T A T E M E N T

BY DR ANDRESTINOS N. PAPADOPOULOS

HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF CYPRUS TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

6 DECEMBER 1985



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Mr. Chairman,

It augurs well, at this stage of our Conference, that the joint statement, issued on 21 November 1985, at the end of the Geneva meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbatchev, contains a paragraph on our Conference. We welcome this statement and wish to underline "the intention of the two sides to facilitate, together with the other participating States, an early and successful conclusion of the Conference". Our expectation is that the great importance they attach to the Stockholm Conference and their expressed intention to facilitate our work will soon be translated into practical terms, so as to reach tangible results, the soonest possible. To this end, my delegation would like to see, before the end of this session, the continuation of our work under co-ordinators and a smooth transition towards drafting.

The joint statement, further reaffirms "the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of the non-use of force". It is expected, therefore, that this document would cover both the CSBMs and the non-use of force. My delegation is in favour of one concluding document, but it prefers to see a separate section on the non-use of force. This textual arrangement accommodates not only those who give a narrow interpretation to the Madrid mandate, but also those who believe, as my delegation does, that a solemn declaration on the non-use of force should, as a political text, have a separate identity. After all, the joint statement puts on an equal footing CSBMs and non-use of force. In our view the non-use of force is this Conference's political theme par excellence, a theme which found its rightful place in the gentlemen's



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agreement of 14 October 1985, because the participating States are conscious of the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security within the CSCE context, a reality we cannot escape from.

The joint statement indicates that the concluding document would give concrete expression and effect to the principle of the non-use of force. What better concrete expression of the principle could one have than an all-embracing, solemn declaration which through the linkage to "sufficiently incisive measures", to use the words of Ambassador Ciarrapico, would give effect to the principle of the non-use of force, within the CSCE context? This same linkage was highlighted on 29 November 1985 by State Secretary Dr Andreas Meyer-Landrut of the Federal Republic of Germany, who underlined that his Government's main objective is to reinforce the prohibition of force "by seeking agreement on substantive and militarily significant confidence-and security-building measures that effectively limit the possibilities of using force". "Such an agreement", he stressed, "would lend greater emphasis, effect and credibility to the validity of this fundamental principle".

Here, at the Conference, the discussion of this issue benefitted from many contributions. There are arguments, put forward during this session, which I would like to address today. The distinguished representative of France, in his statement of 5 November 1985, referring to the remarks of his delegation about what should not be accepted, mentioned inter alia "le fait de privilégier l'un des dix principes du Décalogue en négligeant leur interdépendance". The answer to this argument lies in the mandate, which singles out the principle of the non-use of force because of its relevance to our task, and enunciates that concrete actions should be undertaken so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations. As far as the interdependence of the non-use of force principle with the other principles of the Decalogue is concerned, a close study of document SC.7 shows that



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this point was not neglected and that at least six out of the ten principles are referred to therein, a fact which attracted the attention of the French delegation at one of our informal meetings.

Ambassador Gaschignard, implicitly referring to a Cypriot argument, further stated "on nous répète que la CDE ne saurais se limiter à recopier un principe et qu'il conviendrait donc de le développer, de lui donner 'une dimension CDE ou CSCE'" and offered the following comments: "Nous ne pouvons actuellement que répondre : premièrement, que nous ne repartirons pas à zéro; depuis dix ans l'Acte final existe et fait partie de notre expérience commune. Nous n'allons pas le rerédiger. Deuxièmement, en tout état de cause, le principe de non-recours à la force ne peut que demeurer identique à lui-même sans altération. Troisièmement, la réaffirmation du principe de non-recours n'a de sens que si elle vient couronner un résultat substantiel sur le plan des mesures concrètes."

These comments call for the following remarks: The fact that the U.N. Charter had already existed for thirty years when the Final Act was drafted did not inhibit our representatives in Helsinki from elaborating on the principle of the non-use of force and further clarifying its meaning. A close student of the Helsinki process, Dr. Sizoo, in his talking points of 24 September 1985 also reached the conclusion that "the Final Act represents already an elaboration of what might be drawn from relevant UN texts in the CSCE context with respect to the non-use of force principle". I had the opportunity to put forward legal arguments in that respect in my statement of 28 June 1985 and I would not like to repeat them. I only want to reaffirm that if, 40 years after the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, we try to give to the principle of the non-use of force its CDE dimension, we are not rewriting the principle; the principle is there and what we are trying to do is to adapt it to our needs and use it for the purpose of confidence-and security-building. The distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Grinevsky, in his statement of 11 November 1985 aptly pointed out that "the UN Charter or the Final Act, for all their significance, have not exhausted and



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cannot exhaust all the ways and forms of the manifestation of the non-use of force principle because life does not stand still. Therefore, it is incumbent on us to determine, taking into account, the topical requirements of the European reality, which of these forms and ways are most suitable at present for elaborating a mutually acceptable agreement on the non-use of force".

Moreover, the fact that the Final Act is part of our common experience invites simple questions: What are the lessons of this experience, are we satisfied with the way the principle of the non-use of force has so far been implemented, if not, how can we make it more effective? The answers to these questions suggest that we should look at it from various angles so as to get as much enlightenment as we can, because we agree that the principle is "identical to itself", or, to put it as the British delegation wants it, that the principle is not to be reinvented. What we propose is to use it for our purpose and act in accordance with the Biblical teaching that "No one lights a lamp and puts it in a cellar, but rather on the lamp-stand so that those who enter may see the light".

My last remark concerns the contention that the reaffirmation of the principle of the non-use of force would have a meaning only if it crowned a substantial result in the field of concrete measures. We sincerely look forward to achieving this substantial result, i.e. measures which would have, among other qualities, a discouraging effect on all those who do not consider it as their duty to refrain from the threat or use of force - but we would like to hear what exactly it is that we are reaffirming. The distinghished representative of Italy, Ambassador Ciarrapico, in his statement of 15 November 1985 expresses a similar idea, but makes a step forward when he says that "It would be more useful and productive to <u>evaluate the constituting elements</u> of the reaffirmation of the non-use of force in a context that takes into account the progress we could gradually achieve in the field of concrete measures, to which such a principle must be linked". In an effort to set in motion a meaningful and result-oriented dialogue, we have invited answers to the questions why we reaffirm, what we reaffirm, within what context and for what purpose. It is high time to have some reaction to these questions.



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As to how best to reafffirm the principle of the non-use of force, a question put by Ambassador Mevik in his statement of 5 November 1985, Cyprus, along with the other Neutral and Non-Aligned participating States has proposed in Document SC.7 a set of ideas which we believe give an appropriate answer to the question.

A close study of SC.7 reveals that what lies in the background is the overriding concern to maintain international peace and security. Within this context is seen the commitment to the Final Act - of course no merely academic commitment, for the need is stressed for improved and consistent implementation of all its provisions. Experience so far has proved that what we need is implementation and respect for all the principles set forth in the Final Act, an attitude which would certainly encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among the participating States in all fields and consequently make the use of force unlikely.

The principle of the non-use of force is considered as a universally recognized obligation of international law, a norm of international life which should be stricly and effectively observed. Hence, no consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle. The expression "no consideration" excludes any legal permissiveness and intends to cover all possible motivations, whether political, economic, military or other. Non-compliance with the principle, with only one exception - the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in case of an armed attack - constitutes a violation of international law. This violation entails a series of consequences, political, legal, moral and other, which are squarely assumed by the culprit. Any advantage, such as territorial occupation or acquisition, resulting from resort to the threat or use of force, is illegal and will not be recognised by the international community as legal, since "ex injuria non jus oritur".



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In enunciating and reaffirming the principle of the non-use of force as contained in the Final Act, SC.7 takes a small step further concerning the aspect of manifestation of force - it specifies the manifestation of force as direct or indirect. My delegation had the opportunity in the past to suggest exploration of this aspect of the concept of the non-use of force. Since the drafters of the Helsinki Final Act, in their search for clarity, thought it advisable to specify the use of force as direct or indirect, my delegation sees no reason why we should not do the same with the threat of force and mention its concrete and direct expression, namely the manifestation of force, since our purpose is to cover all acts which constitute use of force - from the threat or manifestation to the actual use of force. If in theory at least, manifestations of force could be taken as threats because of their intimidating character, there are cases in practice where the element of escalation is clearly discernible, leading from a simple and veiled threat to a concrete and overt manifestation of force. Against this background, the reference in SC.7 to direct or indirect manifestation of force is a positive contribution to the search for clarity.

In my statement of 28 June 1985, in an effort to throw more light on the concept of the non-use of force I addressed such questions as how the use of force is manifested, what is to be protected and what duties it imposes. That analysis demonstrated that the principle of the non-use of force is the expression of several principles contained in the decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act. SC.7 particularly refers inter alia to peaceful settlement of disputes, human rights and fundamental freedoms and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The CDE dimension to the principle of the non-use of force is given by SC.7 through the reference to "the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security within the CSCE" and to the fact that "by their very nature concrete CSBMs serve to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force". It is evident that our determination to promote by all means the increased effectiveness of the principle of the non-use of force implies positive, intensive and determined actions. And here comes the linkage of the



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principle to the measures, as the fulfilment of this duty requires the adoption of concrete CSBMs, militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable. It is expected that these measures will have a discouraging effect on all those who do not consider it as their duty to refrain from the threat of use of force and will act as operational barriers against the violation of this duty.

Progress in the process of confidence- and security-building would certainly contribute towards the effectiveness of the principle through the adoption of additional measures, designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe, strengthen security for all and promote disarmament. Equal respect for the legitimate security interests of every participating State requires determined efforts in this direction. Within the context of the desire to promote by all means the effectiveness of the principle of the non-use of force we might even explore the possibility of adopting such supportive measures as deemed appropriate, which by their positive nature would further contribute towards confidence- and security-building.

So much for the non-use of force. I would like now to revert to a question which preoccupies us all. This is the lack of progress in the Conference. Two weeks before the end of the session we are still in the exploratory phase. At one stage it was argued that it was necessary to have an N + N paper. SC.7 is there, and the comments so far made about its contribution to our deliberations are encouraging. What we need now is to continue our informal work under co-ordinators who will steer us to the drafting stage as rapidly as possible. As I said earlier, we need such a decision urgently so as to have at least the co-ordinators for the last week of this session. This would greatly help our work next year.

Another decision which we must take before we leave is the one concerning the work programme for 1986. It is, I believe, a shared view that we cannot afford procedural discussion on this issue in the coming



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year. An agreement should be reached at this session - an agreement for a full programme not allowing our precious time to be wasted. Such an agreement should provide for the completion of our work before the preparatory meeting of the Vienna follow-up, as small delegations like mine would find it difficult to follow two meetings simultaneously. Under the circumstances my delegation prefers to have as an adjournment date for this Conference the 19th September 1986, hoping that before the end of the summer common determination and political pragmatism would secure a global agreement here in Stockholm.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



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USSR PLENARY STATEMENT

DELIVERED BY GEN TATARNIKOV, DEC 6, 1985

COMRADE CHAIRMAN,

TODAY WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS SEVERAL IDEAS ON THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION OF LARGE SCALE EXERCISES OF ARMED FORCES. THE MANDATE HAS CLEAR AND PRECISE PROVISIONS ON THAT SCORE. PERMIT ME TO QUOTE THEM AND I ASK YOU IN ADVANCE TO FORGIVE THIS LONG QUOTATION:

"ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, BALANCE AND RECIPROCITY, EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, THESE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA (ASTERISK OMITTED IN THE RUSSIAN ORIGINAL) AND AIR SPACE. THEY WILL BE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.

AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA (ASTERISK OMITTED IN THE RUSSIAN ORIGINAL) AND AIR SPACE IS CONCERNED, THE MEASURES WILL BE APPLICABLE TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES TAKING PLACE THERE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WIITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH THEY WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY. NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE MADE THROUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AT THE CONFERENCE."

WE FIRMLY AND CONSISTENTLY ADHERE TO THESE PROVISIONS AND WE DO NOT INTEND TO CHANGE ANYTHING IN THE MANDATE. THERE IS NO MENTION IN THE MANDATE TO THE EFFECT THAT ONLY GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY IS COVERED BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US TO ADOPT MUST BE EXTENDED TO ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY, NOT JUST TO GROUND FORCE EXERCISES.

HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS ARE STILL TRYING TO READ THE MANDATE SO THAT THE CONCEPT OF "MILITARY ACTIVITY" IS REPLACED BY THE CONCEPT OF "LAND ACTIVITY". THE MATTER HAS BEEN PURSUED TO THE POINT OF (MAKING) STATEMENTS WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO THIS: "AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITY IS NOT COVERED BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES SINCE IT IS OUTSIDE THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE."

IF WE USE THE WORDS OF DISTINQUISHED HEAD OF DELEGATION AMBASSADOR DELWORTH, THEN ONE CAN ALSO ASK THE QUESTION: IS THIS "AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE NEW DEFINITIONS TO BASIC CONCEPTIONS AND TERMINOLOGY?" BUT PERHAPS THIS IS BEING DONE IN ORDER TO REPLACE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GIVEN ISSUE WITH THE DEVLOPMENT OF A FRUITLESS DISCUSSION ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE?

WE THINK THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO DEAL WITH THIS NOW THAT WE HAVE ENTERED THE PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES.

THEREFORE, LET'S MOVE FROM GENERALITIES BACK TO THE DOCUMENTS ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. DEVELOPING THE FINAL ACT





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AND IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE, WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES COVER NOT ONLY GROUND FORCE EXERCISES, BUT ALSO AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES, THAT IS, THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. AS A RESULT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MEASURE DYNAMIC, MULTI-PURPOSE SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES, HEAVILY EQUIPPED WITH MODERN WEAPONS, SUCH AS THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY, WHICH REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO EUROPE, WOULD BE PLACED UNDER CONTROL. OUR PROPOSALS ARE MILITARILY SIGINIFICANT AND REPRESENT A QUALITATIVE STEP FORWARD FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AS COMPARED WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

WHAT HAVE WE HEARD FROM OUR PARTNERS ON THIS SCORE? AMBASSADOR BARRY SAID THE FOLLOWING ON OCTOBER 18: "MY GOVERNMENT AND, I ASSUME, THE GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES CANNOT ACCEPT EMPTY FORMULATIONS PROMISING SECURITY FOR OUR PEOPLES, BUT DOING NOTHING TO SATISFY THESE PROMISES." WHAT CAN ONE REPLY TO THAT? WE COMPLETELY AGREE WITH SUCH AN ASSESSMENT.

IF WE ARE TALKING ABOUT EMPTY FORMULATIONS, WE REALLY CAN ATTRIBUTE TO THEM NOTIFICATION OF ONLY OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITY OF ONLY GROUND FORCES. SUCH NOTIFICATION REALLY WOULD NOT SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY FOR OUR PEOPLES ABOUT WHICH AMBASSADOR BARRY SPOKE.

WHAT ARE THE COAUTHORS OF SC.1 CALLING ON US TO DO? TO KEEP IN THE FIELD OF VISION ONLY ONE ASPECT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM THE WHOLE TRIAD -- GROUND FORCES, WHICH, BY THE WAY, TODAY ARE ALREADY COVERED BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND NEED ONLY FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. THIS IS JUST WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING. BUT AT THE SAME TIME IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE WE MUST PUT INTO OPERATION ADDITIONAL MEASURES WHICH ARE OF A MORE SIGNIFICANT CHARACTER, WHICH COVER MILITARY ACTIVITY BOTH IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREAS (SIC) AND AIR SPACE. BUT WHAT COULD MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THESE SPACES (SIC) BE EXCEPT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITY?

THIS ISSUE HAS REALLY COME OF AGE (LIT. RIPENED). THE REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS STATES -- THIS IS COMPLETELY NATURAL -- RAISE THE SECURITY ISSUES WHICH AFFECT THEM. SOME SAY THAT LARGE-SCALE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES THREATEN THEM, OTHERS COMPLETELY JUSTIFIABLY CITE EXAMPLES OF GREAT THREAT FROM THE MASSING OF AIR ACTIVITY OVER EUROPE, STILL OTHERS EXPRESS APPREHENSION REGARD THE THREAT FROM NAVAL FORCES IN THE SEA AREAS (SIC) ADJOINING EUROPE. THIS IS COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED BECAUSE IT SATISFIES THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RESPECT FORTHE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. WHY SHOULD WE NOT CONSIDER THEM AND INSTEAD BE LED BY ONE GROUP OF COUNTRIES AND TALK ONLY OF GOUND FORCE ACTIVITY, SETTING AIR AND NAVAL FORCES TO ONE SIDE? SUCH A TENDENCY EVOKES CONCERN.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE WE MUST ADOPT A SET OF MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE DIRECTED AT "REDUC(ING) THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE." DOESN'T SUCH CONFRONTATION ALSO INCLUDE AIR AND NAVAL FORCES? IT (CONFRONTATION) EXISTS IN THE COMPLEX OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY ON LAND, ON THE SEA AND IN THE AIR.

JUDGE FOR YOURSELVES, THE ARMED FORCES OF ANY STATE FUNCTION AS A UNIFIED ORGANISM. YOU CAN'T HAVE A SITUATION IN



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WHICH ONE OF THE SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES DEMONSTRATES HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY WHILE ANOTHER REMAINS PASSIVE.

THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY -- FULLFLEDGED SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES JUST LIKE THE GROUND FORCES -- IN ADDITION ARE DISTINQUISHED BY AN EVEN HIGHER LEVEL OF EQUIPMENT ("OSNASHCHENNOST'") AND FIRE POWER. IN ADDITION, WE ARE, AFTER ALL, TALKING ABOUT THE GROUND FORCES OF PARTICIPATING STATES AND NOT OF ANY OTHERS. WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE AREAS OF NAVAL EXERCISES ARE SET, AS A RULE, NEAR EUROPEAN SHORES, NOT IN THE REMOTE WESTERN ATLANTIC. THE SPECIFIC TASKS OF CARRYING OUT STRIKES AGAINST COASTAL TARGETS AND AGAINST TARGETS DEEP IN THE TERRITORY OF STATES OR THE TASKS OF DESTRUCTION OF NAVAL FORCES OF THE ENEMY, THAT IS, OF ANOTHER EUROPEAN STATE, ARE MASTERED. FINALLY, DURING AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES MISCALCULATION, MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISINTERPRETATION OF ORDERS ARE ALSO POSSIBLE, WHICH CAN LEAD TO UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES. ALL OF THIS, OF COURSE, AFFECTS THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL STATES AND ALSO IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH MILITARY ACTIVITY CONDUCTED WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE REPEATEDLY ASKED THE QUESTION HERE: WHAT IS THE "INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITY" OF NATO STATES, WHY DOESN'T IT REPRESENT A THREAT, WHY SHOULDN'T IT BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION? SO FAR THEY HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO GIVE US AN INTELLIGIBLE ANSWER TO THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION CONCERNING ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR IT.

LET'S TAKE ANOTHER ISSUE. WE ARE SOMETIMES TOLD THAT NATO STATES ARE PREPARED TO NOTIFY AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, BUT ONLY OF A SO-CALLED FUNCTIONAL REGIME, IN A REGIME OF SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. THEY REPEAT OVER AND OVER -- WE WILL NOTIFY STARTING WITH ONE PLANE OR ONE SHIP. HOWEVER, AT THE SAME TIME THEY SAY THAT SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR THIS ARE NOT NECESSARY. IN THIS CASE HOW WILL NOTIFICATION BE IMPLEMENTED, WHAT WILL BE ITS CONTENT WITHOUT PARAMETERS?

LET'S EXAMINE, FOR EXAMPLE, JUST ONE TYPE OF NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE CSBM'S ZONE, WHICH IS FUNCTIONALLY LINKED WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY -- AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. IT STARTS NOT WITH THE LEAPING OF SOLDIERS FROM SHIPS TO SHORE, BUT THOUSANDS OF MILES FROM IT (THE SHORE), WITH THE EMBARCATION OF PERSONEL ONTO THE SHIPS, THE LOADING OF MILTIARY EQUIPMENT IN NAVAL AND AIR BASES, WITH THE FORMATION OF GROUPS ("GRUPPIROVKA") OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT FOR THE PURPOSE OF A LANDING OPERATION. ITS PROCESS CONTAINS DIFFERENT ACTIVITY, INCLUDING THE EXIT OF GROUPS ("OTRYAD") OF SHIPS FROM BASES, THE ORGANIZATION OF A SYSTEM OF AIR AND SEA (LIT. FROM AIR AND SEA) PROTECTION, MOVEMENT TO THE LANDING PLACE, SUPPORT OF THE LANDING, INCLUDING OPERATIONS OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND OTHER SHIPS CARRYING OUT ARTILLERY AND AIR PREPARATORY FIRES ("PODGOTOVKU"). THE LANDING ON THE SHORE IS NOT THE LAST STAGE; FOLLOWING IT COMES NAVAL (LIT. FROM THE SEA) SUPPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE TROOPS ON THE SHORE. IN THE GIVEN EXAMPLE, THAT IS WHAT, IN BRIEF, ONE OF THE TYPES OF FUNCTIONAL NAVAL ACTIVITY LOOKS LIKE. BY NO MEANS DO ONE PLANE AND ONE SHIP PARTICIPATE IN IT.

WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW WILL NATO STATES NOTIFY THE WHOLE PROCESS OF THIS FUNCTIONALLY LINKED ACTIVITY OF GROUND, AIR AND



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NAVAL FORCES? WHAT WILL SPECIFIC NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS BE, ARE THEY (NATO) PREPARED TO NOTIFY THE ACTIVITY DESCRIBED ABOVE FROM THE MOMENT OF ITS COMMENCEMENT TO ITS FINISH, TO GIVE CERTAIN INFORMATION ON IT, TO SEND OBSERVERS TO IT? THIS IS A BUSINESSLIKE QUESTION, LET'S DISCUSS IT WITHOUT EXCUSES.

THE CITED EXAMPLE ONCE AGAIN CONVINCES US THAT ANY TYPE OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITY ALSO REPRESENTS A THREAT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE, JUST LIKE GROUND FORCES. THIS IS AN INDISPUTABLE FACT AND, CONSEQUENTLY, AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITY MUST BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.

COMRADE CHAIRMAN.

UNDERSTANDINGS ARE BORN AND BECOME STRONGER NOT AS A RESULT OF IMPOSITION OF ONE'S POSITION, BUT ON THE BASIS OF CONSIDERATION OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL. HERE THERE SHOULD NOT BE A GAIN FOR SOME AND A LOSS FOR OTHERS, ALL PARTICIPATING STATES MUST GAIN, WITHOUT EXCEPTION. THE SOCIALISTS COUNTRIES WANT TO WORK PRECISELY IN THIS KEY.



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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY !

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION !

# S T A T E M E N T .

## BY AMBASSADOR ALOIS ŘEZNIK, HEAD OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

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PLENARY MEETING

DECEMBER 6, 1986

STOCKHOLM



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Distinguished Comrade Chairman,

The state of affairs at our Conference depends largely on the state of international relations in general. In this connection many speakers stressed here the great importance of the meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and President of the United States R.Reagan. The results of the meeting and, in the first place, the fact that the Joint Statement of November 21 reflects the intention of the two sides to facilitate an early and successful completion of the work of the Conference and the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force, have given a fresh impetus to the work of the Conference.

As Mikhail Gorbachev stressed at the recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the agreements reached in Geneva go, on the whole, far beyond the framework of Soviet-American relations.

The strengthening of peace and international security is a common affair; and this aim must be promoted by all states, big and small. This primary objective requires a concrete contribution from every state both here in Stockholm and in Vienna, and in other important international fora, and in bilateral relations. As to our country it is sufficient to recall, at least, such a recent initiative as



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the proposal of Czechoslovakia and the G.D.R. to the Government of the F.R.G. to establish in Central Europe a chemical-weapon-free zone. The implementation of this proposal would contribute not only to the improvement of the situation in the region but would also constitute a concrete step toward banning these weapons in the entire world.

The recent Prague meeting of the top leaders of the Warsaw Treaty organization member-states reaffirmed the principled course of the socialist countries at improving the international situation, at reviving detente. In this connection it was noted that the joint statement on the inadmissibility of nuclear war and the sides' renunciation of the achievement of military superiority that was included in the final document of the Geneva Summit is fundamentally important. It was stressed that all agreements reached in Geneva should be translated into practical deeds. It concerns directly the work of our Conference as well.

Distinguished Comrade Chairman,

As I noted above, international relations show certain positive shifts and tendencies. Moreover, the Stockholm Conference, in our view, manifests a movement to practical results. For the transition to concrete negotiations that make it possible to study in greater detail the positions of individual countries and outline the shape of the concluding



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document is, in itself, not a small thing. However, we all notice that the Conference does not move at the pace which would assure its successful completion before the upcoming Vienna conference.

In this context we assess positively the tabling of SC.7 by the neutral and nonaligned countries, which contributed,to a certain degree, to more active work at the Conference. Obviously we, like all the others, are studying it carefully. We find provisions in it that are close to or coincide with ours. At the same time we also see questions that cause us difficulties while some important aspects are missing. On the whole, we believe that the tabling of this document can contribute to making another step forward in the direction of moving over to drafting.

We all understand, however, that it is not simple to start drafting. We still have to overcome many difficulties. One such difficulty is formed, in our view, by attempts on the part of some delegations to exempt from CBMs air and naval activities.

One should not be a military expert to understand that military activities are not composed only of ground force activities. European nations can be seriously threatened from air and sea, as it has been more than once in history.



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The question of air and naval activities is serious. It cannot be excluded from the scope of the Conference. It should be realized by anyone who is really interested in its success. Drafting should cover, in our opinion, all military activities, including air and naval activities, from the very start.

Difficulties also exist in the understanding of some other questions, for example on such an important problem as non-use of force. The socialist countries suggested the conclusion of a Treaty on the mutual renunciation of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. Some countries suggest the form of a Declaration, others suggest the reaffirmation of the non-use of force principle with the inclusion of some new elements. Unfortunately, some delegations view the matter simplistically: just recopy the existing formula from the U.N. Charter, make a full stop and be content with it. This approach is not consonant either with the Final Act or the Mandate's requirements, or the October 14 agreement. It is designed, in fact, to impede the work of the Conference. Words about their readiness to seriously get down to work on the non-use of force problem are not accompanied by concrete steps on the part of certain delegations. Political declarations on the matter should be accompanied by practical deeds in Stockholm.



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Distinguished Comrade Chairman,

It would seem that certain, one may say organizational matters are going to be settled in the coming days. This does not mean that those matters are not important. But in settling them we should be guided by the understanding that they must not be allowed to take the central place in our work. This would not lead, in any way, to early and concrete results.

As Deputy Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia Jaromír Johanes stated on October 4 at a plenary meeting of the Stockholm Conference, the requirement of undertaking, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament would be met by the accomplishment of first agreements at the Conference. It is in this direction that we should advance.

Thank You, Comrade Chairman.





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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09366
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS CONSIDERATION OF NNA COOR-
- DINATORS PROPOSAL, DECEMBER, 6, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 063
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NNA HAS PROPOSED DESIGNATING FOUR NNA DELEGATIONS (AUSTRIA, FINLAND, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND) AS COORDINATORS FOR THE FIVE CDE WORKING GROUPS. THE SWISS WOULD COORDINATE TWO GROUPS -- A-2 (INFORMATION/ VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATION) AND A-3 (CONSTRAINTS; ANNUAL FORECASTS). IN NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSION, SEVERAL DELEGATIONS (LED BY THE FRG) WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE NNA PROPOSAL PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITY OF SWISS AND ALLIANCE VIEWS ON INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND CONSTRAINTS. THE U.S., UK AND CANADA URGED A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH. BARRY (U.S.) OBSERVED THAT ANY PROPOSAL WHICH PUTS GROUPS A-2 AND A-3 UNDER A SINGLE DELEGATION'S COORDINATION WAS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AND SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE STILL OTHER ALTERNATIVES WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED, INCLUDING TWO "SUPER-COORDINATORS" AND FIVE "SUB-COORDINATORS." THE CAUCUS AGREED TO SUSPEND CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE UNTIL DECEMBER 9. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH WE CLEARLY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE TWO COORDINATOR OPTION, GIVEN THE POSITIONING OF THE SWISS, WE MIGHT ULTIMATELY ACCEPT THE NNA PROPOSAL, PORTRAYING IT AS A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION. END COMMENT) END SUMMARY.
4. NNA COORDINATOR PROPOSAL: BULWALDA (NETHERLANDS, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY) AND LIAN (NORWAY) REPORTED ON THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR COORDINATORS PRESENTED TO THEM ON BEHALF OF THE NNA BY LOIBL (AUSTRIA). THE NNA PROPOSED FOUR DELEGATIONS REPEAT DELEGATIONS (NOT INDIVIDUALS) TO BE COORDINA'ORS, WITH THE SWISS DELEGATION COORDINATING 'WO GROUPS. LOIBL PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN WITH HIS UNOFFICAL VIEW OF WHICH SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS WOULD ACTUALLY COORDINATE EACH GROUP:
A-1 (NON-USE OF FORCE) - AUSTRIA (LOIBL)
A-2 (INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATION)
- SWITZERLAND (SCHENK)
A-3 (CONSTRAIN'S; ANNUAL CALENDARS)
- SWITZERLAND (JUNOD, SWISS DEPREP).
B-1 (NOTIFICATION) - SWEDEN (LIDGARD)
B-2 (OBSERVATION) - FINLAND (KAHILUOTO)
LOIBL ADDED THAT WHILE HE, SCHENK, AND JUNOD WOULD BE PERMANENT COORDINATORS, LIDGARD, AND KAHILUOTO HELD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THEIR DEPREPS OCCASIONALLY. LOIBL INDICATED THAT THE NNA WAS PREPARED TO BEGIN COORDINATING AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK AND SUGGESTED THAT A COFFEE GROUP MEET LATE MONDAY, IF POSSIBLE, TO FINALIZE THE AGREEMENT. HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT FROM THE NNA POINT OF VIEW THIS WAS THE ONLY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT, AS TWO COORDINATORS WERE OUT OF THE QUESTION AND THE OPTION



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OF FIVE WOULD RESURRECT CYPRIOT DEMANDS TO CHAIR THE NUF GROUP AND YUGOSLAVIAN DEMANDS TO CHAIR CONTRAINTS; ANNUAL FORECASTS. BUWALDA RESPONDED BY REPEATING NATO PREFERENCE FOR TWO COORDINATORS AND EXPRESSING SKEPTICISM OVER ASPECTS OF NNA PROPOSAL.

5. CAUCUS DISCUSSION: SEVERAL NATO DELEGATIONS (NOTABLY, THE FRG, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK AND FRANCE) WERE FULLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE NNA PROPOSAL. CITRON (FRG) SPOKE FOR THIS GROUP WHEN HE NOTED THAT NO BETTER DISTRIBUTION WAS POSSIBLE BECAUSE: 1) THE SWISS ARE THE CLOSEST NNA MEMBER TO NATO'S POSITIONS ON INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND CONSTRAINTS; 2) THE NNA HAS NO INTERNAL FLEXIBILTY TO OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE; AND 3) THE IRISH OPTION IS UNWORKABLE. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO REFUSE THIS OFFER WHICH HE VIEWED AS FAVORING NATO'S INTERESTS OVER THE EAST'S. MELLBIN (DENMARK) OBSERVED THAT ALTHOUGH ONLY FOUR NNA DELEGATIONS WOULD BE USED, THE PROPOSAL DID ESTABLISH FIVE "COORDINATORSHIPS", THUS INSURING THAT ALL FIVE WORKING GROUP WOULD MAINTAIN THEIR INDIVIDUAL INTEGRITY. ON THIS POINT, SEVERAL DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE PROPOSAL MIGHT BE IMPROVED IF THE NNA WOULD AGREE TO PROPOSE SPECIFIC

FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS CONSIDERATION OF NNA COOR-

INDIVIDUALS (RATHER THAN DELEGATIONS) FOR EACH GROUP AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST EITHER A-2 OR A-3 LOSING ITS INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFY. THE U.S., CANADA AND UK, HOWEVER, MOVED TO HEAD OFF ANY CAUCUS STAMPEDE TO AGREEMENT, ARGUING THAT THE PROPOSAL MUST BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY. DELWORTH (CANADA) COMMENTED THAT THE CAUCUS' POSITION WAS STILL FOR TWO COORDINATORS, AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT RUSH TO EMBRACE AN NNA PROPOSAL FOR FOUR PRESENTED AS A "FAIT ACCOMPLI". BARRY (U.S.) NOTED THAT ANY COMBINATION OF WORKING GROUPS A-2 AND A-3 UNDER A SINGLE DELEGATION'S COORDINATION WAS DANGEROUS AND PERHAPS UNACCEPTABLE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE STILL A NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES THAT COULD BE EXPLORED INCLUDING HAVING GROUPS A-1 AND A-3, OR A-3 AND B-2 COORDINATED BY ONE DELEGATION. BARRY ALSO NOTED THAT KAHILUO'O (FINLAND) AND LIDGARD (SWEDEN) SEEMED TO BE HOLDING OPEN THE OPTION OF KEEPING THEMSELVES IN RESERVE TO BE "SUPER-COORDINATORS" AT SOME LATER POINT. IN LIGHT OF THIS, HE ASKED THE CAUCUS TO RECONSIDER HIS SUGGESTION FOR TWO SUCH "SUPER-COORDINATORS" NOW, SUPPORTED BY FIVE DEPUTY COORDINATORS. EDES (UK) OBSERVED THAT THE NNA PROPOSAL MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF "CASTRATING" OUR MAIN NNA "ALLY" (SWITZERLAND) AND ADVISED THAT WE SHOULD SEE WHAT THE EAST'S REACTION IS BEFORE PROVIDING ANY RESPONSE.

6. INTERIM ACTIONS: AS THE U.S. AND UK CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THEY COULD NOT JOIN A CONSENSUS IN SUPPORT OF THE NNA



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PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME, THE CAUCUS AGREED TO TELL LOIBL (AUSTRIA) ONLY THAT CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL WAS CONTINUING AND THAT NO COFFEE GROUP SHOULD BE SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY. THE CAUCUS WILL RESUME ITS CONSIDERATION OF THIS SUBJECT ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, DECEMBER 9.

7. BEGIN COMMENT: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE COORDINATOR ISSUE WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE NNA, AND GIVEN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ISSUES AND COORDINATORS IT MAY BE THAT THE OUTCOME IS THE BEST POSSIBLE. ALL OF US IN NATO AGREE THAT TWO COORDINATORS IS NOT POSSIBLE. THE IRISH OPTION WAS REJECTED BY KEY EEC DELEGATIONS AS WELL AS THE EAST. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LOBBYING FOR THE TWO COORDINATOR/5 SUB-COORDINATOR IDEA WON ONLY A SINGLE CONVERT, ROMANIA. THE A-2/A-3 COMBINA'ION IS NOT GOOD, BUT THIS IS BALANCED BY HAVING IT IN SWISS HANDS. ANOTHER COMBINATION (SAY A-3/B-2) MIGHT BE FEASIBLE, BUT THIS WOULD PROBABLY MEAN PUTTING A-2 (VERIFICATION) IN LESS RELIABLE HANDS. AT THE SAME TIME USDEL IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE EVOLUTION OF NATO THINKING ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES, AND WE WANT TO SLOW THINGS DOWN WITH A STRONG DOES OF SKEPTICISM. IF IT APPEARS NEXT WEEK THAT NO BETTER OUTCOME IS FEASIBLE AND EVERYONE ELSE IN THE NATO CAUCUS IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS SOLUTION, WE WILL GO ALONG TOO. BUT WE WILL PORTRAY ANY ACCEPTANCE AS A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION AND THUS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE WILL BE EXPECTING THE COORDINATORS TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF U.S. VIEWS. END COMMENT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09426
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 6, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 067
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSION REVEALED CONFLICTING ASSESSMENTS OF A NOTIFICATION SPEECH PRESENTED BY TATARNIKOV (USSR) IN THE DECEMBER 6 PLENARY. THE NETHERLANDS AND ITALY REGARDED THE ADDRESS AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE OF ITS FOCUS ON THE "FUNCTIONAL APPROACH" TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH THEY ADMITTED THAT THE SOVIETS' DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WAS FAR BROADER THAN NATO'S. THE U.S., UK AND TURKEY STRONGLY DISAGREED. BARRY (U.S.) EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE "REAL TACTICAL SITUATION" WAS A HARDENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION AND THE ADOPTION OF AN ELASTIC FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ARGUMENT WAS DESIGNED TO EVENTUALLY CAPTURE U.S. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. HE CONCLUDED THAT SUCH A POSITION WAS "ANATHEMA" TO THE U.S. AND THUS WAS A "RECIPE FOR STALEMATE." NATO'S GRID GROUP REPRESENTATIVE REPORTED THAT THEY HAD INDICATED TO NNA AND EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES THAT NATO WANTS TO ESTABLISH A FULL WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986 WITH AN ADJOURNMENT DATE BEFORE "VIENNA." BOTH THE NNA AND THE EAST WERE NONCOMMITTAL. CONTACTS HAVE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE EAST IS ONLY PREPARED TO SCHEDULE THE FIRST TWO SESSIONS FOR NEXT YEAR AT THIS TIME, WHILE THE NNA IS HAVING TROUBLE OBTAINING MALTESE SUPPORT FOR THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE. END SUMMARY.

4. AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: THE CAUCUS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED TATARNIKOV'S (USSR) PLENARY STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 6 (REPORTED SEPTEL) ON NOTIFICATION OF "MILITARY ACTIVITIES" (AIR, NAVAL AND GROUND). BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) SAW POSITIVE SIGNS IN TATARNIKOV'S EMPHASIS ON THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN HIS STATEMENT AND OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NO LONGER REALLY SPEAKING ABOUT INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. WHILE HE ADMITTED THAT TATARNIKOV'S DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WAS NOT OUR OWN, HE ARGUED THAT THE FACT THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO TALK IN FUNCTIONAL TERMS CREATED A BETTER NEGOTIATING SITUATION FOR THE WEST. CIARRAPICO (ITALY) WAS EVEN MORE ENTHUSIASTIC AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS WAS ONE OF A VARIETY OF RECENT SIGNALS OF EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION ON THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT ACTIVITES. HE CONCLUDED THAT THIS NOW COULD BE ONE OF THE FIRST AREAS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO SHOW PROGRESS. THE U.S., TURKEY, AND UK, HOWEVER, PROVIDED A MORE SOBER ASSESSMENT OF TATARNIKOV'S MESSAGE, WHILE FRANCE URGED CAUTION. BARRY (U.S.) SAID THAT HIS ANALYSIS OF THE "REAL TACTICAL SITUATION" WAS THAT THE



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SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE RETREATING FROM EARLIER SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. BOTH BARRY AND OZGUL (TURKEY) POINTED TO REZNIK'S (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) PLENARY SPEECH (REPORTED SEPTEL) WHICH HAD CLEARLY REAFFIRMED "DOUBLE-LINKAGE" AND HAD ATTEMPTED TO EXPLOIT REAL OR PERCEIVED DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THE AIR AND NAVAL ISSUE. BARRY NOTED THAT NATO HAD TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO SEND FALSE SIGNALS OF FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE EAST TO HOLD OUT OR TRY TO ENGAGE IN "SALAMI-SLICING" TACTICS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. HE REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT WE (U.S.) HAD LITTLE FLEXIBILITY IN THIS AREA, NOTING THAT THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE WAS TO ADOPT A VERY ELASTIC "FUNCTIONAL APPROACH" WHICH COULD EVENTUALLY EMBRACE U.S. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. THIS, HE OBSERVED, WAS ANATHEMA TO THE U.S. AND, AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY NOTED, "A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE." EDES (UK) AGREED WITH BARRY'S VIEWS AND NOTED THAT THIS WAS ALL THE MORE REASON FOR US NOT MERELY TO DEFEND OUR DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, BUT TO ACTIVELY PROMOTE IT. (COMMENT: THE POSITIVE FIRST REACTION OF SOME OF OUR ALLIES TO TATARNIKOV'S ADDRESS COULD BE A CAUSE FOR CONCERN IF IT SURVIVES A MORE DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SOME OF OUR LESS STALWART ALLIES MAY BE WEARING DOWN
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 6, 1985
UNDER CONSTANT EASTERN PRESSURE ON THE AIR AND NAVAL ISSUE AND ARE ENGAGING IN NO SMALL MEASURE OF WISHFUL THINKING IN THEIR READING OF ALLEGED EASTERN SIGNALS. END COMMENT.)

5. SIZOO (NETHERLANDS) AND ANSTIS (CANADA), THE CAUCUS GRID GROUP REPRESENTATIVES, REPORTED THAT THEY HAD RELAYED NATO'S GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON THE WORK CALENDAR FOR 1986 TO NNA AND EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES AFTER THE PLENARY, I.E., THE WEST WANTS TO ESTABLISH A FULL WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986 WHICH CONTAINS NO OVERLAP WITH "VIENNA." FOR RATHER VAGUE TACTICAL REASONS, HOWEVER, THE NATO GRID GROUP REPS DID NOT CONVEY A KEY ELEMENT OF THEIR INSTRUCTIONS -- THAT IN DEVELOPING THE 1986 CALENDAR NATO STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF AGREEING TO AN ADJOURNMENT OR SUSPENSION DATE. BOTH GROUPS WERE NONCOMMITTAL -- AND IN FACT THE NNA REP HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO LISTEN, AS IT WAS THE "PREVAILING" VIEW OF THE NNA THAT THIS WAS NOT SUITABLE FOR DISCUSSION IN THE GRID GROUP -- BUT PROMISED TO CONSIDER THE NATO POSITION AND RECONVENE THE GRID GROUP MONDAY AFTER WORKING GROUP AB. BARRY (U.S.) REPORTED THAT KAHILUOTO (FINLAND), FOR REASONS OF "TACTICS, SUBSTANCE, AND MOST IMPORTANT, SUMMER



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VACATIONS," STRONGLY ENDORSED SETTING A FULL WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986, ENDING BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPARATORY CONFERENCE, I.E., SEPTEMBER 19, 1985. OTHER SPEAKERS CONCURRED THAT ALL OF THE NNA, EXCEPT FOR MALTA AND PERHAPS YUGOSLAVIA, COULD ENDORSE SUCH A PROGRAM (WHICH COINCIDES WITH NATO'S THINKING ON THE SUBJECT). EDES (UK) NOTED THAT MALTESE AMBASSADOR GAUCI HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS "PERSONALLY NOT AGAINST" A SEPTEMBER 19 SUSPENSION AND THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECENT HONEYMOON VOYAGE MIGHT "SOFTEN" HIM UP TO THE PROPOSAL. OTHERS, WISELY, CAUTIONED AGAINST ACCEPTING MALTESE COMMENTS AT FACE VALUE. THE GENERAL CONSENSUS IS THAT THE SOVIETS, LOYALLY, IF GRUDGINGLY, FOLLOWED BY THEIR ALLIES, ARE ONLY WILLING TO SET THE DATE FOR THE FIRST TWO SESSIONS NEXT YEAR WITH A SUSPENSION DATE BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING (NOVEMBER 4). IMPLICIT IN THIS EASTERN SCENARIO (TACITLY SUPPORTED BY MALTA AND YUGOSLAVIA) IS THAT THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING WOULD ONLY DECIDE "WHEN AND WHERE" THE CDE WOULD RESUME; STOCKHOLM WOULD DETERMINE "IF" IT WOULD BE RECONVENED. THE CAUCUS GROUP WAS MANDATED TO DELIVER A "FIRM STATEMENT" ON THE WEST'S STRONG POSITION FAVORING A DEFINITE SUSPENSION DATE AT MONDAY'S MEETING, TO LISTEN TO NNA AND EASTERN VIEWS, AND REPORT BACK TO CAUCUS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09452
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
- DECEMBER 2-6, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 068
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ONCE AGAIN THE CONFERENCE WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH MATTERS OF PROCEDURE -- THE 1986 CALENDAR AND THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS. ON CALENDARS, NATO CANNOT OFFER DATES FOR A 1986 SCHEDULE BECAUSE THE FRENCH WILL ONLY DISCUSS PRINCIPLES; AND THE EAST AND THE MALTESE WILL ONLY DISCUSS DATES, NOT PRINCIPLES. THE CALENDAR CONUNDRUM MUST BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR WE MAY BE TAKING AN EXTENDED WINTER VACATION THIS YEAR. ON COORDINATORS, THE WEST, AT U.S. INSISTENCE, IS TAKING A CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO AN NNA PROPOSAL FOR FIVE NNA COORDINATORS DRAWN FROM FOUR NNA DELEGATIONS IN THE FIVE MEETINGS, WITH THE SWISS PLAYING A KEY DUAL ROLE. NATO'S PERFORMANCE IN THE WORKING GROUPS CONTINUED TO SHOW SIGNS OF IMPROVED, IF UNEVEN, COORDINATION. THE NNA AND EAST CONTINUE TO DELIVER PEDESTRIAN WORKING GROUP STATEMENTS WHILE THEY AWAIT A SOLUTION OF THE COORDINATOR ISSUE. ONLY THE QUESTION OF HOW TO HANDLE AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES HAS CAUSED A PUBLIC STIR AND PRIVATE CONSTERNATION AMONG OUR ALLIES, WITH THE SOVIETS IN GENERAL AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV IN PARTICULAR ORCHESTRATING THE ISSUE. END SUMMARY.
THE NNA:
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4. TERMS OF ENDEARMENT: THE NNA, COURTED SHAMELESSLY BY BOTH EAST AND WEST, ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF LETTING KIND WORDS TURN THEIR COLLECTIVE HEADS. CASE IN POINT: THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS. EVERYONE AGREES THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF NNA COORDINATORS WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING COMMON GROUND IN STOCKHOLM. HOWEVER, THE NNA COORDINATORS CAN BE EFFECTIVE ONLY IF THEY ARE TRULY "NEUTRAL" AND OPERATE AS SERVANTS, NOT MASTERS, OF THE CONFERENCE. SOME OF OUR NNA COLLEAGUES SEEM TO HAVE LOST SIGHT OF THIS ESSENTIAL FACT. FIRST, THE NNA REPORTEDLY REJECTED THE IRISH CANDIDACY FOR A COORDINATOR'S ROLE BECAUSE THE IRISH ARE NOT CO-SPONSORS OF THE NNA PROPOSAL, SC.7. THIS, OF COURSE, LEADS ONE
-
TO QUESTION WHETHER THE NNA WILL SERVE AS FACILITATORS OF COMMON GROUND OR ADVOCATES OF THEIR OWN PROPOSALS. SECOND, THE NNA HAVE REJECTED THE TWO-COORDINATOR APPROACH PROPOSED BY NATO AND, AFTER DISCUSSING OTHER SUGGESTIONS, HAVE PRESENTED THE WEST, AS WELL AS THE EAST, WITH WHAT AMOUNTS TO A FAIT ACCOMPLI: FOUR DELEGATIONS (AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, FINLAND, AND SWITZERLAND)



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WOULD SERVE AS COORDINATORS WITH SWITZERLAND ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR TWO KEY WORKING GROUPS (INFORMATION/ VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATION AND CONSTRAINTS). WHILE NNA BEHAVIOR -- SOME WOULD SAY ARROGANCE -- IS DISQUIETING, THE EVENTUAL PROPOSAL OFFERED BY THE NNA MAY BE THE LEAST BAD ALTERNATIVE AVAILABLE, GIVEN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ISSUES AND COORDINATORS. WE HAVE CAUTIONED SOME OF OUR MORE ANXIOUS ALLIES AGAINST ACCEPTING THE NNA PROPOSAL WITH UNDUE HASTE OR WITHOUT DUE CONSIDERATION. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, WE WILL PROBABLY ACCEPT THE NNA PROPOSAL AS THE BEST AVAILABLE, BUT ONLY AFTER SIGNALING THAT WE WILL NOT PERMIT NNA COORDINATORS TO TAKE THE BIT IN THEIR TEETH. WE WILL ALSO PLAY ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL AS A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION, THUS MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE WILL EXPECT THE COORDINATORS TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF ALLIANCE VIEWS.

5. THE MALTESE MARPLOT: ON THE CALENDAR QUESTION, MOST OF THE NNA SEEM TO BE AT LEAST AS ANXIOUS AS NATO IS TO ESTABLISH A FULL 1986 SCHEDULE WITH A DEFINITE CUTOFF DATE BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPCOM. EVEN THE NORMALLY ALOOF FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO STRONGLY ADVOCATES SETTING A FULL AGENDA WITH A FIXED SUSPENSION DATE IN SEPTEMBER FOR FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,

REASONS OF PROFESSIONAL PLANNING AND "PERSONAL PLANS." "WE ARE HUMAN BEINGS, TOO," NOTED THE VACATION-MINDED FINN. HOWEVER, A STRONG MAJORITY DOES NOT A CONSENSUS MAKE, ESPECIALLY WHEN MALTA IS ADDED TO THE MIX. NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, MALTA, WITH TACIT SUPPORT FROM YUGOSLAVIA, IS REFUSING TO JOIN AN NNA CONSENSUS BEHIND A 1986 CALENDAR WITH A SEPTEMBER ADJOURNMENT DATE. THE CALENDAR CONUNDRUM MUST BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO OR WE MAY BE TAKING AN EXTENDED WINTER VACATION THIS YEAR.

6. IN THE WORKING GROUPS, THE NNA CONTINUED THEIR LOW-KEY CLARIFICATIONS OF SC.7 THROUGH THEIR RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS AND, IN SOME CASES, STATEMENTS ELABORATING ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SC.7 BY INDIVIDUAL NNA DELEGATIONS CONTINUED, E.G., WHETHER THE NOTIFICATION TRIGGER IS NUMERICAL OR STRUCTURAL. PRIMARY SPEAKERS AMONG THE NNA ON SC.7 CONTINUE TO BE AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, FINLAND, AND SWITZERLAND, WITH YUGOSLAVIA TAKING THE FLOOR ONLY WHEN PROVOKED. MALTA KEEPS SINGING THE SAME TUNE -- THE NEED TO COVER ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES -- GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL. WHILE MALTA'S MESSAGE MAYBE MONOMANIACAL, IT HAS NOT BEEN INEFFECTIVE. THE PERSISTENT BUT SOFT-SPOKEN APPROACH TAKEN BY THE NEW MALTESE AMBASSADOR (GAUCI) IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE



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SPORADIC BUT STRIDENT MALTESE STATEMENTS OF YORE.
NATO
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7. ONCE AGAIN, THE ALLIANCE WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH MATTERS OF PROCEDURE -- THE 1986 CALENDAR, AND COORDINATORS. WITH TIME RUNNING OUT FOR THIS SESSION, THE CAUCUS WRESTLED WITH THE THORNY ISSUE OF ACHIEVING AN ALLIANCE POSITION ON THE 1986 CALENDAR. WHILE ALL OTHER CAUCUS MEMBERS WERE PREPARED TO AGREE TO A SEPTEMBER 19 ADJOURNMENT DATE, THE FRENCH REFUSED TO FALL OFF THEIR INSISTENCE ON JULY 18 (A TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE OPTION TO MOST CAUCUS MEMBERS). THEY HINTED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY MIGHT SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY IF THE NNA AND EAST WOULD FIRST AGREE TO A CUTOFF DATE IN PRINCIPLE. EVENTUALLY, THE FRENCH WENT ALONG WITH A U.S. INTERIM COMPROMISE PROPOSAL TO RAISE THE ISSUE IN THE GRID GROUP IN AN EFFORT TO SOLICIT NNA AND EASTERN SUGGESTIONS FOR ADJOURNMENT DATES, AND THEREBY ESTABLISH THE CUTOFF PRINCIPLE. THE EAST, HOWEVER, WOULDN'T TAKE THE BAIT AND IS NOW CALLING FOR A SPECIFIC WESTERN PROPOSAL. THIS HAS DONE NOTHING TO SATISFY FRENCH REQUIREMENTS; THUS IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHERE NATO CAN GO FROM HERE. THE IRON-CLAD GUARANTEE
-
THE FRENCH SEEK AGAINST PROCEDURAL BLACKMAIL TO PROLONG THE CONFERENCE IS PROBABLY UNOBTAINABLE GIVEN THE CSCE CONSENSUS RULE. WHILE WE SHARE FRANCE'S CONCERNS ABOUT A CUTOFF DATE, THEIR STUBBORN REFUSAL TO BUDGE OFF JULY 18 MAY HAVE COST US AN OPPORTUNITY TO SET ANY ADJOURNMENT DATE FOR NEXT YEAR. THE EAST IS NOW INDICATING THAT IT NO LONGER CAN AGREE TO SCHEDULE MORE THAN THE FIRST TWO SESSIONS OF 1986. NEVERTHELESS, THE EAST HAS INDICATED THAT IT WOULD CONSIDER A NATO PROPOSAL FOR A FULL CALENDAR. BUT WITH LESS THAN TWO WEEKS LEFT IN THE SESSION THE NATO CAUCUS CANNOT EVEN TAKE UP THIS OFFER BECAUSE THE FRENCH WILL ONLY DISCUSS PRINCIPLES, AND THE EAST WILL ONLY DISCUSS DATES.

8. COORDINATORS: FOR MOST OF THE WEEK THE CAUCUS SIFTED THROUGH RUMORS AND SPECULATION CONCERNING THE ANTICIPATED NNA PROPOSAL FOR WORKING GROUP COORDINATORS AND IT SEEMED YOU COULD FIND AN NNA INTERLOCUTOR WHO WOULD TELL YOU ANYTHING YOU WANTED TO HEAR AND THEN SOME ON THIS TOPIC. WHEN THE OFFICIAL PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED ON FRIDAY, HOWEVER, IT CAME AS A SURPRISE TO ALMOST EVERYONE (SEE PARA 4 FOR NNA PROPOSAL). MANY (LED BY THE FRG, NETHERLANDS, AND ITALY) FOUND THE NNA PROPOSAL GIVING THE SWISS RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORKING GROUPS A-2 (INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS) AND A-3
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,



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(CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS) A PLEASANT SURPRISE AND ADVISED EARLY, IF NOT IMMEDIATE, ACCEPTANCE. THEY ARGUED THAT GIVEN INTERNAL NNA PROBLEMS THIS WAS THE BEST WE COULD EVER EXPECT TO GET, SINCE THE SWISS ARE OUR CLOSEST NNA "ALLIES" ON CONSTRAINTS, INFORMATION AND VERFICATION. OTHERS (U.S., CANADA, AND UK), HOWEVER, ADVISED CONSIDERABLE CAUTION IN CONSIDERING THE NNA SCHEME AND BLOCKED CONSENSUS, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING (SEE PARA 5 FOR DISCUSSION). WE ARE SOMEWHAT DISTURBED BY THE UNQUESTIONING WILLINGNESS OF SEVERAL CAUCUS MEMBERS, IN THEIR EVIDENT EAGNERNESS TO PROCEED TO DRAFTING, TO ACCEPT A "TAKE OR LEAVE IT" PROPOSAL FROM THE NNA AND TO ASSUME THAT IT IS THE BEST ARRANGEMENT POSSIBLE. WHILE WE AGREE THAT IT IS NOT THE WORST

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POSSIBLE OPTION, IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE ONLY POSSIBLE OPTION AS THE FRG AND ITALY SEEMED TO IMPLY. U.S. EFFORTS TO PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS, INCLUDING TWO "SUPER-COORDINATORS" (FOR A AND B) AND FIVE SUB-COORDINATORS, WERE DIMISSED OUT OF HAND AS UNWORKABLE" BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS, AS WAS STICKING TO THE ORIGINAL NATO POSITION OF TWO COORDINATORS ONLY. IN THIS REGARD WE NOTE THAT, FOLLOWING A WEEKEND OF REFLECTION, MANY CAUCUS MEMBERS -- WHILE STILL FAVORING EVENTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL -- ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WAS NOT CALLED FOR. THIS RENEWED CAUTION HAS BEEN LARGELY CAUSED BY HINTS THAT THE NNA MIGHT USE SC.7 AS THE BASIS OF THEIR COORDINATION EFFORTS.

9. WORKING GROUPS: NATO'S PERFORMANCE IN THE WORKING GROUPS CONTINUED TO SHOW SIGNS OF IMPROVED, IF UNEVEN, COORDINATION. ONCE AGAIN THE BEST PERFORMANCE MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE GROUP, WHERE THE EAST APPEARS TO HAVE SENT IN ITS WORST TEAM. IN GENERAL, THE WORKING GROUPS WERE QUIET ALL WEEK AS THE CONFERENCE SEEMED TO BE HOLDING ITS COLLECTIVE BREATH AWAITING THE INTRODUCTION OF COORDINATORS. NATO WAS EFFECTIVE IN HIGHLIGHTING THOSE PARTS OF SC.7 WHICH MIRROR CONCEPTS ALREADY ENSHRINED IN SC.1. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE WEST DID NOT ALLOW THE AIR AND NAVAL ISSUE TO DOMINATE THE DISCUSSION. STILL, THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO APPEAR UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS ISSUE. THE CAUSES OF THIS PROBLEM CAME INTO SHARP RELIEF FOLLOWING TATARNIKOV'S DECEMBER 6 PLENARY SPEECH ON NOTIFICATION WHICH EMPLOYED THE NEW EASTERN TACTIC OF EMPHASIZING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (SEE PARA 11). IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE CAUCUS IS DIVIDED BOTH ON HOW TO INTERPRET THIS APPROACH AND ON HOW TO RESPOND TO IT. THE FRG, NETHERLANDS, AND ITALY VIEW THE EASTERN SWITCH TO THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AS A POSITIVE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE FROM THEIR FORMER FOCUS ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND



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AIR ACTIVITIES. EAGER TO DRAFT AND TO FIND SOME AREA OF COMMON GROUND WITH THE EAST, THEY URGE THAT WE RESPOND -
TO THIS OVERTURE BY BEING MORE FORTHCOMING ON THE MODALITIES OF NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATIONS OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THESE DELEGATIONS ARE GROWING INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT WITH THE U.S., UK AND TURKEY WHICH HAVE ANALYZED THE SOVIET TACTICAL SWITCH AS EXACTLY THAT -- A SWITCH IN TACTICS NOT OBJECTIVES -- BASED ON A FUNCTIONAL LINK RAISED TO THE STRATEGIC LEVEL WHICH WOULD STILL CAPTURE INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. THE WORKING GROUP MINI-CLUSTERS CONTINUED TO WORK ON COMMON ARGUMENTS TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF ALLIANCE DISARRAY ON THIS ISSUE, BUT THE DEEPER ISSUE OF HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS EASTERN APPROACH IN THE LONG TERM REMAINS UNRESOLVED AND IS BECOMING ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THIS NEGOTIATION BEING SOUGHT BY NATO "WETS AND "DRYS."
THE EAST
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10. IN STRIKING CONTRAST TO LAST WEEK'S PRIVATE HINTS FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
AT INCREASED EASTERN FLEXIBILITY ON KEY WESTERN CONCEPTS, THIS WEEK THE SOVIETS HARDENED THEIR POSITION ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND APPLIED THEIR ELASTIC FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES WHICH THEY MENTIONED IN VIRTUALLY EVERY MEETING.
11. OF COORDINATORS AND CALENDARS: PLAYING UP TO THE NNA, THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT WHATEVER COMBINATION OF COORDINATORS THE NNA WOULD PROPOSE. THEY WERE LESS EASYGOING ON THE 1986 CALENDAR, HOWEVER, REFUSING TO SCHEDULE MORE THAN TWO SESSIONS NOW IN THE EXPECTATION OF A SECOND U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT IN JUNE 1986.
12. A STAR IS BORN: AS WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY TECHNICAL, THE SOVIET MILREP (GENERAL TATARNIKOV) HAS ADOPTED A PROFILE WHICH, IN PUBLIC AT LEAST, HAS AT TIMES BEEN HIGHER THAN THAT OF HIS AMBASSADOR. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT, BEFORE JOINING THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION, TATARNIKOV WORKED IN THE SOVIET -
GENERAL STAFF'S "PUBLIC RELATIONS" DEPARTMENT AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRIEFING TOP CIVILIAN OFFICIALS ON SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY AND PROGRAMS. THIS HELPS TO EXPLAIN HIS ABILITY TO ARGUE HIS CASE PERSUASIVELY AND THINK ON HIS FEET -- QUALITIES WHICH, FORTUNATELY FOR US, MOST OF HIS EASTERN LACKEYS LACK.) TATARNIKOV'S STRONG POSITION ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS UNDERSCORED WHEN HE DELIVERED A MAJOR POLICYMAKING SPEECH IN THE DECEMBER 6 PLENARY.



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IN A PRIVATE MEETING ON DECEMBER 3 WITH A PENTAGON VISITOR (BRIGADIER GENERAL DENSON), TATARNIKOV OFFERED A SNEAK PREVIEW OF SEVERAL ARGUMENTS WHICH HE USED LATER IN THE WEEK IN SUPPORT OF NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: (1) THE TWO AREAS CAUSING A "DEADLOCK" IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE WESTERN REJECTION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND THE WESTERN OUT-OF-GARRISION CONCEPT, WITH ITS LIMITED APPLICATION TO GROUND FORCES; (2) THE MANDATE CALLS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF HELSINKI CBM'S AND, TO DO THIS, NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS; (3) "ABSOLUTELY INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITY" DOES NOT EXIST; IT IS ALL LINKED WITH GROUND ACTIVITY; (4) AIR ACTIVITY IS "THE MOST VERIFIABLE" MILITARY ACTIVITY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF U.S. AND SOVIET NTM'S, MODERN EQUIPMENT FOR MONITORING AIR SPACE, FOR CIVIL AVIATION CONTROL, AND FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE TO PREVENT VIOLATION OF AIR SPACE.

13. THE ELASTIC FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT TATARNIKOV, SEEKING NEW ARGUMENTS FOR EXPANDING THE ZONE WHICH WOULD BE MOST PALATABLE TO THE NNA -- AND TO OUR SOFTER ALLIES -- CONTINUED TO PUSH THE ELASTIC FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ARGUMENT DESIGNED EVENTUALLY TO CAPTURE U.S. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. JUXTAPOSING AMBIGUOUS AND CONTRADICTORY ASSERTIONS IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT, THE SOVIET GENERAL SUCCEEDED IN THROWING AT LEAST SOME IN THE NATO CAUCUS OFF BALANCE: HE SIMULTANEOUSLY REASSURED HIS LISTENERS THAT "NAVAL EXERCISE AREAS ARE SET, AS A RULE, NEAR EUROPEAN SHORES, NOT IN THE REMOTE WESTERN ATLANTIC" AND HE INSISTED THAT

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS START "NOT WITH THE LEAPING OF SOLDIERS FROM SHIPS TO SHORE, BUT THOUSANDS OF MILES FROM IT (THE SHORE)," WITH THE EMBARKATION OF THE SOLDIERS AND LOADING OF EQUIPMENT. IN WORKING GROUP B, TATARNIKOV DESCRIBED TWO EXAMPLES (U.S. AND SOVIET) OF AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD TRIGGER THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD (200 AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR IN THE SAME AREA SIMULTANEOUSLY): (1) AN EXERCISE INVOLVING 350 BOMBERS, FIGHTER BOMBERS, AND FIGHTERS WITH ONLY SMALL LAND FORCE INVOLVEMENT (FROM TWO MILITARY DISTRICTS) IN WHAT SOUNDED REMARKABLY LIKE THE SOVIET INDEPENDENT AIR OPERATION, AND (2) U.S. NUCLEAR STRIKE EXERCISES IN 1981 IN WHICH 400 AIRCRAFT DEMONSTRATED PREPAREDNESS. (WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET EXERCISE DESCRIBED ABOVE WAS LAST CONDUCTED ON THAT SCALE IN THE LATE 60'S.)

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,

14. OBSERVATION VS INSPECTION: IN PUBLIC THE EAST



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AGREES TO OBSERVE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES -- GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL -- "FROM START TO FINISH." IN PRIVATE TATARNIKOV MADE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION: ON THE ONE HAND, HE INTRODUCED THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN SOME INSTANCES OBSERVERS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO CERTAIN -- "NOT THE BEST" -- RADAR STATIONS TO WATCH AIR ACTIVITY BEING MONITORED ON RADAR SCREENS; ON THE OTHER HAND, HE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE NOTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD GRANT U.S. INSPECTORS ACCESS TO SOVIET AIR COMMAND CENTERS, RADAR STATIONS OR COMMAND POSTS.

15. ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE SOVIET UNION (BOGDANOV) ENDED ITS SILENCE ON ANNUAL FORECASTS. SPEAKING THURSDAY IN THE WORKING GROUP MEETING (AND THUS IMPLICITLY SUPPORTING THE WESTERN, AS OPPOSED TO THE NNA, POSITIONING OF FORECASTS) BOGDANOV AGREED WITH SWITZERLAND THAT THE EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE START OF THE NOTIFICATION PERIOD OF THE FIRST MILITARY EXERCISE IN THE FORECAST.

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16. NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF): THE EAST WAS LEAST EFFECTIVE IN SELLING THE CROWN JEWEL OF ITS PROPOSALS: THE NON-USE OF FORCE. EASTERN, IN PARTICULAR, SOVIET STATEMENTS, HAVE BEEN UNFOCUSED; ALMOST NO WORKING GROUP TIME HAS BEEN SPENT DISCUSSING THE SOVIET DRAFT NUF TREATY, SC.6. THE ROMANIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAS WORN OUT HIS WELCOME WITH HIS CONSTANT ASSERTIONS THAT WE ARE REACHING COMMON GROUND ON NUF. EVEN HIS EASTERN COLLEAGUES NOW ROLL THEIR EYES WHEN HE TAKES THE FLOOR. THE EAST DESCRIBED ITS "VERY SHORT LIST" OF TYPES OF FORCE IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE IN A NUF REAFFIRMATION -- POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY -- WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON MILITARY FORCE. WHILE THIS ISSUE APPEARS MANAGEABLE, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT SESSION, IT WILL GIVE US PROBLEMS DOWN THE ROAD. SOME OF OUR MORE NERVOUS ALLIES (E.G., THE FRG, ITALY) ARE ALREADY DISCUSSING WAYS TO INCLUDE THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY FORCE IN A FINAL DOCUMENT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09451
SUBJECT: CDE: FRENCH POSITION ON 1986 WORK PROGRAM
1. CDE VIII-069 - CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: FRENCH INSTRUCTIONS ON THE 1986 CALENDAR HAVE BEEN MODIFIED SLIGHTLY, BUT THEY STILL DO NOT PROVIDE A VIABLE BASIS FOR A NATO POSITION. IT MAY ALREADY BE TOO LATE TO NEGOTIATE A FULL 1986 CALENDAR BEFORE WE BREAK ON DECEMBER 20, BUT THERE IS STILL A CHANCE FOR SUCCESS IF THE FRENCH WILL AGREE TO OUR PUTTING FORWARD A FULL PROPOSAL.
3. AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD PREVIEWED THE NEW FRENCH INSTRUCTIONS WITH US ON DECEMBER 10. HE IS NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT SEPTEMBER 19 AS A "CUT-OFF" BUT HE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO AGREE TO A DETAILED WORK PROGRAM EXTENDING BEYOND JULY 18. ACCORDING TO A MEMBER OF GASCHIGNARD'S DELEGATION, HIS INSTRUCTIONS ALSO CALL FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT CONTINUING BEYOND JULY 18 WOULD REQUIRE CONSENSUS.
-
4. I TOLD GASCHIGNARD THAT I DID NOT THINK THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NNA, THE EAST OR EVEN THE NATO CAUCUS. THE ONLY CHANCE OF GETTING AGREEMENT ON AN ADJOURNMENT DATE AT THIS STAGE WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF A FULL WORK PROGRAM FOR FOUR SESSIONS. THE NNA COULD NOT COME UP WITH SUCH A PROPOSAL BECAUSE THE MALTESE WERE BLOCKING CONSENSUS. THE SOVIETS WERE HOLDING OUT FOR IMMEDIATELY SCHEDULING TWO SESSIONS WITH THE CALENDAR RUNNING OUT IN MAY. IF NATO COULD COME WITH A PROGRAM FOR FOUR SESSIONS WITH AN ADJOURNMENT DATE BUT NOT TOO MUCH LANGUAGE ON PRINCIPLES THE NNA WOULD PROBABLY JOIN IN, AND UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE EAST PROBABLY WOULD ALSO.
5. UNLESS WE ARE ABLE TO COME UP WITH A FULL PROGRAM, THE WHOLE ISSUE OF A CLOSING DATE AND A SUMMER SCHEDULE WILL BE LEFT HANGING UNTIL NEXT YEAR. THE SOVIETS WOULD USE CONTINUING DISCUSSION ON THE PROGRAM TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS AND THEN USE THE PROSPECTIVE U.S./SOVIET SUMMIT AS AN EXCUSE FOR KEEPING US IN SESSION ALL SUMMER. AND THEN WE WOULD BE BLACKMAILED BY MALTA AND THE NATO WETS TO KEEP GOING AT LEAST UNTIL NOVEMBER 4, THE OPENING OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE PROPER. THUS, FRENCH INSISTENCE ON JULY 18 WOULD HAVE A RESULT DIRECTLY COUNTER TO WHAT WE AND THE FRENCH WANT TO ACHIEVE: A CLEAR ADJOURNMENT DATE AND A WORK PROGRAM WHICH WOULD FORCE THE SOVIETS TO MAKE EARLY SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS.
6. I EXPECT THAT THE NATO CAUCUS TODAY WILL REJECT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, AND THAT ISSUE WILL BE A PROMINENT ONE ON THE MARGINS OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL. THE FRENCH TELL US IT HAS ALREADY COME UP TO THEIR CONSIDERABLE FRUSTRATION ON THE FRINGES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SUMMIT.
BARRY



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09453
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 9, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 065
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CAUCUS DEFERRED A DECISION ON THE NNA COORDINATOR PROPOSAL AS THE U.S., UK, CANADA, AND TURKEY INDICATED THEY WERE STILL NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT IT. IN FACT, ALTHOUGH MOST DELEGATIONS FAVOR ACCEPTANCE, A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH WAS SPURRED BY INDICATIONS THAT THE NNA HAD DISMISSED IRELAND'S CANDIDACY BECAUSE THE IRISH HAD DECLINED TO BECOME CO-SPONSORS OF SC.7. THE U.S., CANADA, AND UK SAW THIS "LITMUS TEST" AS A DISTURBING INDICATION THAT THE NNA MIGHT INTEND TO USE THEIR COORDINATOR ROLE AS A MEANS TO PROMOTE SC.7 AS THE BASIS FOR COMPROMISE. WHILE THE CAUCUS CONTINUES TO CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL, THE NATO CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY (ALLENDESALAZAR, SPAIN) WAS TASKED TO ASK QUESTIONS OF THE PRESENT NNA CHAIRMAN DESIGNED TO OBTAIN NNA ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT COORDINATORS WOULD NOT USE SC.7 AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. HE WAS ALSO TOLD TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE NATO ATTACHES TO HAVING THE SAME INDIVIDUAL COORDINATE A SPECIFIC GROUP FOR THE ENTIRE CONFERENCE. THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE GRID GROUP REJECTED NATO EFFORTS TO DISCUSS CALENDAR PRINCIPLES, AND HE ASKED FOR CONCRETE WESTERN AND NNA PROPOSALS FOR THE 1986 CALENDAR. ROZANOV (USSR) DID NOT RULE OUT SETTING A FULL CALENDAR FOR NEXT YEAR BUT INDI-
CATED AN EASTERN PREFERENCE FOR A TECHNICAL MEETING BETWEEN THE PREPCON AND MAIN VIENNA MEETING. THE NNA REPS INDICATED THAT THEIR GROUP COULD NOT OBTAIN CONSENSUS ON ANY CALENDAR, AND NATO REMAINS IMMOBILIZED BY THE FRENCH POSITION. END SUMMARY.
-
4. COORDINATORS: THE CAUCUS RESUMED ITS DISCUSSION OF THE NNA COORDINATOR PROPOSAL IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF INCREASED CAUTION, ALTHOUGH MOST DELEGATIONS (LED BY THE NETHERLANDS, ITALY, NORWAY, AND FRG) CONTINUED TO FAVOR ULTIMATE ACCEPTANCE. TWO NEW FACTORS HAD COME INTO PLAY SINCE THE LAST CAUCUS: (1) THE EAST HAD APPARENTLY ACCEPTED THE NNA PROPOSAL; AND (2) SEVERAL SOURCES HAD INDICATED THAT THE NNA HAD REJECTED THE IRISH CANDIDACY BECAUSE IRELAND HAD REFUSED TO EITHER JOIN THE NNA GROUP OR BECOME CO-SPONSORS OF SC.7. CIARRAPICO (ITALY) FOCUSED ON THE FIRST FACTOR AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS NOW UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL. THE U.S., CANADA, AND UK, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO ADVISE CAUTION AND WERE JOINED BY TURKEY IN STRESSING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF SC.7 AS A LITMUS TEST FOR COORDI-
NATORS. BARRY (U.S.) WONDERED IF THE NNA'S TACTICS



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INDICATED THAT THEY INTENDED TO USE THEIR ROLE AS COORDINATORS TO PROMOTE SC.7 AND STATED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WAS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE. DELWORTH (CANADA) AGREED AND ADDED THE SC.7 WAS "IRRELEVANT" TO THE PURPOSES OF COORDINATION. HE CAUTIONED THE CAUCUS TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN ACCEPTING THIS PROPOSAL BECAUSE "THIS MODE OF OPERATION WILL BE WITH US UNTIL THE END OF THE CONFERENCE." EDES (UK) SAID THAT THE ISSUE RAISED DOUBTS IN HIS MIND ABOUT THE REAL "NEUTRALITY" OF THE NNA. WHILE MOST DELEGATIONS SHARED THE CONCERN THAT THE NNA NOT USE SC.7 AS THE BASIS OF THEIR COORDINATION EFFORTS, THEY, INCLUDING THE FRENCH, CONTINUED TO AGREE WITH BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) THAT THERE WAS "NO BETTER ALTERNATIVE" TO THIS PROPOSAL. IN RESPONSE, BARRY (AGAIN PROPOSING THE TWO "SUPER-COORDINATORS" PLUS FIVE DEPUTIES OPTION), DELWORTH (FLOGGING THE IRISH CANDIDACY) AND EDES (SUGGESTING WE GO BACK TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR TWO COORDINATORS) ALL RAISED "BETTER ALTERNATIVES," BUT THE MAJORITY OF THE CAUCUS CLEARLY HAD NO STOMACH FOR ANYTHING BUT ACCCEPTANCE OF THE NNA PROPOSAL. IN THIS REGARD, THE NETHERLANDS, SUPPORTED BY BELGIUM, EFFECTIVELY KILLED THE IRISH CANDIDACY BY STATING THAT THEY OBJECTED TO ANY EC MEMBER BECOMING A "NEUTRAL" COORDINATOR.

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FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 9, 1985

5. NEXT STEPS: AS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE U.S., UK, CANADA, AND TURKEY REMAINED UNPREPARED TO ACCEPT THE NNA PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME, THE CAUCUS AGREED TO DEFER FURTHER DISCUSSION UNTIL WEDNESDAY WHILE TRYING TO CLARIFY CERTAIN ISSUES IN THE INTERIM. THE CAUCUS CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY (ALLENDESALAZAR, SPAIN) WAS INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH THE NNA CHAIRMAN (PAPADOPOULOS, CYPRUS), INFORM HIM THAT OUR CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL WAS CONTINUING, AND CONFIRM THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAD, IN FACT, ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL AND WHETHER THE EAST HAD ASKED ANY QUESTIONS OR IMPOSED ANY CONDITIONS. IF THE EAST'S ACCEPTANCE WAS UNCONDITIONAL, ALLENDESALAZAR WAS TO SEEK NNA CONCURRENCE WITH THE FOLLOWING TWO ASSUMPTIONS: (1) WE (NATO) UNDERSTAND THAT COORDINATORS WOULD BE COMPLETELY NEUTRAL AND WOULD NOT TAKE SC.7 AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION; AND (2) WE RESPECT THE RIGHT OF EACH DELEGATION TO APPOINT INDIVIDUALS TO BE COORDINATORS, BUT WE EXPECT THAT ONCE APPOINTED THOSE INDIVIDUALS WILL REMAIN IN THEIR POSITIONS UNTIL THE END OF THE CONFERENCE. THIS LATTER POINT WAS ADDED BECAUSE NATO IS CONCERNED THAT THE SWISS MAY BE RESERVING THE RIGHT TO HAVE AMBASSADOR SCHENK AND SWISS DEPREP JUNOD MOVE BACK



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AND FORTH BETWEEN GROUPS A-2 AND A-3, WHICH COULD RESULT IN A DE FACTO MERGING OF THESE GROUPS, OR EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SWISS BRINGING IN A "RINGER" FROM BERN. NATO WOULD PREFER AT LEAST A TACIT AD PERSONAM DESIGNATION THAT APPOINTS, FOR INSTANCE, AMBASSADOR SCHENK TO THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION CLUSTER AND JUNOD TO THE CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL CALENDARS CLUSTER ON A PERMANENT BASIS AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST ANY MERGING OF THESE TOPICS. ALLENDESALAZAR WILL REPORT HIS FINDINGS TO ALL HEADS OF DELEGATION PRIOR TO THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING.

6. THE 1986 CALENDAR: SIZOO (DUTCH DEPREP AND NATO GRID GROUP REP) REPORTED ON THE DECEMBER 9 GRID GROUP MEETING. ROZANOV (USSR) HAD EXPRESSED SURPRISE WITH THE WEST'S DECEMBER 6 QUESTIONS ON PRINCIPLES, WHICH HE SAID HAD TO BE REFERRED TO MOSCOW. HE OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME TO DISCUSS PRINCIPLES BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION AND PRESSED NATO FOR A "CONCRETE" PROPOSAL ON DATES. ROZANOV ADDED THAT THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION COULD AGREE TO DATES WITHOUT REFERENCE TO MOSCOW AND EXPRESSED HIS PREFERENCE FOR A JANUARY 28 STARTING DATE. ROZANOV DID NOT RULE OUT A FULL CALENDAR FOR 1986, ALTHOUGH HE INDICATED THAT HE SAW SUBSTANTIVE WORK BEING COMPLETED BY SEPTEMBER WHILE A "TECHNICAL SESSION" COULD BE HELD BETWEEN THE VIENNA PREPCON AND THE MAIN REVIEW MEETING. HE HAD ALSO PRESSED THE NNA TO PROVIDE A CONCRETE PROPOSAL, BUT THE NNA REPS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY COULD NOT ACHIEVE CONSENSUS WITHIN THEIR GROUP ON A CALENDAR. THE CAUCUS DEFERRED FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE UNTIL THE ITS WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11 SESSION. (COMMENT: APPARENTLY PROBLEMS WITH MALTA ARE FORCING THE NNA TO OPT OUT OF PLAYING ANY USEFUL ROLE IN DEVELOPING A 1986 CALENDAR. GIVEN THE CURRENT EASTERN POSITION, HOWEVER, IT MAY NOT BE TOO LATE TO SALVAGE SOMETHING IF NATO CAN PUT FORWARD ITS OWN PROPOSAL. WITH TIME RUNNING OUT, THE WEDNESDAY CAUCUS SESSION WILL BE CRITICAL. IF THE FRENCH CAN AGREE TO SUPPORT THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE, WE STILL HAVE A CHANCE; BUT IF THEY CLING TO JULY 18, OR AGREE TO SEPTEMBER 19 IN COMBINATION WITH RIGID STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE, WE ARE LIKELY TO RETURN TO STOCKHOLM IN JANUARY WITH NO SCHEDULE AND NO ADJOURNMENT DATE. END COMMENT.

BARRY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09524
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS, DECEMBER 11-12, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 9453
1. CDE VIII - 073
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON DECEMBER 11, THE NATO CAUCUS AUTHORIZED ITS REPRESENTATIVES TO JOIN IN A COFFEE GROUP WITH NNA AND EASTERN REPS TO DISCUSS THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR 5 COORDINATORS DRAWN FROM 4 DELEGATIONS FOR THE 5 WORKING GROUPS. THE CAUCUS TOOK THIS STEP AFTER HAVING RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THE NNA THAT: 1) NNA COORDINATORS WOULD NOT USE SC.7 AS THE BASIS OF THEIR EFFORTS; AND 2) COORDINATORS ONCE APPOINTED WOULD REMAIN THE SAME FOR THE DURATION OF THE CONFERENCE. IN LIGHT OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY BARRY (U.S.) NATO COFFEE GROUP REPS WILL SEEK FURTHER ASSURANCES THAT: 1) ENGLISH WILL BE THE ONLY LANGUAGE USED IN DRAFTING; AND 2) AS A GENERAL RULE NO INDIVIDUAL WILL COORDINATE MORE THAN ONE GROUP OR ACT AS A DEPUTY IN ONE GROUP WHILE COORDINATING ANOTHER. THE NNA HAVE PROPOSED A FULL WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986 WHICH INCLUDES FOUR SESSIONS, THE LAST SESSION ENDING ON SEPTEMBER 19. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE, THE CAUCUS WAS PREPARED TO EMBRACE THIS PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE EAST (SPECIFIC DATES IN THE NNA PROPOSAL COULD BE MODIFIED). FRANCE, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO BLOCK CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THIS COURSE OF ACTION. ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH AGREED TO A SEPTEMBER 19 CUT-OFF AND FOUR SESSIONS IN PRINCIPLE, THEY REFUSED TO SET A STARTING DATE FOR THE FOURTH SESSION UNTIL THC CONCLUSION OF THE THIRD SESSION IN 1986, I.E., JULY 18. BARRY (U.S.) OBSERVED THAT THIS POSITION WOULD CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EAST TO FORCE US INTO CONTINUOUS SESSION NEXT SUMMER. BARRY FURTHER NOTED THAT FAILURE TO AGREE TO A 1986 CALENDAR BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION WILL NEGATIVELY EFFECT THE ALLIANCE'S SUBSTANTATIVE POSITION NEXT YEAR AND WILL BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THE OBJECTIVES THAT THE FRENCH THEMSELVES ARE SEEKING. END SUMMARY.
4. COORDINATORS (DECEMBER 11): ALLENDESALAZAR (SPAIN) TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT PAPADAPOULOUS (CYPRUS, AND PRESENT NNA CHAIRMAN) HAD PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ANSWER TO NATO'S THREE QUESTIONS ON THE COORDINATOR PROPOSAL (SEE REFTEL): 1) THE EAST HAD ACCEPTED THE NNA PROPOSAL; 2) THE NNA COORDINATORS WOULD PERFORM THEIR TASK ON THE BASIS OF ALL DOCUMENTS TABLED AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF SC.7; AND 3) THE NNA AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT ONCE DELEGATIONS HAD APPOINTED AN INDIVIDUAL TO COORDINATE A PARTICULAR GROUP HE WOULD REMAIN IN THAT GROUP FOR THE DURATION OF THE CONFERENCE. PAPADOPOULOUS HAD ADDED, HOWEVER THAT ON THIS LAST POINT THE SWISS WISHED TO KEEP



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A "CERTAIN FLEXIBILITY."
5. BARRY (U.S.) OBSERVED THAT GIVEN THIS INFORMATION AND THE RESULTS OF SEVERAL BILATERAL CONTACTS HE HAD MADE, HE WAS NOW REASONABLY CONFIDENT: 1) THAT THE NNA WOULD NOT TRY TO USE THEIR POSITION AS COORDINATORS TO PROMOTE SC.7; 2) THE SWEDISH COORDINATOR OF THE NOTIFICATION GROUP UNDERSTOOD THAT ANNUAL CALENDARS WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN B-1 BUT RATHER IN THE A-3 GROUP AS STATED IN THE GENTLEMENS AGREEMENT; AND 3) THE PROPOSED NNA COORDINATORS UNDERSTOOD THAT THEIR INTRODUCTION DID NOT MEAN AN IMMEDIATE START OF DRAFTING BUT THAT A TRANSITION PERIOD WOULD BE REQUIRED. BARRY TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT IT WAS NOW HIS VIEW THAT A COFFEE ROUP (NATO, WARSAW PACT, NNA) COULD BE SCHEDULED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT SEVERAL ISSUES REMAINED ON WHICH WE NEEDED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION. BARRY IDENTIFIED FOUR ISSUES. 1) HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH ASSIGNING COORDINATORSHIPS TO DELEGATIONS, WITH THE DELEGATIONS THEMSELVES DESIGNATING INDIVIDUALS TO FILL EACH SLOT. HE OBSERVED THAT WE AT LEAST NEEDED TO PUT DOWN A MARKER THAT NATO HAS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN ANY CHANGES AND FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS, DECEMBER 11-12,
SHOULD BE CONSULTED BEFORE ANY COORDINATOR IS CHANGED.
2) HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT SWISS AMBASSADOR SCHENK'S PLAN (REPORTED BY BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS)) TO USE JUNOD AS HIS DEPUTY IN A-2, AT THE SAME TIME THAT JUNOD WOULD BE COORDINATOR IN A-3. HE WARNED THAT THIS POTENTIALLY COULD CREATE A DE FACTO MERGING OF THESE GROUPS. 3) BARRY PROPOSED THAT WE CLEARLY ESTABLISH NOW THAT DRAFTING, WHEN IT BEGINS, WILL ONLY BE DONE IN ONE LANGUAGE -- ENGLISH. 4) HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ABUSED THEIR PRIVILEGE OF HAVING TWO DELEGATES AT THE TABLE IN THE WORKING GROUPS BY HAVING BOTH OF THEM SPEAK. BARRY EXPLAINED THAT THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH HAD BEEN REACHED ON THIS QUESTION IN OCTOBER HAD ONLY ALLOWED THE SECOND POSITION TO BE USED FOR SUPPORT. ON THIS LAST POINT, MELLBIN (DENMARK), SPEAKING FOR THE NATO REPS WHO HAD NEGOTIATED THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMENS AGREEMENT, SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON THE SECOND SEAT. BARRY (U.S.) TOOK UP THE SUGGESTION OF SEVERAL CAUCUS MEMBERS THAT IF HE WISHED TO PURSUE THIS LAST POINT HE DO SO ILATERALLY WITH GRINEVSKY (USSR).
6. THE CAUCUS DECIDED THAT THE COFFEE GROUP SHOULD GO FORWARD, BUT MOST DELEGATIONS (INCLUDING THE UK, ITALY, NETHERLANDS AND FRG) SHARED BARRY'S CONCERNS ON THE LANGUAGE QUESTIONS AND THE INDEPENDENT IDENTIFY OF GROUPS A-2 AND A-3. REGARDING THE LATTER, THE CAUCUS



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ACCEPTED A PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY GRONDAL (ICELAND) THAT NATO REPS TO THE COFFEE GROUP SEEK ACCEPTANCE FROM ALL PARTIES OF A GENERAL RULE THAT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL CAN NEITHER BE A COORDINATOR IN MORE THAN ONE GROUP NOR A COORDINATOR IN ONE GROUP AND A DEPUTY IN ANOTHER (THUS LOCKING THE SWISS PLAN WITHOUT SINGLING THEM OUT BY NAME). THE NATO REPS WILL ALSO SEEK THE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES THAT DRAFTING WILL BE DONE IN ONLY ONE LANGUAGE -- ENGLISH. AMBASSADORS CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), GRONDAL (ICELAND) AND OZGUL (TURKEY) WERE CHOSEN AS CAUCUS REPRESENTATIVES TO THE COFFEE GROUP WHICH WILL MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY WILL REPORT EASTERN AND NA REACTION BACK TO THE CAUCUS.

7. 1986 CALENDAR: FOLLOWING TWO DAYS OF DISCUSSION DECEMBER 11-12 THE CAUCUS REMAINS UNABLE TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON A 1986 WORK CALENDAR. ON DECEMBER 11, THE CAUCUS RECEIVED A FULL CALENDAR PROPOSAL FROM THE NNA WHICH WOULD SET FOUR SESSIONS FOR THE FOLLOWING DATES:

NNA PROPOSAL:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIRST SESSION -- | JANUARY 21 | TO | MARCH 14 |
| SECOND SESSION -- | APRIL 8 | TO | MAY 16 OR 30 |
| THIRD SESSION -- | JUNE 10 OR 17 | TO | JULY 18 |
| FOURTH SESSION -- | AUGUST 26 | TO | SEPT. 19 |

WHEN THIS PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED IN THE CONFERENCE GRID GROUP ON DECEMBER 12, ROZANOV (USSR) HAD CLAIMED THAT IT WAS INCOMPLETE BECAUSE OF THE OPTIONAL DATES FOR THE SECOND AND THIRD SESSION. ROZANOV HAD ADDED THAT THIS MEANT WE SHOULD ONLY SCHEDULE THE FIRST SESSION NOW; HOWEVER, HE DID NOT RULE OUT CONSIDERING A FULL SCHEDULE. IT WAS THE SENSE OF THE CAUCUS ON DECEMBER 12 THAT IF NATO COULD AGREE TO THE NNA PROPOSAL (PERHAPS WITH SOME MINOR MODIFICATION IN DATES) THE EAST WOULD BE PUT IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND MAY UE FORCED TO ACCEPT. THE FRENCH, HOWEVER CONTINUED TO BLOCK CAUCUS AGREEMENT TO A FULL WORK PROGRAM.

8. "IN THE HANDS OF THE FRENCH:" AT THE DECEMBER 12 CAUCUS SESSION, 15 MEMBERS WERE IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD: 1) ACCEPT THE NNA PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE; 2) PROPOSE AS THE TITLE FOR THE SCHEDULE "FULL WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986," IN ORDER TO STRENGHTHEN OUR VIEW THAT THE CONFERENCE CANNOT GO BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19; AND 3) SELECT THE FIRST LISTED OPTION FOR BOTH THE SECOND AND THIRD SESSIONS TO AVOID EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THE

FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS, DECEMBER 11-12,

PROPOSAL IS NOT COMPLETE. TIE CAUCUS REMAINED, HOWEVER, IN THE WORDS OF CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), "IN THE HANDS OF THE FRENCH," AND THE FRENCH HAD A FIRM GRIP INDEED. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) DID REFLECT SOME GLACIAL MOVEMENT



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IN THE FRENCH POSITION WHEN HE INDICATED THAT FRANCE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF FOUR SESSIONS, BUT HE OBJECTED TO SETTING ANY STARTING DATE FOR THE FOURTH SESSION NOW AS THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED NEXT JULY WHEN, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, NATO WOULD HAVE MORE LEVERAGE. IN RESPONSE, MOST SPEAKERS AGREED WITH BARRY'S (U.S.) ASSESSMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE SITUATION AND THE FRENCH POSITION. BARRY ARGUED THAT THE CALENDAR ISSUE WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROCEDURAL ISSUE WE WILL FACE AND THAT FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A CALENDAR NOW WILL SEVERELY AFFECT OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION NEXT YEAR. IN BARRY'S VIEW THIS FAILURE WILL MEAN THAT THE EAST WILL BE ABLE TO "END-LOAD" SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSTANCE BY DRAGGING THE CONFERENCE ON TOWARD NOVEMBER 1986 AND TRYING TO FORCE US INTO "SOME KIND OF MINI-PACKAGE". THIS IS IN CONSTRAST, HE OBSERVED, TO THE SUBSTANTIVE "FRONT-LOADING" WE WOULD PREFER AND MIGHT ACHIEVE BY ESTABLISHING A CALENDAR WITH A CUTOFF DATE. BARRY CONCLUDED THAT THE INCREASED LIKELIHOOD OF PROCEDURAL/POLITICAL BLACKMAIL IN THE SUMMER WAS EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT THE FRENCH WANT, BUT WAS LIKELY TO BE WHAT WE WOULD GET IF FRANCE CONTINUED TO BLOCK CONSENSUS ON AN ALLIANCE COURSE OF ACTION. HE SPECIFICALY REJECTED (AS DID ALL OTHERS) GASCHIGNARD'S SUGGESTION NOT TO SCHEDULE THE BEGINNING OF THE FOURTH SESSION UNTIL NEXT JULY, BECAUSE IN HIS VIEW SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT ENABLE THE EAST TO FORCE US INTO CONTINUOUS SESSION FROM JUNE 10 TO NOVEMBER 4. THE BALANCE OF THE SESSION WAS DEVOTED TO VARIOUS ATTEMPTS TO PRESSURE THE FRENCH INTO CHANGING THEIR POSITION, BUT IT REMAINED CLEAR THAT PARIS HAS LEFT GASCHIGNARD LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER. TWO DEVELOPMENTS REVEAL THE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE INFLUENCE THE FRENCH POSITION IS HAVING ON THE ALLIANCE: 1) BULWALDA (NETHERLANDS) IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD GO PUBLIC ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT THE "ONUS" FOR NOT AGREEING TO A CALENDAR WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO FALL ON 15, BUT ON ONE ONLY; 2) THE NETHERLANDS, CANADA AND DENMARK MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF FRANCE DOCS NOT JOIN THE CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THIS ISSUE THEY WILL FALL-BACK TO THEIR EARLIER PREFERENCE TO WORK UP TO NOVEMBER 4. THE CAUCUS WILL CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE ON DECEMBER 12.

9. ( COMMENT: THE INTRODUCTION OF AN NNA 1986 CALENDAR PROPOSAL INCREASED THE POSSIBILITY THAT A FULL WORK PROGRAM COULD BE AGREED TO THIS ROUND. NATO COULD GET BACK IN THIS GAME SIMPLY BY EXPRESSING BASIC AGREEMENT WITH THE NNA PROPOSAL AND THUS ISOLATING THE EAST . THE FRENCH, HOWEVER, ARE PREVENTING NATO FROM EVEN GETTING UP OFF THE BENCH, LET ALONE IN THE GAME, THUS LEAVING AN OPEN FIELD FOR THE EAST TO PURSUE ITS OBJECTIVE OF ONLY



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SCHEDULING THE FIRST ONE OR TWO SESSION FOR NEXT YEAR WHILE AVOIDING ANY ADJOURNMENT DATE. ALTHOUGH ITS LATE IN THE FOURTH QUARTER, IF THE FRENCH WILL CONSIDER THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES THEIR PRESENT STAND IS HAVING ON THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES AND JOIN A CAUCUS CONSENSUS, WE STILL HAVE A CHANCE TO PULL THIS ONE OUT. IF THE FRENCH REFUSE TO BUDGE, HOWEVER, NATO WILL HAVE LOST THIS GAME WITHOUT HAVING TAKEN THE FIELD. END COMMENT.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET

Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic
CSCE - CDE
Stockholm

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY!

# S T A T E M E N T

by

Ambassador Károly Szigeti

Head of the Hungarian Delegation

to the

Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

Stockholm, December 13, 1985



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Mr. Chairman,

One week from now the current session of the Stockholm Conference comes to an end and so does the second year of our negotiations. This offers a good occasion to reappraise the work done, to consider it in the broader context of the international scene and to take the long view in thinking about its future course and prospects. I feel it is opportune to make a few remarks which may be particularly relevant at this stage.

The international political environment surrounding the Conference is becoming more conducive to meaningful negotiations. As a result of the recent summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan one can see some welcome signs of stabilization and improvement.

It was with high expectations that the Hungarian Government and public followed the Geneva negotiations and we welcome their results. We expected the summit to contribute to the relaxation of tension, reducing the danger of war, and to adopt decisions aimed at preventing the race in military technology from undermining strategic stability by extending into new dimensions.

The results, as reflected in the joint statement, have met realistic expectations and made the summit a significant event with an impact not only on bilateral relations but on the



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course of events on the international scene in general and on the activities of East-West negotiating fora in particular.

Let me recall what we believe to be the most important of those results. They are, above all, the common understanding, contained in the joint statement, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and the pledge not to seek to achieve military superiority. Recognizing the possible catastrophic consequences the importance of preventing any military conflict between the two major nuclear powers was also emphasized.

These understandings, jointly endorsed at the highest level, contain the essentials of peaceful coexistence in the age of nuclear overkill. If these commitments are sustained to guide both political conduct and negotiations and continue to serve as a basis for the emerging dialogue at various levels agreed upon at Geneva, there is an opportunity to unburden the East-West strategic relationship of the tensions of its most threatening aspects and to introduce the political and strategic stability needed to foster the process of progressively removing both the danger and the present scope of nuclear confrontation.

As for the Stockholm Conference, one can only welcome and readily subscribe to the stated intentions to facilitate, together with the other participating states at this forum of 35, an early and successful completion of the work of



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the Conference with the adoption of a document which is expected to include both concrete obligations to non-use of force and mutually acceptable confidence-building measures.

This delegation noted with satisfaction the recognition of the Conference's potential and of the chances of reaching a generally acceptable agreement - possibly the first major one on security issues in this decade.

Mr. Chairman,

At some of our recent meetings rhetorical stunt and strong language may have overshadowed the common assets we have succeeded in accumulating during the past two years. It may be useful to recall them since they are what we can rely upon when embarking on the elaboration of a concluding document.

- We have a considerable amount of knowledge and understanding of each other's intentions, positions and proposals. On a number of important issues the limits of acceptability and compromise have also become clear. Whether or not two years were really needed to gain this experience, it is surely indispensable for the next stage of negotiations and drafting.

- The Mandate, designed to accommodate a variety of interests in and approaches to confidence-building, continues to provide



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a shared objective and a proper framework for the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary CSBMs designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

- The submission of SC.7 completed the broad array of proposals which, in their entirety, are adequate to fulfil the objectives of the first stage of the Conference and seem to offer a broad basis for a generally acceptable agreement that could meet the expectations of all of us.

- By identifying those issues on which consensus can realistically be expected and which hence may become, in one form or another, part of the document to be elaborated before the Vienna meeting, the agreement on the informal negotiations can provide a proper frame for the imminent crucial stage of the Conference.

We may have different views about the usefulness and potential of the current informal talks, called by some of us an exploratory phase, but we could certainly agree that they cannot replace negotiations in the real sense of the word.

On the other hand, a sustained theoretical discussion on geography and linguistics can serve no useful purpose at this advanced stage of the Conference. It could prolong a sterile debate, accentuating differences without holding out the promise of accommodation. It could only foster antagonism,



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preventing us from making an attempt to extend common ground.

On earlier occasions I set forth the position of my delegation on the issue of major manoeuvres of air and naval forces. The sponsors of SC.1/Amplified continue to focus on defending the approach that is said to be the basis of their proposal and no effort is being made to elaborate in detail how, in their view, air and naval activities concerned would be notified and observed. SC.1/Amplified itself gives little, if any, guidance in this regard.

What is really needed now is a more effective way of handling differing positions with a view to reconciling them wherever possible. This is not to propose papering over those difficulties the solution of which seems to be indispensable for reaching an agreement. As I ventured to suggest in my statement of November 18 in Working Group (A+B) we ought first to develop a clear awareness of the scope and details of our disagreements on this controversial issue before making a judgement on whether or not compromises may help to reconcile them.

Detailed negotiations on the basis of concrete proposals, modalities and parameters seem to offer the best and probably the only chance of moving ahead. This course can be pursued through a structured negotiating process and, in the context of this particular stage of the Conference, negotiation means drafting.



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It is the force of circumstances that leads us to embark on drafting on those major issues contained in the October 14 informal agreement, with due respect for and mutual recognition of each other's priorities and interests. Drafting should, in our view, begin as a balanced process which, by definition, does not allow preferential treatment for any of the individual measures.

Mr. Chairman,

The sense of urgency was expressed by almost all speakers who took the floor at recent plenaries. We share the concern that the Conference is falling behind in its race to meet the deadline of Vienna. The eleven months left before the Vienna meeting mean, depending on the final shape of next year's programme of work, that about 25 weeks still remain at our disposal. This is alarmingly few. The ebb and flow of negotiations in the CSCE process does not lend itself to easy prediction. I may argue for the obvious by saying that the sooner we begin elaborating the final document the better the chances of reaching agreement in due time.

We were pleased by the preparedness of the neutral delegations to offer their assistance which is certainly indispensable for initiating a balanced and structured process of negotiation and drafting and guiding it between the Scylla of a sterile debate and the Charybdis of time trouble. We note with satisfaction that the protracted consultations have



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eventually led to an understanding on the appointment of co-ordinators. Now, still in the wake of the Geneva summit, we can make the next step ahead in compliance with the obligation shared, I believe, by all of us to conclude successfully our negotiations.

Early progress towards an agreement is not a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, this delegation believes we have a chance of achieving a meaningful agreement provided the willingness is there to engage now in a serious and determined process of negotiations.

The pace of our work is plainly lagging behind what political conditions allow and shrinking time demands. Procrastination is the thief of time - and momentum. It would be a welcome signal to our governments and public if we were able to begin, without further wasting time, elaborating the document we have to agree upon by next autumn.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09643
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, DECEMBER 13, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 9365
1. CDE VIII - 078
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: NATO ACCEPTED THE NNA COORDINATOR PROPOSAL AT THE DECEMBER 13 CAUCUS SESSION AND COORDINATORS WILL BEGIN THEIR WORK ON DECEMBER 17. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO THE PROPOSAL AFTER NATO REPS TO A COFFEE GROUP MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT REPORTED THAT ALL GROUPS HAD AGREED THAT ENGLISH WOULD BE THE SINGLE LANGUAGE USED FOR DRAFTING. THE SWISS (A-2 AND A-3 COORDINATORS), INDICATED THAT WHILE THEY COULD ACCEPT THE RULE THAT NO INDIVIDUAL COULD COORDINATE OR BE DEPUTY IN MORE THAN ONE GROUP, THEY WOULD WANT SOME FLEXIBILITY IN APPLYING THE RULE. THE CAUCUS ELECTED NOT TO PURSUE THIS MATTER, AS THE SWISS SAID THEY WOULD DROP OUT OF COORDINATING ENTIRELY IF NATO PRESSED THE ISSUE. THE SWISS DID SAY THEY WOULD NOT MOVE IN A WAY TO IMPLY DE FACTO MERGING OF THESE TWO GROUPS (A-2, A-3).
4. COORDINATORS: THE CAUCUS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR COORDINATORS REPORTED REFTEL. ALL GROUPS HAVE NOW ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL AND THE COORDINATORS WILL BEGIN THEIR WORK IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS NEXT WEEK (DECEMBER 16-20). THE CAUCUS MADE ITS DECISION FOLLOWING GRONDAL'S (ICELAND) REPORT ON THE MEETING OF THE COFFEE GROUP (NATO, EAST, NNA, INCLUDING ALL PROPOSED COORDINATORS) ON DECEMBER 11. GRONDAL SAID THAT HE HAD PUT FORWARD NATO'S POINTS THAT ENGLISH WOULD BE THE ONLY LANGUAGE USED IN DRAFTING AND THAT NO INDIVIDUAL COULD BE A COORDINATOR OR DEPUTY IN MORE THAN ONE GROUP. GRINEVSKY (USSR) HAD REACTED NEGATIVELY TO THE FORMER, BUT HAD TACITLY ACQUIESCED WHEN ALL THE COORDINATORS HAD SUPPORTED THE NATO POSITION INDICATING THAT A SINGLE LANGUAGE FOR DRAFTING (ENGLISH) WAS STANDARD CSCE PRACTICE. ON THE LATTER POINT, SCHENK (SWITZERLAND) HAD SAID THAT WHILE HE COULD GUARANTEE THAT TWO DIFFERENT COORDINATORS WOULD BE APPOINTED FROM HIS DELEGATION FOR A-2 AND A-3, HE COULD NOT MAKE AN ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT THAT HE AND JUNOD (SWISS DEPREP AND A-3 COORDINATOR) WOULD NEVER SUBSTITUTE FOR EACH OTHER OR THAT JUNOD WOULD NEVER SIT AS HIS DEPUTY IN A-2. GRONDAL AND CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) SPOKE WITH SCHENK ON THIS MATTER AFTER THE MEETING. SCHENK TOLD THEM THAT ANY CHANGES WOULD BE VERY SELDOM, BUT THAT HE HAD A SMALL DELEGATION AND HAD TO MAINTAIN SOME FLEXIBILITY. IN A CONVERSATION WITH BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) SCHENK HAD INDICATED THAT HE WOULD ONLY USE JUNOD AS A DEPUTY COORDINATOR IN A-2 IN "EXCEPTIONAL CASES." ALL OF SCHENK'S INTERLOCUTORS, HOWEVER, CAME AWAY WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE SWISS HAD NO



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FLEXIBILTY ON THIS POINT AND THAT THE NNA PROPOSAL COULD COLLAPSE ENTIRELY IF THE WEST PUSHED TOO HARD ON THIS ISSUE. IT WAS THE SENSE OF THE CAUCUS THAT ALL THAT COULD BE DONE HAD BEEN DONE, AND THAT IT WAS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO RISK HAVING THE NNA PROPOSAL FALL APART. IT WAS AGREED TO KEEP A WATCHFUL EYE ON THE SWISS FOR ANY PERSONNEL MOVES WHICH COULD BLUR THE INDEPENDENT IDENTITIES OF GROUPS A-2 AND A-3. THE CAUCUS FURTHER DECIDED TO DISCUSS AT A FUTURE MEETING STRATEGIES FOR COORDINATING WITH COORDINATORS.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09652
SUBJECT: WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 9-13 1985
1. CDE VIII - 079
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AFTER A WEEK OF CAUTIOUS REFLECTION, THE NATO CAUCUS AGREED TO THE NNA'S FORMULA ON THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS AND INCHED TOWARD A SOLUTION ON THE 1986 WORK SCHEDULE. ON COORDINATORS, NATO AGREED TO FIVE COORDINATORS, REPRESENTING FOUR NNA COUNTRIES, WITH THE SWISS PLAYING A KEY ROLE, BASED ON CERTAIN UNDERSTANDINGS OUTLINED BY THE CAUCUS THAT 1) ENGLISH WOULD BE THE LANGUAGE USED IN DRAFTING; AND 2) THAT NO ONE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A COORDINATOR OR DEPUTY COORDINATOR IN MORE THAN ONE GROUP. ON CALENDARS, THE U.S. CRAFTED A DELICATE CONSENSUS AROUND A FOUR-SESSION FORMULA WITI AN ADJOURNMENT DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19, WITH THE FRENCH AND THE DUTCH, THE YIN AND YANG OF THE NATO CAUCUS, ALTERNATELY THREATENING TO BLOW UP THE WHOLE DEAL. IN THE MIDST OF THESE PROCEDURAL WRANGLES THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS, PERHAPS INADVERTENTLY, ADDRESSED SOME KEY SUBSTANTIVE POINTS. THE EAST, UNFORTUNATELY, SHOWING LITTLE OR NO FLEXIBILITY, PUSHED FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THE WEST, FORTUNATELY, SHOWING LITTLE OR NO FLEXIBILITY, FIRMLY REJECTED THIS APPROACH. NNA INTERPRETATIONS OF COMMON POSITIONS ENUNCIATED IN SC.7 WERE FLEXIBLE THEREBY LENDING AN AIR OF CONFUSION TO SOME SC.7 ELEMENTS. END SUMMARY.
NATO
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4. 1986 CALENDAR: WHILE ONE PROCEDURAL MATTER (COORDINATION) WAS RESOLVED, THE SECOND (1986 CALENDAR) INCHED TOWARD SOLUTION, FOLLOWING A WEEK OF INTENSE AND INCREASINGLY ACRIMONIOUS CAUCUS DISCUSSION. PROSPECTS FOR CONFERENCE AGREEMENT TO A FULL WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986 ROSE DURING THE WEEK WHEN THE NNA PUT FORWARD A COMPLETE CALENDAR PROPOSAL. IN INFORMAL CONTACTS THE EAST WAS LETTING IT BE KNOWN THAT IT WAS INTERNALLY "DIVIDED" ON THE CALENDAR QUESTION. IT WAS THE CLEAR SENSE OF 15 NATO MEMBERS THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD SUPPORT THE NNA PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE. FRANCE, HOWEVER, STUBBORNLY
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CONTINUED TO BLOCK ANY ACTION BY THE ALLIANCE. THE FRENCH REFUSED TO ENDORSE THE NNA PROPOSAL UNLESS AND UNTIL TWO CONDITIONS WERE MET: 1) BOTH THE EAST AND NNA'S EXPLICITLY ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A CUTOFF DATE; AND 2) THE DATE OF THE START OF THE FOURTH SESSION WAS KEPT OPEN UNTIL NEXT JULY 18, AT WHICH TIME A CONSENSUS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SET THAT DATE AND, IN FRANCE'S VIEW, THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE MORE LEVERAGE. THE REST OF THE



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CAUCUS, HOWEVER, REJECTED THE FRENCH POSITION, BECAUSE, INTER ALIA, PARIS' MOVE TO KEEP THE STARTING DATE OF THE FINAL SESSION OPEN UNTIL NEXT JULY ONLY GIVES OTHERS IN THE EAST AND NNA AN OPPORTUNITY TO BLACKMAIL THE WEST INTO CONTINUOUS SESSION DURING THE SUMMER.

5. FRANCE, FOR REASONS OF PRIDE AND PERSONALITY, SEEMED FULLY PREPARED TO BLOCK ANY CAUCUS ACTION ON THIS ISSUE. THE IRONCLAD GUARANTEES THE FRENCH SEEK FOR ACCEPTING ANY CUTOFF DATE OTHER THAN JULY 18 SIMPLY DO NOT EXIST, AND THEIR STUBBORN REFUSAL TO BUDGE ALMOST SQUANDERED THE OPPORTUNITY NATO HAD BEEN PRESENTED WITH TO ACHIEVE A FULL CALENDAR AGREEMENT. THROUGHOUT THIS DISCUSSION WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE CALENDAR ISSUE MIGHT WELL BE THE MOST IMPORTANT PROCEDURAL DECISION THE CAUCUS WILL TAKE THIS YEAR; FAILURE TO AGREE ON A 1986 SCHEDULE WOULD NEGATIVELY AFFECT OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION BY ALLOWING THE EAST TO "END LOAD" THE NEGOTIATIONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE US INTO A "MINI-PACKAGE" ON THE EVE OF VIENNA. INTERNAL CAUCUS BICKERING, MOREOVER, REACHED NEW HEIGHTS AND THREATENED TO BURST INTO PUBLIC VIEW. DURING THE WEEK, FOR EXAMPLE, BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD GO PUBLIC ON THIS ISSUE AND

FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 9-13, 1985

BLUNTLY STATED THE "ONUS" WOULD NOT FALL ON THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE. FORTUNATELY, THE DECEMBER 16 CAUCUS WAS ABLE TO AGREE ON A COMMON POSITION ON A FULL 1986 CALENDAR WHICH CONTAINED A 1986 ADJOURNMENT DATE AND FOUR SESSIONS BEGINNING ON JANUARY 21. (SEE SEPTEL FOR AN ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING.)

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6. COORDINATORS: FOLLOWING A WEEK OF CAUTIOUS REFLECTION (IMPOSED BY THE U.S., UK, CANADA, AND TURKEY) NATO JOINED IN THE CONFERENCE CONSENSUS FOR THE NNA COORDINATOR PROPOSAL ON FRIDAY AND COORDINATORS WILL BEGIN THEIR WORK ON DECEMBER 17. IN RESPONSE TO U.S. CONCERNS, NATO REPS TO THE COFFEE GROUP (NNA, NATO, WARSAW PACT) ON COORDINATORS DID SEEK AN UNDERSTANDING: 1) THAT ENGLISH WOULD BE THE ONLY LANGUAGE USED IN DRAFTING; AND 2) THAT NO ONE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A COORDINATOR OR DEPUTY COORDINATOR IN MORE THAN ONE GROUP. WHILE THE FIRST PROPOSITION WAS ACCEPTED AFTER SOME INITIAL SOVIET GRUMBLING, SWISS AMBASSADOR SCHENK HAD SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE SECOND. SCHENK DID NOTE THAT SUCH SWITCHES WOULD BE "VERY SELDOM" BUT IMPLIED TO NATO REPS THAT IF THE WEST PERSISTED ON THIS ISSUE, THE SWISS MIGHT WITHDRAW FROM COORDINATING ALTOGETHER. AS IT WAS THE SENSE OF THE CAUCUS THAT NATO HAD DONE ALL THAT COULD BE DONE ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT A WITHDRAWAL BY THE SWISS



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WAS NOT IN THE WEST'S INTEREST, IT WAS AGREED NOT TO PUSH THE POINT.

7. WORKING GROUPS: NATO MAY ONCE AGAIN HAVE HAD ITS GREATEST SUCCESS IN AVOIDING THOSE ISSUES WE DON'T WANT TO TALK ABOUT. AN ITALIAN COLLEAGUE REPORTED TO THE CAUCUS THAT NATO HAD "SUCCEEDED IN TEMPORIZING" IN THE NUF CLUSTER, WHERE A CONTINUED FOCUS ON SC.7, REPETITION OF THE REASONS WE SUPPORT ONLY A NUF REAFFIRMATION, AND PERHAPS A TOUCH OF BLUE SMOKE AND MIRRORS HAVE FOR THREE WEEKS NOW KEPT THE SOVIETS FROM DISCUSSING SC.6. IN THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATION CLUSTER THE ALLIANCE WAS SUCCESSFUL, WITH SWISS ASSISTANCE, IN PUTTING THE EAST ON THE DEFENSIVE ON INFORMATION, PRESSING THEM FOR WHAT THEY WOULD AND WOULD NOT PROVIDE. IN A-3 THE WEST KEPT THE FOCUS ON POSSIBLE COMMON GROUND ON ANNUAL FORECASTS AND LARGELY AVOIDED THE SUBJECT OF CONSTRAINTS. WHILE THE EAST CONTINUED TO PUSH ON OBSERVATION/NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE IN DEFENDING SC.1 WAS CONSIDERABLY IMPROVED THIS WEEK, PARTICULARLY IN DEFENDING OUR

APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THE NATO TROOPS' IMPROVED PERFORMANCE ON THIS SUBJECT MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM A MORALE BOOST PROVIDED BY CITRON (FRG) AND MOST ESPECIALLY EDES (UK), WHO KICKED OFF THE WEEK WITH SPIRITED DEFENSES OF THE MANDATE'S FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN WORKING GROUP AB.

THE NNA

8. AFTER WEEKS OF NOT SO PRIVATE AGONIZING, THE NNA AGREED ON A FORMULATION ON WORKING GROUP COORDINATORS THAT WAS ACCEPTED BY BOTH EAST AND WEST -- WITH CERTAIN CONDITIONS (SEE PARA 6). THE NNA -- NOLENS VOLENS -- ACCEPTED THE NATO CONDITIONS (OF COURSE IN THE OBLIQUE WORLD OF CSCE-SPEAK ONE NEVER SUBMITS "PRECONDITIONS" BUT "UNDERSTANDINGS"). THE DELAY IN ACCEPTING THE NNA PROPOSAL ALLOWED US TO PUT DOWN CERTAIN MARKERS WITH THE NNA: 1) THE WEST WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY DE FACTO COMBINING OF GROUPS A-2 AND A-3; AND 2) THE INTRODUCTION OF COORDINATORS DOES NOT MEAN AN AUTOMATIC START TO DRAFTING. ON CALENDARS, THE NNA WERE ABLE TO GET THE MALTESE TO GO ALONG WITH A FULL WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986 WHICH INCLUDES FOUR SESSIONS, THE LAST SESSION ENDING ON SEPTEMBER 19. WHETHER THE MALTESE ACCEPT SEPTEMBER 19 AS A DEFINITE "CUTOFF" DATE IS ANOTHER MATTER.

9. WORKING GROUPS: SOME ELEMENTS OF SC.7, DRAFTED WITH

FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 9-13, 1985

CAREFULLY CRAFTED AMBIGUITY, REMAIN A MYSTERY. THE



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PROCESS OF EXPLANATION OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF SC.7 BEGUN BY VARIOUS NNA DELEGATES IN WORKING GROUPS HAS RAISED MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT HAS ANSWERED. INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS, IT IS TRUE, HAVE CLARIFIED THEIR POSITIONS, BUT USUALLY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE TENUOUS THREAD OF CONSENSUS ESTABLISHED IN SC.7. THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR (PAPADOPOULOS), FOR EXAMPLE, CONTINUES HIS FLIGHTS OF FANCY IN NUF, MUCH TO THE DISMAY OF HIS SWEDISH AND AUSTRIAN COLLEAGUES. IN THE NOTIFICATION MEETING, THE SWISS EXPLAINED THAT THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENT OF A DIVISION OR EQUIVALENT FORMATION, COMBINED WITH EQUIPMENT (MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER), WOULD BE THE PRIMARY NOTIFICATION TRIGGER, WHILE THE FINNS EMPHASIZED TROOP NUMBERS COMBINED WITH EQUIPMENT WHEN DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT. THE YUGOSLAVS, MEANWHILE, POINTEDLY REFUSED TO ELABORATE ON SC.7'S PROVISION FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN PRIOR NOTIFICATION (WHICH WE KNOW IS AN OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF NORMAL LOCATIONS), INDICATING THAT THE QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED. WHILE THIS WAS SEEN AS OPENING THE DOOR FOR OTHER NNA'S WHO HAVE IDEAS ON THE POSSIBLE CONTENTS OF THIS PROVISION, AN NN DEAL NOT TO SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF NORMAL LOCATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS SPECIFIC PROVISION KEPT THE OTHERS SILENT. SWEDEN DID, HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT THE MORE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT THE AGREEMENT, THE MORE INFORMATION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

THE EAST

10. IN WORKING GROUPS, THE WARSAW PACT CONTINUED TO PUSH FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES AND PRESSED NATO DELEGATIONS FOR THEIR NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES, BOTH INDEPENDENT AND FUNCTIONALLY LINKED. THE SOVIETS ARGUED THAT SC.1 RECOGNIZES THAT AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN EUROPE AND REJECTED WESTERN STATEMENTS ON THE DIFFICULTY OF VERIFYING SUCH ACTIVITIES. IN THE WEDNESDAY WORKING GROUP A MEETING, THE USSR ALSO LISTED THE KIND OF INFORMATION IT WOULD PROVIDE IN A NOTIFICATION OF AN AIR ACTIVITY, THEREBY KILLING THREE BIRDS WITH ONE STONE: 1) IT APPEARED FORTHCOMING ON INFORMATION; 2) IT FOCUSED ATTENTION ON AIR ACTIVITIES AND 3) IT SPELLED OUT ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT. ON THE LATTER POINT, THE SOVIETS INSIST THAT THEY AGREED IN THE OCTOBER 14 AGREEMENT THAT THEIR VERSION OF INFORMATION WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION, I.E., ANNUAL FORECASTS, NOTIFICATION AND BRIEFINGS FOR OBSERVERS AT MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE SOVIETS LEFT NO DOUBT AS TO THE SOVIET POSITION ON "STATIC



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INFORMATION:" MOSCOW WOULD NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HEADQUARTERS LOCATIONS OR PRECISE GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES OF UNITS AND IMPLICITLY ACCUSED A WESTERN DELEGATE (FREEMAN, UK) ADVOCATING "STATIC" INFORMATION OF BEING A SPY FOR SEEKING SUCH "INTELLIGENCE" INFORMATION.

11. A SOMNAMBULANT PERFORMANCE: THE WEST BENEFITED FROM AN ALL-ROUND "SLEEPY" PERFORMANCE BY THE EAST IN THE WORKING GROUPS THIS WEEK. WHEN IT LOOKED AS IF THE NUF MEETING MIGHT CLOSE WITHOUT A SINGLE STATEMENT, RAKHMANINOV LEAPED INTO THE BREACH, CALLING ON THE WORKING GROUP TO USE THE CYPRIOT PLENARY STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 6 (SEE STOCKHOLM 9427) AS A BASIS FOR THE CONFERENCE'S WORK ON NUF ("THE KEY ISSUE OF THE CONFERENCE"); THERE WERE NO TAKERS. THE SOVIETS REMAINED SILENT FOR THE REST OF THE MEETING. THE ROMANIAN SUBJECTED HIS LISTENERS TO A PAINSTAKING EXEGESIS OF THE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE NNA NUF PROPOSAL (SC.7) AND HIS OWN DELEGATION'S "BUILDING BLOCKS". IN THE CONSTRAINTS/ ANNUAL FORECAST MEETING SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV, DISCREETLY PROPPED UP AT THE TABLE BY HIS DEPUTY, HAPPILY FROM USDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 9-13, 1985

SLEPT THROUGH HALF OF THE MEETING AND ROUSED HIMSELF ONLY TO ACCUSE THE U.S. OF USING LINGUISTICS TO INTRODUCE "POLITICS" INTO THE CONFERENCE (WE OBJECTED TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF "CONSTRAINTS" -- SEE SEPTEL ON LANGUAGE PROBLEMS).

12. THE EAST WAS LESS SOMNAMBULANT, BUT NO LESS CONFUSED IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS. DESPITE (OR PERHAPS BECAUSE OF) POLISH ATTEMPTS AT CLARIFICATION, THE EAST WAS UNABLE TO EXPLAIN HOW MANEUVERS VS MOVEMENTS VS TRANSFERS WOULD BE NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED. TATARNIKOV RAISED THE ISSUE OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AGAIN THIS WEEK, ASKING HOW THEY WOULD BE NOTIFIED AND WHETHER THEY WOULD BE OBSERVED TO THE SAME DEGREE AS GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. HE ALSO FOCUSED ON "REFORGER" AND ASKED HOW OBSERVATION OF TROOPS BEING TRANSFERRED TO EUROPE FROM THE U.S. WOULD BE CONDUCTED.

13. COORDINATORS AND THE 1986 CALENDAR: SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN PUSHING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS AND FOR EARLY DRAFTING, THE SOVIETS COULD NOT VERY WELL REJECT THE NNA'S CHOICES, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE FAR FROM PLEASED WITH THE PROMINENT SWISS ROLE. THE SOVIETS STILL FAVOR A LIMITED 1986 CALENDAR WHICH WOULD SET DATES FOR THE FIRST TWO SESSIONS ONLY AND WOULD NOT AGREE ON A CUTOFF DATE; FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH, SOME OF MOSCOW'S EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE QUIETLY SIGNALED TO US THAT THEY WOULD PREFER A FULL CALENDAR. IF NATO AND THE NNA CAN



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AGREE ON A FULL CALENDAR FOR 1986, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WILL BE HARD-PRESSED TO REJECT THE EMERGING SENSE OF THE CONFERENCE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 09624
SUBJECT: TEXT OF US STATEMENT IN WORKING GROUP AB, DECEMBER 16, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 077.
2. FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF U.S. STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY HEAD, DR. LYNN M. HANSEN IN WORKING GROUP AB ON DECEMBER 16, 1985.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS ABOUT THE DECEMBER 6 PLENARY STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE OF THE SOVIET UNION, MAJOR-GENERAL TATARNIKOV. MY DELEGATION HAS GIVEN MUCH ATTENTION TO HIS STRAIGHT-FORWARD AND CLEAR LANGUAGE; WE HAVE GIVEN IT CAREFUL STUDY INASMUCH AS IT HAS BEEN WIDELY SUGGESTED BY EASTERN DELEGATIONS THAT THE SOVIET PLENARY INTERVENTION CONTAINED SOME IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENTS AND INDICATORS OF FLEXIBILITY.
FIRST, MY DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THE TIME IS PAST FOR THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE MADRID MANDATE AND THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR FUTURE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES; FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE WOULD BE A WASTE OF OUR VALUABLE TIME. WE ALL KNOW WHAT THE TEXT SAYS; WE ALL KNOW THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY. THE FORMULATION THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE WILL BE COVERED ONLY IF THEY "AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTUTUTE A PART OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE . . ." WAS HARD-FOUGHT; IT PROVIDED THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE WEST -- AND NOT ONLY THE WEST -- WAS ABLE TO AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CONFERENCE. WE ARE NOT HERE TO REARGUE THE CASE OR REINTERPRET WHAT THE MANDATE SAYS IN WAYS WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE THEN AND ARE UNACCEPTABLE NOW.
IN THE SECOND PART OF THE SOVIET DECEMBER 6 STATEMENT, MANY OF US HAVE BEEN TOLD TO LOOK FOR SOMETHING NEW. THERE IS A NUANCE THERE -- ALBEIT ONE WHICH HAS APPEARED BEFORE IN MEETINGS OF THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS. THIS WAS THE STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF "INDEPENDENT" AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. WHY THEN, DOES THIS CONCEPT APPEAR IN SECTION VI OF SC-4 AS WELL AS IN WORKING DOCUMENTS WGB-2 AND WGB-3? MY DELEGATION HAS ASSUMED THAT THESE PROPOSALS MEANT THAT MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION SOUGHT TO REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL AND AIR OPERATIONS WHICH HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. THIS, AS IS WELL KNOWN, IS NOT IN HARMONY WITH THE MANDATE AND IS THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE TO MY DELEGATION. PERHAPS, HOWEVER, THE QUESTIONING ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION TOWARD INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND



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AIR ACTIVITIES COULD SUGGEST A RECONSIDERATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EMBODIED IN THE MANDATE AND REFLECTED IN SC-1/AMPLIFIED. BUT THEN THE SOVIET STATEMENT, TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED, GOES ON TO SUGGEST THAT AN APPARENTLY OPEN MIND TO THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IS REALLY JUST ANOTHER WAY OF EXTENDING THE ZONE OF APPLICATION, A METHOD FOR INCLUDING ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY CALLED "INDEPENDENT" IN SC-4, WGB-2 AND WGB-3 BY RENAMING SUCH ACTIVITIES "FUNCTIONAL". IT IS, HOWEVER, CLEAR THAT WHAT IS NOW CALLED "FUNCTIONAL" BY THE SOVIET UNION IS IN NO WAY THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EMBODIED IN THE MANDATE, UPON WHICH SC-1 IS BASED. CONSIDER THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. (AS AN ASIDE, HOWEVER, LET US FIRST NOTE THAT THE SPONSORS OF SC-4 AND WGB-1 HAVE NOT PROPOSED ANY SEPARATE THRESHOLDS FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF
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USIA FOR P/PFE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL NST; USDEL CD
E.O. 12356: DECL: N/A
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TEXT OF US STATEMENT IN WORKING GROUP AB,
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES). THE QUESTIONS SUGGEST THAT NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OUGHT TO OCCUR FROM THE MOMENT THAT TROOPS EMBARK ON SHIPS IN UNITED STATES PORTS AND WHEN SUPPORT VESSELS SAIL FROM THEIR PORTS. THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN MADRID, VICE-MINISTER LEONID ILICHEV, PROVIDED AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION IN A PLENARY ADDRESS ON 27 OCTOBER 1981. HE SAID:

- WE ARE NOT PROPOSING COVERING THE WHOLE ATLANTIC,
- BUT RATHER REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE APPLICATION
- OF CONFIDENCE MEASURES TO THOSE OF ITS PARTS
- WHICH ADJOIN EUROPE, AND NOT AMERICA. ALSO, NO
- REFERENCE IS MADE IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO THE
- TERRITORY OF NON-EUROPEAN PARTICIPATING STATES,
- THE U.S.A. AND CANADA.

TO PUT IT QUITE SIMPLY, ALL OF US AGREED IN MADRID THAT THE ZONE OF APPLICATION DID NOT INCLUDE NORTH AMERICAN TERRITORY. THIS AGREEMENT CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE CHANGED THROUGH OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE IN STOCKHOLM. WHEN IT COMES TO THE ACTUAL AMPHIBIOUS LANDING, WE WILL, OF COURSE, NOTIFY SUPPORT OF THE LANDING, I.E. SHIP-TO-SHORE ARTILLERY FIRES AND AERIAL PREPARATION, WHETHER ONE SHIP OR ONE AIRCRAFT OR SEVERAL ARE INVOLVED. SOME HAVE SUGGESTED THERE WAS SOMETHING NEW IN GENERAL TATARNIOV'S STATEMENT THAT NAVAL EXERCISES TAKE PLACE, AS A RULE, NEAR EUROPE, NOT IN THE DISTANT WESTERN ATLANTIC. THE SUGGESTION SEEMS TO BE THAT, ASIDE FROM AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES, SOME KIND OF EXEMPTION MIGHT BE MADE FOR U.S. NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN



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ATLANTIC; NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION MIGHT APPLY ONLY TO FLEET MOVEMENTS PAST SOME IMAGINERY MID-ATLANTIC DIVIDING LINE -- THE SO-CALLED "OCEAN APPROACHES" TO EUROPE. THIS DOES NOT SOUND VERY NEW TO MY DELEGATION. NOT ONLY DID FORMER GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV REFER TO THIS IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE GERMAN MAGAZINE DER SPIEGEL IN NOVEMBER, 1981, BUT IT REPEATS A CONCEPT PROPOSED AND REJECTED AT MADRID. FOR THE SAME REASONS, IT WILL NOT GAIN CONSENSUS HERE. IT WOULD MEAN A REDEFINITION OF THE ZONE AND AN UNREVELLING OF THE MANDATE OF MADRID. MORE IMPORTANTLY, SUCH A CONCEPT WOULD MEAN INVOLVING NAVAL ACTIVITIES ON THE HIGH SEAS WHICH OCCUR INDEPENDENTLY OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE WHERE THERE WOULD BE NO SHIP-TO-SHORE ACTIVITY. ATTEMPTS TO GIVE A GEOGRAPHICAL RATHER THAN A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION TO THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE FAILED IN MADRID. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED. THE HIGH SEAS ARE EQUALLY OPEN AND FREE TO ALL; AND THEY ARE INDIVISIBLE.

NOW LET ME TURN TO A THIRD POINT RAISED IN THE SOVIET SPEECH OF DECEMBER 6: THE REQUIREMENT FOR THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION OF THE ACTIVITY OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, WHETHER INDEPENDENT OR IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY. AGAIN, THIS IS NOT A NOVEL IDEA. THE FORMER HAVE BEEN COVERED IN SPECIFIC WTO PROPOSALS, AND THE LATTER POINT HAS BEEN REPEATED MANY TIMES IN THE WORKING GROUPS BOTH DURING THIS SESSION AND BEFORE.

LET ME RECALL THAT SC-1/AMPLIFIED PROPOSES THAT, WHENEVER THE THRESHOLD FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES IS MET, STATES WILL ALSO NOTIFY THE PARTICIPATION OF NAVAL AND AIR FORCES AND ALLOW OBSERVATION WHERE THE FORCES INTERSECT WITH LAND ACTIVITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SPONSORS AND SUPPORTERS OF SC-4 FAVOR AN APPROACH WHICH HAS THREE TRIGGERS FOR PROVIDING NOTIFICATIONS. THEY PROPOSE SEPARATE AND VERY HIGH THRESHOLDS SO THAT NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE NAVAL AND AIR

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ACTIVITIES WOULD BE GIVEN, EVEN IF THERE IS LITTLE OR NO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY. I MIGHT NOTE THAT THIS SOUNDS VERY MUCH LIKE THE "INDEPENDENT" NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, WHICH THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS FOUND SO PUZZLING.

LET US TRY TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIS THREE-TRIGGER CONCEPT IS BEING ADVANCED. IT IS NOT, IT APPEARS, BECAUSE MORE NOTIFICATIONS WOULD BE EXPECTED. CONSIDER



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THE PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR EXER-
CISES: WITH A THRESHOLD OF 200 AIRCRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY
AIRBONE OVER THE SAME AREA IN THE ZONE, WESTERN AND
NNA STATES WOULD MAKE NO NOTIFICATIONS AT ALL. BY WAY
OF CONTRAST, UNDER THE SINGLE-TRIGGER FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT
CONTAINED IN SC-1, NOTIFICATIONS WOULD FREQUENTLYL ACTIVITY WE WOULD
PROVIDE UNDER SC-1/
AMPLIFIED. OUR POSITION ON THIS QUESTION IS CLEAR.
NEVERTHELESS, I WILL ONCE AGAIN EXPLAIN IT. FORTY-FIVE
DAYS IN ADVANCE OF ANY OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITY, MOBILI-
ZATION, OR AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY WHICH EXCEEDS AN AGREED
THRESHOLD WE WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION THAT THE ACTIVITY
WILL OCCUR. IN ADDITION TO INFORMATION ON LAND FORCE
ACTIVITIES, THAT NOTIFICATION WILL INCLUDE INFORMATION
ON THE TYPES OF OTHER FORCES INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY.
FOR EXAMPLE, IF CARRIER-BASED AVIATION SUPPORT IS
FORESEEN, THIS FACT WILL BE REPORTED. WE DO NOT
ENVISION NAMING THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER OR PROVIDING THE
NAMES OF THE SHIPS IN THE CARRIER BATTLE GROUP.
MOVEMENTS OF THESE SHIPS TO THE POINT WHERE THEY ENGAGE
IN THE ACTIVITY WILL NOT BE NOTIFIED. AND WE WILL NOT
AGREE TO A MEASURE INCORPORATING OBSERVATION OF SUCH
MOVEMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE FACT THAT WE NOTIFY
FORTY-FIVE DAYS IN ADVANCE THAT AN EXERCISE WILL INVOLVE
SUPPORT FROM CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT CONSTITUTES A
NOTIFICATION THAT A CARRIER TASK FORCE WILL BE INVOLVED
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IN THE ACTIVITY. WE WILL NOT NOTIFY OR HOST OBSERVA-
TION OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE OR AIR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
WHICH ARE PART OF ROUTINE NAVAL OPERATIONS. OBSERVATION,
IN THE CONTEXT OF A CSBMS REGIME, WILL BE AT THE POINT
OF INTERSECTION WHERE THE CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT ARE
PROVIDING TACTICAL SUPPORT TO AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR
AN OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITY.
OBSERVERS WILL NOT BE ON BOARD OUR CARRIERS OR
FLAGSHIPS. THEY WILL NOT BE PERMITTED IN OUR LAND-BASED
AIR COMMAND CENTERS NOR ON BOARD AWACS AIRCRAFT. MY
DELEGATION DISCERNS NO REAL DIFFERENCES ON THESE POINTS
WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION, IF WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD
CORRECTLY THE REMARKS OF GENERAL TATARNIKOV IN WORKING
GROUP B ON 10 DECEMBER. OUR CONCEPT OF THE BEGINNING
AND END OF NAVAL OR AIR ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF A
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY IS THAT THE FUNCTIONALLY RELATED
ACTIVITY BEGINS WHEN THE AIRCRAFT OR FIRE SUPPORT
VESSELS APPEAR OVER THE EXERCISE AREA OR WITHIN RANGE
OF THE LANDING ZONE. IT ENDS WHEN THE ACTIVITIES IN



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QUESTION NO LONGER ARE PART OF THE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY. TO REITERATE, THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER "NIMITZ" WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION WHEN IT DEPARTS NORFOLK, VIRGINIA; WE CAN HARDLY TAKE SERIOUS ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE "KIEV" WOULD EMBARK OBSERVERS WHEN IT LEAVES THE BASE ON THE KOLA PENINSULA AND SAILS ALONG THE NORWEGIAN COAST. MY DELEGATION DOES NOT THINK WE HAVE ANY DIFFERENCE WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION ON THIS POINT; HERE, TOO, I THINK WE SHARE A COMMON POSITION. MY DELEGATION HAS TODAY RESPONDED TO GENERAL TATARNIKOV'S STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CLEAR STATEMENT WITH ONE WHICH WE BELIEVE IS EQUALLY CLEAR AND STRAIGHTFORWARD. BUT MORE NEEDS TO BE SAID. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EMBODIED IN THE MANDATE AND EXEMPLIFIED IN SC-1/AMPLIFIED WILL, IN FACT, PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION RELATED TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES THAN THE PROPOSALS SUPPORTED BY MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION.

IT IS OUR PURPOSE IN STOCKHOLM TO MAKE THE AMBIGUOUS AND NON-BINDING OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED THE FINAL ACT WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE UNAMBIGUOUS AND BINDING. MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF CSBM NOTIFICATIONS WOULD CONTAIN INFORMATION ON THE NAVAL AND/AIR FORCES INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH DEALS WITH MODERN MILITARY REALITIES. UNITS AND SUB-UNITS OF THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF THE MILITARY MAY TRAIN SEPARATELY, BUT THEY MUST ACT IN CONCERT, IN THE COMBINED ARMS MODE, TO SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT ANY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATION; THEY THEY FUNCTION, AS GENERAL TATARNIKOV HAS STATED AS A UNIFIED ORGANISM. SURPRISE ATTACK OR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION IN EUROPE CANNOT BE EFFECTIVE WITHOUT THE GROUND FORCES BEING INVOLVED OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS.

IN CONCLUSION, MY DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO STRESS WHAT WE HAVE IN COMMON, NOT WHAT SEPARATES US. ISSUES RESOLVED THROUGH THREE DIFFICULT YEARS OF NEGOTIATION CANNOT BE TAKEN UP AGAIN, THEY MUST BE PUT ASIDE TO ENABLE US TO FOCUS ON OBTAINING THE SIGNIFICANT OUTCOME CALLED FOR IN THE MANDATE. IN THE TWO YEARS OF THIS CONFERENCE, OUR COMMON THINKING HAS UNDERGONE SOME EVOLUTION. THIS IS PERHAPS BEST SYMBOLIZED BY THE TABLING OF SC-7 BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. WE ARE ABOUT TO ENTER THE FINAL STAGES OF OUR NEGOTIATION WHERE WE MUST MOLD AND SHAPE A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT. THE CONFERENCE CANNOT, THEREFORE, ACCEPT CONCEPTS WHICH ENTAIL DOUBLE LINKAGE; I.E, ARTIFICIAL DEMANDS FOR PARALLELISM BETWEEN REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF

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FORCE PRINCIPLE AND CONCRETE CSBMS ON THE ONE HAND AS
WELL AS AN ADDITIONAL DEMAND RELATING TO INDEPENDENT
NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES ON THE OTHER. THIS KIND OF
DOUBLE LINKAGE IS WHAT IS KNOWN IN WESTERN FINANCIAL
CIRCLES AS A "POISON PILL", WHICH COULD SABOTAGE
THE WHOLE DEAL.
IF WE WANT TO REACH AGREEMENT, AND THE UNITED STATES IS
COMMITTED TO AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT, WE MUST LOOK HARD
FOR AREAS OF COMMON GROUND. THEY DO EXIST. PERHAPS
OUR SEARCH FOR THEM WILL BE FACILITATED THROUGH THE
INSTITUTION OF A SYSTEM OF COORDINATORS WHICH WILL
SOON OCCUR. IN ADDITION, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOW
ALL AGREE ON A WORK CALENDAR FOR 1986 IN ORDER THAT WE
CAN FOCUS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF OUR WORK TO
REACH AN ACCORD BEFORE VIENNA.
THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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Mr. Chairman,

At this stage of our work we would like to make some general observations on the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual and international relations.

The Madrid mandate has entrusted this Conference with the task to "undertake in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations".

Much has already been said in favour or against the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use or threat of force. No less time and words have been used in favour of or against a simple reaffirmation of that important principle and universal legal obligation.

In the opinion of this Delegation, Mr. Chairman, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is not mandated and is not able to adopt and conclude such a treaty. On the other hand, a simple reaffirmation would not do, not only because of its practical implications and consequences, but first and foremost because a simple reaffirmation would not answer the requirements of confidence- and security-building process and would not contribute to the elimination of contradictions in the behaviour of States when it comes to the practical application of the universal obligation not to use force or the threat of force in their international relations. Finally, a simple reaffirmation would, in our view, fall short of the expectations of those who drafted and adopted the Madrid mandate that calls for new, effective and concrete actions and links those actions not only to the progress in strengthening confidence and security but also to the progress in achieving disarmament. In other words, Mr. Chairman, it would be contrary to the letter and to the spirit of the mandate to treat the problem of the non-use of force or the threat of force within the



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context of the first phase of the Stockholm Conference alone and to limit it to or link its elaboration with the CSBM's only. Conceptually and operatively the elaboration should cover the whole process started in Madrid, which means that it has to provide a political background for the second phase also.

The Delegation of Yugoslavia is convinced that this Conference can best contribute to the process of confidence- and security-building and to the disarmament in Europe by elaborating as extensively as possible on the principle of non-use of force or threat of force in a Declaration that may or may not be an integral part but has to be one of the final results of this first stage of our Conference. Such an elaboration would - we do believe - also be in accordance with the vital interests of all European states, and especially those who, like Yugoslavia, do not see their security best protected by joining military alliances and who favour the establishment of relations based on such a system of rules and measures whose implementation, within the process and of confidence- and security-building and disarmament in Europe, would have as practical effect the elimination of the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

With regard to some fears expressed here that an elaboration would lead to the weakening of the already existing universal obligation not to use force we would like to make the following comments:

First, this would not be the first time that such an exercise has been undertaken as the Final Act itself, and more specifically its Declaration on Principles, are in fact an elaboration of the principle of the UN Charter. If the concern and fears from elaboration and innovation that seems to preoccupy some of us here today had prevailed during the process of negotiating the Final Act, then it is by no means certain that the Helsinki document would have been such as we know it today.

Secondly, mindful of the concern expressed in the same manner, if not perhaps by the same countries, at the time of the elaboration of the Declaration on Friendly Relations, which contains the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force elaborated



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in a rather detailed manner, the Delegation of the United Kingdom found an adequate safeguard. In a proposal submitted to the competent UN body, the Delegation of the United Kingdom, after quoting in the first paragraph Art. 2 § 4 of the UN Charter, started the second paragraph with an introductory clause which read: "In accordance with the foregoing fundamental principle and without limiting its generality" which was followed by concrete suggestions on the content of an elaboration of the principle. The same exercise was repeated in a joint proposal submitted to the same UN body by the Delegations of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, after this excursion into the past to come back to the elaboration on the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force. Such an elaboration in our view would not contradict or change in any way the universal legal force of the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. Quite to the contrary. It would complement them in a way which would clearly recognize the primary nature of the legal obligation and treat concrete measures in the military field as acts aimed at the implementation of the universal obligation we all say that we do and that we will respect.

Furthermore, a meaningful elaboration of the principle would, we believe, provide an adequate political context for the implementation of concrete military measures. It would, at the same time, be an expression of a deliberate and definite orientation towards negotiations on disarmament in Europe, an orientation that would result in accepting and implementing confidence-building measures as a method and as a means within the broader process aimed at preventing military confrontation and at strengthening security in Europe. Without such a political framework and context, the danger of "fetishization" of the CSBM's would continue to exist and those measures, instead of promoting confidence- and security-building, could easily have counterproductive effects and even serve and be used as means of pressure.

Mr. Chairman, the document SC 7, submitted by neutral and non-aligned countries, contains a list of elements that could help the Conference fulfil its mandate. The Delegation of Yugoslavia



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stands behind those elements but does not consider the list as either exhaustive or limitative or as being proposed on a "take it or leave it" basis. Our concept of an elaboration on the principle of non-use of force or threat of force and of the role such an elaboration would have within the process of confidence- and security-building and disarmament in Europe includes the need for the inclusion in the text of the declaration of measures such as:

- implementation and constant promotion of confidence- and security-building in Europe;

- constraining of military activities in such a way that would reduce the risk of military confrontation; and

- undertaking of obligation to work for an early passage to the second stage of this Conference which means to the negotiations on disarmament in Europe.

With regard to the last point I would like to remind this Conference of a joint proposal, submitted by Italy and the Netherlands to the UN body that elaborated the Declaration on Friendly Relations among States, in which these two countries, after having proposed a list of elaborated aspects of the use of force, included a paragraph in which it was stated:

"5. In order to promote the development of the rule of law in the international community, all States should endeavour to secure the early conclusion of a universal treaty of general and complete disarmament, accompanied by the provisions necessary for the effective supervision and control of disarmament measures, for the maintenance of peace and security and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and in the meantime shall endeavour to carry out such agreed collateral arms control and disarmament measures as would be susceptible of reducing international tension and of ensuring progress towards general and complete disarmament."

This proposal, Mr. Chairman, needed in our view to be brought to the attention of this Conference because it may very usefully apply mutatis mutandis to efforts we are going to undertake with a view to elaborate on the principle of non-use of force or threat of force.



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Mr. Chairman,

Confidence- and security-building is a process that cannot be developed and promoted by a stand-by or passive attitude. It can only be done by acts aimed at taking concrete actions with a view to promote and speed up the development of the process or to prevent everything that runs counter such efforts and the letter and the spirit of the Final Act. The same applies to the implementation of the obligation not to use force or threat of force where the participating States are expected, in order to make the principle fully effective in practice, to undertake, among others, steps to prevent terrorist and subversive activities directed against other States. An obligation of participating States to refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State has been included in the Final Act. This obligation was reaffirmed and specified in a more detailed way in the Madrid Concluding Document, wherein the participating States undertook an obligation not only to refrain from assistance to terrorist and subversive activities, but also to take effective measures to prevent such acts and to prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism.

The idea of prevention by undertaking concrete measures, has been spelled out also in other international documents, like, for example, in the Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by consensus at the thirty-fourth session of the UN General Assembly. All this clearly indicates that the obligations of States in combatting terrorism and subversion do not end with refraining from certain actions, but require also the undertaking of positive and resolute actions, which would effectively bar any activity of those groups or organizations which call for or engage in the preparation and execution of terrorist or subversive acts against other States. To tolerate the existence or activities of such groups or organizations, to help them in their activities in any way or to attempt to justify the absence of concrete steps to prevent such



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activities is contrary to the obligations that the participating States have undertaken by signing the Final Act and adopting the Madrid Concluding Document. How such international obligations undertaken by signing of or agreeing to international documents, be they bilateral or multilateral, are going to be fulfilled rests with the participating States. But fulfilled they have to be if the necessary degree of credibility has to be maintained in intra-European and international relations in general.

My final comment, Mr. Chairman, relates to the question of human rights. Any use of or threat to use force in international relations leads to violation of human rights and has to be dealt as such within an elaboration on the principle of non-use of force or threat of force. But if it is expected from this Conference to deal with human rights in general, within the European context, and we certainly have nothing against that, then the status and the position of migrant workers that as we all know leave much to be desired, cannot be left out. Among human rights of migrant workers that have to be respected is also the right to an objective information about their country of origin, where information is given through national massmedia like radio and television. There are cases, Mr. Chairman, where by no stretch of imagination and by no skilful juggling with ear-catching slogans information given in some countries and under certain circumstances can be called objective. Such information is meant to and aimed to complicate relations among States and render more difficult their cooperation so much needed if we want - as we say we do - to build confidence and security in Europe. These are the hard facts of life which we cannot escape either by closing our eyes or trying to find plausible excuses.

The status and position of national minorities will also have to be dealt with if this Conference decides to deal with human rights in Europe in general.



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SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: STRATEGY FOR 1986
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 8885, B) STOCKHOLM 8814,
C) STOCKHOLM 9571, D) BONN 36586

1. <><>CDE<><> VIII - 076

2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE PROLIFERATION OF ALLIED NUF TEXTS DURING THIS ROUND IS JUST ONE INDICATION OF CAUCUS IMPATIENCE WITH THE ABSENCE OF NATO LANGUAGE ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE. WHILE THE WEST HAS -- SO FAR -- SHOWN ADMIRABLE UNITY IN THE FACE OF INEPT EASTERN ATTACKS ON THE WESTERN POSITION, THE APPOINTMENT OF NNA COORDINATORS WILL ADD TO EXISTING PRESSURES TO DEVELOP A NATO POSITION ON NUF. THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO DISSUADE OUR ALLIES FROM EARLY UNCORDINATED NUF INITIATIVES, AND TO ESTABLISH A COMMON NATO LINE DURING NEGOTIATIONS NEXT YEAR, DELEGATION BELIEVES USG SHOULD BEGIN TO DEVELOP ITS OWN MINIMALIST NUF LANGUAGE; SUCH A TEXT, MOREOVER, FOR TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, SHOULD CONTAIN SOME ELEMENTS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS SUCH AS ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, AFGHANISTAN, AND HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCES. THIS CABLE SUGGESTS A POSSIBLE U.S. TEXT AND A WESTERN APPROACH ON THIS SUBJECT FOR 1986 (SEE PARAS 7 AND 8). WE RECOMMEND THAT THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY ADDRESS THIS QUESTION BEFORE THE NEXT SESSION. END SUMMARY.

4. OVER THE PAST TWO SESSIONS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THERE HAS BEEN A PROLIFERATION OF NUF TEXTS. AT THE CONFERENCE, THE NNA TABLED A THREE-PAGE NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT CONTAINING 15 SEPARATE ELEMENTS AS PART OF THEIR CSBM'S PACKAGE (SEE REFTEL FOR ANALYSIS). THE ROMANIANS AND CYPRIOTS, THROUGH THEIR STATEMENTS AND AIDES MEMOIRE, PRESS FOR A "<><>CDE<><> DIMENSION" OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE. WITHIN THE NATO CAUCUS, THE DANES AND THE ITALIANS HAVE CIRCULATED DRAFT LANGUAGE ON NUF (SEE REFS B AND C, RESPECTIVELY). THE CANADIANS HAVE PRESENTED A THREE-TIERED NUF NON-PAPER TO WASHINGTON AND, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING, WILL SOON INTRODUCE A MODIFIED PAPER ON THE SUBJECT TO THE NATO CAUCUS. THE FRG, NORWEGIAN, AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRIES CONTINUE TO DO INTERNAL WORK ON NUF LANGUAGE. NOW, EVEN THE BRITISH, OUR CLOSEST SOULMATE ON NUF IN STOCKHOLM, ARE FORMULATING THEIR OWN NUF LANGUAGE. ALL OF THESE TEXTS GO BEYOND WHAT USDEL BELIEVES SHOULD BE A COMMON ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE.

5. FORTUNATELY, THE PROLIFERATION OF NUF LANGUAGE HAS BEEN MANAGEABLE AT THE CONFERENCE -- SO FAR. THIS HAS BEEN LARGELY DUE TO A COMBINATION OF ALLIED UNITY IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUP AND EASTERN INEPTNESS. THE ALLIES HAVE KEPT CLOSE TO THE BARE-BONED SCRIPT FIRST



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ENUNCIATED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN DUBLIN ("WE WILL DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATION ON A CONCRETE SET OF CSBM'S). THE TEXTS OF VARIOUS NATO DRAFTS -- OR EVEN THEIR EXISTENCE -- HAVE NOT, CONTRARY TO THE CAUCUS NORM, LEAKED OUT YET. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE SPENT MUCH OF THIS ROUND PEPPERING THE NNA WITH QUESTIONS ON THEIR NUF PROPOSAL. THE EAST, IN THE FACE OF WESTERN SOLIDARITY, HAS DISPLAYED AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF DISARRAY AND AN UNDERSTANDABLE DEGREE OF FRUSTRATION. THE SOVIET TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (SC.6), THE CROWN JEWEL OF SOVIET PROPOSALS IN STOCKHOLM, HAS LOST MUCH OF ITS LUSTER. IN SHORT, ALTHOUGH THE EIGHTH SESSION HAS WITNESSED INCREASED INTERNAL NATO PRESSURE ON NUF, WORKING GROUP DEVELOPMENTS HAVE BOUGHT US SOME TIME TO CONSIDER OUR OPTIONS FOR NEXT YEAR.

6. THE NINTH SESSION: THE APPOINTMENT OF NNA COORDINATORS WILL ADD TO PRESSURES TO DEVELOP OUR NUF POSITION DURING THE NEXT ROUND. OUR ALLIES ARE INCREASINGLY UNEASY WITH THE ABSENCE OF NATO LANGUAGE ON NON-USE OF FORCE. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE LACK OF AN ARTICULATED WESTERN POSITION PUTS US AT A DISADVANTAGE, PARTICULARLY AS WE APPROACH DRAFTING. ABSENT AN ALLIED POSITION, THE SOVIET AND NNA TEXTS, THEY ARGUE, WILL

LIMDIS
FROM USDEL <><>CDE<><>
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: <><>CDE<><>, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: STRATEGY FOR 1986

FORM THE BASIS FOR DRAFTING. THUS, THE TENDENCY IN THE WORKING GROUP WOULD BE TO SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE ON THE EXISTING TEXTS -- THE SOVIET AND NNA DOCUMENTS. IN ADDITION, SOME, PARTICULARLY THE FRG, MAINTAIN THAT NATO MUST GIVE SOMETHING ON NUF IN ORDER TO GET SOMETHING ON CSBM'S (SEE REF D). THE PROBLEM IS TO MAINTAIN NEEDED ALLIED UNITY WITHOUT GIVING AWAY ANY ESSENTIAL WESTERN POSITIONS ON NUF.

7. DELEGATION BELIEVES WE SHOULD RESIST PRESSURES FOR EARLY DRAFTING ON NUF, BECAUSE DRAFTING NUF LANGUAGE WILL BE FAR SIMPLER THAN DRAFTING LANGUAGE FOR CONCRETE AND COMPLEX CSBM'S. FURTHERMORE, WE DO NOT WANT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS A PRETEXT TO PUSH FOR A MINI-PACKAGE ("WE ARE CLOSE TO A CONSENSUS ON NUF, NOTIFICATION, AND OBSERVATION; ONLY UNREALISTIC WESTERN DEMANDS ON INFORMATION AND INSPECTION IS PREVENTING US FROM OUR GOAL OF REACHING AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM"). AT THE SAME TIME, BECAUSE OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS, THE NATURE OF THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE PRESENT WORKING STRUCTURE AND THE APPOINTMENT OF NNA COORDINATORS, AS WELL AS USG OFFICIAL POLICY AS ARTICULATED BY THE PRESIDENT IN DUBLIN, STRASBOURG, AND GENEVA, WE CAN NO LONGER RELY ON A STRICT SEQUENTIAL APPROACH TO NUF NEGOTIATIONS, I.E., LET'S FIRST NEGOTIATE CSBM'S THEN WE WILL NEGOTIATE NUF. THEREFORE, DELEGATION BELIEVES WASHINGTON SHOULD BEGIN PREPARATORY



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WORK IMMEDIATELY ON AN ACCEPTABLE NUF TEXT IN PREPARATION FOR WIDER ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS WHEN DEEMED APPROPRIATE. DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THIS TEXT SHOULD BE SHORT AND PREAMBULAR (SO AS NOT TO DRAW ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE OPERATIVE CORE OF AN AGREEMENT -- CONCRETE CSBM'S). (DELEGATION TEXT FOLLOWS IN PARA 8.) IN ORDER TO COORDINATE A COMMON ALLIANCE POSITION, USDEL SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION:

-- AGREEING ON A MINIMALIST U.S. DRAFT TEXT ON NUF, WHICH ALSO CONTAINS ELEMENTS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS SUCH AS AN ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, AFGHANISTAN, AND HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCES, BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF NEXT ROUND (PROBABLY JANUARY 21). THIS WOULD ENTAIL CALLING A <><>CDE<><> WORKING GROUP MEETING ON THE SUBJECT BEFORE JANUARY 10.

-- CONSULTING WITH OUR "CLOSE ALLIES" SHORTLY THEREAFTER TO ESTABLISH A COMMON POSITION AND TO AGREE ON WHEN WIDER ALLIANCE CONSULTATION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

-- DISCUSSING THIS COMMON TEXT WITH ALLIED DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM, THE NATO DELEGATES REPRESENTING THEIR COUNTRIES IN THE NUF MEETING HERE ARE, ALMOST UNIFORMLY, MUCH TOUGHER VIS-A-VIS NUF LANGUAGE THAN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. NATO <><>CDE<><> REPS HAVE ALREADY EXPERIENCED MORE THAN FOUR MONTHS OF WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT WITL THE EAST AND NNA AND REALIZE THE SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF A MINIMALIST WESTERN POSITION. FURTHERMORE, THEY, UNLIKE SOME CAPITALS, HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR ABILITY TO STICK TO A COORDINATED AND MINIMALIST WESTERN APPROACH, E.G., NO DISCUSSION OF BONN DECLARATION LANGUAGE OR DEFINING TYPES OF FORCE.

8. THERE FOLLOWS DELEGATION'S SUGGESTED PREAMBULAR TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE:

- 1) RECALLING THEIR PLEDGE TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT.
- (MADRID MANDATE)
- 2) RECALLING THEIR UNDERTAKING TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
- (HELSINKI FINAL ACT)

LIMDIS

FROM USDEL <><>CDE<><>

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: <><>CDE<><>, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: STRATEGY FOR 1986

- 3) REAFFIRMING THE PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATIN CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, ALL OF WHICH SHOULD BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED.
- (HFA, SC.7)



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- THIS SECTION REAFFIRMS THE FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN VIEW THAT ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE HFA SHOULD BE "EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED," I.E., THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING THE BALANCE AND ENSURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL SECTIONS OF THE ACT.

- 4) REAFFIRMING THAT NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

- (HFA, UN CHARTER)

- 5) RECALLING THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE.

- (UN CHARTER)

- 6) REASSERTING THAT EVERY STATE HAS AN INALIENABLE RIGHT TO CHOOSE ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE IN ANY FORM BY ANOTHER STATE.

- (DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1970 (2625 (XX WHICH WAS ADOPTED WITHOUT A VOTE)

- THE PURPOSE OF THIS PASSAGE IS TO INDICATE THAT NON-SIGNATORY STATES LIKE AFGHANISTAN HAVE THEIR RIGHTS, TOO. HOWEVER, DELEGATION NOTES THAT SUCH A PASSAGE MIGHT ESTABLISH AN UNPREDICTABLE PRECEDENT BY INTRODUCING THE "FRIENDLY RELATIONS DECLARATION" LANGUAGE INTO THE STOCKHOLM CONTEXT.

- 7) REAFFIRMING THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

- (BASED ON SC.7).

-

- THE PURPOSE OF THE PASSAGE IS TO LINK DIRECTLY AND PROMINENTLY HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS WITH INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WHILE WE STRONGLY BELIEVE SUCH A DIRECT LINKAGE WOULD BE A UNIQUE AND IMPORTANT ADDITION TO THE CSCE PROCESS, WASHINGTON SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THIS LINKAGE MIGHT CREATE A PRECEDENT FOR ELEVATING THE STATUS OF THE OTHER TEN HFA PRINCIPLES IN THE <><>CDE<><> CONTEXT.

- 8) CONVINCED OF THE IMPORTANCE OF STRICTLY OBSERVING THIS UNDERTAKING IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE STATES AGAINST WHICH FORCE IS USED OR THREATENED ARE A PARTY TO THE SAME TREATY OF ALLIANCE.

- (NEW -- BUT BASED ON SC.7, PARA 7, NUF SECTION)

- (GOOD NEGOTIATING FAT; DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET ACTIONS IN HUNGARY (1956), CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1968), POLAND (1981).

- 9) RECALLING THAT BY THEIR VERY NATURE CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES SERVE TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THE MUTUAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.



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- (BASED ON SC.3 NUF SECTION)
- THIS PASSAGE WOULD BE USED AS A BRIDGE TO THE OPERATIVE -- AND THEREFORE MOST IMPORTANT -- SECTION OF LIMDIS
FROM USDEL <><>CDE<><>
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: <><>CDE<><>, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: STRATEGY FOR 1986 THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT -- CONCRETE CSBM'S.

- HAVE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING:
- (TEXT OF AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURE WOULD FOLLOW).
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET



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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09715
SUBJECT: USDEL EVALUATION OF EXPLORATORY PHASE OF CDE
REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 9176; B. STOCKHOLM 7987
1. CDE VIII - 82
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: WITH APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS, THE EXPLORATORY PHASE OF CDE IS RUNNING ITS COURSE, AND THE CONFERENCE IS LOOKING AHEAD TO THE TRANSITION INTO DRAFTING. FOLLOWING IS USDEL'S EVALUATION OF HOW WELL OUR OBJECTIVES FOR THIS PHASE HAVE BEEN MET AS THE LAST ROUND OF L985 ENDS. AS WITH OUR INTERIM EVALUATION (REF A), OUR ANALYSIS IS KEYED TO THE GOALS WE SET AT THE END OF ROUND VII (REF B). END SUMMARY.
4. MAINTAINING/ENHANCING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND EDUCATION: RECENT WEEKS HAVE SEEN A FAIR MEASURE OF SUCCESS IN EDUCATING ALLIES ON THE DETAILS OF SC.L/AMPLIFIED AND THE THINKING BEHIND THE DETAILS. NATO COORDINATION IN ALL THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS HAS IMPROVED MARKEDLY; THE EXPERIENCE GAINED HAS HELPED THE CAUCUS TO DEVELOP THE WORKING PROCEDURES WHICH WILL BE NEEDED FOR AN EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE IN DRAFTING. THE ABILITIES OF INDIVIDUAL DELEGATES HAVE BECOME CLEAR, AND THE CAUCUS AS A WHOLE HAS RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE IN THE GROUPS.
5. THE NATO PACKAGE: WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE GONE

ABOUT AS FAR AS WE CAN IN ARGUING AND AMPLIFYING ON THE MERITS OF SC.L/AMPLIFIED; THE TIME TO TRY TO CONSOLIDATE AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE DETAILS HAS ARRIVED.
6. CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCES: SOME OF THE NNA HAVE SHOWN A TENDENCY TO SEE FAMILY RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN SOME ASPECTS OF SC.7 AND SC.L/AMPLIFIED, NOT NECESSARILY PREFERRING SC.L FORMULATIONS, OF COURSE, BUT AT LEAST RECOGNIZING COMMONALITY OF OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH. ON NON-USE OF FORCE THERE HAS BEEN PARTICULAR CONVERGENCE BETWEEN MOST OF THE NNA AND NATO, OVER THE PAST SESSION, ALTHOUGH FOR TACTICAL REASONS WE HAVE NOT SAID O PUBLICLY. THE MAIN PUBLIC DIVERGENCE HAS BEEN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ON THE ISSUE OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, WHERE BOTH SIDES HAVE CLEARLY STAKED OUT THEIR POSITIONS; DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IS NOW MAINLY POSTURING, AND WE EXPECT NO MOVEMENT ON IT FROM THE EAST UNTIL DRAFTING BEGINS.



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7. GAIN NNA SUPPORT: AS ABOVE, SOME OF THE NNA HOLD THAT SC.7 AND SC.L/AMPLIFIED SHARE A COMMON BASIC APPROACH, ALTHOUGH DIFFERENCES IN DETAIL, SOME STRONG, EXIST. SOME NNA DEMONSTRATE IN THE WORKING GROUPS GREATER AFFINITY FOR NATO THAN FOR THEIR OWN CO-SPONSORS OF SC.7. INSOFAR AS SC.7 IS REPLETE WITH AMBIGUITIES, WE HAVE TRIED TO FLUSH OUT THOSE WHO SUPPORT AN INTERPRETATION OF IT THAT FALLS CLOSER TO OUR OWN APPROACH THAT TO THE WARSAW PACT'S. THIS PROCESS, OF COURSE, WILL CONTINUE INTO THE DRAFTING PHASE. AN EXAMPLE OF AN AREA WE HAVE BEEN FOCUSSING ON IS THAT OF THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, WHERE WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING AN EMPHASIS ON STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AS OPPOSED TO NUMERICAL.

8. IN SUM, USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE HAS PROGRESSED AS FAR AS IT IS GOING TO IN MEETING THE OBJECTIVE WE SET FOR IT. REAL PROGRESS NOW MUST DEPEND ON THE DETAILED PROCESS OF DRAFTING WHICH ALONE CAN TAKE US FURTHER BEYOND GENERAL STATEMENTS OF POSITION. IN PARTICULAR, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO FLEXIBILITY TO CHANGE THEIR POSITIONS BEFORE THE DYNAMIC OF DRAFTING FORCES THEM (AND ALLOWS THEM) TO DO SO.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09766
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSION OF COORDINATORS,
- DECEMBER 18, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 084
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF COORDINATORS ON DECEMBER 18 THE CAUCUS GAVE GENERAL SUPPORT TO THE IDEA OF APPOINTING A NATO "SECRETARY" FOR EACH WORKING GROUP TO INTERFACE WITH THE NNA COORDINATOR. THERE WAS ALSO A GENERAL SENSE THAT SOME WORKING GROUPS, E.G., NOTIFICATION, MAY NEED TO MEET MORE OFTEN THAN IS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED IF AN AGREEMENT IS TO BE REACHED IN THE 24 WEEKS REMAINING. THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE IDEA OF FREEING MORE TIME ON THE CONFERENCE'S WEEKLY GRID BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF PLENARY AND AB MEETINGS NEXT YEAR. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF HOW THE ALLIANCE WOULD LIKE TO SEE COORDINATORS ORGANIZE DRAFTING WAS INCONCLUSIVE. END SUMMARY.
4. THE CAUCUS HELD A BRIEF PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF HOW THE ALLIANCE MINI-CLUSTERS WILL INTERACT WITH THE NEW NNA COORDINATORS. THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT EXPRESSED FOR THE SUGGESTION OF CITRON (FRG) THAT EACH MINI-CLUSTER DESIGNATE A PERMANENT CONTACT PERSON TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE WORKING GROUP COORDINATOR ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS. THE CONTACT PERSON WOULD ALSO ACCOMPANY THE MINI-CLUSTER CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY TO MEET WITH THE COORDINATOR ON MORE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE. CITRON MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT INTENDED TO PREJUDGE OR BE A PRECURSOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF A CHEF DE FILE OR TEAM DE FILE. THE CAUCUS WILL TAKE UP THE PROPOSAL AGAIN AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT ROUND.
5. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION WAS ALSO GIVEN TO THE COORDINATORS' ROLE IN DRAFTING AS WELL AS TO POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE WEEKLY GRID IN 1986. THERE WAS NO CLEAR VIEW OF HOW COORDINATORS SHOULD ORGANIZE A DRAFTING EXERCISE, E.G., WHETHER TO USE A COORDINATOR'S TEXT. THE FRG AND OTHERS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT A COORDINATOR'S TEXT COULD BE HELPFUL TO US IN SOME GROUPS, BUT NOT IN OTHERS. THERE WAS ALSO A SENSE THAT SOME ADJUSTMENT MAY HAVE TO BE MADE TO THE WEEKLY GRID
-
TO ALLOW MORE THAN ONE WORKING GROUP SESSION A WEEK IN THE MORE COMPLEX AREAS, E.G., NOTIFICATION, IF AN AGREEMENT IS TO BE CONCLUDED IN THE 24 WEEKS REMAINING TO US. EDES (UK) SUGGESTED REDUCING EITHER THE NUMBER OF PLENARIES WHILE OTHERS PROPOSED FEWER MEETINGS OF



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WORKING GROUPS AB IN ORDER TO FREE MORE TIME ON THE SCHEDULE. IT WAS AGREED THAT CAUCUS REPRESENTATIVES TO THE GRID GROUP WOULD FLOAT THIS IDEA IN GENERAL TERMS WITH NNA AND EASTERN REPS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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25X1

UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 09751
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, LL/20/85
L. CDE VIII - 085
2. FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, MADE TO THE CDE TODAY, DECEMBER 20.
3. BEGIN TEXT: LAST WEEK, THE CANDLES OF SANTA LUCIA REMINDED US THAT, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOW IN THE DARKEST DAYS OF THE YEAR, WE WILL ENJOY MORE LIGHT SOON. CERTAINLY, WHEN DRAFTING BEGINS WE WILL EXPERIENCE LONGER DAYS. MY DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE DRAFTING PROCESS SHOULD LEAD TO A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT WHICH WILL LOWER THE BARRIERS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. THIS PAST SESSION HAS SEEN REAL PROGRESS TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE, AND THE OUTLINES OF AN AGREEMENT ARE NOW VISIBLE. THE MECHANISM FOR DRAFTING IS IN PLACE; THE POLITICAL WILL FOR A SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT EXISTS, I TRUST, AMONG ALL THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED HERE. WHAT REMAINS IS FOR US TO BUILD UPON WHAT WE HAVE ESTABLISHED SO FAR TO TAKE THE FINAL -- AND THE MOST DIFFICULT -- STEPS TO REACH THAT AGREEMENT.
4. HOW FAR WE HAVE COME IS ALL THE MORE EVIDENT WHEN WE CONSIDER THE WAY THINGS STOOD WHEN WE BEGAN OUR WORK IN L984. REFLECTING THE LACK OF A GENERAL CONSENSUS ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF OUR WORK IN STOCKHOLM, OUR DELEGATIONS TALKED PAST ONE ANOTHER MORE OFTEN THAN THEY ENGAGED IN CONCRETE AND USEFUL DISCUSSIONS. IN SPITE OF THE BEST EFFORTS OF MANY, POLITICS AND POLEMICS WERE MORE THE RULE THAN DIALOGUE AND REAL EXCHANGE. THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE HAS IMPROVED SINCE THEN, AND, MOREOVER, THERE HAS BEEN REAL CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ABOUT THE GOALS WE ARE TRYING TO REACH. THIS CONVERGENCE IS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV (FROM THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT IN GENEVA) WHICH EXPRESSED THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO "FACILITATE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE." I KNOW THIS COMMITMENT IS SHARED BY ALL DELEGATIONS HERE. THE US-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT WAS MEANT TO PROVIDE A POLITICAL IMPULSE FOR OUR EFFORTS HERE, AND IT HAS. ALTHOUGH IT IS PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT "THE SPIRIT OF STOCKHOLM," I SENSE THAT, AS THE PACE OF THE CONFERENCE ACCELERATES, OUR WILL TO SUCCEED STRENGTHENS.
5. INSIDE THE CONFERENCE, THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PROPOSALS IN DOCUMENT SC.7 HAS BEEN A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION; IT WAS A STEP NECESSARY FOR US TO MOVE AHEAD AND IT HAS MERITED THE SERIOUS



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ATTENTION OF ALL.
6. PROCEDURALLY, WE HAVE NOW AGREED ON A PROGRAM OF WORK FOR L986 WHICH WILL ALLOW US TO EMPLOY OUR LIMITED TIME RATIONALLY. COORDINATORS HAVE BEGUN THEIR IMPORTANT ROLES. WE ARE FORTUNATE TO HAVE SUCH WELL QUALIFIED PERSONS AVAILABLE FOR THIS COMPLEX, DEMANDING AND SENSITIVE TASK. MY DELEGATION IS CONFIDENT OF THEIR SKILL AND IMPARTIALITY AND WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO ASSIST THEM IN THEIR ROLES.
7. IN GENERAL TERMS, ALL PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED IN MORE OR LESS DETAILED FORM, AND THEY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL DURING THE LAST FEW WEEKS, WITH THE RESULT THAT WE UNDERSTAND THEM BETTER. IN SPITE OF MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF PRINCIPLE AND APPROACH, THESE PROPOSALS AND DISCUSSION OF THEM IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS HAVE ALREADY DEFINED SUBSTANTIAL COMMON GROUND AND IDENTIFIED THE TOPICS ON WHICH FINAL AGREEMENT MAY BE FOUND. JUDGING BY THEIR PROPOSALS AND THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, ALL PARTICIPATINB STATES AGREE ON SOME BASIC ELEMENTS OF A FINAL AGREEMENT:
-- ALL AGREE THAT THE PROVISION OF DETAILED INFORMATION IS A KEY ELEMENT IN A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM COMPRISING A MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES;
-- ALL AGREE TO AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION;
-- ALL AGREE TO GIVE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF A SIZE AND SCOPE EXCEEDING CERTAIN PARAMETERS;
-- ALL AGREE THAT OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD BE INVITED TO ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH NOTIFICATION IS REQUIRED;
-- ALL AGREE THAT VERIFICATION IS A NECESSARY PART OF ANY SYSTEM OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES;
-- AND ALL AGREE THAT A FINAL AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AN APPROPRIATE REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE.
8. THUS, THE OUTLINES OF AGREEMENT EXIST. THE DIFFERENCES LIE IN THE DETAILS, AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF OVERCOMING THEM SHOULD NOT BE MINIMIZED. WE, THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF DOCUMENT SC.L, BELIEVE THE DETAILS MUST BUILD UPON ONE ANOTHER TO FORM AN AGREEMENT WHICH HAS TRUE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE; NOTHING LESS WILL BE ACCEPTABLE. TO BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, AN AGREEMENT MUST REPRESENT A REAL IMPROVEMENT OVER THE MODEST CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE FINAL ACT OF L975; IT MUST REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE BY CREATING A NEW BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING ABOUT NORMAL MILITARY PRACTICES IN EUROPE. THIS WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCE THE SECURITY



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OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE.
9. THIS BASIS CAN BE CREATED, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY FORCES NORMALLY STATIONED IN EUROPE; SUCH A DATA BASE IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURES WE ARE TO ADOPT. THE NOTIFICATION PROCESS ITSELF MUST BE INTENSIFIED AND MADE A MORE FREQUENT PART OF NORMAL SECURITY PRACTICES IN EUROPE; THIS MEANS THAT NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS MUST BE LOWERED TO A MEANINGFUL DEGREE FROM THOSE IN THE FINAL ACT. THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS SHOULD BE MANDATORY AND EXTENDED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. ALSO, AS WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED, THE MEASURES WE ADOPT MUST BE PROVIDED WITH MEANS OF VERIFICATION WHICH ALLOW THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF EVERY STATE; THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE FINAL ACT DO NOT PROVIDE FOR VERIFICATION.
10. FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER SPONSORS OF SC.1, IN STOCKHOLM AS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORUMS, VERIFICATION IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF ANY MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT ACCORD BECAUSE, WITHOUT MEANS TO ENSURE THAT THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT ARE BEING RESPECTED, NO ACCORD CAN BUILD CONFIDENCE OR CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY. SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE, CAREFULLY BALANCED IN THE SAME EQUATION, DEPEND ON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS; PROMISES OR EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL ARE INSUFFICIENT. THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL BE ADOPTED BY THIS CONFERENCE WILL REQUIRE ON-SITE INSPECTION TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. ALTHOUGH EXTRAORDINARY IN THE REQUIREMENT FOR TIMELY ACTION, INSPECTION WOULD BE ROUTINE POLITICALLY. A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION WOULD NOT REPRESENT A POLITICAL CHALLENGE OR AN ACCUSATION THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN VIOLATED; RATHER, THE INSPECTION WOULD PROVIDE ALL THE STATES INVOLVED, THE HOST AS WELL AS THE REQUESTING STATE, THE OPPORTUNITY TO REMOVE AMBUIGUITY AND ALLAY CONCERN ABOUT THE NATURE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE.
11. WE NOW HAVE A FEW WEEKS' BREAK IN WHICH TO CONSULT OUR GOVERNMENTS. WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT SO THAT WHEN WE RETURN TO STOCKHOLM IN JANUARY WE CAN BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE TIME WE HAVE BEFORE US. WHEN WE COME BACK, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO FACILITATE THE COORDINATORS' TASK. WE DO NOT NEED COORDINATORS TO HELP US FIND AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT; WE CAN DO THAT WITHOUT THEIR ASSISTANCE. WE SHOULD HELP THE COORDINATORS TO EXPAND AND CONSOLIDATE COMMON GROUND. THEY, IN TURN, CAN HELP US BY DEVELOPING TEXT WHICH DESCRIBES POSITIONS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL, NOT JUST RECORDING OR LINING UP COMPOSITE TEXTS, FULL OF



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BRACKETS, WHICH REPRESENT NO PROGRESS. LET US DEVELOP TEXTS, CONSTRUCTIVELY AND WITH AN EYE TO NECESSARY COMPROMISE, ON SUCH KEY ISSUES AS THE PROVISION OF DETAILED INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS, MODALITIES FOR OBSERVERS AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. AS WE GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE THROUGH AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE, CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO REAFFIRM THAT PRINCIPLE IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. IF THIS PROCESS IS TO MOVE AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY, COORDINATORS MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE ON THE BASIS OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL DELEGATIONS. TABLING OF NEW TEXTS BY INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS STRIKES ME AS A TACTIC WHICH WILL HINDER, NOT ADVANCE, OUR WORK. AND SINCE WORKING GROUP SESSIONS AND INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AS THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS INTENSIFIES, I SUGGEST THAT WE CONSIDER WAYS OF PROVIDING MORE TIME FOR THIS BY INTRODUCING MORE FLEXIBILITY INTO OUR WEEKLY PROGRAMS.

L2. MR. CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER LEADERS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE HAVE FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED OUR DESIRE FOR MORE RAPID PROGRESS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE REITERATED THIS COMMITMENT IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE OF DECEMBER L2-L3, WHICH CONFIRMED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS "ACTIVELY WORKING FOR AN EARLY AGREEMENT, CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. THIS WOULD EMBODY A SUBSTANTIAL SET OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, COVERING THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE EXISTING DUTY OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE."

L3. IT MUST ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, AS THE NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE REMINDS US, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS. WHEN THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING CONVENES NEXT FALL, ITS TASK WILL BE NOT ONLY TO EVALUATE PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM BUT ALSO TO CONSIDER THE OUTCOME OF THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM, THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM AND THE BERN MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS, AS WELL AS THE PERFORMANCE OF PARTICIPATING STATES IN FULFILLING ALL OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THIS REQUIREMENT FOR BALANCE, SPECIFIED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, IS FOUNDED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE PROCESS OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY MUST BE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL -- THAT IS, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN, AS WELL AS MILITARY

L4. HERE IN STOCKHOLM WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A



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UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO THAT BROADER OBJECTIVE AND HELP LOWER THE BARRIERS WHICH NOW DIVIDE EUROPE EAST FROM WEST. TO DO SO, WE MUST PROCEED NOW PURPOSEFULLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY TO PUT FIRMLY IN PLACE MEASURES WHICH WILL HAVE AN EFFECTIVE AND POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE REALITIES OF THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION. I BELIEVE WE WOULD DO WELL TO HEED THE ADVICE OF THE AMERICAN MAN OF LETTERS OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, WHO SAID: "I FIND THE GREAT THING IN THIS WORLD IS NOT SO MUCH WHERE WE STAND, AS IN WHAT DIRECTION WE ARE MOVING: TO REACH THE PORT OF HEAVEN, WE MUST SAIL SOMETIMES WITH THE WIND AND SOMETIMES AGAINST IT -- BUT WE MUST SAIL, AND NOT DRIFT, NOR LIE AT ANCHOR." THE TIME FOR STANDING IS OVER; IF WE ARE TO REACH OUR GOAL, THE TIME FOR MOVING HAS ARRIVED. OUR DIRECTION IS CLEAR, AND MY DELEGATION, FOR ONE, IS COMMITTED TO PURSUING IT.
L5. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09767
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS: THE 1986 CALENDAR
REF: STOCKHOLM 9680
1. CDE VIII - 087
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CONFERENCE REACHED AGREEMENT DECEMBER 19 ON A COMPLETE WORKING CALENDAR FOR 1986 WHICH CONTAINS FOUR SESSIONS AND AN ADJOURNMENT DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19 (SEE REFTEL FOR TEXT). IN ORDER TO SECURE SOVIET AGREEMENT THE TEXT ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT THIS PROCEDURAL FACT CAN BE CHANGED BY A CONSENSUS AND IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ADJOURNMENT DATE DOES NOT TERMINATE CDE WHOSE ULTIMATE FATE CAN ONLY BE DECIDED BY THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. NATO WAS ABLE TO MOVE TOWARD THIS AGREEMENT ONLY AFTER FRANCE FINALLY JOINED A CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO SUPPORT THE NNA CALENDAR PROPOSAL, IF THE EAST AND NNA WOULD ACCEPT AS A TITLE OF THE SCHEDULE "COMPLETE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986, INCLUDING THE ADJOURNMENT DATE."
4. ON DECEMBER 13, THE FRENCH DELEGATION FINALLY JOINED IN A CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON A NATO POSITION ON THE 1986 CALENDAR. THE FRENCH ACCEPTANCE CAME AFTER INTENSE BEHIND-THE-SCENES CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), BARRY (U.S., AND CAUCUS CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY) AND OTHER KEY CAUCUS MEMBERS. PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE COMPROMISE WERE THAT THE FRENCH WOULD ACCEPT THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE, FOUR SESSIONS AND THE NNA PROPOSED DATES FOR ALL FOUR SESSIONS IF THE NNA AND EAST FIRST ACCEPTED AS THE TITLE OF THE SCHEDULE "FULL WORK PROGAM FOR 1986, INCLUDING THE ADJOURNMENT DATE." IN FRANCE'S VIEW, EASTERN AND NNA ACCEPTANCE OF THIS TITLE WOULD SATISFY THE FRENCH REQUIREMENT FOR AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A CUTOFF. THIS COMPROMISE WAS NOT ARRIVED AT EASILY AND EVEN THREATENED TO COLLAPSE OVER THE DETAILS OF HOW NATO REPS TO A COFFEE GROUP SHOULD PRESENT THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION (E.G., TABLE A FULL PAPER, DISCUSS ONLY THE TITLE FIRST WITHOUT A PAPER, TABLE A PAPER BRACKETING THE OPENING DATE OF THE FOURTH SESSION, ETC.). FORTUNATELY, BARRY (U.S.), WHO HAD ACTED AS HONEST BROKER BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE REST OF THE CAUCUS ON THIS ISSUE, WAS IN THE CHAIR AND CONVINCED ALL THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED. THE CAUCUS MANDATED BARRY (U.S.), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) AND DELWORTH (CANADA) TO PRESENT THE NATO PROPOSAL TO NNA AND EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES.
-
5. IN THE DECEMBER 17 COFFEE GROUP MEETING, THE EAST WAS NONCOMMITAL IN RESPONSE TO THE NATO PROPOSAL, BUT VOICED TWO QUESTIONS: 1) DID NATO'S PROPOSALS FOR A



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SEPTEMBER 19 ADJOURNMENT DATE MEAN THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD NOT BE EXTENDED EVEN IF WE WERE ONLY A FEW WORKING DAYS AWAY FROM AN AGREEMENT?; AND 2) WAS NATO REALLY TRYING TO STOP CDE ALTOGETHER ON SEPTEMBER 19 (RATHER THAN LEAVING THAT DECISION THE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING)? EASTERN REPS DUTIFULLY BUT UNENTHUSIASTICALLY MADE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO SCHEDULE ONLY THE FIRST TWO SESSIONS OF 1986 (COMMENT: EASTERN CONTACTS HAD ALREADY BEEN UNUSUALLY CANDID IN INDICATING STRONG NON-SOVIET EASTERN SUPPORT FOR A FULL CALENDAR. END COMMENT.) GIVEN THE SHORT TIME REMAINING TO REACH A DECISION ON THIS ISSUE, BARRY (U.S.) CRAFTED A PROPOSAL FOR NEW LANGUAGE TO ANSWER EASTERN CONCERNS AND PERSONALLY WORKED WITH GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) AND GRINEVSKY (USSR) TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS PALATABLE TO THE KEY PROTAGONISTS. BARRY PROPOSED INSERTING THREE SENTENCES IN THE TEXT OF THE CALENDAR AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD: 1) ACKNOWLEGE THAT THE COMPLETE WORK PROGRAM WOULD COMPRISE FOUR SESSIONS; 2) IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE FATE OF CDE IS IN THE HANDS OF VIENNA AND NOT STOCKHOLM; AND 3) ACKNOWLEDGE THE PROCEDURAL FACT THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD CHANGE THE WORK PROGRAM AT ANYTIME IF THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO DO SO. ON DECEMBER 18, THE NATO CAUCUS ACCEPTED BARRY'S PROPOSAL WITH SOME MINOR MODIFICATIONS. ONCE AGAIN IN ORDER TO "GREASE THE SKIDS" FOR THE NEXT COFFEE GROUP MEETING, BARRY CONTACTED GRINEVSKY BILATERALLY. GRINEVSKY INDICATED THAT, WITH THE NEW LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY THE ALLIANCE, HE BELIEVED HE COULD NOW ACCEPT (SUBJECT TO MOSCOW'S CONCURRENCE) A FULL 1986 CALENDAR INCLUDING AN ADJOURNMENT DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19 AND FOUR SESSIONS (SEE REFTEL FOR FULL TEXT). IN THE COFFEE GROUP MEETING OF DECEMBER 18, THE NNA QUICKLY ACCEPTED THE NATO PROPOSAL. EASTERN REPS INDICATED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL ON DECEMBER 19. AT EASTERN BEHEST SOME MINOR DATE CHANGES TO THE ORIGINAL NNA PROPOSAL WERE AGREED TO (KEY -
CHANGE MOVES THE 1986 START DATE BACK TO JANUARY 28). THE FULL CALENDAR WAS FORMALLY ADOPTED BY THE DECEMBER 20 PLENARY. COMMENT: USDEL BELIEVES THAT 1986 CALENDAR ADOPTED FULLY PROTECTS OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF A COMPLETE SCHEDULE, A CLEAR ADJOURNMENT DATE, AND NO OVERLAP WITH THE VIENNA PREPCON ON MAIN MEETINGS. WHILE FRENCH TACTICS WERE POTENTIALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, THE ALLIANCE WAS FORTUNATE IN THAT THIS TIME, AT LEAST, THEY COST US NO SUBSTANTIVE PRICE. END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09680
SUBJECT: CDE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986
1. CDE VIII - 81
2. C- ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DECISION OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986. THIS DECISION HAS BEEN APPROVED BY NATO AND THE NNA. THE EAST BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IT, BUT THE SOVIETS NEED TO GET SPECIFIC APPROVAL FROM MOSCOW. FINAL AGREEMENT IS EXPECTED MIDDAY TOMORROW (12/19), IN WHICH CASE THE DECISION WILL BE ADOPTED BY THE PLENARY FRIDAY (12/20).
4. BEGIN TEXT: COMPLETE WORK PROGRAMME FOR 1986, INCLUDING THE ADJOURNMENT DATE
THE COMPLETE WORK PROGRAMME FOR 1986 WILL COMPRISE FOUR SESSIONS.
IT IS AGREE THAT THE 19TH SEPTEMBER, THE LAST DAY OF THE FOURTH SESSION, WILL BE THE DATE ON WHICH THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WILL ADJOURN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID CONFERENCE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING.
THE WORK PROGRAMME FOR 1986 MAY BE MODIFIED BY CONSENSUS.
ANNEX:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FIRST SESSION: | JANUARY 28 | TO | MARCH 14 | 7 WEEKS |
| SECOND SESSION: | APRIL 15 | TO | MAY 23 | 6 WEEKS |
| THIRD SESSION: | JUNE 10 | TO | JULY 18 | 6 WEEKS |
| FOURTH SESSION: | AUGUST 19 | TO | SEPT 19 | 5 WEEKS |
| --- | | TOTAL | 24 WORKING | WEEKS |

END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09770
SUBJECT: EIGHTH SESSION, TWO YEARS OF CDE
1. CDE VIII - 090.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: THE END OF THE EIGHTH SESSION OF CDE ALSO MARKED TWO YEARS OF PREPARATORY NEGOTIATION IN WHICH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND POSITIONS HAVE BEEN REPETITIVELY AIRED. TO THE CASUAL OBSERVER IT COULD APPEAR THAT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE FEW MAJOR CONCESSIONS, IT IS EQUALLY TRUE THAT THEIR POSITION IN THIS MULTI-LATERAL FORUM DOES NOT ENJOY MUCH CREDIBILITY, EVEN AMONG OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT. THE OUTLINES OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN TERMS OF A FINAL AGREEMENT HAVE EMERGED THIS SESSION IN CLEARER THAN EVER TERMS. WHILE THE SOVIET POSITION ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES DOES NOT ENJOY GREAT CREDIBILITY OR SUPPORT IN THE CONFERENCE, IT WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE DISCOMFORT AMONG SOME PARTICIPANTS. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR POSITION IS AN ISOLATED ONE WHICH THE CONFERENCE IN GENERAL ACKNOWLEDGES WILL REMAIN ISOLATED AND THEREFORE UNTENABLE. WITH THE ADVENT OF THE EXPANDED AND MORE DETAILED NNA PROPOSAL, IT HAS BECOME MORE EVIDENT THAT MOST WESTERN CONCEPTS HAVE WON GENERAL APPROBATION. ALTHOUGH MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE, THERE SEEMS TO BE GROWING SUPPORT FOR SOME FORM OF INSPECTION. THE TWO AREAS WHERE WE APPEAR TO BE MOST AT ODDS WITH THE SENSE OF THE CONFERENCE ARE 1) THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF GROUND FORCES AND LAND-BASED AIR FORCES AS A SEPARATE MEASURE DISTINCT FROM OTHER NOTIFICATION MEASURES AND 2) CONSTRAINTS. WHILE WE ANTICIPATE PRESSURE TO PRESENT IN WRITTEN FORM A WESTERN POSITION ON THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE, THE CONFERENCE HAS MOVED SUBSTANTIVELY TOWARD THE MINIMALIST POSITION WE ADVOCATE. WESTERN COHESION AND PERFORMANCE IN THE WORKING GROUPS HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE IN PREPAR TION FOR THE INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS EXPECTED IN THE COMING YEAR. MAJOR PROCEDURE PROBLEMS HAVE FOUND ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION; NNA COORDINATORS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED AND THE WORK CALENDAR FOR 1986 HAS BEEN ADOPTED COMPLETE WITH A COMMITMENT TO ADJOURN THE THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
- -- ALTHOUGH LITTLE OPTIMISM REMAINS THAT A SEPARATE MEASURE ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WILL WIN CONSENSUS IN A FINAL DOCUMENT, THE CONFERENCE APPEARS TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROVISION OF DETAILED INFORMATION MUST BE AN INTEGRAL ASPECT OF ANY CSBMS REGIME.
- -- THE CONFERENCE HAS ACCEPTED AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS OR FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES IN





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THE FORMAT OF AN ANNUAL CALENDAR.

- -- ALTHOUGH IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PUSH THROUGH THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT EXACTLY AS IT APPEARS IN THE WESTERN PACKAGE, THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE BASIC CONCEPT CAN WIN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT THROUGH DEFINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE AWAY FROM NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS IN THE ZONE. THE SOVIETS, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS SESSION THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO NOTIFY ALL EXERCISE ACTIVITIES WHICH EXCEED AN AGREED THRESHOLD.
- -- A COMBINATION THRESHOLD STRESSING STRUCTURE BUT INCLUDING NUMERICAL TOTALS FOR EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS SEEMS TO BE WITHIN REACH, ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL SOME CONFUSION ABOUT WHICH ELEMENT OF ELEMENTS OF A COMBINED THRESHOLD WOULD ACTUALLY TRIGGER A NOTIFICATION AND THUS BE THE ELEMENT WHICH WOULD BE THE BASIS OF THE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION TASK.
- -- THE SOVIETS HAVE INFORMED THE USDEL BILATERALLY THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT A SEPARATE THRESHOLD FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. THIS WOULD SEEM TO PREPARE THE WAY PROGRESS IN THIS AREA, BUT THIS ISSUE IS STILL CLOUDED BY THE ISSUE OF NOTIFYING NAVAL ACTIVITIES (SEE BELOW).
- -- MUCH COMMON GROUND EXISTS IN THE CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF INVITING OBSERVERS TO NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITES. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SLOW IN ACKNOWLEDGING THE REQUIREMENT TO INVITE ALL OBSERVERS AND THE NNA (AS WELL AS SOME ALLIES) IMPART MORE VERIFICATION POTENTIAL TO OBSERVATION THAN WE WOULD WISH.
- -- WITH REGARD TO VERIFICATION, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO VERBALLY EXPRESS THEIR REJECTION OF ON-SITE INSPECTION. YET, OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT CAMP ARE FAR LESS CATEGORICAL. THIS SESSION DID NOT SEE AS MUCH DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN THE WORKING GROUPS AS WE MIGHT HAVE WISHED. SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS TO DENEGRATE THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INDEPENDENT INFORMATION EXCHANGE ENGENDERED A GREATER EMPHASIS BY THE WEST ON MEASURE ONE. NEVERTHELESS, THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ISSUE HAS BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE NNA COUPLED WITH CONSISTENT WESTERN INSISTANCE THAT ON-SITE INSPECTION MUST BE PART OF A FINAL OUTCOME GIVES RISE TO CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. THE EIGHTH SESSION SAW REMARKABLE LITTLE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE PLACE OF NTM IN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS, DESPITE SOVIET EFFORTS TO ASSIGN THEM A MAJOR ROLE.
- -- AS USUAL, THE ROMANIANS HAVE BEEN THE CONSTANT CHAMPION OF COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION. THE NNA HAVE HARDLY MENTIONED THIS ASPECT OF SC-7 AND THE WEST HAS SUCCESSFULLY SKIRTED EVEN DISCUSSING ITS OWN IDEAS FOR DEDICATED COMMUNICATION LINKS TO BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH CSBMS IMPLEMENTATION. THE U.S. AND FRANCE



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HAVE BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT IN KEEPING THIS QUESTION OFF THE DISCUSSION AGENDA. IT HAS BEEN INFREQUENTLY RAISED BY THE SOVIETS AND THEIR CLOSEST FRIENDS, BUT INDICATIONS REMAIN THAT THE PACT SEES CONSULTATIONS AS A PRELUDE TO ANY POSSIBLE INSPECTIONS.

- -- ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT OUT OF THE WOODS, THE WEST MAY HAVE HAD ITS GREATEST SUCCESS STORY IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE. WITH THE USDEL PLAYING A STRONG ROLE AMONG THE ALLIES AND TAKING A SOMEWHAT LOWER PROFILE IN THE ACTUAL WORKING GROUP, EVEN THE "WETS" HAVE BEEN TOUGH IN ADHERRING TO COORDINATED POSITIONS. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN UNIMAGINATIVE AND INEFFECTIVE IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PRY A NUF TEXT FROM THE WESTERN GROUP. AT THE SAME TIME, THE WORKING GROUP HAS VIRTUALLY IGNORED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, SC-6. AND, DESPITE UNHELPFUL UTTERANCES BY THE CYPRIOT, THE SOVIETS GENERALLY EVALUATE THE NNA POSITION AS BEING CLOSER TO THE WEST AND, NOT WISHING TO ALIENTATE THE NNA, HAVE BEEN AT A LOSS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE NUF LANGUAGE IN SC-7.
- -- DESPITE THE CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN SC-7, NOT EVEN THE EAST HAS BEEN QUICK TO SING ITS VIRTUES. AMONG THE NNA, YUGOSLAVIA REMAINS MOST ADAMANT THAT REAL LIMITATIONS OR CEILINGS MUST BE AGREED WITH A CORRESPONDING REJECTION OF WESTERN INSISTENCE THAT THE ANNUAL FORECAST WILL HAVE A CONSTRAINING EFFECT. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS THE YUGOSLAVIAN WHO SLYLY SUGGESTED THAT THE ANNUAL CALENDAR COULD SERVE AS A CONSTRAINT IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY (CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF SC-1'S MEASURE TWO) THAT AN UNLIMITED NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES NOT ANNOUNCED ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR COULD BE HELD AT SHORT NOTICE.

5. DESPITE DISPARATE INDICATIONS DURING THIS SESSION THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BACK AWAY FROM THEIR UNTENABLE POSITION ON THE NOTIFICATIONS OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, GENERAL TATARNIKOV SEEMED DETERMINED TO MAKE THIS THE ISSUE UPON WHICH PROGRESS DEPENDED IN EACH OF THE WORKING GROUP SESSIONS. THUS, IT MATTERED LITTLE WHICH OF THE WESTERN CSBMS PROPOSALS THE DISCUSSION FOCUSSED UPON, TARTARNIKOV FOUND A WAY TO INJECT NAVAL AND AIR. HIS INSISTENCE THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN BOTH EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE MUST BE COVERED SEEMED TO INTENSIFY TOWARD THE END OF THE SESSION. SOME CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS SAW SOVIET FOCUS ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AS AN INDICATION OF A WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE, AND EVENTUALLY ADOPT, THE WESTERN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. USDEL, HOWEVER, EXPOSED THE SOVIET TACTIC AS AN ATTEMPT TO TURN THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH INTO A RUBBER BAND SO EXPANDABLE THAT IT COULD BE USED TO JUSTIFY ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUDING INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITES IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME



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THEREBY DESTROYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.
6. ALTHOUGH GENERAL TATARNIKOV OCCUPIES A PREDOMINANT POSITION IN THE EASTERN GROUP, THERE APPEARS TO BE DIFFERENT NUANCES IN THE EASTERN POSITION. ROZANOV, WHO HAD BEEN ASSUMED TO BE THE NOMINAL DEPUTY, HAS FREQUENTLY APPEARED MORE CONCILIATORY IN PUBLIC AND GENTLY CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY IN PRIVATE. HE HAS APPEALED TO USDEL FOR A GREATER ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY THE "POLITIKI" (POLITICAL DELEGATES) BECAUSE THEY ARE MORE SKILLED IN THE ART OF COMPROMISE. OTHER KEY EASTERN PLAYERS (IF THERE ARE ANY), E.G. KONARSKY OF POLAND AND BUEHRING OF THE GDR, ARE ALMOST FRANK IN EXPRESSING THEIR THEIR UNDERSTANDING IN PRIVATE THAT THE MANDATE EXCLUDES INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. THEY URGE GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS AND POLITICAL PRESTIGE AND CALL FOR WESTERN COMPROMISES ON OTHER ISSUES.
NATO
7. AT THE END OF THE EIGHTH SESSION, MEMBERS OF THE NATO CAUCUS CAN STILL BE CATEGORIZED ALONG FAMILIAR LINES. THE "WETS" ARE EAGER TO ACCEPT ANYTHING THAT GIVES THE ALLUSION OF PROGRESS, OFTEN WITHOUT DUE RECOGNITION TO THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES. THIS TAXES OUR PATIENCE AND DIDACTIC SKILLS AS WE MUST REPEATEDLY ADD A LITTLE STARCH WHILE ASSISTING IN DRYING OUT THE WETS. NEVERTHELESS, NORMAL CAUCUS DIVISIONS --EASILY OBSERVABLE IN THE DREARY AND OFTEN JUVENILE DEBATES OF THE NATO CAUCUS-- HAVE NOT SURFACED IN THE PUBLIC SESSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE. APART FROM THE PECULIARTIES OF THE FRENCH, WHO DO NOT BELONG TO THE "WET" CAMP, THERE HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY FEW PUBLIC DEVIATIONS FROM COMMON POSITIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS.
8. ONE OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THIS SESSION THEREFORE HAS BEEN A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE WAY THE ALLIES HAVE COORDINATED THEIR EFFORTS AND STRENGTHENED THEIR INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCES IN THE WORKING GROUPS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE VOLATILE FRENCH MILITARY REP, WESTERN EXPERTS HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE REQUIREMENT FOR UNIFIED TACTICS IN ARGUING A UNIFIED POSITION ON SUBSTANIVE POINTS. JCS REPS HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN MANAGING THE MORE ADVENTURESOME AMONG THE MILITARY GROUP. WHILE SUCH ALLIES HAVE BEEN KEPT ON A SHORT LEASH IN PUBLIC, THERE STILL REMAIN SOME BASIC DIFFERENCES ON SUBSTANCE WHICH WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED ATTENTION. THE ITALIANS AND THE FRENCH MILREP, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE UNCONVINCED ABOUT THE TACTICAL WISDOM OF NATO'S SUBSTANTIVE POSITION ON THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION TO BE SUPPLIED ON NAVAL AND AIR ELEMENTS NOTIFIED AS PART OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND THEY URGE GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON WHAT IS TO BE OBSERVED. THE NETHERLANDS, IN PARTICULAR, IS CONVINCED THAT THE WEST WILL HAVE TO



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BE IN A POSITION TO ACCEPT SOME LIMITATIONS MEASURE; WE EXPECT THEM TO PUSH THIS VIEW AMONG OTHER LIKE-MINDED AND AT EVERE. AND, NOT SUPRISINGLY, SEVERAL ALLIES ARE MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE ON THE NUF ISSUE THAN WE THINK NECESSARY OR ADVISABLE AT THIS POINT.

OTHER ISSUES

9. 1986 WORK PROGRAM: WHILE THE EXPERTS WERE TOTALLY OCCUPIED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONFERENCE, MUCH OF THE AMBASSADORS' TIME WAS OCCUPIED WITH PROCEDURAL ISSUES. FOR MOST OF THE SESSION, THE ALLIANCE WRESTLED WITH THE 1986 CDE CALENDAR ISSUE WITH A POSITIVE SOLUTION BEING ACHIEVED IN THE WANING MOMENTS. FOR WELL OVER A MONTH, THE FRENCH BLOCKED ANY NATO CALENDAR PROPOSAL WHILE TOUTING THEIR POSITION, PUBLICALLY ANNOUNCED BY MITTERAND, THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST ADJOURN BY JULY 18, 1986. USDEL SUPPORTED THIS POSITION AS LONG AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN CAUCUS AGREEMENT TO AN ABSOLUTE ADJOURNMENT BEFORE THE PREPCON FOR THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. ONLY IN THE FINAL WEEK DID THE FRENCH FINALLY COME AROUND AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A COMMON ALLIED COMMITMENT TO A COMPLETE CALENDAR FOR 1986 WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A DATE FOR ADJOURNING THE CONFERENCE. AFTER INITIAL HESITATION BY THE USSR AND MALTA, WHO OPTED FOR AN ESSENTIALLY OPEN-ENDED 1986 CALENDAR, THE FINAL PLENARY OF THE YEAR ADOPTED A WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986 WHICH PROVIDES FOR FOUR SESSIONS AND SETS SEP 19, AS THE FINAL DAY OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CDE FOR 1986.

10. COORDINATORS: AS THE EXPLORATORY PHASE OF INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS --WHOSE CHAIRMANSHIP WAS ROTATED AMONG ALL DELEGATIONS-- PROCEEDED, CONFERENCE SUPPORT GREW FOR INSTALLING NNA COORDINATORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL CSCE PRACTICE. AT U.S. PROMPTING, THE NATO GROUP PROPOSED THAT ONLY TWO COORDINATORS (ONE EACH FOR WORKING GROUP-A AND WORKING GROUP-B) BE AGREED INITIALLY. THE NNA REJECTED THIS APPROACH AS WELL AS A SUBSEQUENT SUGGESTION THAT THE TWO COORDINATORS MIGHT BE SUPPLEMENTED BY FIVE ADDITIONAL ASSISTANTS. THE NNA COUNTER PROPOSAL TOOK THE STARCH OUT OF WESTERN ARGUMENTS FOR ONLY TWO COORDINATORS WHEN THEY SUGGESTED THAT SWITZERLAND PROVIDE COORDINATORS FOR TWO OF THE SUB-GROUPS ESTABLISHED BY A 14 OCTOBER "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT", ONE DEALING WITH INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/ COMMUNICATION AND THE OTHER WITH ANNUAL FORECASTS AND OTHER CONSTRAINING MEASURES. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR WOULD COORDINATE THE NOTIFICATION GROUP, THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR THE OBSERVATION GROUP, AND THE AUSTRIAN THE GROUP DEALING WITH NUF. AFTER DETERMINING THAT 1) THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH DRAFTING, 2) THAT SC-7 WOULD NOT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS, 3) THAT ENGLISH WOULD BE THE



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LANGUAGE USED WHEN DRAFTING BEGINS AND 4) THAT NO ONE INDIVIDUAL WOULD COORDINATE MORE THAN ONE GROUP, THE NNA PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTED. DURING THE ONE WEEK IN WHICH THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED, NNA COORDINATORS PLAYED A GENERALLY MODEST ROLE WITH PROCEEDINGS HARDLY DIFFERENT THAN UNDER A ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP.

11. DRAFTING: THE CONFERENCE IS POISED FOR DRAFTING. COORDINATORS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED, INFORMAL MECHANISMS ARE IN PLACE AND THE LINES HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY DRAWN DEFINING THE SUBSTANCE ON WHICH DRAFTING WILL OCCUR. HOWEVER, THE SNAIL'S PACE OF THE CONFERENCE COUPLED WITH THE PECULIARITIES OF "DRAFTING" IN CSCE MIGHT MEAN THAT WEEKS COULD GO BY BEFORE ANY TEXT ACTUALLY BEGINS TO TAKE SHAPE. NEVERTHELESS, DRAFTING (HOWEVER IT IS DEFINED) IS THE NEXT STEP OF THE CONFERENCE AND ITS FURTHER POSTPONEMENT CAN NO LONGER BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION.

12. RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION: MOSCOW SUPPLIED INTERPRETERS IN THE LANGUAGE BOOTH HAVE CONTINUED TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAN TO THOSE OF THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT. DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE SESSION THIS PRACTICE BECAME A CONFERENCE ISSUE AS THEY INSISTED ON USING THE RUSSIAN WORD FOR "LIMITATIONS" WHEN INTERPRETING THE ENGLISH WORD "CONSTRAINTS". DESPITE USDEL EFFORTS TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO WHAT WE CONSIDER A SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS TO DATE BEEN RELUCTANT TO COOPERATE WITH EITHER THE USDEL OR THE SECRETARIAT. WE NOTE THAT THE INTERPRETATION/TRANSLATION PROBLEM CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AND WILL IN THE FUTURE REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT EXPERTISE AND CONSTANT VIGILANCE TO PROTECT WESTERN SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS.

HANSEN

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